Davis v. Washington

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

No. 05–5224. Argued March 20, 2006—Decided June 19, 2006*
In No. 05–5224, a 911 operator ascertained from Michelle McCottry
that she had been assaulted by her former boyfriend, petitioner
Davis, who had just fled the scene. McCottry did not testify at
Davis’s trial for felony violation of a domestic no-contact order, but
the court admitted the 911 recording despite Davis’s objection, which
he based on the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. He was
convicted. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the
State Supreme Court, which concluded that, inter alia, the portion of
the 911 conversation in which McCottry identified Davis as her as
sailant was not testimonial.
In No. 05–5705, when police responded to a reported domestic dis
turbance at the home of Amy and Hershel Hammon, Amy told them
that nothing was wrong, but gave them permission to enter. Once
inside, one officer kept petitioner Hershel in the kitchen while the
other interviewed Amy elsewhere and had her complete and sign a
battery affidavit. Amy did not appear at Hershel’s bench trial for, in
ter alia, domestic battery, but her affidavit and testimony from the
officer who questioned her were admitted over Hershel’s objection
that he had no opportunity to cross-examine her. Hershel was con
victed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.
The State Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding that, although
Amy’s affidavit was testimonial and wrongly admitted, it was harm
less beyond a reasonable doubt.
Held:
1. The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial state
ments of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was un
——————
* Together with No. 05–5705, Hammon v. Indiana, on certiorari to
the Supreme Court of Indiana.
2 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Syllabus

available to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53–54.
These cases require the Court to determine which police “interroga
tions” produce statements that fall within this prohibition. Without
attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable
statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to de
cide the present cases to hold that statements are nontestimonial
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are tes
timonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the inter
rogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution. Pp. 6–7.
2. McCottry’s statements identifying Davis as her assailant were
not testimonial. Pp. 8–14.
(a) This case requires the Court to decide whether the Confronta
tion Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay, and, if so, whether
the 911 recording qualifies. Crawford suggested the answer to the
first question, noting that “the Confrontation Clause . . . applies to
‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear tes
timony.’ ” Only “testimonial statements” cause a declarant to be a
witness. The Court is unaware of any early American case invoking
the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation
that did not involve testimony as thus defined. Well into the 20th
century, this Court’s jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the
testimonial context, and its later cases never in practice dispensed
with the Confrontation Clause requirements of unavailability and
prior cross-examination in cases involving testimonial hearsay.
Pp. 8–11.
(b) The question in Davis, therefore, is whether, objectively con
sidered, the interrogation during the 911 call produced testimonial
statements. In contrast to Crawford, where the interrogation took
place at a police station and was directed solely at establishing a past
crime, a 911 call is ordinarily designed primarily to describe current
circumstances requiring police assistance. The difference is apparent
here. McCottry was speaking of events as they were actually hap
pening, while Crawford’s interrogation took place hours after the
events occurred. Moreover, McCottry was facing an ongoing emer
gency. Further, the statements elicited were necessary to enable the
police to resolve the present emergency rather than simply to learn
what had happened in the past. Finally, the difference in the level of
formality is striking. Crawford calmly answered questions at a sta
tion house, with an officer-interrogator taping and taking notes,
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

