United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit
No. 96-10183.
Raye Ellen STILES, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GTE SOUTHWEST INCORPORATED; GTE Incorporated, Defendants-
Appellees.
Nov. 24, 1997.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas.
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, KING and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
The appellant, Raye Ellen Stiles, proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, appeals from a number of orders of the district
court, including the district court's order granting the appellees'
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the
reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I.
On December 5, 1995, Stiles filed suit against GTE Southwest,
Inc., a local telecommunications company, and GTE Incorporated1
seeking damages under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. §§ 206-07, 415(b) ("the Act"). Stiles alleged, inter alia,
that GTE Southwest refused to provide her with business telephone
service, later provided her with only restricted service, and
1
According to counsel for GTE Southwest, there is no legal
entity named "GTE Incorporated." Because this statement is not
challenged by the appellant, we will refer only to GTE Southwest in
this opinion.
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regularly failed to repair her service as needed. She sought
damages for mental anguish, harassment, loss of business income,
and invasion of privacy.
On December 28, 1995, GTE Southwest filed its answer, in which
it argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Stiles's complaint and counterclaimed for reimbursement of costs
and attorney's fees. On January 22, 1996, GTE Southwest filed a
motion to dismiss Stiles's complaint for failure to state a claim,
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and for abatement. GTE
Southwest argued that Stiles had failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted because she had not indicated any specific
violation of the Act or specified any damages that she had
suffered. GTE Southwest further argued that because Stiles had
filed an informal administrative complaint with the Federal
Communications Commissions ("FCC"), she could not pursue her claim
in federal court. Alternatively, GTE Southwest argued that
Stiles's claims should be abated because the FCC enjoys "primary
jurisdiction" over such claims.
In her response, although Stiles admitted that she had filed
an informal complaint with the FCC, she argued that her informal
complaint did not preclude her from bringing suit in federal court.
In support of her argument, Stiles attached a letter sent to her
from the FCC which addresses the FCC's informal complaint
procedures. According to the letter, when the FCC receives a
letter from a consumer complaining about a company providing
interstate or international common carrier services, the FCC serves
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the complaint on the carrier. The carrier is then directed to
investigate the complaint and to report the results of its
investigation to the FCC. The letter concludes by stating that if
the complainant is not satisfied by the company's response to the
informal complaint or the FCC's disposition of the complaint, the
complainant may file a formal complaint with the FCC.
Stiles also attached a copy of the FCC's instructions for
filing a formal complaint with the FCC. Inter alia, this document
advises that the complainant must elect to pursue either a formal
complaint or bring suit in federal court, but not in both.
On February 22, 1996, GTE Southwest filed a motion to
supplement its motion to dismiss, in which it sought to attach the
following in support of its motion: (1) copies of Stiles's formal
complaints against GTE with the Texas Public Utility Commission
("PUC"); (2) the proposal for decision, the proposed order, and
the order dismissing Stiles's PUC complaint; (3) a letter from the
FCC explaining that the FCC's files regarding Stiles's informal
complaint have been destroyed; and (4) GTE's copies of Stiles's
informal complaint against GTE and the FCC's final determination
letter.
On April 16, 1996, the district court granted GTE Southwest's
motion to dismiss, finding that Stiles had elected to pursue her
claim administratively with the FCC, thereby precluding her from
litigating her complaint in federal court. Although the district
court acknowledged the pending contested motion to supplement in
its order granting GTE Southwest's motion to dismiss, the court did
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not expressly rule on that motion. The district court entered a
separate judgment on that same day.
On April 22, 1996, within ten days of the district court's
judgment, Stiles filed the following pleadings: (1) a "motion to
request reconsideration, and motion to vacate order and set aside
judgment with incorporated brief"; (2) a "motion for clarification
and findings of law" regarding the court's denial of her motion to
recuse and dismiss counsel for GTE Southwest; (3) a "motion for
ruling as to defendant's motion to supplement defendant's motion to
dismiss"; and (4) a "motion for ruling as to Plaintiff's motion to
dismiss defendant's counterclaim with incorporated brief."
On May 7, 1996, Stiles then filed a notice of appeal from the
district court's dismissal of her complaint. Subsequently, Stiles
sued Judge Cummings, the presiding judge, and his law clerk. In
response, Judge Cummings requested that the case be reassigned to
another judge to consider the pending post-judgment motions; Judge
Buchmeyer was assigned to handle these post-judgment matters.
Still not satisfied, Stiles then moved to recuse all of the judges
and magistrate judges in the Northern District of Texas because
they are all "personally acquainted" with Judge Cummings. Judge
Buchmeyer denied the motion as "totally without merit."
