UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5005
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANDRE CORBETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 08-5033
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NILES M. BELK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:07-cr-00144-RJC-1; 3:07-cr-00144-
RJC-2)
Submitted: March 8, 2010 Decided: April 2, 2010
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina; Andrew Brady
Banzhoff, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellants. Edward R.
Ryan, United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Andre Corbett was convicted of a Hobbs Act 1 conspiracy,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006) (Count 1); bank robbery
and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)
(2006) (Count 2); Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), 2 (2006) (Counts 5, 9, 13, 20,
and 24); possession and brandishing a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 2 (2006) (Counts 3, 6, 10, 14,
21, 25); obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503 (2006) (Counts 29 and 30); threatening a federal officer,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006) (Count 31); and
mailing threatening communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 876 (2006) (Count 32). He received a total sentence of 1,692
months’ imprisonment.
Corbett’s codefendant, Niles M. Belk was convicted of
a Hobbs Act conspiracy (Count 1); robbery affecting interstate
commerce and aiding and abetting (Counts 5, 13, 20, and 24); and
possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
1
In pertinent part, the Hobbs Act prohibits the unlawful
obstruction of commerce, or the movement of any article of
commodity in commerce, by robbery or actual or threatened
violence. 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
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violence and aiding and abetting (Counts 5, 14, 21, and 25). He
was sentenced to a total of 1,194 months’ imprisonment.
Corbett and Belk filed timely appeals, challenging
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts
against them. We affirm the district court’s judgment except as
to Corbett’s two obstruction of justice convictions, vacate
those convictions, and remand Corbett’s case to permit
resentencing.
“A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence faces a heavy burden.” United States v. Foster, 507
F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007). We review a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge by determining whether, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Government, any rational
trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d
515, 519 (4th Cir. 2005); see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942). We review both direct and circumstantial
evidence, and accord the Government all reasonable inferences
from the facts shown to those sought to be established. United
States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008).
I. Counts 29 and 30: Obstruction of justice
The Government concedes that the evidence was
insufficient to support Corbett’s convictions for obstruction of
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justice. To be guilty of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503 (2006), there must be a pending judicial proceeding, of
which the defendant has knowledge, and the defendant “must have
acted with the intent to influence, obstruct, or impede that
proceeding in its due administration of justice.” United
States v. Littleton, 76 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1996). A
defendant’s interference with the investigation of a grand jury
is an obstruction of the due administration of justice. United
States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 437 (4th Cir. 1993). After
reviewing the record, we agree that the Government failed to
provide evidence sufficient to support Corbett’s conviction on
these counts. Accordingly, we vacate Corbett’s conviction on
Counts 29 and 30, and remand so that a corrected judgment can be
imposed.
II. Count 1: Hobbs Act conspiracy
Count 1 charged Corbett and Belk with conspiring to
violate the Hobbs Act. “The Hobbs Act prohibits robbery or
extortion that ‘in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce.” United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 353 (4th
Cir. 2003) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)). In order to be
convicted of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act, the Government must
prove (1) the defendants conspired (2) to commit the underlying
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robbery or extortion (3) that affected interstate commerce. Id.
To prove a conspiracy, the Government must show an agreement
between two or more parties, that the defendant was aware of the
conspiracy, and the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily became
a part of this conspiracy.” United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d
220, 225-26 (4th Cir. 2008). “Commerce is sufficiently affected
under the Hobbs Act where a robbery depletes the assets of a
business that is engaged in interstate commerce.” Williams, 342
F.3d at 354-55.
After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence
was sufficient to demonstrate Corbett’s and Belk’s conspiracy to
violate the Hobbs Act by way of robbing the Salisbury Dollar
General on December 11, 2005. Keith Turner, a coconspirator,
testified as to the conspiracy. Turner testified that the
Defendants discussed with him which store to rob, and the
location of the safe in the store. Turner twice scouted the
store at Corbett’s instruction, providing information to Corbett
regarding the store’s occupants and security.