while McCottry’s frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an
environment that was not tranquil, or even safe. Thus, the circum
stances of her interrogation objectively indicate that its primary pur
pose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
She was not acting as a witness or testifying. Pp. 11–14.
3. Amy Hammon’s statements were testimonial. They were not
much different from those in Crawford. It is clear from the circum
stances that Amy’s interrogation was part of an investigation into
possibly criminal past conduct. There was no emergency in progress,
she told the police when they arrived that things were fine, and the
officer questioning her was seeking to determine not what was hap
pening but what had happened. Objectively viewed, the primary, if
not sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible
crime. While the formal features of Crawford’s interrogation
strengthened her statements’ testimonial aspect, such features were
not essential to the point. In both cases, the declarants were sepa
rated from the defendants, the statements recounted how potentially
criminal past events began and progressed, and the interrogation
took place some time after the events were over. For the same rea
sons the comparison to Crawford is compelling, the comparison to
Davis is unpersuasive. The statements in Davis were taken when
McCottry was alone, unprotected by police, and apparently in imme
diate danger from Davis. She was seeking aid, not telling a story
about the past. Pp. 14–17.
4. The Indiana courts may determine on remand whether a claim
of forfeiture by wrongdoing—under which one who obtains a wit
ness’s absence by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to con
frontation—is properly raised in Hammon, and, if so, whether it is
meritorious. Absent such a finding, the Sixth Amendment operates
to exclude Amy Hammon’s affidavit. Pp. 18–19.
No. 05–5224, 154 Wash. 2d 291, 111 P. 3d 844, affirmed; No. 05–5705,
829 N. E. 2d 444, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO,
JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006_) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–5224 and 05–5705
_________________

ADRIAN MARTELL DAVIS, PETITIONER
05–5224 v.
WASHINGTON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

WASHINGTON

HERSHEL HAMMON, PETITIONER
05–5705 v.
INDIANA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

INDIANA

[June 19, 2006]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases require us to determine when statements
made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at
a crime scene are “testimonial” and thus subject to the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause.
I
A
The relevant statements in Davis v. Washington, No.
05–5224, were made to a 911 emergency operator on
February 1, 2001. When the operator answered the initial
call, the connection terminated before anyone spoke. She
2 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

reversed the call, and Michelle McCottry answered. In the
ensuing conversation, the operator ascertained that
McCottry was involved in a domestic disturbance with her
former boyfriend Adrian Davis, the petitioner in this case:
“911 Operator: Hello.
“Complainant: Hello.
“911 Operator: What’s going on?
“Complainant: He’s here jumpin’ on me again.
“911 Operator: Okay. Listen to me carefully. Are
you in a house or an apartment?
“Complainant: I’m in a house.
“911 Operator: Are there any weapons?
“Complainant: No. He’s usin’ his fists.
“911 Operator: Okay. Has he been drinking?
“Complainant: No.
“911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. I’ve got help started.
Stay on the line with me, okay?
“Complainant: I’m on the line.
“911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you
know his last name?
“Complainant: It’s Davis.
“911 Operator: Davis? Okay, what’s his first name?
“Complainant: Adran
“911 Operator: What is it?
“Complainant: Adrian.
“911 Operator: Adrian?
“Complainant: Yeah.
“911 Operator: Okay. What’s his middle initial?
“Complainant: Martell. He’s runnin’ now.” App. in
No. 05–5224, pp. 8–9.
As the conversation continued, the operator learned that
Davis had “just r[un] out the door” after hitting McCottry,
and that he was leaving in a car with someone else. Id., at
9–10. McCottry started talking, but the operator cut her
off, saying, “Stop talking and answer my questions.” Id.,
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Opinion of the Court

at 10. She then gathered more information about Davis
(including his birthday), and learned that Davis had told
McCottry that his purpose in coming to the house was “to
get his stuff,” since McCottry was moving. Id., at 11–12.
McCottry described the context of the assault, id., at 12,
after which the operator told her that the police were on
their way. “They’re gonna check the area for him first,”
the operator said, “and then they’re gonna come talk to
you.” Id., at 12–13.
The police arrived within four minutes of the 911 call
and observed McCottry’s shaken state, the “fresh injuries
on her forearm and her face,” and her “frantic efforts to
gather her belongings and her children so that they could
leave the residence.” 154 Wash. 2d 291, 296, 111 P. 3d
844, 847 (2005) (en banc).
The State charged Davis with felony violation of a do
mestic no-contact order. “The State’s only witnesses were
the two police officers who responded to the 911 call. Both
officers testified that McCottry exhibited injuries that
appeared to be recent, but neither officer could testify as
to the cause of the injuries.” Ibid. McCottry presumably
could have testified as to whether Davis was her assailant,
but she did not appear. Over Davis’s objection, based on
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the
trial court admitted the recording of her exchange with
the 911 operator, and the jury convicted him. The Wash
ington Court of Appeals affirmed, 116 Wash. App. 81, 64
P. 3d 661 (2003). The Supreme Court of Washington, with
one dissenting justice, also affirmed, concluding that the
portion of the 911 conversation in which McCottry identi
fied Davis was not testimonial, and that if other portions
of the conversation were testimonial, admitting them was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 154 Wash. 2d, at
305, 111 P. 3d, at 851. We granted certiorari. 546 U. S.
___ (2005).
4 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

