United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 16, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-41574
PREMIERE NETWORK SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SBC COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEXAS
HOLDINGS, INC.; SWBT TEXAS LLC; SOUTHWESTERN BELL
TELEPHONE LP, FORMERLY KNOWN AS SOUTHWESTERN BELL
TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before JOLLY, BEAM,1 and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
BEAM, Circuit Judge.
This case involves a long-standing and procedurally
complicated dispute between Premiere Network Services, Inc.
(Premiere) and SBC Communications, Inc. and its affiliates
(collectively SBC) over access to telephone services and
facilities. The district court granted SBC's motion to dismiss and
Premiere appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
1
Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
I. BACKGROUND
Under the regulatory regime of the Federal Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (FTA), Premiere is a competitive local exchange carrier
(CLEC) in the Texas telecommunications market. SBC and its
affiliated entities comprise an incumbent local exchange carrier
(ILEC), controlling most of the cables, poles, and systems
necessary to provide telephone exchange service to a particular
area. Pursuant to the FTA, Premiere operates under an
interconnection arrangement with SBC called a "T2A" agreement2 that
regulates the business relationship between the two companies.
This appeal grows out of a somewhat convoluted chain of
litigation. In January 1999, Premiere filed a complaint against
SBC with the Texas Public Utilities Commission (TPUC), alleging
violations of the T2A, the FTA, state law, and orders of the TPUC.
Premiere claimed that the violations stymied competition in the
local telecommunications market. In November 1999, Premiere and
SBC executed a Confidential Joint Settlement Agreement and Release
2
"T2A" is short for "Texas 271 Agreement," which refers to 47
U.S.C. § 271. This section provides for Bell operating companies
to enter into interLATA service in a region. A LATA, or Local
Access and Transport Area, is a contiguous geographic area
comprised of one metropolitan area within the same state that is
served by a telecommunications company. InterLATA service is
telecommunications service between a point within and a point
outside a LATA. Providing interLATA service requires review by
both the specific state utilities commission and the Federal
Communications Commission for compliance with section 271.
2
(Settlement Agreement), and the parties jointly moved to dismiss
Premiere's complaint with prejudice. In December 1999, the TPUC
granted the motion.
In May 2002, Premiere filed a formal complaint against SBC
with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) alleging
discriminatory and anti-competitive practices regarding access to
"555" telephone numbers.3 In November 2002, Premiere filed a
motion to dismiss the proceeding without prejudice, based on
concerns that the record was flawed, and asserting that dismissal
would conserve the parties' and FCC's resources. In June 2003, the
FCC granted the motion, citing Premiere's optimism that the parties
could resolve their dispute in some other way. The FCC noted that
it does not have a specific rule for dismissing formal complaints,
but found instructive Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
41(a)(2), which provides a court discretion to dismiss an action
upon the plaintiff's request under terms and conditions set by the
court. The FCC declined SBC's request that it treat Premiere's
motion as a motion to dismiss with prejudice per FRCP 41(a)(1)
since Premiere had previously filed a related complaint with the
3
A "555" telephone number is a number assigned by the North
American Numbering Plan Administration (NANPA) to a particular
entity, which can use the number to access sundry information.
Until 1992, these numbers were used mostly for directory
assistance. At that time, the telecommunications industry
determined that "555" numbers should be used in a wider variety of
ways, and NANPA began assigning "555" numbers in 1994.
3
TPUC. The FCC dismissed the proceeding without prejudice. Citing
FRCP 41(a)(2), the FCC added a condition to the dismissal requiring
that if Premiere should file a complaint against SBC with the FCC
within one year of the dismissal raising materially similar facts
and legal issues, Premiere would provide SBC an exhibit comparing
the new complaint with the current complaint, to aid SBC in
preparing for the new case.
Then, in October 2003, Premiere filed the instant action
against SBC in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas. Premiere asserted claims for (1) violations of
sections 201, 202, 251(b), 251(c), and 251(e) of the FTA; (2)
breach of fiduciary duty; (3) fraud under the T2A; (4) fraudulent
inducement to enter an April 2001 settlement agreement;4 (5) breach
of contract (the T2A); (6) fraudulent inducement to enter the
November 1999 settlement agreement; (7) breach of contract (the
November 1999 settlement agreement); (8) tortious interference with
prospective contract; and (9) tortious interference with contract.
