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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-10954
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cr-00383-EAK-AEP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JARIS YOUNGBLOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(October 22, 2013)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jaris Youngblood appeals his 188-month sentence for distributing and
possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. After reviewing the record
and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
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I
Mr. Youngblood engaged in a number of crack cocaine sales transactions
with an undercover police officer over the course of several months. On
November 8, 2012, Mr. Youngblood pled guilty to four counts of distributing and
possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1). Because he was charged with controlled substance offenses and had
previously been convicted of two charges of possession of cocaine with intent to
sell, Mr. Youngblood was classified as a career offender, with a corresponding
advisory range under the Sentencing Guidelines of 188 to 235 months’
imprisonment. The district court imposed a sentence of 188 months’
imprisonment, explaining that it based its sentence, in large part, on Mr.
Youngblood’s previous criminal conduct, history, and characteristics.
On appeal, Mr. Youngblood argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because (1) the sentence did not comport with the “parsimony
clause” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) public policy considerations render the career
offender guideline unsound; (3) the government’s comment at sentencing that a
188-month sentence would be "more than enough to get [Mr. Youngblood’s]
attention” led to the application of the wrong sentencing standard; and (4) the
district court’s statement at sentencing expressing concern that it would “be
reversed by the 11th Circuit for failing to follow the advisory guidelines”
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demonstrated that the district court erroneously analyzed and applied the advisory
guidelines as mandatory.
II
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Even if the district
court's sentence is more severe or more lenient than the sentence we would have
imposed, we will only reverse if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515
F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).
III
First, Mr. Youngblood contends that his sentence was longer than necessary
to achieve the sentencing goals of § 3553(a) and thereby violated the so-called
“parsimony principle.” We ordinarily expect, but do not automatically assume,
that a sentence within the applicable advisory guidelines range is reasonable.
United States v. Victor, 719 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing United States
v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008)). The district court’s sentence in this
case fell at the low end of the guideline range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.
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The district court considered Mr. Youngblood’s personal and criminal history and
concluded that a sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment comported with the
Section 3553(a) factors. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of
discretion.
Second, Mr. Youngblood argues that a policy disagreement over the
application of the career offender guideline to a “low-level, non-violent drug
addict/dealer” renders his sentence substantively unreasonable under Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) and Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261
(2009). Although Kimbrough and Spears held, at most, that a district court may
vary from a guidelines range where it disagrees with a particular guideline,
application of this principle necessarily requires that the district court actually
disagree with the guideline at issue. Here, the district court declined Mr.
Youngblood’s suggestion that it vary from the career offender advisory guideline,
and the record offers no indication that the district court did, in fact, take issue with
the policy underlying that guideline. See Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267,
1279 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Kimbrough empowered the district courts with this
discretion, but it did not command them to exercise it.”).
Third, Mr. Youngblood maintains that the government’s comment at
sentencing that a 188-month sentence would be "more than enough to get [Mr.
Youngblood’s] attention” set forth an erroneous sentencing standard. The record,
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however, reflects that the district court applied the correct sentencing standard,
having stated on the record that “the sentence imposed is sufficient but not greater
than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing.” See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). This argument therefore fails.
Finally, Mr. Youngblood asserts that the district court’s statement that it
would “be reversed by the 11th Circuit for failing to follow the advisory
guidelines” demonstrated an improper unwillingness to grant a downward variance
for fear of reversal. Coming as it did following Mr. Youngblood’s objection to
imposition of the career offender guideline and before the district court entertained
argument on a downward variance and made final guideline findings, we construe
this comment merely to reflect the district court’s recognition that it was required
to calculate Mr. Youngblood’s guideline range correctly. See United States v.
Balentine, 106 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 1996) (Table) (rejecting argument that district
court's mere "fear of being overturned" reflected the belief that it could not grant a
downward variance).
IV
Mr. Youngblood’s 188-month sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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