IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY 1999 SESSION
FILED
April 1, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
Appellee, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9803-CC-00085
)
) Fayette County
V. )
) Honorable Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge
)
FLOYD LEE WILLIAMSON, ) (Possession of Schedule VI with Intent to
) Deliver, Possession of Firearm with Intent to
Appellant ) Go Armed, Possession of Schedule II with
) Intent to Deliver, Evading Arrest)
)
)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
ANDREW S. JOHNSTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
108 E. Court Square Attorney General & Reporter
Somerville, TN 38068
ELIZABETH T. RYAN
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
ELIZABETH T. RICE
District Attorney General
302 Market Street
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
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OPINION
The defendant, Floyd Lee Williamson, appeals on a certified question of
law. The defendant moved to suppress evidence found in a vehicle that he was
operating. After the Circuit Court of Fayette County denied the motion, the
defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a schedule VI substance with intent to
deliver, possession of a schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver,
possession of a firearm with intent to go armed, and evading arrest. The
defendant appeals the trial court’s ruling and argues that the initial stop of the
vehicle was not a legitimate investigatory stop. We AFFIRM the trial court’s
decision.
BACKGROUND
Fayette County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Ricky Wilson responded to a
suspicious vehicle report and located a large vehicle proceeding slowly on a
roadway approximately one-half mile from the reported area. Wilson testified
that the area of the report was part of his patrol territory. He further testified as
to his experience with numerous incidents of burglaries, auto thefts, drug
trafficking offenses, and other crimes occurring in that locality. Wilson noted that
the vehicle had Madison County license tags and was proceeding at
approximately thirty miles an hour in a fifty-five miles per hour zone.
Wilson followed the vehicle for approximately two miles and observed it
on two or three occasions drift back and forth within its lane. The vehicle also
crossed the marked center line of the roadway at least once. Wilson suspected
that the driver was intoxicated. He stopped the vehicle and conversed with the
driver, the defendant. Deputy Freeman, also of the Fayette County Sheriff’s
Department, conversed with the passenger. The defendant stated that he and
the passenger were en route to Mississippi to visit the passenger’s girlfriend.
The passenger advised Freeman that they were en route to visit a male friend.
The deputies compared these conversations and noted the conflicting
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statements. Both the defendant and the passenger consented when the
deputies requested permission to search the vehicle. Wilson stayed with the two
subjects, and Freeman searched the vehicle. Freeman returned and advised
Wilson to place the two subjects on the hood of the car. The defendant
immediately fled on foot and was not located until after Freeman obtained a
warrant for that subject’s arrest.
In the vehicle, Freeman had found a bag containing a handgun,
approximately one hundred rocks of suspected crack cocaine, and thirteen bags
of suspected marijuana. Freeman obtained the warrant for the defendant’s
arrest. Neither Freeman nor the defendant testified at the hearing.
The defendant’s passenger, who actually owned the vehicle, testified at
the hearing and denied that the vehicle swerved while the deputy followed the
car. He also testified that, in the area “right before” the stop, the speed limit was
forty miles per hour and that the defendant was driving at approximately thirty-
five to forty miles per hour in that zone.
After the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence,
the defendant apparently pleaded guilty to the enumerated charges and
reserved his appeal on a certified question of law.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s determination at a suppression hearing “is presumptively
correct on appeal.” State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994).
This Court upholds a trial court’s decision “unless the evidence in the record
preponderates against the finding.” State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299
(Tenn. 1998). “Questions of credibility of witnesses, the weight and value of the
evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the
trial judge as the trier of fact.” Id. “The party prevailing in the trial court is
1
The record submitted to this Court does not include the Judgment. We will assume that
the J udg me nt ref eren ces the O rder and t hus qualif ies th e plea as be ing co nting ent o n the appe al.
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entitled to the strongest view of the evidence, as well as all reasonable and
legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” Id. However, this
Court reviews de novo the application of law to those determined facts. State v.
Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).
ANALYSIS
The defendant presents his certified question under Tenn. R. Crim. P.
37(b)(2)(iv):
An appeal lies from any order or judgment in a criminal proceeding
where the law provides for such appeal, and from any judgment of
conviction: . . . (2) Upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere if: . . .
(iv) Defendant explicitly reserved with the consent of the court the
right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of the
case.
A defendant entering a guilty plea not subject to a plea agreement may reserve,
with the court’s permission, an appeal on a certified question of law. The
certified question must “clearly identify the scope and the limits of the legal issue
reserved.” State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988).
The certified question is dispositive: The trial court’s suppression of the
evidence would dispose of the state’s case. An issue is dispositive when the
appellate court must either affirm or reverse and dismiss. See State v. Wilkes,
684 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). An improper stop mandates
suppression of this evidence, and, on the record submitted to this Court, the
state’s case against the appellant as regards the controlled substances and the
handgun would necessarily fail.2 See State v. Dennis Keith and Timothy Collins,
No. 02S01-9604-CC-00035 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Sept. 28, 1998, at Jackson).
The certified question inquires whether “the Defendant was unlawfully
and unconstitutionally stopped as said stop was not a legitimate investigative
stop.” The defendant limits his complaint to the validity of the actual stop and
2
W e do not a ddress whethe r this ques tion is dispo sitive for the e vading a rrest cha rge.
Our ho lding rend ers the iss ue m oot.
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contests neither the subsequent detention nor the search.
An officer using his blue lights to stop a vehicle “seizes” that vehicle and
thereby invokes analysis of the reasonableness of the stop under the protection
granted by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State
v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30-31 (Tenn. 1993). However, “the reasonableness of
seizures less intrusive than a full-scale arrest is judged by weighing the gravity of
the public concern, the degree to which the seizure advances that concern, and
the severity of the intrusion into individual privacy.” Id. at 30.
In the instant case, the defendant challenges Wilson’s reasonable
suspicion for the investigatory stop. A suspicious vehicle complaint prompted
Wilson’s searching the area for that vehicle. On his locating a vehicle consistent
with the reported general description, he observed that vehicle proceeding at
little over one-half the posted speed limit. Such operation of the vehicle was “not
unlawful” but “qualified as unusual” and may legitimately be considered by a trier
of fact in its determining the reasonableness of a stop. State v. Greer, No.
01C01-9404-CR-00140 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed June 15, 1995, at Nashville).
Wilson also observed the vehicle weaving, once crossing over the marked center
line of the roadway. A driver’s weaving “more than twice,” even if his vehicle
remains in his lane of traffic, “lends credence to the potential for a drunk driver.”
State v. Jenkins, No. 01C01-9712-CR-00590 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed Dec. 21,
1998, at Nashville).
Wilson articulated the specific bases for his reasonable suspicion that the
driver was intoxicated. A trial court evaluating the validity of an officer’s
reasonable suspicion, and thus the validity of the initial interference with a
defendant’s liberty, “must consider the totality of the circumstances,” which
includes “the officer’s personal objective observations, . . . the pattern of
operation of certain offenders,” and “the rational inferences and deductions that
a trained officer may draw from the facts and circumstances known to him---
inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v.
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Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tenn. 1998).
The trial court resolved the conflict between Wilson’s testimony and the
passenger’s contradicting testimony in favor of the State’s case. Wilson
articulated specific facts for his reasonable suspicion and subsequent stop, and
the defendant’s appeal lacks the requisite preponderance of evidence for
overturning the trial court’s holding. This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the judgment below is AFFIRMED.
____________________________
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
_____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
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