The district court noted that either section 252(e)(6) or
section 207 could provide the court with jurisdiction under the
FTA, but that Premiere did not specify under which section it
4
For clarity, we note that only Premiere's claims related to
the November 1999 settlement agreement, and not those related to
the April 2001 settlement agreement, are now before us on appeal.
4
brought its claims. The court estimated that since Premiere and
SBC were parties to an interconnection agreement, the source of
federal jurisdiction for the suit was likely section 252(e)(6), but
the court analyzed the claims under both sections.
Under section 252(e)(6), the district court found that all of
Premiere's federal claims were subsumed within the T2A. The court
dismissed Premiere's federal claims without prejudice, apparently
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that section
252(e)(6) contemplates exhaustion of administrative remedies for
disputes over interconnection agreements before a state public
utilities commission, which exhaustion had not yet occurred.5 The
5
Given the Supreme Court's recent reminder in Eberhart v.
United States, 126 S. Ct. 403 (2005), that courts be precise in
their use of the term "jurisdiction," we make the following
observation. See id. at 405 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.
443, 455 (2004) for the proposition that clarity would be advanced
"'if courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional' not for
claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the
classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons
(personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory
authority.'"). Because the district court dismissed Premiere's
claims under section 252(e)(6) for Premiere's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, it would have been more accurate for the
court to have framed its dismissal in terms of Premiere's failure
to state a claim, and not in terms of the court lacking
jurisdiction. "Whenever the Congress statutorily mandates that a
claimant exhaust administrative remedies, the exhaustion
requirement is jurisdictional . . . ." Taylor v. United States
Treasury Dep't, 127 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 1997). But where a
statute does not textually require exhaustion, only the
jurisprudential doctrine of exhaustion controls, which is not
jurisdictional in nature. Id. Section 252(e)(6) does not
expressly require exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus only
the jurisprudential doctrine of exhaustion is applicable. Under
5
court also dismissed what it termed Premiere's "state law" claims
without prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over them, and noting that there was no diversity jurisdiction
since both parties are citizens of Texas.
Under section 207, the district court stated it would dismiss
Premiere's claims on two bases. First, it said that those claims
(the court did not differentiate between state or federal) with a
nexus to the "555" number dispute would have to be dismissed,
apparently for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because of
Premiere's earlier filing of that dispute with the FCC. The court
said that those claims with such a nexus were: (1) violations of
section 251(e)(1) of the FTA; (2) fraudulent inducement to enter
the November 1999 settlement agreement; (3) breach of contract (the
November 1999 settlement agreement); (4) tortious interference with
prospective contract; and (5) tortious interference with contract.
The court did not agree with Premiere that the FCC's dismissal
without prejudice of those claims allowed Premiere to litigate them
in federal court. Second, the court stated that if it had
jurisdiction under section 207 over Premiere's remaining claims, it
that doctrine, Premiere likely failed to state a claim under
section 252(e)(6) because "'no one is entitled to judicial relief
for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted.'" Id. at 476 (quoting
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)).
6
would defer to the primary jurisdiction of the TPUC for those
claims.
Premiere appeals the dismissal of its "555" number-related
claims under section 207.6
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court's dismissal based on lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Stiles v. GTE Southwest, Inc.,
128 F.3d 904, 906 (5th Cir. 1997).
A. Effect of Filing With FCC on Application of Section 207
Premiere first argues that section 207 does not bar its "555"
number-related claims from federal court. The statutory provision
at issue in this appeal, 47 U.S.C. § 207, provides that
[a]ny person claiming to be damaged by any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this chapter may either make
complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for,
or may bring suit for the recovery of the damages for
6
Premiere does not appeal the district court's dismissal of
its federal claims under section 252(e)(6). As such, we express no
opinion as to the merits of the court's application of that section
to Premiere's assertions, and we assume that Premiere concedes that
if section 252(e)(6) applies, its federal claims require exhaustion
before the TPUC.