This conspiracy is further shown through the events of
the robbery itself. That Belk was shot by police while fleeing
with a coconspirator necessarily demonstrates his participation
in the conspiracy. Concerning Corbett’s participation, the jury
heard Turner’s testimony describing his flight from the scene
with Corbett, including Corbett’s attempts to hide his gun and
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the stolen money. Finally, it was undisputed that Dollar
General was engaged in interstate commerce, as it was
headquartered in Tennessee, and had over eight-thousand stores
in thirty to forty states, and sold goods manufactured outside
of North Carolina. Thus, it is clear that the robbery affected
interstate commerce, as it depleted the resources of a business
engaged in interstate commerce. Williams, 342 F.3d at 354-55.
Though the Defendants contend that we erred when concluding in
Williams that a minimal effect on interstate commerce satisfied
the jurisdictional requirement, one panel of this court cannot
overrule the precedent established by a prior panel. United
States v. Chong, 285 F.3d 343, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2002). Thus,
the Defendants’ arguments in this regard are unavailing. As a
rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of a
Hobbs Act conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, Corbett’s and
Belk’s sufficiency challenges to Count 1 fail.
Additionally, though Appellants now raise a venue
challenge, they failed to do so before the trial court. Though
challenges to venue are of a constitutional dimension, they may
be waived if not raised either before trial, or at the close of
all the evidence. See United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517,
524-25 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Melia, 741 F.2d 70, 71
(4th Cir. 1984). Because Corbett and Belk failed to raise this
7
issue at any point before the district court, they have waived
their right to challenge venue.
III. Counts 2 and 3: First Citizens Bank robbery
In Counts 2 and 3, Corbett was charged with bank
robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2,
2113(a), and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 2113(a) of 18 U.S.C.
proscribes the use of force, violence, or intimidation to
“take[] or attempt[] to take, from the person or presence of
another . . . any property or money or any other thing of value
belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or
possession of, any bank” insured by the FDIC. To prove a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the government must prove that
the defendant used a firearm, and the defendant did so during
and in relation to a crime of violence. United States v.
Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997). “To prove the
crime of aiding and abetting the government must show that the
defendant knowingly associated himself with and participated in
the criminal venture.” United States v. Kingrea, 573 F.3d 186,
197 (4th Cir. 2009).
After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence
was sufficient to demonstrate that Corbett both robbed the First
Citizens Bank and used a firearm while doing so. It is
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undisputed that the robbers of the First Citizens Bank used
firearms to effect the robbery. One robber, carrying a black
duffle bag, was wearing a dark shirt with a distinctive diamond
pattern. At the robber’s instruction, the bank teller put
$1,356 and a dye pack in the bag, and gave the bag back to the
robber, who then left the branch with his companion. The teller
testified that the robbers entered a sedan and removed their
masks, revealing that they were black males. As they drove
away, the teller observed the dye pack exploding, and the robber
throwing the bag into a nearby construction area. A crime scene
investigator authenticated a black nylon bag filled with dye-
stained currency that was found at the construction site,
pictures of the bag, a spent dye pack, and a luggage claim
ticket attached to the bag that read “Corbett, Andre.”
Additionally, the prosecution displayed a DMV picture of Andre
Corbett alongside a surveillance photo of the robbery. In both
pictures, Corbett was wearing the same dark shirt with a
distinctive diamond pattern. Viewing this evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could
find the essential elements of Counts 2 and 3 beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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IV. Counts 9 and 10: Sam’s Mart robbery
Count 9 charged Corbett and Belk with violation of the
Hobbs Act by robbing and aiding and abetting the robbery of a
Sam’s Mart; Count 10 alleged that Corbett and Belk used a
firearm in furtherance of the robbery. “A Hobbs Act violation
requires proof of two elements: (1) the underlying robbery or
extortion crime, and (2) an effect on interstate commerce.”
Williams, 342 F.3d at 353.