B

In Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05–5705, police responded
late on the night of February 26, 2003, to a “reported
domestic disturbance” at the home of Hershel and Amy
Hammon. 829 N. E. 2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005). They found
Amy alone on the front porch, appearing “ ‘somewhat
frightened,’ ” but she told them that “ ‘nothing was the
matter,’ ” id., at 446, 447. She gave them permission to
enter the house, where an officer saw “a gas heating unit
in the corner of the living room” that had “flames coming
out of the . . . partial glass front. There were pieces of
glass on the ground in front of it and there was flame
emitting from the front of the heating unit.” App. in No.
05–5705, p. 16.
Hershel, meanwhile, was in the kitchen. He told the
police “that he and his wife had ‘been in an argument’ but
‘everything was fine now’ and the argument ‘never became
physical.’ ” 829 N. E. 2d, at 447. By this point Amy had
come back inside. One of the officers remained with
Hershel; the other went to the living room to talk with
Amy, and “again asked [her] what had occurred.” Ibid.;
App. in No. 05–5705, at 17, 32. Hershel made several
attempts to participate in Amy’s conversation with the
police, see id., at 32, but was rebuffed. The officer later
testified that Hershel “became angry when I insisted that
[he] stay separated from Mrs. Hammon so that we can
investigate what had happened.” Id., at 34. After hearing
Amy’s account, the officer “had her fill out and sign a
battery affidavit.” Id., at 18. Amy handwrote the follow
ing: “Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the floor
into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and threw me
down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my van where I
couldn’t leave the house. Attacked my daughter.” Id., at
2.
The State charged Hershel with domestic battery and
with violating his probation. Amy was subpoenaed, but
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Opinion of the Court

she did not appear at his subsequent bench trial. The
State called the officer who had questioned Amy, and
asked him to recount what Amy told him and to authenti
cate the affidavit. Hershel’s counsel repeatedly objected to
the admission of this evidence. See id., at 11, 12, 13, 17,
19, 20, 21. At one point, after hearing the prosecutor
defend the affidavit because it was made “under oath,”
defense counsel said, “That doesn’t give us the opportunity
to cross examine [the] person who allegedly drafted it.
Makes me mad.” Id., at 19. Nonetheless, the trial court
admitted the affidavit as a “present sense impression,” id.,
at 20, and Amy’s statements as “excited utterances” that
“are expressly permitted in these kinds of cases even if the
declarant is not available to testify.” Id., at 40. The officer
thus testified that Amy
“informed me that she and Hershel had been in an ar
gument. That he became irrate [sic] over the fact of
their daughter going to a boyfriend’s house. The ar
gument became . . . physical after being verbal and
she informed me that Mr. Hammon, during the verbal
part of the argument was breaking things in the living
room and I believe she stated he broke the phone,
broke the lamp, broke the front of the heater. When it
became physical he threw her down into the glass of
the heater.
. . . . .
“She informed me Mr. Hammon had pushed her
onto the ground, had shoved her head into the broken
glass of the heater and that he had punched her in the
chest twice I believe.” Id., at 17–18.
The trial judge found Hershel guilty on both charges, id.,
at 40, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in rele
vant part, 809 N. E. 2d 945 (2004). The Indiana Supreme
Court also affirmed, concluding that Amy’s statement was
admissible for state-law purposes as an excited utterance,
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829 N. E. 2d, at 449; that “a ‘testimonial’ statement is one
given or taken in significant part for purposes of preserv
ing it for potential future use in legal proceedings,” where
“the motivations of the questioner and declarant are the
central concerns,” id., at 456, 457; and that Amy’s oral
statement was not “testimonial” under these standards,
id., at 458. It also concluded that, although the affidavit
was testimonial and thus wrongly admitted, it was harm
less beyond a reasonable doubt, largely because the trial
was to the bench. Id., at 458–459. We granted certiorari.
546 U. S. ___ (2005).
II
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36,
53–54 (2004), we held that this provision bars “admission
of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear
at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the de
fendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.” A critical portion of this holding, and the
portion central to resolution of the two cases now before
us, is the phrase “testimonial statements.” Only state
ments of this sort cause the declarant to be a “witness”
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. See id.,
at 51. It is the testimonial character of the statement that
separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to
traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not sub
ject to the Confrontation Clause.
Our opinion in Crawford set forth “[v]arious formula
tions” of the core class of “ ‘testimonial’ ” statements, ibid.,
but found it unnecessary to endorse any of them, because
“some statements qualify under any definition,” id., at 52.
Among those, we said, were “[s]tatements taken by police
officers in the course of interrogations,” ibid.; see also id.,
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Opinion of the Court