7
which such common carrier may be liable under the
provisions of this chapter, in any district court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person
shall not have the right to pursue both such remedies.
47 U.S.C. § 207. The district court pointed to our decision in
Stiles in deciding that since Premiere had earlier filed a formal
complaint with the FCC regarding the "555" dispute, it could not
later bring claims related to that same dispute into federal
district court. In Stiles, appellant had filed an informal
complaint with the FCC against GTE Southwest. Appellant later sued
GTE Southwest in federal court, seeking damages under the FTA. The
central issue in that case was whether section 207 barred the
filing of claims in federal court that had already been brought to
the FCC through an informal, as opposed to formal, complaint. The
Stiles court held that section 207 draws no distinction between
formal and informal proceedings. In interpreting the statute, the
court determined that the language of section 207 "is unambiguous:
A complainant can file a complaint either with the FCC or in
federal district court, but not in both." 128 F.3d at 907. The
court concluded that "§ 207 precludes a complainant from filing
suit in federal court once she has initiated the administrative
complaint process with the FCC either by filing a formal or
informal complaint." Id. (emphasis added).
8
Premiere asserts that the holdings in Stiles and other similar
cases, some of which rely on Stiles, are bounded by their factual
context: the litigants in those cases brought a federal claim
either while their complaint with the FCC was pending, or after the
FCC had issued a final determination. Premiere asserts that those
cases bar simultaneous actions, or actions in federal court
following a final disposition by the FCC, but that neither
situation applies in this case. See id. at 905-06 (noting that the
defendant-appellee GTE sought to attach a copy of the plaintiff-
appellant's informal complaint and FCC final determination letter
to its motion to dismiss); Mexiport, Inc. v. Frontier Commc'ns
Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 573 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that appellant
could not file in federal court after having filed informal
complaint with FCC, in case where FCC had completed informal
complaint process); Digitel, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 239 F.3d
187, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that "a party that has filed an
informal complaint [with the FCC] may not also sue in district
court," in case where district court had dismissed appellant's case
in part because FCC was proceeding with informal complaint
process); Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Allnet Commc'n Servs., Inc.,
17 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 1994) (deciding that appellant could not have
filed a counterclaim in the district court on the same dispute that
was the subject of its FCC complaint, in case where appellant's FCC
complaint was pending at the time of federal court litigation);
9
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. MFS Commc'ns Co., 901 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del.
1995) (holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to
hear complaint on same issues brought to the FCC, in case where
appellant's FCC complaint was still pending).
While Premiere points out substantial factual differences
between Stiles, the other cited cases, and this case, we do not
find the argued distinctions persuasive. Though it appears that
either an FCC complaint was pending or the FCC had made a final
determination in Stiles, Mexiport, and Digitel, those cases do not
condition their holdings on those facts. Rather, their decisions
are couched in terms of the appellant having initiated or filed a
complaint with the FCC. The determination in Bell Atlantic in
particular seems to stand apart from the fact that a complaint was
pending with the FCC. Appellant in that case argued that inaction
by the FCC on its complaint allowed it to file in federal court.
But the court stated that appellant "offer[ed] no explanation as to
why or how its choice of fora becomes, in a sense, 'reset' in the
face of FCC inaction. Title 47 offers no indication that a party's
election of fora, once made, is anything but irrevocable." 901 F.
Supp. at 852-53. The court concluded that "[b]y the terms of §
207, the choice to proceed in one or the other available forum
destroys jurisdiction in the remaining body; the electing party
10
must then accept and work through the problems of reaching a
judgment." Id. at 853.
We agree with the weight of authority that section 207 is an
election-of-remedies provision, and we now amplify our holding in
Stiles: once an election is made by either filing a complaint with
the FCC or filing a complaint in federal court, a party may not
thereafter file a complaint on the same issues in the alternative
forum, regardless of the status of the complaint. As the court in
Bell Atlantic pointed out, this has the effect of preventing
"duplicative adjudications and inconsistent results between
[federal court] and the FCC." Id. It also avoids giving a
complaining party several bites at the apple through dismissal and
re-filing of complaints, thereby upholding judicial efficiency and
fairness to responding parties.
