IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JUNE 1997 SESSION FILED
October 1, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9701-CC-00043
Appellee, )
) Henry County
V. )
) Honorable Julian P. Guinn, Judge
)
MICHAEL RAY GRICE, ) (Possession of Controlled Substance)
)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Michael J. Flanagan John Knox Walkup
Dale M. Quillen Attorney General & Reporter
Attorneys at Law
95 White Bridge Road, #208 Deborah A. Tullis
Nashville, TN 37205 Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Robert “Gus” Radford
District Attorney General
Todd A. Rose
Assistant District Attorney General
P.O. Box 94
Paris, TN 38242
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Michael Ray Grice, was indicted for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell; unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia; and unlawful possession of a weapon. He
pled guilty to the indictment reserving the right to appeal as a certified question
of law the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. See Tenn. R. Crim. P.
37(b)(2). The appellant contends that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to
make an investigatory stop of his vehicle. He argues that evidence obtained as
a result of the search should be suppressed. Upon review, we affirm.
FACTS
On the night of the appellant's arrest, the Tennessee Highway Patrol and
Henry County Sheriff's Department were conducting a saturation project to deter
drunk driving. The saturation entailed making occasional drive-by inspections of
local taverns. Officers Robert Edwards and David Powell made such an
inspection of the Doll House Tavern in Paris, Tennessee, around 11:40 p.m. As
Officer Edwards entered the Doll House parking lot, he thought he saw the
appellant back into a parked vehicle. He pulled his patrol car up behind the
appellant's vehicle and got out to investigate. Officer Powell, who had heard
Edwards announce his intentions over the police radio, pulled into the parking lot
behind Edwards. Officer Edwards inspected the car that he thought the
appellant had hit. He concluded that he was mistaken. He then instructed the
appellant to wait while he went inside the tavern to make sure the appellant had
not committed any crime inside. As Officer Edwards headed inside, Officer
Powell approached the appellant. He noticed the appellant had an odor of
alcohol about his person. He also noticed that the appellant's eyes were
bloodshot and that he appeared nervous. The officer requested the appellant to
perform a series of field sobriety tests to determine if he was impaired. During
the administration of these tests, Officer Powell noticed a bulge in the upper right
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portion of the appellant's jacket. He asked the appellant for permission to search
his person and his vehicle. The appellant consented to the search. Officer
Powell patted the appellant down. He recovered a .35 caliber handgun and what
appeared to be a marijuana cigarette. Officer Powell placed the appellant under
arrest. The appellant's vehicle was searched. A large quantity of marijuana
wrapped in cellophane and a set of scales were seized.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to
suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle and person. He argues that the
initial stop was not based on reasonable suspicion and was illegal. We disagree.
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure"
within the meaning of the federal and state constitutions. State v. Binion, 900
S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Tennessee's Supreme Court set
forth the appropriate standard for determining the constitutionality of
investigatory stops of automobiles:
A police officer may make an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle
when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific
and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to
be committed. In determining whether a police officer's reasonable
suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts, a court
must consider the totality of the circumstances. This includes, but
is not limited to, objective observations, information obtained from
other police officers or agencies, information obtained from
citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offenders. A court
must also consider the rational inferences and deductions that a
trained police officer may draw from the facts and circumstances
known to him.
State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992).
In the instant case, Officer Edwards testified that he stopped the appellant
because he thought that he just witnessed the appellant back into a parked
vehicle. This, coupled with the lateness of the hour and the fact that the
appellant was leaving a tavern, gave Officer Edwards reasonable suspicion to
suspect that the appellant had just committed or was in the process of
committing an offense. Upon investigation he determined that no collision had
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occurred. Officer Edwards stated that he told the appellant to wait while he
established that the appellant had not committed a crime inside the tavern. At
this time, Officer Edwards did not have any lawful justification for further
detaining the appellant. Officer Edwards did not have reasonable suspicion to
suspect the appellant had committed a crime inside the tavern. Any evidence he
might have found inside the tavern would have been illegally obtained and
subject to suppression. However, as Officer Edwards left to go inside the tavern,
Officer Powell approached the appellant. He testified that upon exiting his patrol
car he went directly to question the appellant. At this point, not having conferred
with Officer Edwards, he was unsure of whether the appellant had or had not
committed any crime. Therefore, his initial questioning of the appellant was
supported by reasonable suspicion. Once in a lawful position to briefly detain the
appellant for questioning, he noticed signs of intoxication. He then had
reasonable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests on the appellant. During
the testing, the appellant consented to the search of his person and vehicle.
We find that, through a series of transactions, the appellant was stopped
and detained based upon reasonable suspicion. The conduct of Officer
Edwards, after determining that the appellant had not backed into a parked car,
was not unreasonable but exceeded constitutional parameters. However, we
find that each officer, based on the totality of the circumstances known to each
respective officer, had reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts to
detain the appellant. During this lawful detention, the appellant consented to the
search of his person and vehicle. The resulting search and seizure was,
therefore, constitutionally proper. The judgment of the trial court denying the
appellant's motion to suppress is affirmed.
__________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
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____________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, Judge
____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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