at 53. The questioning that generated the deponent’s
statement in Crawford—which was made and recorded
while she was in police custody, after having been given
Miranda warnings as a possible suspect herself—
“qualifies under any conceivable definition” of an “ ‘inter
rogation,’ ” 541 U. S., at 53, n. 4. We therefore did not
define that term, except to say that “[w]e use [it] . . . in its
colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense,” and
that “one can imagine various definitions . . . , and we
need not select among them in this case.” Ibid. The char
acter of the statements in the present cases is not as clear,
and these cases require us to determine more precisely
which police interrogations produce testimony.
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classifica
tion of all conceivable statements—or even all conceivable
statements in response to police interrogation—as either
testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the
present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontesti
monial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the pri
mary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assis
tance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimo
nial when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.1
——————
1 Our holding refers to interrogations because, as explained below, the
statements in the cases presently before us are the products of interro
gations—which in some circumstances tend to generate testimonial
responses. This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the
absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The
Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination
volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they
were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation. (Part of the evidence
against Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was
plainly not the result of sustained questioning. Raleigh’s Case, 2 How.
St. Tr. 1, 27 (1603).) And of course even when interrogation exists, it is
8 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

III
A
In Crawford, it sufficed for resolution of the case before
us to determine that “even if the Sixth Amendment is not
solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its
primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement
officers fall squarely within that class.” Id., at 53. More
over, as we have just described, the facts of that case
spared us the need to define what we meant by “interroga
tions.” The Davis case today does not permit us this lux
ury of indecision. The inquiries of a police operator in the
course of a 911 call2 are an interrogation in one sense, but
not in a sense that “qualifies under any conceivable defini
tion.” We must decide, therefore, whether the Confronta
tion Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay; and, if so,
whether the recording of a 911 call qualifies.
The answer to the first question was suggested in Craw
ford, even if not explicitly held:
“The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this
focus [on testimonial hearsay]. It applies to ‘wit
nesses’ against the accused—in other words, those
who ‘bear testimony.’ 1 N. Webster, An American Dic
tionary of the English Language (1828). ‘Testimony,’
in turn, is typically ‘a solemn declaration or affirma
tion made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact.’ Ibid. An accuser who makes a formal
——————
in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s
questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.
2 If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they

may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interro
gations of 911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without
deciding the point), we consider their acts to be acts of the police. As in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), therefore, our hold-
ing today makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when state
ments made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are
“testimonial.”
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

statement to government officers bears testimony in a
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.” 541 U. S., at 51.
A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitu
tional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely
its “core,” but its perimeter.
We are not aware of any early American case invoking
the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to
confrontation that did not clearly involve testimony as
thus defined.3 Well into the 20th century, our own Con
frontation Clause jurisprudence was carefully applied only
in the testimonial context. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U. S. 145, 158 (1879) (testimony at prior trial was
subject to the Confrontation Clause, but petitioner had
forfeited that right by procuring witness’s absence); Mattox