B. Effect of Voluntary Dismissal on Filing Status
Premiere alternatively argues that the voluntary dismissal of
its complaint with the FCC prior to a decision essentially "un-
files" the complaint with the FCC just as it would in federal court
under FRCP 41(a)(2), and "'leaves the situation as if the action
never had been filed.'" Br. for Appellant 7 (quoting Long v. Bd. of
Pardons and Paroles of Texas, 725 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1984)).
11
Applying that reasoning under our interpretation of section 207,
Premiere would not be barred from filing suit in federal court
since essentially no election would have yet been made. Premiere
offers no precedent in support of this assertion, nor have we found
any. True, the FCC, in its order of dismissal, found FRCP 41(a)(2)
instructive, but only for the proposition that the rule leaves the
decision to dismiss within the sound discretion of courts, and not
for the reason that dismissal under the rule would "un-file" the
action. Regardless of their applicability, which we do not decide
here, we would not read the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
such a way as to defeat the clear statutory election-of-remedies
provision of section 207.7 We decline to adopt Premiere's "un-
filing" argument.
C. Disposition of Premiere's "555" Number-Related Claims
Arising Under Confidential Joint Settlement Agreement
After finding that section 207 divested it of jurisdiction,
the district court proceeded to consider which of Premiere's claims
would be barred from federal court. The results of this exercise
create some uncertainties that we now address.
7
Even if we were to strictly apply FRCP 41(a)(2), we would
have to recognize that the FCC conditioned its dismissal of
Premiere's complaint in such a way that it anticipated that any
subsequent legal action by Premiere would take place before the
FCC, not in federal court.
12
Since Premiere's complaint to the FCC dealt with the "555"
number dispute, the court, citing Digitel, determined that all
claims with any nexus to that issue are barred by section 207, and
must be brought to the FCC for adjudication. In Digitel, the court
stated "[o]f course, the filing of an informal complaint with the
FCC does not bar the complainant from bringing all claims, no
matter how unrelated, in district court. Instead, there must be a
nexus between the claims in the two forums that is sufficient to
bring § 207 into play." (Emphasis added). 239 F.3d at 191. The
claims seemingly relegated to the FCC by the district court under
its section 207 analysis include those for breach of the Settlement
Agreement, fraudulent inducement to enter into the Settlement
Agreement, tortious interference with contract and tortious
interference with prospective contractual relationships.
Premiere argues that these claims were never before the FCC in
the earlier "555"-related complaint and thus are not subject to a
section 207 election because they are based only on the Settlement
Agreement. In response, SBC, relying upon Digitel, asserts that
because Premiere's contract and tort claims are inextricably
intertwined with its FTA-based "555" number dispute, Premiere
cannot establish them as distinct and separable matters. We
disagree.
13
We note that the district court's conclusions with regard to
these competing arguments are less than precise. The court's
statements under its section 252(e)(6) analysis concerning
dismissal of state-law claims and rejection of supplemental
jurisdiction seem, at least on their face, to conflict with the
court's evaluation of the nature of the identical claims for
section 207 purposes. In this regard, the district court stated
that "all of Premiere's claims with a nexus to the '555' service
must be brought before the FCC." Premiere Network Servs., Inc. v.
SBC Commc'ns, Inc., No. C-03-418, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
19, 2004). It also stated, without again mentioning a lack of
diversity jurisdiction or that it would forego exercising
supplemental jurisdiction, that
[t]hose claims that must be dismissed by this court under
Section 207 [presumably to FCC jurisdiction] are:
violations of Sections 251(e)(1), fraudulent inducement
to Settlement Agreements based on "555" numbers, breach
of contract for Settlement Agreements, tortious
interference with prospective contract, and tortious
interference with existing contract.
Id. Thus, the district court appears to make no jurisdictional
distinction in its 207 analysis between federal statutory claims
and claims that it earlier recognized as state causes of action,
apparently directing them all to FCC jurisdiction. To the extent
14
that we have accurately read the district court's opinion, we
disagree with this result.