First, it is undisputed that Sam’s Mart is engaged in
interstate commerce, as it sells items received from outside
North Carolina. Therefore, it is clear that the robbery of
this establishment affected interstate commerce. Williams, 342
F.3d at 354-55. Similarly, it is undisputed that the robber
used a firearm in furtherance of the robbery.
Moreover, we find the Government presented sufficient
evidence during its case in chief to demonstrate that Corbett
assisted in the robbery. Rosalyn Joyner, a customer at the
Sam’s Mart during the robbery, testified that the robber was a
black man, between 5 feet 8 inches and 5 feet 11 inches tall,
and chubby, and was wearing a black t-shirt and a ski mask, and
had darker skin than the driver of the get-away car. The car
was a tan Ford Taurus, with the license number TXY-3193, which
was registered to Corbett and his former fiancé, Jameelah
Johnson. Additionally, Johnson testified that she had cosigned
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for Corbett to purchase the car, and that the car was driven by
Corbett. Toward the end of the trial, both Belk and Corbett
stood so the jury could observe their relative heights, weights,
hair styles, and relevant physical features. As Belk matched
the description of the robber, and Corbett matched the
description of the get-away driver, and the robbery was
perpetrated using his car, a rational trier of fact could find
the essential elements of Counts 9 and 10 beyond a reasonable
doubt.
V. Counts 24 and 25: Stallings Dollar General robbery
Count 24 charged Corbett and Belk with violation of
the Hobbs Act by robbing a Dollar General store in Stallings,
North Carolina; Count 25 alleged that Corbett and Belk used a
firearm in furtherance of the robbery. It is undisputed that
the Dollar General is engaged in interstate commerce, as it
sells items manufactured in other states and other countries.
Therefore, it is clear that the robbery of this establishment
affected interstate commerce. Williams, 342 F.3d at 354-55.
Similarly, it is undisputed that the robbers used firearms in
furtherance of the robbery.
Additionally, we find the evidence was sufficient to
demonstrate that Corbett and Belk were the perpetrators of the
robbery. Augustus King, district manager for Dollar General
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Stores in the Stallings, NC area, authenticated surveillance
recordings of the robbery, which were admitted into evidence and
shown to the jury. From the surveillance video, the jury was
able to observe the heights, weights, and physical features of
the robbers.
Marsha Cochran, a lead clerk at the Dollar General,
testified that one of the robbers approached her and began to
search and question her, while the other walked the other
direction through the store, searching for another woman the
robbers believed was working with Cochrane. The robber
questioning Cochrane was approximately 5 feet 8 inches or 5 feet
9 inches tall, and was wearing a black ski mask and black
jacket. The robber pulled her around the back of the cash
registers, and forced her at gunpoint to enter the store’s
office and open the safe. This was done in substantially the
same manner as Corbett and Belk had perpetrated the Salisbury
Dollar General robbery.
Additionally, Cochran testified that the store sold
DVD players, and one was missing after the robbery. The
surveillance video of the robbery showed one of the robbers
repeatedly walking by the area in which the DVD players were
kept. Jameelah Johnson, Corbett’s former fiancé, testified that
Corbett gave her a small, silver DVD player as a gift. The DVD
player she received did not have a box or user’s manual with it,
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and it appeared to be the same type stocked by the Dollar
General Store. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Government, we find that a rational trier of fact could
find the essential elements of Counts 24 and 25 beyond a
reasonable doubt.
VI. Food Lion robberies
A. Counts 5 and 6: Indian Trail Food Lion robbery
Count 5 charged Corbett and Belk with violation of the
Hobbs Act by robbing the Indian Trail Food Lion; Count 6 alleged
that Corbett and Belk used a firearm in furtherance of the
robbery. It is undisputed that the Indian Trail Food Lion is
engaged in interstate commerce, as it sells items manufactured
in other states and other countries. (JA 675-76). Therefore,
it is clear that the robbery of this establishment affected
interstate commerce. Williams, 342 F.3d at 354-55. Similarly,
it is undisputed that the robbers used firearms in furtherance
of the robbery.