——————
3 See, e.g., State v. Webb, 2 N. C. 103, 103–104 (Super. L. & Eq. 1794)

(per curiam) (excluding deposition taken in absence of the accused);
State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. 229 (Super. L. & Eq. 1807) (per curiam) (ex
cluding prior testimony of deceased witness); Johnston v. State, 10
Tenn. 58, 59 (Err. & App. 1821) (admitting written deposition of de
ceased deponent, because defendant had the opportunity to cross-
examine); Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 701, 707–708 (1827) (exclud
ing prior testimony of a witness still alive, though outside the jurisdic
tion); State v. Hill, 20 S. C. L. 607 (App. 1835) (excluding deposition of
deceased victim taken in absence of the accused); Commonwealth v.
Richards, 35 Mass. 434, 436–439 (1837) (excluding preliminary exami
nation testimony of deceased witness because the witness’s precise
words were not available); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. 344 (1842) (admit
ting deposition of deceased where defendant declined opportunity to
cross-examine); People v. Newman, 5 Hill 295 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (per
curiam) (excluding prior trial testimony of witness who was still alive);
State v. Campbell, 30 S. C. L. 124, 125 (App. L. 1844) (excluding deposi
tion taken in absence of the accused); State v. Valentine, 29 N. C. 225
(1847) (per curiam) (admitting preliminary examination testimony of
decedent where defendant had opportunity to cross-examine); Kendrick
v. State, 29 Tenn. 479, 491 (1850) (admitting testimony of deceased
witness at defendant’s prior trial); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 439–441
(1858) (excluding deposition of deponent who was still alive).
10 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

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v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 240–244 (1895) (prior trial
testimony of deceased witnesses admitted because subject to
cross-examination); Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 55–
56 (1899) (guilty pleas and jury conviction of others could
not be admitted to show that property defendant received
from them was stolen); Motes v. United States, 178 U. S.
458, 467, 470–471 (1900) (written deposition subject to
cross-examination was not admissible because witness was
available); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U. S. 325, 330–331
(1911) (facts regarding conduct of prior trial certified to by
the judge, the clerk of court, and the official reporter did not
relate to defendants’ guilt or innocence and hence were not
statements of “witnesses” under the Confrontation Clause).
Even our later cases, conforming to the reasoning of
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980),4 never in practice
dispensed with the Confrontation Clause requirements of
unavailability and prior cross-examination in cases that
involved testimonial hearsay, see Crawford, 541 U. S., at
57–59 (citing cases), with one arguable exception, see id.,
at 58, n. 8 (discussing White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346
(1992)). Where our cases did dispense with those re
quirements—even under the Roberts approach—the
statements at issue were clearly nontestimonial. See, e.g.,
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171, 181–184 (1987)
(statements made unwittingly to a Government infor
mant); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 87–89 (1970) (plural
ity opinion) (statements from one prisoner to another).
Most of the American cases applying the Confrontation
Clause or its state constitutional or common-law counter
parts involved testimonial statements of the most formal
——————
4 “Roberts condition[ed] the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on

whether it falls under a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bears
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Crawford, 541 U. S.,
at 60 (quoting Roberts, 448 U. S., at 66). We overruled Roberts in
Crawford by restoring the unavailability and cross-examination
requirements.
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Opinion of the Court

sort—sworn testimony in prior judicial proceedings or
formal depositions under oath—which invites the argu
ment that the scope of the Clause is limited to that very
formal category. But the English cases that were the
progenitors of the Confrontation Clause did not limit the
exclusionary rule to prior court testimony and formal
depositions, see Crawford, supra, at 52, and n. 3. In any
event, we do not think it conceivable that the protections
of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by
having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hear
say testimony of the declarant, instead of having the
declarant sign a deposition. Indeed, if there is one point
for which no case—English or early American, state or
federal—can be cited, that is it.
The question before us in Davis, then, is whether, objec
tively considered, the interrogation that took place in the
course of the 911 call produced testimonial statements.
When we said in Crawford, supra, at 53, that “interroga
tions by law enforcement officers fall squarely within [the]
class” of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind
(for that was the case before us) interrogations solely
directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order
to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator.
The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a
writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the mem
ory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is
testimonial. It is, in the terms of the 1828 American
dictionary quoted in Crawford, “ ‘[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or prov
ing some fact.’ ” 541 U. S., at 51. (The solemnity of even an
oral declaration of relevant past fact to an investigating
officer is well enough established by the severe conse
quences that can attend a deliberate falsehood. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stewart, 433 F. 3d 273, 288 (CA2 2006)
(false statements made to federal investigators violate 18
U. S. C. §1001); State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶30, 695 N. W.
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Opinion of the Court