Section 207 grants federal court (or FCC) jurisdiction over
only FTA-created claims. Statutes granting federal court
jurisdiction "'are to be construed "with precision and with
fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its
wishes,"'" Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577,
580 (1982) (quoting Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 396
(1973) (quoting Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 392 U.S. 206, 212 (1968))), and courts are to avoid
expanding federal court jurisdiction by reading jurisdictional
statutes broadly. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 379 (1959), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990). While Congress
has the power to convert complaints purportedly based on state law
into complaints stating federal claims from their inception, see
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987), legislative
intent to do so must be reasonably clear and discernible. In other
words, as noted in Digitel, the "nexus" between the federal
statute, here the FTA, and claims traditionally viewed as sounding
in state law must be "sufficient to bring [the federal statute]
into play." 239 F.3d at 191. We do not think it necessary to
determine today whether Digitel is an acceptable reading of the
15
FTA's grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Nor do we find it
necessary to lay out the nature and character of the nexus needed
to create federal jurisdiction, if nexus alone is indeed a
satisfactory test. This is because we believe that the purported
connection between the "555" issue and the Settlement Agreement is
too tenuous in this case.8
Premiere's claims for breach of contract, fraudulent
inducement, tortious interference with contract, and tortious
interference with prospective contractual relations arise by virtue
of mutual promises made by Premiere and SBC within the four corners
of a contract–the Settlement Agreement9–or by virtue of SBC's
8
Applying Digitel's nexus theory broadly enough to include the
state-law type claims asserted may run afoul of recent Supreme
Court precedent regarding statutes that impact the state-federal
balance. Where Congress aims to change the usual constitutional
balance between the states and the federal government, it must make
unmistakably clear its intention to do so in the statute's
language. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65
(1989). This precept was recently echoed in Gonzales v. Oregon,
126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
9
The November 1999 Confidential Joint Settlement Agreement and
Release is not part of the TPUC's order dismissing Premiere's
complaint, or any court's dismissal order, so it is not akin to a
consent decree encompassing an agreement that becomes in essence
part of a judgment of a "hybrid nature." See Ruiz v. Estelle, 161
F.3d 814, 822 (5th Cir. 1998). The Settlement Agreement is purely
a contract between Premiere and SBC arising under state law.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381-82
(1994) (stating that claim for breach of a settlement agreement
that dismissed a federal lawsuit is a claim for breach of contract,
over which there is no federal court jurisdiction, outside of
ancillary jurisdiction when made part of court order).
16
purported conduct relating to this contract. These claims sound in
state, not federal, law, as the district court apparently
recognized under its section 252(e)(6) analysis.
In any event, our conclusion is fully supported by Digitel.
The earlier arguments before the FCC and the contract allegations
set forth in the district court complaint "arise[] out of distinct
disputes." 239 F.3d at 191. Premiere's claims before the FCC,
though they dealt with "555" number use, alleged violations of
specific provisions of federal law, including the FTA, FCC rules,
and SBC's tariff. On the other hand, Premiere's claims under the
Settlement Agreement, which were brought only in federal court,
relate to a purported breach of a promise by SBC, in violation of
state contract law, not to oppose Premiere's efforts to use a
specific "555" number for one of its major clients. That promise
was made to Premiere by SBC in a separate contract designed to end
litigation before the TPUC. In Digitel, the claims found to be
barred by section 207 were federal, not state, claims, brought
pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, appellee's tariff
(filed under the Communications Act of 1934), and federal common
law. 239 F.3d at 189. Consistent with Digitel, we believe that
since Premiere's contract-related claims are asserted under the
language of the Settlement Agreement and not under the terms of the
FTA, they are substantially unrelated to Premiere's previous claims
17
before the FCC.10 Thus, whatever the reach of section 207, there
is insufficient nexus between the two sets of claims to trigger the
section's election of remedies mandate.11
10
If and when Digitel is fully fleshed out in an appropriate
case, the elements of the "nexus" necessary for section 207
purposes may place at least some facially state-law related claims
within the reach of the FTA's federal subject matter jurisdiction.