Additionally, the evidence presented by the Government
was sufficient to establish that Corbett and Belk were the
perpetrators of the robbery. Tiffany Horne, an employee at the
Indian Trail Food Lion, testified that two masked men entered
the store twenty minutes before closing time. One of the
robbers took approximately $200 from Horne’s register, while the
13
other ran over to the customer service counter and went into the
office. Horne testified that though both robbers wore ski
masks, she could tell both were African-American, and one was
larger than the other. The jury watched multiple videos of the
robberies, in which they were able to observe the robbers’
physical features, clothing, and the guns they carried;
additionally, still frames of the robberies were entered into
evidence. One such still frame depicted the smaller robber
emptying a safe in the Food Lion office. While doing so, a
taped revolver sat on the floor next to his feet. Jameelah
Johnson testified that Corbett owned a revolver with silver tape
on the handle, and images of such a revolver were recovered from
Corbett’s cell phone. Another still frame from the robbery
depicted the larger robber holding a long gun while wearing
distinctive white gloves with black stripes, the same as those
worn by Belk when he robbed the Salisbury Dollar General.
B. Counts 13 and 14: Plaza Food Lion robbery
Count 13 charged Corbett and Belk with violation of
the Hobbs Act by robbing the Plaza Food Lion; Count 14 alleged
that Corbett and Belk used a firearm in furtherance of the
robbery. Once again, the only dispute is whether the Defendants
were the actual perpetrators of the offense. Tonya McQueen, an
employee at the Plaza Food Lion, testified as to the August 29,
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2005 robbery. McQueen testified that the two robbers entered
the Food Lion around seven in the morning. The first robber was
wearing a toboggan style mask and a dark blue mechanic’s suit.
He carried a black handgun. During McQueen’s testimony, a
surveillance video of the robbery was played, during which the
jury was able to observe the robbers’ physical features,
clothing, and weapons. The video depicted the second, smaller
robber going into the office with the bank manager.
Iris Faulkner-Riley, a Food Lion customer, also
testified regarding the Plaza Food Lion robbery. Faulkner-Riley
testified that she saw the larger robber carrying what appeared
to be a sawed-off shotgun as he approached the cash register.
The robber was African-American, and was wearing all black, with
a black mask covering the lower half of his face. The robber
instructed her to lay down on the floor and gave instructions to
the other individuals at the cash register to do the same.
During Faulkner-Riley’s testimony, the jury watched two
surveillance videos of the robbery, during which the jury as
able to observe the robbers’ physical features, clothing, and
weapons. The jury also saw a still frame from the video, which
depicted a robber wearing distinctive white gloves with black
stripes. These gloves appeared to be the same as those worn by
one of the robbers of the Indian Trail Food Lion and those worn
by Belk when he was shot during the Dollar General robbery in
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Salisbury, NC. Additionally, the jury was shown a picture
extracted from Corbett’s cell phone, taken approximately thirty
minutes after the Plaza Food Lion was robbed, which depicted a
large pile of loose cash.
C. Counts 20 and 21: South Tryon Food Lion robbery
Count 20 charged Corbett and Belk with violation of
the Hobbs Act by robbing the South Tryon Food Lion; Count 21
alleged that Corbett and Belk used a firearm in furtherance of
the robbery.
Again, only the identities of the perpetrators is in
question. Jessica Duran, a store employee, testified that two
armed men wearing masks entered the Food Lion at approximately
10:55 p.m., five minutes before closing time. One robber had a
handgun and the other had a longer gun that was grey at the end.
Duran informed the jury that while she was hiding behind a
cashier register, one of the robbers stood near the registers,
telling her to put her head down, while the other robber went
with the manager to the office. The jury watched three
surveillance videos of the robbery, while Duran identified the
individuals depicted in the videos.
