CHARLES JACKSON, )
)
Petitioners/Appellant, )
) Davidson Chancery
) No. 95-1889-I
VS. )
) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9606-CH-00276
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF )
AMERICA, et al., )
Respondent/Appellant.
)
)
FILED
March 12, 1997
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE Cecil W. Crowson
MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE Appellate Court Clerk
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
HONORABLE IRVING KILCREASE, CHANCELLOR
TOM ANDERSON #7104
Frankie K. Stanfill #016518
P.O. Box 483
Lexington, TN 38251
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS/APPELLEES
CHARLES JACKSON #202911
W.T.H.S.F., Route 2
Green Chapel Road
Henning, TN 38041
PRO SE/PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
REVERSED, VACATED AND REMANDED
HENRY F. TODD
PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
CONCUR:
SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
CHARLES JACKSON, )
)
Petitioners/Appellant, )
) Davidson Chancery
) No. 95-1889-I
VS. )
) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9606-CH-00276
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF )
AMERICA, et al., )
)
Respondent/Appellant. )
OPINION
The captioned plaintiff has appealed from an order of the Trial Court dismissing his
“Petition for Certiorari pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-8-101" seeking relief from disciplinary action
of the captioned defendants who are employees of Correction Corporation of America, a private
prison contractor. The petition alleges that the disciplinary action (not specified), was taken
violated T.C.A. § 41-24-110 which states:
“POWER AND DUTIES NOT DELEGABLE TO CONTRACTOR”
No contract for correctional services SHALL authorize, allow
or imply a delegation of the authority or responsibility of the
Commissioner to a prison contractor for any of the following:
(5) Granting, denying or revoking sentence credits; placing
an inmate under less restrictive custody or more restrictive
custody; or taking any disciplinary actions.
On August 7, 1995, the defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to T.R.C.P. Rule 12.02(6)
for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The motion refers to a Memorandum
of Law which is not included in the record on appeal.
On August 10, 1995, at 8:52 a.m. the plaintiff filed a “:Reply to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss which stated:
It must be note (sic) that the disciplinary hearing summary
of evidence forms, CR-1834, clear DO NOT bare (sic) the
signature of the TDOC Liaison, but do in fact bare (sic) the
CCA employees, indicating (1) evidence that was presented
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before them (2) findings of facts relied on by the CCA
employees & (3) the disposition and statements as to why the
CCA employees made a specific decision as to taking a
specific disciplinary action, and then signed by the named
CCA employees.
The reply does not state that the document mentioned therein is exhibited to the reply,
but three documents entitled “CR 1834" were filed by the Trial Clerk on August 10, 1995, at
8:52 a.m. and bound in the Technical Record following the reply. The documents are entitled
“Disciplinary Report Hearing Summary.” Script entries under the heading “Finding of Fact” and
“Disposition” are illegible. There is no notation in the blanks provided for:
Recommendation of Loss of:
1. Good/Honor Time, Good Condict (sic)
Sentence Credit (Amount)
2. Incentive/Times PPSC (Amount)
3. Other (Specify) (Amount)
On November 27, 1995, the Trial Clerk filed an order sustaining the motion and
dismissing the suit, but the order hears no certificate of service upon the plaintiff. Therefore, the
order did not effectively dispose of the case. T.R.C.P. Rule 58.
On January 18, 1996, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and a “Petition and Motion for
Delayed Appeal” asserting that plaintiff did not receive a copy of the order of dismissal until
January 11, 1996.
On February 16, 1996, the Trial Judge vacated the November 27, 1995 dismissal; and on
February 20, 1996, entered a further order stating:
After a careful review of the record, the Court finds that
the defendants have not violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-24-
110. Tennessee Department of Correction Policy no.
9502.01 VI (D)(2), provides the following:
The commissioner’s designee shall observe all class A and
B disciplinary hearings and approve or modify all
recommendation of the disciplinary board at the time of the
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hearing. In case of Class C infractions where punitive
segregation is recommended, the Commissioner’s designee
must approve/modify the recommendations as soon as
possible and prior to the inmate’s placement in segregation.
If the Commissioner’s designee is not present at a Class C
hearing at which the Board recommends any punishment
other than a verbal warning, the chairperson shall
forward all documentation to the commissioner’s designee
for review prior to punishment.
It is clear from the record in this case that the
Disciplinary Board at SCCC only recommended a finding
of guilt and possible punishment to the Tennessee
Department of Correction liaison, Mr. Overbey. Mr.
Overbey approved the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation
in accordance with policy no. 9502.01. Policy no. 9502.01
clearly does not delegate by contract the authority to take
disciplinary action. The disciplinary action and involuntary
segregation sentencing were adjudicated in compliance with
Tenn. Code Ann. §41-24-110. Hence, the petitioner’s claim
is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the respondent’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted. State
Litigation costs are assessed against the petitioner. All
other costs are waived.
This order bears a certificate of service upon the plaintiff.
Plaintiff presents for review the following issues:
Did the Chancery Court err in dismissal of writ
certiorari, in holding that T.C.A. § 41-24-110(5), of that
prohibit private prison contractors from taking disciplinary
actions against inmates, was not violated by appellees who
are in fact private prison contractors?
It appears from the judgment of the Trial Court that, in ruling upon the motion to dismiss,
the Trial Court considered evidence of facts. Other than the documents filed contemporaneously
with the reply of plaintiff to the motion, no evidence is cited or found to support the above
findings of the Trial Court.
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A complaint seeking the writ of certiorari must state factual grounds to support the
issuance of the writ. Mere use of the general words of the statute is insufficient. Buel Gray
Motors Inc. V. Fanburgs’ Garage, 202 Tenn. 648, 308 S.W.2d 410 (1957).
The complaint states only:
On May 11, 1995, and May 15, 1995, I was taken before
The CCA/SCCF’s Disciplinary Board, that was made up of
the defendants names within this pleading [Rusty Harville;
Paula El-Didi; Roy Hughes; & Rudy Whitson].
These employees of C.C.A. on May 11, 1995, and May
15, 1995, illegally acted as a tribunal/triers of the facts and
took disciplinary action against petitioner requiring
petitioner to serve punitive segregation time.
The issue of whether the actions of a private corporation having custody of state prisoners
are subject to review by certiorari is not presented, and this Court expresses no views thereon.
The judgment under review is a summary judgment based upon facts not supported by
evidence in this record.
The judgment of the Trial Court is reversed and vacated and cause is remanded to the
Trial Court for further proceedings. Costs of appeal are assessed against the defendants.
REVERSED, VACATED AND REMANDED
_______________________________________
HENRY F. TODD
PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
CONCUR:
_____________________________________
SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
_____________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
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