State/federal relationships created by the FTA clearly exist. See,
e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 252(e) (providing for state commission
jurisdiction to approve interconnection agreements, and review of
state commission decisions by federal district court).
11
We believe our conclusion that Premiere's claims under the
Settlement Agreement do not arise under federal law is undiminished
by a preemption argument. Because preemption was not raised by
either party below, we mention it only to recognize a potential
issue. Because we do not reach the merits of Premiere's claims
under the Settlement Agreement, but rather analyze only whether
they are susceptible to federal jurisdiction, we are guided by the
theory of complete preemption, as distinct from a general theory of
federal preemption as a defense. See Sullivan v. American
Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 273, n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) ("'[I]n
complete preemption cases, federal law so occupies the field that
any complaint alleging facts that come within the statute's scope
necessarily 'arise under' federal law . . . .'") (quoting 15
Moore's Federal Practice § 103.45[2] (3d ed. 2005)) (alterations in
original); Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001)
("[O]rdinary preemption operates to dismiss state claims on the
merits . . . .") (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). As such,
we express no opinion as to the validity of any defense based on
general federal preemption.
A number of cases have held that the FTA does not completely
preempt state-law causes of action. See, e.g., Smith, 236 F.3d at
1312-13 (reviewing the relationship between section 414 and section
207, and holding that Congress did not intend state-law claims
within the scope of the FTA to be federalized). See also Pinney v.
Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding there is no
evidence, given the FTA's "savings" clause, that Congress intended
the FTA to be the exclusive remedy for state-law claims, and thus
state claims in that case did not arise under federal law); Marcus
v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). And because
Premiere's claims under the Settlement Agreement apparently do not
challenge SBC's tariff, the filed-rate doctrine likely does not
18
We further believe that the FTA's savings clause counsels
recognition of these contract-based allegations as non-federal
claims. "Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies." 47 U.S.C. § 414.12 Section 207's election requirement
and section 414's preservation of state-law claims requirement are
harmonized in this case by noting that it is only claims brought
pursuant to the FTA that are subject to section 207's election.13
In sum, the district court was correct in directing the
federal claims to the FCC. The district court was also correct in
apply to completely preempt such claims and make them federal. See
AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998) (holding
state contract and tort claims which seek services contrary to
filed tariff are preempted by FTA under filed-rate doctrine);
Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that where effect of contract action is to challenge tariff, the
action arises under federal law).
12
The savings clause merely preserves existing state-law
remedies and does not require a restrictive reading of the FTA's
grant of federal jurisdiction. Thus, proper court analysis of
traditional state-law claims actually subsumed within the federal
legislation, if any, will prohibit reformulated and duplicative
state and federal litigation.
13
Section 207 provides that a complaint about a common carrier
may be brought to the Commission "as hereinafter provided for;"
section 208 states that such complaint must be for "contravention
of the provisions [of the FTA]." 47 U.S.C. § 208 (emphasis added).
Section 207 also provides that suit may be filed in federal court
against a common carrier for the recovery of damages "for which
such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this
chapter." Id. at § 207 (emphasis added).
19
disclaiming jurisdiction over the state-law claims. With the
federal claims properly dismissed and no diversity of citizenship
apparent, the district court was well within its discretion to
decline supplemental jurisdiction over Premiere's remaining issues.
See Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580,
585 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Our general rule is to dismiss state claims
when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed.").
There was also no ancillary jurisdiction over the state-law claims
because the Settlement Agreement did not arise out of a matter
before the district court and was not part of any court order
retaining federal control. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court's dismissal of Premiere's federal
claims without prejudice. To the extent the district court
concluded that Premiere's claims for breach of the Settlement
Agreement, fraudulent inducement to enter into the Settlement
Agreement, tortious interference with contract, and tortious
interference with prospective contractual relations must be taken
to the FCC, if anywhere, we reverse and remand for dismissal of the
state-law claims without prejudice to their assertion in a court of
competent jurisdiction.
20