FRANK BELL, )
)
Petitioner/Appellant, ) Appeal No.
) 01-A-01-9506-CH-00273
v. )
) Davidson Chancery
CHRISTINE BRADLEY, et al, ) No. 94-2561-III
)
Respondents/Appellees. )
FILED
Sept. 27, 1995
COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE Appellate Court Clerk
APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. BRANDT, CHANCELLOR
FRANK BELL
R.M.S.I./U-5-B-101
7475 Cockrill Bend Industrial Road
Nashville, Tennessee 37243
PRO SE PETITIONER/APPELLANT
CHARLES W. BURSON
Attorney General and Reporter
JOHN R. MILES
404 James Robertson Parkway
Suite 2000, Parkway Towers
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
This is an appeal by petitioner, Frank Bell, from the
chancellor's judgment dismissing Mr. Bell's petition for writ of
certiorari. The chancellor dismissed the petition on the ground
that it "was not timely filed."
The record does show that petitioner filed the petition
within sixty (60) days of the final disposition of petitioner's
disciplinary appeal. On appeal, respondents admit that the
petition was timely filed, but insist the chancellor's judgment
should be affirmed on the ground that the petition does not state
a cause of action. Respondents contend that it would be futile to
reverse the order of the chancery court because the petition fails
to state a ground upon which the chancellor could grant relief.
"Where the lower Court decides a case correctly, but upon
an erroneous ground, [this] court will affirm the decree basing its
decision upon what it conceives to be the correct theory." Hamby
v. Fouche, 15 Tenn. App. 248, 251 (1932).
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that "[c]ommon law
certiorari is available where the court reviews an administrative
decision in which that agency is acting in a judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity." Davison v. Carr, 659 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn.
1983). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-101 provides:
The writ of certiorari may be granted whenever
authorized by law, and also in all cases where an
inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising
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Court of Appeals Rule 10(b):
The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the
case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court
by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no
precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion
it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be
published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a
subsequent unrelated case.
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judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction
conferred, or is acting illegally, when, in the
judgment of the court, there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy. This section does not
apply to actions governed by the Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 (Supp. 1994).
The scope of review under common law writ of certiorari is
limited to the record to determine, as a matter of law, whether
there is any material evidence to support the agency's finding.
Davison, 659 S.W.2d at 363. In order for petitioner's common law
writ of certiorari to properly arrive within the jurisdiction of
the chancery court, it must allege facts which would show that the
disciplinary board acted outside its jurisdiction, illegally,
arbitrarily, or fraudulently. See Tomlinson v. Board of
Equalization, 88 Tenn. 1, 6-7, 12 S.W. 414 (1889); Spunt v.
Fowinkle, 572 S.W.2d 259, 265 (Tenn. App. 1978).
The petition alleged that the disciplinary board erred
because it did not find petitioner innocent of disciplinary reports
which were issued to the board. Even if that allegation is true,
it does not establish that the disciplinary board acted illegally,
arbitrarily, fraudulently, or in excess of its jurisdiction in
finding petitioner guilty of the charges in each of the matters.
Here, petitioner is questioning the correctness of the disciplinary
board's decision and the internal policies of the Tennessee
Department of Correction.
The correctness of the application of a principle of law by
the Board of Claims is not reviewable by certiorari. Henry v.
Board of Claims, 638 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tenn. App. 1982).
"[C]ourts do not have jurisdiction to review
decisions of [Boards] as to whether there is
material evidence to support the findings of the
Board."...The trial court cannot review the
intrinsic correctness of the Board's decision. To
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do so would be to exceed the power and jurisdiction
of the trial court under the common law writ of
certiorari.
Larue v. Bell, No. 01-A-01-9403-CH00328, 1994 WL 462221, at *2
(Tenn. App. at Nashville 26 Aug. 1994)(quoting Murry v. Tennessee
Bd. of Paroles, No. 88-288-II, 1989 WL 14221, at *2 (Tenn. App. at
Nashville 22 Feb. 1989)(citations omitted)).
Here, the correctness of the disciplinary board's
application of the internal policies of the Department of
Correction is not reviewable by common law writ of certiorari. The
chancery court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the review requested
by petitioner, and the chancellor should have dismissed the
petition for this reason.
For the reasons set forth, the decision of the chancery
court is affirmed, and the costs are taxed to the petitioner. The
cause is remanded to the chancery court for any further necessary
proceedings.
__________________________________
SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_________________________________
HENRY F. TODD, P.J., M.S.
_________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
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