UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-10668
WILLIAM HOPKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
AMERICAN TELEPHONE and TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(3:95-CV-461-T)
January 6, 1998
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
William Hopkins [“Hopkins”] appeals adverse summary judgment
rejecting his race discrimination and retaliation claims brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. §
1981 against American Telephone and Telegraph [“AT&T”].
Hopkins contends the summary judgment record shows factual
disputes on whether discriminatory or nondiscriminatory reasons
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
prompted his termination. Particularly, Hopkins testified in a
deposition that he was placed on a program designed to monitor an
employee’s performance, a “work program,” within one month of
reporting discriminatory racial comments made by an account
representative for AT&T. Hopkins alleges that Virgil Jochimsen, an
account representative with the Network Systems division of AT&T,
repeatedly warned Hopkins to cancel plans to attend product
demonstrations scheduled for AT&T’s southeastern territory.
Hopkins Depo., p. 32-38. Jochisem told Hopkins that most of AT&T’s
customers in that area were Ku Klux Klan members and that Hopkins’s
presence would jeopardize sales and place Hopkins in physical
danger. Id. at 32. Hopkins reported Jochisem’s remarks to
Hopkins’s supervisor Paul Casson who took no action. Id. at 38-39.
There is no evidence in the record that tends to corroborate or
refute Hopkins’s account of this incident. In effect, Hopkins
argues that his report of the racial comments landed him on a work
program and that being on a work program precipitated his
termination.
AT&T avers that it placed Hopkins on a work program and,
ultimately, terminated Hopkins for poor job performance. In
support of its position, AT&T produced written complaints from
account team managers describing Hopkins’s performance as
unsatisfactory. AT&T also produced substantial summary judgment
evidence of Hopkins’s unsatisfactory progress in the work program,
including evidence of poor performance reports and of Hopkins’s
failure to complete assigned tasks. Hopkins counters that the
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allegations of poor performance are untrue, but produced no summary
judgment evidence, aside from his unsupported assertions, to bear
out his contention.
Hopkins points to timing as circumstantial evidence of
discrimination. But, even if timing alone is sufficient to survive
summary judgment in some cases, the timing evidence in this case
does not create a jury issue. See Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997
F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993). Here, Hopkins’s placement on the work
program followed more closely the receipt of complaint letters from
account managers, than it did Hopkins’s report of discriminatory
comments. There is no direct evidence that the account managers
were aware of, or influenced by, Jochisem’s statements to Hopkins
or Jochisem’s concern that Hopkins’s presence at particular product
demonstrations could jeopardize sales to racially bigoted potential
customers.
Having reviewed the summary judgment record in the light most
favorable to Hopkins, we cannot conclude that it would be
reasonable, as opposed to speculative, for a jury to infer that
AT&T engaged in discriminatory practices. See Grimes v. Texas Dept.
of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). The many
reports of Hopkins’s poor performance, countered only by Hopkins’s
unsupported assertions, are fatal to his claims of discrimination.
Accordingly, the district court appropriately granted summary
judgment in favor of AT&T.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
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