2d 315, 323 (state criminal offense to “knowingly giv[e]
false information to [an] officer with [the] intent to mis
lead the officer in the performance of his or her duty”).) A
911 call, on the other hand, and at least the initial inter
rogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordi
narily not designed primarily to “establis[h] or prov[e]”
some past fact, but to describe current circumstances
requiring police assistance.
The difference between the interrogation in Davis and
the one in Crawford is apparent on the face of things. In
Davis, McCottry was speaking about events as they were
actually happening, rather than “describ[ing] past events,”
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U. S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opin
ion). Sylvia Crawford’s interrogation, on the other hand,
took place hours after the events she described had oc
curred. Moreover, any reasonable listener would recog
nize that McCottry (unlike Sylvia Crawford) was facing an
ongoing emergency. Although one might call 911 to pro
vide a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent
danger, McCottry’s call was plainly a call for help against
bona fide physical threat. Third, the nature of what was
asked and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively,
was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be
able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply
to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the past.
That is true even of the operator’s effort to establish the
identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched officers
might know whether they would be encountering a violent
felon. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of
Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 186 (2004). And
finally, the difference in the level of formality between the
two interviews is striking. Crawford was responding
calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with
the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her
answers; McCottry’s frantic answers were provided over
the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could make
out) safe.
We conclude from all this that the circumstances of
McCottry’s interrogation objectively indicate its primary
purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongo
ing emergency. She simply was not acting as a witness;
she was not testifying. What she said was not “a weaker
substitute for live testimony” at trial, United States v.
Inadi, 475 U. S. 387, 394 (1986), like Lord Cobham’s
statements in Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603), or
Jane Dingler’s ex parte statements against her husband in
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791), or
Sylvia Crawford’s statement in Crawford. In each of those
cases, the ex parte actors and the evidentiary products of
the ex parte communication aligned perfectly with their
courtroom analogues. McCottry’s emergency statement
does not. No “witness” goes into court to proclaim an
emergency and seek help.
Davis seeks to cast McCottry in the unlikely role of a
witness by pointing to English cases. None of them in
volves statements made during an ongoing emergency. In
King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779), for
example, a young rape victim, “immediately on her coming
home, told all the circumstances of the injury” to her
mother. Id., at 200, 168 Eng. Rep., at 202. The case
would be helpful to Davis if the relevant statement had
been the girl’s screams for aid as she was being chased by
her assailant. But by the time the victim got home, her
story was an account of past events.
This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an
interrogation to determine the need for emergency assis
tance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme Court put it, “evolve
into testimonial statements,” 829 N. E. 2d, at 457, once
that purpose has been achieved. In this case, for example,
after the operator gained the information needed to ad
dress the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears
14 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

