UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-31099
Summary Calendar
LARRY C. WALTERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
RUBICON INCORPORATED; R.H. LANE; LEONARD B. SANFORD;
JOHN DELANEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Louisiana
(95-CV-1927)
May 14, 1997
Before JONES, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Larry Walters (“Walters”) appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee Rubicon, Inc. on
his Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim. Walters argues
on appeal that his high blood pressure condition, which was
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
aggravated due to stress related to his job, constituted a
disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and thus under the ADA, his
employer Rubicon, Inc. was obligated to provide him with reasonable
accommodation.
We review orders granting summary judgement de novo, employing
the same standards as the district court. Guillory v. Domtar
Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996). In order to
demonstrate a violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) that
he suffers from a disability; (2) that he is qualified for the job;
and (3) that an adverse employment action was taken against him
because of his disability. Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning
Ctrs, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1996).
To demonstrate a disability under the ADA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate a (1) physical or mental impairment substantially
limiting one or more major life activities, (2) a record of such
impairment, or (3) that the plaintiff is regarded as having such an
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
In order to show a substantial limitation in working, there
must be an impairment significantly restricting the performance of
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. See
Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, -- U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 770, 136 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1997);
Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir.
1996); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) & (i). Walters’ condition
did not constitute a disability under the ADA. In this case,
Walters’ only restriction on work was an inability to work with his
stress-inducing supervisor. Thus, without an inability to perform
a class or broad range of jobs, he did not present the requisite
disability. See Weiler, 101 F.3d at 525 (citing cases) (if a
plaintiff “can do the same job for another supervisor, [he] can do
the job, and does not qualify under the ADA.”) In addition, high
blood pressure, where not the source of limitations on “major life
activities,” as required by the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), is not a disability. Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp.,
74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1996).
Walters did not demonstrate a disability under either of the
alternative criteria. Walters did not present a record of
disability, nor did Rubicon regard him as having a disability.
Rather, it indicated a concern about his well-being. See Ellison
v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996).
Walters failed to demonstrate a disability, the first of the
three requirements necessary to an ADA claim, and we AFFIRM the
district court.