IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
April 17, 1997
GREGORY TURNER, )
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate C ourt Clerk
Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9701-CC-00025
)
vs. ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY
)
JIMMY HARRISON, WARDEN, ) No. 4869
)
Respondent. )
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the
judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The
case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the
petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on January 17,
1997, and the petitioner's brief was filed on February 18, 1997. The petitioner was
originally indicted on one count of aggravated rape in January 1994, and was
subsequently convicted of the same. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in
part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment
failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.
Having reviewed the state’s motion in light of the petitioner’s response
and the entire record on appeal, we conclude that the motion is well-taken and should
be granted. The trial judge dismissed the petition stating, in effect, that this is not an
appropriate matter for habeas corpus relief. It is well established that challenges to the
sufficiency of an indictment cannot be tested in a habeas corpus proceeding. See
Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Brown v. State, 445
S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). A panel of this Court recently held the same
in a capital case. Barber v. State, No. 01C01-9408-CR-00281 (Tenn. Crim. App., Feb.
23, 1995).
Nonetheless, we have considered the substance of the petitioner’s claim
and determine it to be without merit. Aggravated rape is defined as the “unlawful sexual
penetration of a victim by the defendant” accompanied by certain enumerated
aggravating circumstances, including that the “defendant causes bodily injury to the
victim.” T.C.A. § 39-13-502 (1996 supp.).
The indictment at issue before us charged that the petitioner did
“unlawfully sexually penetrate and cause bodily injury to [the victim], in violation of
T.C.A. 39-13-502.” We find that the indictment at issue here sufficiently apprised the
petitioner of the offenses charged, and is therefore valid.
A valid indictment in this state must contain the elements constituting the
offense and must sufficiently apprise the accused of the offense he is called upon to
defend. State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). When the
legislature neglects, however, to include the requisite mental state in the definition of an
offense, permitting the application of any one of the three mental states set forth in
T.C.A. § 39-11-301(c), an allegation of criminal conduct will provide the accused
constitutionally adequate notice of the facts constituting the offense. State v. Dison,
No. 03C01-9602-CC-00051 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jan. 31, 1997). The accused’s culpable
mental state, therefore, is not an essential element of the offense. Id. Consequently,
the failure to allege a culpable mental state in this case did not invalidate the
indictment.
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED, pursuant to Rule
20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the judgment of the trial court
dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall
be assessed against the petitioner.
Enter, this the ___ day of April, 1997.
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__________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
__________________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
__________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
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