By order dated March 28, 1997, after construing Stiles's
motion "to request for reconsideration, and motion to vacate order
and set aside judgment with incorporated brief" as a Rule 59(e)
motion, this court found that Stiles's notice of appeal was
ineffective. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4). As a result, the court
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ordered the record returned to the district court for a ruling on
that motion. See Burt v. Ware, 14 F.3d 256, 260-61 (5th Cir.1994).
On April 7, 1997, the district court denied Stiles's motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, Stiles's appeal is now properly
before the court. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
II.
On appeal, Stiles challenges the decision of the district
court on six grounds. First, she argues that the district court
erred in dismissing her complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Second, she argues that the district court erred in
not addressing her objections to GTE Southwest's motion to
supplement its motion to dismiss. Third, she argues that the
district court erred in denying her motion for default judgment.
Fourth, she apparently argues that the district court erred in not
addressing her motion to dismiss GTE Southwest's counter-claim for
attorney's fees, even though the district court did not award fees
in this case. Fifth, Stiles challenges the district court's denial
of her motion to dismiss counsel for GTE Southwest and the district
court's subsequent denial of her request for reconsideration of
that denial. Finally, she appeals the district court's denial of
her motion for recusal. After reviewing the record in this case,
we find that only the first issue merits any discussion.
In dismissing this case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the district court held that, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
§ 207, once a complainant files a complaint with the FCC, she is
thereafter barred from bringing suit in federal court on the same
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claim. We review a district court's dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction de novo. Home Capital Collateral, Inc. v.
FDIC, 96 F.3d 760, 762 (5th Cir.1996).
Section 207 of the Act provides that:
Any person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this chapter may either make
complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or
may bring suit for the recovery of damages for which such
common carrier may liable ... in any district court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person
shall not have the right to pursue both such remedies.
47 U.S.C. § 207 (emphasis added). Section 208 then describes the
procedures by which a complaint may be filed and investigated. 47
U.S.C. § 208. The regulations implementing § 208 provide that a
complaint to the Commission may be informal or formal. See 47
C.F.R. § 1.711 (1996). Under the informal complaint procedure, the
FCC forwards a copy of the complaint to the carrier for
investigation. 47 C.F.R. § 1.717. The carrier must then "advise
the Commission in writing, with a copy to the complainant, of its
satisfaction of the complaint or of its refusal or inability to do
so." Id. If the complainant is not satisfied with the carrier's
response and the FCC's actions, the complainant may then file a
formal complaint. Id.
In contrast, "[f]ormal complaint proceedings are generally
resolved on a written record consisting of a complaint, answer and
reply but may also include other written submissions such as briefs
and written interrogatories." 47 C.F.R. § 1.720. In short, formal
complaint proceedings are more akin to traditional judicial
proceedings.
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Stiles argues that the jurisdictional bar of § 207 only
applies to formal complaints. In support of this argument, she has
provided two letters from the FCC regarding the procedures for
filing informal and formal complaints; the letters essentially
mirror the regulations implementing the statute. Although not
entirely clear, Stiles appears to rest her argument on the fact
that the letter setting forth the formal complaint procedures
advises the complainant that she may file either a formal complaint
or a complaint in federal district court, but not both, whereas the
letter setting forth the informal complaint procedures does not.
From this, Stiles concludes that you must be able to file both an
informal complaint and a complaint in federal district court.
While we acknowledge that there is some logic in this conclusion,2
a result of the fact that neither letter appears to have been
written with the other in mind, these letters are not the
determinative documents in this case.
In interpreting a statute, our objective is to give effect to
the intent of Congress. As always, we begin with the language of
the statute itself. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766
(1980) ("[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself."). When the language of the
statute is unambiguous, we must "give effect to the unambiguously
2
This is not to say that we agree entirely with Stiles's
reading of the FCC letters. Nonetheless, we are compelled to
invite the FCC to revisit the wording of these letters in light of
the disposition of this case.
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expressed intent of Congress." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778,
2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In other words, "we follow the plain
meaning of a statute unless it would lead to a result so bizarre
that Congress could not have intended it." Johnson v. Sawyer, 120
F.3d 1307, 1319 (5th Cir.1997) (quotations omitted).
In this case, the language of the statute is unambiguous: A
complainant can file a complaint either with the FCC or in federal
district court, but not in both. Contrary to Stiles's arguments,
§ 207 draws no distinction between formal and informal complaints
and the fact that the FCC has decided to provide both formal and
informal complaint proceedings does not alter the clear language of
the statute.
In sum, we hold that § 207 precludes a complainant from filing
suit in federal court once she has initiated the administrative
complaint process with the FCC either by filing a formal or
informal complaint. Accordingly, we find that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint and properly
dismissed Stiles's complaint on that ground.
With respect to Stiles's remaining arguments, we have reviewed
the record and find them to be without merit. Likewise, we have
reviewed Stiles's pending motions and find them to be without
merit; therefore, all pending motions are DENIED.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
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