UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4075
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
BRENT RENARD CHRISTIAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00204-NCT-1)
Submitted: September 13, 2013 Decided: October 24, 2013
Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marcia G. Shein, LAW FIRM OF SHEIN & BRANDENBURG FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW CENTER, Decatur, Georgia, for Appellant. Ripley
Rand, United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brent Renard Christian appeals from his conviction and
178-month sentence entered pursuant to his conditional guilty
plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and
possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of one of the
search warrants in his case, and he avers that the district
court clearly erred in imposing a sentencing enhancement for
maintaining a premises for drug manufacturing or distribution.
We affirm.
When considering the denial of a motion to suppress,
we review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions, while
its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United
States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2011). The
evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the
Government, the prevailing party below. United States v.
Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 2004). Christian first
contends that the warrant lacked probable cause as there was
insufficient evidence connecting an apartment at 2122-H Chester
Ridge Drive with criminal activity.
To comport with the Fourth Amendment, a magistrate
issuing a search warrant must find probable cause based on “a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair
2
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983). “The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals
with probabilities and depends on the totality of the
circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
For that reason, in reviewing the sufficiency of a supporting
affidavit, we avoid “hypertechnical scrutiny,” instead granting
great deference to the issuing magistrate. Owens v. Lott, 372
F.3d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2004)(quoting United States v. Robinson,
275 F.3d 371, 380 (4th Cir. 2001). Here, we conclude that the
corroborated informant information, in conjunction with
Christian’s drug activity and the detective’s knowledge of drug
trafficking protocol, was sufficient to support probable cause
for the warrant.
A confidential informant provided information that
Christian stayed at Chester Ridge. This tip was confirmed
through surveillance; Christian was observed traveling between
Chester Ridge and Wilson Place, the site of alleged drug
dealing, and he was observed staying overnight on a regular
basis at Chester Ridge. He was spotted at Chester Ridge the day
before the warrant issued and was seen traveling between the two
residences 48 hours prior to the warrant application. While
Christian contends that these statements in the application were
3
general and conclusory, we determine that, considering all the
allegations together, there was sufficient specificity from more
than one source to show that Christian regularly spent time at
Chester Ridge and traveled between Wilson Place and Chester
Ridge.
Moreover, the application provided an undisputedly
reliable confidential tip that Christian had sold cocaine within
the five days prior to the warrant application at Wilson Place.
In addition, the applicant detective included assertions based
on his long experience as a veteran police officer that
Christian would likely store his drugs and related items
somewhere other than Wilson Place and that the storage would
probably take place at a residence or business which is used as
a “stash house.” See United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 471
(4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he nexus between the place to be searched
and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of
the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely
keep such evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United
States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e
have upheld warrants to search suspects’ residences and even
temporary abodes on the basis of (1) evidence of the suspects’
involvement in drug trafficking combined with (2) the reasonable
suspicion (whether explicitly articulated by the applying
officer or implicitly arrived at by the magistrate judge) that
4
drug traffickers store drug-related evidence in their homes.”).
Based on the foregoing, the district court determined correctly
that probable cause supported the warrant.
Christian next argues that the sentencing judge erred
by finding that he maintained a premises for manufacturing or
distributing drugs, which resulted in a two-point enhancement of
his sentence. Specifically, Christian avers that there was no
evidence as to how long the drugs were stored at the Chester
Ridge apartment and that he did not own, lease, live at, or pay
any expenses for the apartment.
We review the lower court’s application of the
sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir.
2012). The “premises” relied upon by the trial court in
applying the enhancement was the master bedroom in the Chester
Ridge apartment. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12) provides that “[i]f the
defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing
or distributing a controlled substance, increase [the offense
level] by 2 levels.” According to the Guidelines commentary,
“[a]mong the factors the court should consider in determining
whether the defendant ‘maintained’ the premises are (A) whether
the defendant held a possessory interest in (e.g., owned or
rented) the premises and (B) the extent to which the defendant
controlled access to, or activities at, the premises.” USSG
5
§ 2D1.1 cmt. n. 17. The commentary makes clear that a
“premises” need not be an actual house or residence, but may be
a “building, room, or enclosure.” Id. “Manufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance need not be the sole purpose
for which the premises was maintained, but must be one of the
defendant’s primary or principal uses for the premises.” Id.
According to the evidence established at sentencing as
well as in the warrant application and the presentence report,
Christian traveled regularly between Chester Ridge and the place
where he distributed drugs. He had a key to the Chester Ridge
apartment, and he stayed there regularly but not exclusively.
He “controlled” a chest and a safe in the master bedroom, which
contained a great deal of money and drugs, as well as two
firearms. A friend lived at least part-time in the apartment
with her son, but she received her mail elsewhere, so presumably
it was either not her only residence or perhaps a temporary
residence. While there is no evidence as to how long the
arrangement had been in place, the search warrant application
makes it clear that there were multiple trips between
residences, and the large amount of money and drugs, as well as
the safe, at the Chester Ridge apartment indicates that the
drugs were being stored there, as opposed to being there
coincidentally. Finally, the spoons and bowls with cocaine
6
residue that were recovered from the apartment support the
conclusion that crack was being manufactured at Chester Ridge.
We conclude that this evidence supports the inference
that Christian maintained and/or controlled the apartment (or
part of it) for the purpose of storing and manufacturing drugs
for distribution. See United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699,
707 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that enhancement applies “when a
defendant uses the premises for the purpose of substantial
drug-trafficking activities, even if the premises was also her
family home at the times in question”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
1296 (2013); United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 729 (7th
Cir. 2013) (noting that “enhancement clearly contemplates that
premises can have more than one principal use. . . . the proper
inquiry is whether the drug transactions were a second primary
use of the premises or were instead merely a collateral use”),
petition for cert. filed (June 3, 2013). Accordingly, the
district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement.
Thus, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
7