Joshua Floyd, a manager at the Food Lion, testified
that he was standing at a computer kiosk at the front of the
store at the time of the robbery. One of the robbers hurdled
16
over the kiosk, grabbed Floyd from behind, and put a gun to his
head. The robber pulled Floyd to the office and told him to
open the office door, threatening to “blow [his] head off,” when
Floyd put the wrong key in the lock. When the door was open,
the robber pushed Floyd toward the safe and instructed him to
open it. Floyd testified that the robber was wearing a jacket
and had a mask covering his whole face, and seemed to be only
slightly taller than Floyd, who was 5 feet 4 inches tall, and
sounded African-American. The other robber appeared to be at
least 6 feet tall, if not taller. The jury watched three more
surveillance videos of the robbery, depicting the physical
characteristics and clothing of the robbers.
The videos of each of the Food Lion robberies, as well
as the testimony of the customer and employee victims of the
robberies, showed that the robbers’ modus operandi in each
robbery was identical. After entering the stores together, the
larger robber would approach the cash registers, rob the
customers or registers, and maintain control of the customers
and employees, while the shorter, slimmer robber would seek out
the office safe and force the manager to open it. The jury
heard testimony that Corbett had worked at multiple Food Lion
stores between 2003 and 2005, and that if someone was familiar
with the safe in one store, he would be familiar with the safe
in other stores as well. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the
17
light most favorable to the Government, we find the evidence
sufficient to support these verdicts.
VII. Count 31: Threatening to assault a federal officer
Count 31 charges that Corbett threatened to assault an
ATF agent working on his case. The charge was based on a letter
Corbett wrote to his girlfriend, Jameelah Johnson, in which
Corbett told her he wanted to slice the agent’s face with a box
cutter, and “want[ed] to see him bleed.”
Title 18 of the United States Code, Section
115(a)(1)(B), prohibits
[T]hreat[s] to assault, kidnap, or murder, a . . .
Federal law enforcement officer . . . with intent to
impede, intimidate, or interfere with such . . . law
enforcement officer while engaged in the performance
of official duties, or with intent to retaliate
against such . . . law enforcement officer on account
of the performance of official duties.
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). In Corbett’s brief, he contends that
the letter was nothing more than “a graphic expression of
contempt for what the agent had done to the intended recipient
of the letter.” Therefore, according to Corbett, “the letter
was not a true threat, but, instead, speech protected by the
First Amendment.” Corbett also asserts that making such
statements was a form of therapy for him.
Corbett’s arguments are unavailing. “Statements
constitute a true threat if an ordinary reasonable recipient who
18
is familiar with their context would interpret those statements
as a threat of injury.” United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182,
185 (4th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
That a defendant cannot, or likely will not, carry out the
statement does not render it unthreatening for purposes of the
statute. Id. Here, since Corbett knew the referenced agent was
investigating both Johnson and himself and had spoken with
Johnson, we find a jury could conclude that a reasonable
recipient would interpret Corbett’s statements about slicing the
agent’s face with a box cutter as a threat, in retaliation for
the agent’s supposed persecution of Corbett. Accordingly, we
find that the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable
trier of fact to find Corbett guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of threatening a federal officer.
VIII. Count 32: Mailing a threatening communication
Count 32 charges that, in mailing the above-mentioned
letter, Corbett violated 18 U.S.C. § 876. Title 18 of United
States Code Section 876
[M]akes it a crime to knowingly deposit in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service or to
knowingly cause the Postal Service to deliver any
communication with or without a name or designating
mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person
and containing any threat to ... injure the person of
the addressee or of another.
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United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867, 869 (4th Cir. 2002)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 876) (quotation marks and alterations
omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Corbett mailed the above-
mentioned letter to Johnson. Because a reasonable recipient
would interpret the statements contained in the letter as a
threat, the evidence is sufficient to support Corbett’s
conviction for mailing a threatening communication.
Accordingly, we grant Corbett’s motion to file a pro
se supplemental brief, 2 affirm the judgment in part, vacate in
part, and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
expressed in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
2
Though we grant Corbett’s motion, we have reviewed
Corbett’s supplemental brief and find the claims raised therein
to be without merit.
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