Case: 13-12602 Date Filed: 01/02/2014 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-12602
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cr-00070-RH-CAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TERIEL LAMAR YOUNG,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(January 2, 2014)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-12602 Date Filed: 01/02/2014 Page: 2 of 6
Teriel Lamar Young appeals his 188-month sentence after pleading guilty to
four counts of distributing cocaine and cocaine base, all in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The presentence investigation report (PSI) determined
that Young qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. At the
sentencing hearing, Young argued that the career offender guideline range imposed
penalties that were too high given the relatively low severity of his predicate
offenses.1
Young also objected to the PSI’s two-level use-of-violence enhancement for
striking a police dog. The district court assumed, for the purposes of sentencing,
that the enhancement did not apply, but noted that this did not change his
applicable guideline range because of Young’s career offender designation. The
court’s written statement of reasons, however, indicated that the PSI was adopted
without change.
On appeal, Young argues that the erroneous statement of reasons may affect
his eligibility for certain programs in prison and asks that we remand the case for
the entry of a judgment consistent with the district court’s statements at sentencing.
Young also argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable.
1
Two of the four convictions that the PSI relied upon in assigning Young career offender
status involved the sale of cocaine or cocaine base for less than twenty dollars.
2
Case: 13-12602 Date Filed: 01/02/2014 Page: 3 of 6
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct.
586, 591 (2007). When the unambiguous oral pronouncement of a sentence
conflicts with the court’s written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.
United States v. Bonilla, 579 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009).
Young’s argument that the discrepancy between the district court’s written
statement of reasons and its oral findings at sentencing constitutes reversible error
fails. Although the statement of reasons indicates that the PSI was adopted without
change, the court expressly stated that it would evaluate Young’s sentence under
the assumption that he prevailed on the enhancement objection. Nevertheless,
Young is correct that the statement of reasons departs from the district court’s
statements at sentencing. Young asserts that the PSI’s finding of the use of
violence could impact some of his prison rights. To that end, we remand to the
district court with instructions to update the statement of reasons to conform to the
court’s oral findings at sentencing.
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first ensure that the
sentence was procedurally reasonable by checking whether the district court
properly calculated the guideline range, treated the Guidelines as advisory,
considered the § 3553(a) factors, did not select a sentence based on clearly
3
Case: 13-12602 Date Filed: 01/02/2014 Page: 4 of 6
erroneous facts, and adequately explained the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
Despite Young’s assertions to the contrary, the district court expressly
considered his arguments regarding the application of the career offender
guidelines to his case. The court acknowledged that the guideline range was not
binding upon it, but stated that the particular facts in Young’s case, including the
consistency of his criminal behavior, dictated that a longer sentence was necessary.
The court calculated the correct guideline range, considered the § 3553(a) factors,
did not rely on erroneous facts, and adequately explained its sentence.
Accordingly, Young’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable.
“The review for substantive unreasonableness involves examining the
totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory factors
in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550
F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The district court “shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes”
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In imposing a particular
sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available,
the applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
4
Case: 13-12602 Date Filed: 01/02/2014 Page: 5 of 6
Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
The imposition of a sentence well below the statutory maximum penalty is
an indicator of reasonableness. See Gonzalez 550 F.3d at 1324 (including the fact
that a sentence was well below the statutory maximum among factors contributing
to the sentence’s reasonableness). Although we do not apply a presumption of
reasonableness for sentences falling within the guidelines range, “ordinarily we
would expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.” United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We reverse only
if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Young’s 188-month sentence was within the applicable guideline range and
below the thirty-year statutory maximum. The court properly considered the §
3553(a) factors, including the frequency and consistency of his offenses in
evaluating the need to promote respect for the law, deter criminal conduct, and
protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. Accordingly, we
5
Case: 13-12602 Date Filed: 01/02/2014 Page: 6 of 6
affirm Young’s sentence and remand the case with instructions to amend the
statement of reasons to conform to the district court’s oral findings at sentencing.
AFFIRMED. REMANDED WITH INSTURCTIONS TO AMEND
THE STATEMENT OF REASONS.
6