court enters written findings and an order allowing the State to proceed
with a second prosecution, NRS 174.085(7). However, where the State has
brought dual proceedings against an accused for the same offense, it may
elect to proceed with one of the pending proceedings and dismiss the other
without implicating NRS 178.562(1). Thompson v. State, 125 Nev. 807,
812, 221 P.3d 708, 712 (2009). This is because "as a general matter, there
is no prejudice to an accused when one of two pending vehicles for
prosecution is dismissed, leaving him accused by only one." Id. at 811, 221
P.3d at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the State filed an information following the preliminary
hearing and later obtained an indictment from the Grand Jury. The
information and the indictment were assigned to different judicial
departments and the indictment alleged additional offenses. Both
proceedings were pending against Brown when the State elected to
proceed solely on the indictment. The district court heard argument on
the State's election: the State argued that it was entitled to dismiss the
information and Brown argued that the dismissal would violate his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. The district court ruled that the
State could dismiss the information pursuant to Thompson and Brown
could pursue his speedy-trial claim in the other judicial department.
Brown challenged the district court's ruling in an original
petition for a writ of mandamus. We determined that the district court
had a duty to rule on Brown's constitutional speedy-trial claim because it
was in the best position to make the factual inquiry necessary to resolve
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the claim, and it could expeditiously dismiss the information with
prejudice if the claim was valid. 1 Accordingly, we issued a writ of
mandamus instructing the district court to hold a hearing and determine
whether Brown was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The district court has since conducted a hearing and entered orders
finding that Brown's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated
and granting the State's motion to dismiss the case.
"[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege
that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold
dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay." Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). There is no established length
of delay which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial. Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972). However, courts have generally found
post-accusation delays to be presumptively prejudicial as they approach
the one-year mark. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1.
The record reveals that Brown was accused by way of criminal
complaint on or about August 20, 2012, and that his trial was set for
January 22, 2013. Therefore, the post-accusation delay was 156 days.
The district court made findings that the State was allowed to continue
the preliminary hearing, Brown filed and later withdrew a petition for a
'We also determined that "[a]ny claim alleging conscious
indifference to petitioner's procedural rights should be brought in a
challenge to the subsequent indictment." Brown v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, Docket No. 62619 (Order Granting Petition in Part, March 13,
2013), at 2 n.1.
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writ of habeas corpus, and a hearing on the State's motion to consolidate
cases was continued. We conclude that the 156-day delay did not trigger a
speedy-trial analysis and, because Brown had not been deprived of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial at the time when the information was
dismissed, the district court did not err by allowing the State to
voluntarily dismiss the information without prejudice. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
J(AdL ,J.
Hardesty
—c201..)t
Parraguirre
cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
Bush & Levy, LLC
Oronoz & Ericsson
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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