IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JUNE SESSION, 1997
WILLIE JACKSON, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9606-CR-00195
)
Appellant, )
)
) SHELBY COUNTY
FILED
VS. ) August 8, 1997
) HON. L. T. LAFFERTY
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
D. TYLER KELLY JOHN KNOX W ALKUP
P. O. Box 98 Attorney General and Reporter
Jackson, TN 38302
DEBORAH A. TULLIS
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243
JOHN W. PIEROTTI
District Attorney General
KAREN COOK
Assistant District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301
201 Poplar Street
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, W illie Jackson, appeals as of right pursuant to Rule 3 of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-
conviction relief on April 15, 1996. On April 21, 1996, the trial court dismissed the
petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, finding that it was barred by
the statute of limitations.1 W e affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On July 18, 1977, the Petitioner was convicted of bank robbery in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. He was
sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for that offense. He was paroled on
February 28, 1985, with eight thousand one hundred eighty-four days remaining
to be served on his federal sentence. On April 25, 1990, in Shelby County
Criminal Court, he was convicted upon guilty pleas of five counts of robbery with
a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to an effective term of twenty years
imprisonment with the Tennessee Department of Correction. On May 16, 1990,
a federal warrant was issued for the Petitioner on grounds that he had violated
a condition of his parole. His parole was revoked on June 21, 1995, and he was
returned to federal custody on July 20, 1995.
On April 15, 1996, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief
which is the subject of the case sub judice. In the petition, he argued that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea proceeding and that
1
See Tenn . Code A nn. § 40-30-20 6(b) (Supp. 199 6).
-2-
both the trial court and his counsel failed to inform him that his convictions could
later be used as a basis for enhancem ent. The trial court found that the petition
was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed it without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. It is from the trial court’s order of dismissal that the
Petitioner appeals.
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that
his petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations. At
the time the Petitioner’s convictions became final, the statute of limitations
applicable to post-conviction proceedings was three years. Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-30-102 (repealed 1995). The expiration of the three-year statute of limitations
in the Petitioner’s case occurred in 1993. As we stated above, the present
petition was not filed until April of 1996.
Of course, the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act governs this petition
and all petitions filed after May 10, 1995. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et
seq. (Supp. 1996). This Act provides, in pertinent part, that “notwithstanding any
other provision of this part to the contrary, any person having ground for relief
recognized under this part shall have at least one (1) year from May 10, 1995, to
file a petition or a motion to reopen a petition under this part.” Compiler’s Notes
to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 (Supp. 1996) (referring to Acts 1995, ch. 207,
§ 3). The Petitioner argues that the terms of the new Post-Conviction Procedure
Act allowed him one year from May 10, 1995, to file his petition and, thus, his
April 1996 petition was timely filed.
-3-
W e recognize that another panel of this Court has held, with one member
dissenting, that the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides “a one-year
window” during which each and every defendant may file a petition. See Arnold
Carter v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9509-CC-00270, Monroe County (Tenn. Crim.
App., Knoxville, July 11, 1996), perm. to appeal granted (Tenn. 1996). The
Carter court held that the one-year window is available even if the petition would
have been long ago barred by the three-year statute provided under the previous
act.
Other panels of this Court have followed the reasoning of the dissent in
Carter and held that the 1995 Act did not provide previously-barred petitioners
with a new one-year period from May 10, 1995 during which they could petition
for post-conviction relief. See Doyle Carter v. State, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9511-CC-
00398, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 12, 1997); Eric C.
Pendleton v. State, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9604-CR-00158, Davidson County (Tenn.
Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 12, 1997); W allace Butler v. Ricky Bell, W arden,
C.C.A. No. 02C01-9510-CC-00297, Fayette County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson,
Nov. 19, 1996); Johnny L. Butler v. State, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9509-CR-00289,
Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Dec. 2, 1996); Stephen Koprowski
v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9511-CC-00365, Anderson County (Tenn. Crim.
App., Knoxville, Jan. 28, 1997); Steve Koprowski v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-
9511-CR-00378, Knox County (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 28, 1997).
W e choose to follow the reasoning set forth in the Carter dissent. In our
view, the one-year window provided by the language of the new Act is applicable
only to those petitioners who were not already barred by the previous statute of
-4-
limitations at the time the new Act took effect. Thus, if the previous three-year
statute of limitations had not expired on a petitioner at the time the new Act took
effect, he or she would have one year from the effective date of the statute, May
10, 1995, to file for post-conviction relief. This approach is in accordance with the
general tenor of the entire Act as well as its legislative history.
In the case sub judice, the record indicates that the Petitioner was
convicted and sentenced in April of 1990. The previous three-year statute of
limitations expired for the Petitioner in April of 1993. As a result, the Petitioner
was already barred by the previous statute of limitations on the date the new Act
took effect, May 10, 1995. In addition, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that
he fits within an exception to the statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§
40-30-202(b) and -202(c) (Supp. 1996). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
finding that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations.
For the reasons set forth in the discussion above, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. W e therefore
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
-5-
CONCUR:
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
-6-