to have ended (when Davis drove away from the prem
ises). The operator then told McCottry to be quiet, and
proceeded to pose a battery of questions. It could readily
be maintained that, from that point on, McCottry’s state
ments were testimonial, not unlike the “structured police
questioning” that occurred in Crawford, 541 U. S., at 53,
n. 4. This presents no great problem. Just as, for Fifth
Amendment purposes, “police officers can and will distin
guish almost instinctively between questions necessary to
secure their own safety or the safety of the public and
questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence
from a suspect,” New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 658–
659 (1984), trial courts will recognize the point at which,
for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in response to
interrogations become testimonial. Through in limine
procedure, they should redact or exclude the portions of
any statement that have become testimonial, as they do,
for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise
admissible evidence. Davis’s jury did not hear the com
plete 911 call, although it may well have heard some tes
timonial portions. We were asked to classify only
McCottry’s early statements identifying Davis as her
assailant, and we agree with the Washington Supreme
Court that they were not testimonial. That court also
concluded that, even if later parts of the call were testi
monial, their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Davis does not challenge that holding, and we
therefore assume it to be correct.
B
Determining the testimonial or nontestimonial charac
ter of the statements that were the product of the interro
gation in Hammon is a much easier task, since they were
not much different from the statements we found to be
testimonial in Crawford. It is entirely clear from the
circumstances that the interrogation was part of an inves
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of the Court

tigation into possibly criminal past conduct—as, indeed,
the testifying officer expressly acknowledged, App. in No.
05–5705, at 25, 32, 34. There was no emergency in pro
gress; the interrogating officer testified that he had heard
no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break
anything, id., at 25. When the officers first arrived, Amy
told them that things were fine, id., at 14, and there was
no immediate threat to her person. When the officer
questioned Amy for the second time, and elicited the
challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine
(as in Davis) “what is happening,” but rather “what hap
pened.” Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the
sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a
possible crime—which is, of course, precisely what the
officer should have done.
It is true that the Crawford interrogation was more
formal. It followed a Miranda warning, was tape-
recorded, and took place at the station house, see 541
U. S., at 53, n. 4. While these features certainly strength
ened the statements’ testimonial aspect—made it more
objectively apparent, that is, that the purpose of the exer
cise was to nail down the truth about past criminal
events—none was essential to the point. It was formal
enough that Amy’s interrogation was conducted in a sepa
rate room, away from her husband (who tried to inter
vene), with the officer receiving her replies for use in his
“investigat[ion].” App. in No. 05–5705, at 34. What we
called the “striking resemblance” of the Crawford state
ment to civil-law ex parte examinations, 541 U. S., at 52, is
shared by Amy’s statement here. Both declarants were
actively separated from the defendant—officers forcibly
prevented Hershel from participating in the interrogation.
Both statements deliberately recounted, in response to
police questioning, how potentially criminal past events
began and progressed. And both took place some time
after the events described were over. Such statements
16 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for
live testimony, because they do precisely what a wit
ness does on direct examination; they are inherently
testimonial.5
Both Indiana and the United States as amicus curiae
——————
5 The dissent criticizes our test for being “neither workable nor a

targeted attempt to reach the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation]
Clause,” post, at 9 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). As to the former: We have
acknowledged that our holding is not an “exhaustive classification of all
conceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in response
to police interrogation,” supra, at 7, but rather a resolution of the cases
before us and those like them. For those cases, the test is objective and
quite “workable.” The dissent, in attempting to formulate an exhaus
tive classification of its own, has not provided anything that deserves
the description “workable”—unless one thinks that the distinction
between “formal” and “informal” statements, see post, at 4–5, qualifies.
And the dissent even qualifies that vague distinction by acknowledging
that the Confrontation Clause “also reaches the use of technically
informal statements when used to evade the formalized process,” post,
at 5, and cautioning that the Clause would stop the State from “us[ing]
out-of-court statements as a means of circumventing the literal right of
confrontation,” post, at 6. It is hard to see this as much more “predict
able,” ibid., than the rule we adopt for the narrow situations we ad
dress. (Indeed, under the dissent’s approach it is eminently arguable
that the dissent should agree, rather than disagree, with our disposi
tion in Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05–5705.)
As for the charge that our holding is not a “targeted attempt to reach
the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause,” which the dissent
describes as the depositions taken by Marian magistrates, character
ized by a high degree of formality, see post, at 2–3: We do not dispute
that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance. But we no
longer have examining Marian magistrates; and we do have, as our
18th-century forebears did not, examining police officers, see L. Fried
man, Crime and Punishment in American History 67–68 (1993)—who
perform investigative and testimonial functions once performed by
examining Marian magistrates, see J. Langbein, The Origins of Adver
sary Criminal Trial 41 (2003). It imports sufficient formality, in our
view, that lies to such officers are criminal offenses. Restricting the
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was origi
nally directed is a recipe for its extinction. Cf. Kyllo v. United States,
533 U. S. 27 (2001).
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17

