UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-20458
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
RHONDA L. GOERLITZ,
Intervenor/Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLEAR LAKE DODGE, ET AL.,
Defendants,
GULF COAST DODGE d/b/a
CLEAR LAKE DODGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
( H-91-CV-957)
February 14, 1997
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:*
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
Clear Lake Dodge appeals the judgment on remand resetting attorney’s fees
for counsel for Rhonda Goerlitz in her Title VII discrimination action. As the
unsuccessful defendant in a Title VII action brought by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, in which Goerlitz was permitted to intervene and fully
participate, CLD was ordered to pay back pay, prejudgment interest thereon, and
attorney’s fees.
On the first appeal we affirmed the judgment but vacated the award of
attorney’s fees and remanded in order that the district court might revisit the issue
and determine the extent to which the efforts by Goerlitz’s counsel were not
“redundant or unnecessary” considering that counsel for the EEOC brought the
action. On remand the court faithfully implemented this court’s directive and
reduced its earlier award by over 30 percent. The trial court also awarded a sum
for fees on the earlier appeal; in doing so, the requested amount was reduced by at
least one-quarter.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that a “prevailing party” in a suit
brought under Title VII is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs.1
Recognizing the “district court’s superior understanding of . . . litigation,” we have
1
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
2
committed the award of such attorney’s fees to that court’s discretion.2 Thus we
will disturb the award of attorney’s fees only if the district court abused its
discretion in making or calculating the award or based it on factual findings that are
clearly erroneous.3 With these principles in mind we again review the district
court’s award of attorney’s fees herein.
On remand the district court conducted a hearing and required written
submissions of the parties, seeking to determine the relative contributions of
counsel for Goerlitz and counsel for the EEOC in the trial and first appeal of this
matter. At the hearing, Goerlitz’s counsel testified that she alone discovered
evidence, including a witness and personnel files, to prove Goerlitz’s claim that
CLD’s alleged reasons for termination were pretextual. In addition, an EEOC
attorney testified that the EEOC relied heavily on Goerlitz’s counsel to act as a
“private attorney general” and depended on Goerlitz’s counsel’s superior
knowledge of and experience in the prosecution of Title VII cases, and that the
EEOC and Goerlitz’s counsel worked “collegially and cooperatively” in the
successful prosecution of Goerlitz’s claim.
2
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
3
Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
3
Based upon the testimony at the hearing and the submissions of the parties,
the district court concluded that “much of the work” performed by Goerlitz’s
counsel was neither redundant nor unnecessary. The district court further found
that Goerlitz’s counsel unilaterally produced the ultimate evidence it relied upon
in ruling against CLD. As noted, the court awarded attorney’s fees some 30
percent less than that previously awarded. In addition, the district court awarded
$32,547.66 in appellate attorney’s fees to compensate Goerlitz’s counsel for her
work on the first appeal, basing this award on the written submissions of the parties
which included a 19-page affidavit by Goerlitz’s counsel detailing the hours spent
on the appeal. The district court reviewed that affidavit with exacting scrutiny,
taking care to assure that any duplicitous hours and any hours spent on Goerlitz’s
unsuccessful cross-appeal were not included.
Our review of the record in this lengthy and contentious case persuades that
we should affirm the district court which, necessarily, is vested with great
discretion in the award of attorney’s fees. We find no abuse of that discretion with
respect to the fees awarded for either the trial or appeal.
Finally, to bring this matter to a termination, which is in the maximum best
interests of all concerned including the courts, we shall set the attorney’s fees for
this appeal. We therefore direct counsel for Goerlitz to submit an application and
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affidavit for fees for this appeal to this court within 20 days from issuance of this
opinion. CLD will have 20 days from that filing to submit any response it deems
appropriate. The matter will be deemed submitted and will be promptly addressed
by this panel which retains jurisdiction for that purpose.
The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
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