UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-41144
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
VERSUS
CLIFFORD WOODS,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division
(1:95-CV-260)
September 19, 1997
Before DeMOSS, DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District
Judges.*
PER CURIAM:**
Appellee State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”)
issued a binder providing fire insurance for appellant Woods’s home
on November 30, 1994. On December 29, 1994, Woods’s home and
*
District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
nearby office building were totally destroyed by a fire determined
to be of incendiary origin. Woods filed a claim with State Farm.
After investigation, State Farm concluded Woods had caused this
destruction to occur. State Farm filed suit in federal district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 seeking a declaratory judgment
that State Farm had no liability for Woods insurance claim. Woods
filed a counterclaim seeking to recover policy benefits and
attorneys’ fees. Woods also alleged State Farm had breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Before trial, Woods filed a motion seeking to have the parties
realigned. The district court denied this motion. The case was
tried before a jury which returned a verdict in favor of State Farm
finding Woods had burned or caused to be burned the insured
property. After judgment was entered, Woods filed a motion for a
new trial alleging the jury was improperly exposed to exhibits
containing prejudicial evidence. The evidence in question
consisted of approximately six pages of Woods’s examination under
oath. These pages contained testimony referring to a polygraph
test taken by Woods and a prior fire insurance claim filed by the
Woods’s son. The district court had ordered in response to Woods’s
motion in limine that no reference was to be made to these subject
matters.
On appeal, Woods argues the district court erred in denying
his motion to realign the parties and in refusing to grant a new
trial because of the jury’s exposure to evidence previously ordered
excluded.
Proper alignment of parties lies within the discretion of the
court. Lloyd v. Pendleton Land & Exploration, Inc., 22 F.3d 623,
625 (5th Cir. 1994), Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. John Labatt Ltd., 89
F.3d 1339, 1344 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom John Labatt
Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 S.Ct. 944 (1997). We find no
abuse occurred.
A denial of a new trial is also reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Bailey v. Daniel, 967 F.2d 178, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1992).
The standard is somewhat narrower when a new trial is denied than
when one is granted. Id. For the following reasons, we conclude no
abuse of discretion occurred. First, Woods did not object at trial
when the unexpunged examination under oath was introduced into
evidence. Furthermore, it appears State Farm’s failure to remove
the testimony in question from the examination under oath was not
intentional or in bad faith. Finally, any error resulting from the
jury’s exposure to this evidence appears harmless as the
overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993), Longoria v.
Wilson, 730 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1984).
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.