Opinion of the Court

argue that this case should be resolved much like Davis.
For the reasons we find the comparison to Crawford com
pelling, we find the comparison to Davis unpersuasive.
The statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was
alone, not only unprotected by police (as Amy Hammon
was protected), but apparently in immediate danger from
Davis. She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the
past. McCottry’s present-tense statements showed imme
diacy; Amy’s narrative of past events was delivered at
some remove in time from the danger she described. And
after Amy answered the officer’s questions, he had her
execute an affidavit, in order, he testified, “[t]o establish
events that have occurred previously.” App. in No. 05–
5705, at 18.
Although we necessarily reject the Indiana Supreme
Court’s implication that virtually any “initial inquiries” at
the crime scene will not be testimonial, see 829 N. E. 2d,
at 453, 457, we do not hold the opposite—that no ques
tions at the scene will yield nontestimonial answers. We
have already observed of domestic disputes that “[o]fficers
called to investigate . . . need to know whom they are
dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to
their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim.” Hiibel, 542 U. S., at 186. Such exigencies may
often mean that “initial inquiries” produce nontestimonial
statements. But in cases like this one, where Amy’s state
ments were neither a cry for help nor the provision of
information enabling officers immediately to end a threat
ening situation, the fact that they were given at an alleged
crime scene and were “initial inquiries” is immaterial. Cf.
Crawford, supra, at 52, n. 3.6
——————
6 Police investigations themselves are, of course, in no way impugned

by our characterization of their fruits as testimonial. Investigations of
past crimes prevent future harms and lead to necessary arrests. While
prosecutors may hope that inculpatory “nontestimonial” evidence is
gathered, this is essentially beyond police control. Their saying that an
18 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

IV

Respondents in both cases, joined by a number of their
amici, contend that the nature of the offenses charged in
these two cases—domestic violence—requires greater
flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence. This particu
lar type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation
or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify
at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives
the criminal a windfall. We may not, however, vitiate
constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of
allowing the guilty to go free. Cf. Kyllo v. United States,
533 U. S. 27 (2001) (suppressing evidence from an illegal
search). But when defendants seek to undermine the
judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from
witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not
require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no
duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do have
the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the
integrity of the criminal-trial system. We reiterate what
we said in Crawford: that “the rule of forfeiture by wrong
doing . . . extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially
equitable grounds.” 541 U. S., at 62 (citing Reynolds, 98
U. S., at 158–159). That is, one who obtains the absence of
a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to
confrontation.
We take no position on the standards necessary to dem
onstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies the forfeiture
doctrine, have generally held the Government to the pre
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard, see, e.g., United

——————
emergency exists cannot make it be so. The Confrontation Clause in no
way governs police conduct, because it is the trial use of, not the inves
tigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends
that provision. But neither can police conduct govern the Confronta
tion Clause; testimonial statements are what they are.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 19

Opinion of the Court

States v. Scott, 284 F. 3d 758, 762 (CA7 2002). State
courts tend to follow the same practice, see, e.g., Com
monwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. 526, 542, 830 N. E. 2d
158, 172 (2005). Moreover, if a hearing on forfeiture is
required, Edwards, for instance, observed that “hearsay
evidence, including the unavailable witness’s out-of-court
statements, may be considered.” Id., at 545, 830 N. E. 2d,
at 174. The Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause
undoubtedly made recourse to this doctrine less necessary,
because prosecutors could show the “reliability” of ex parte
statements more easily than they could show the defen
dant’s procurement of the witness’s absence. Crawford, in
overruling Roberts, did not destroy the ability of courts to
protect the integrity of their proceedings.
We have determined that, absent a finding of forfeiture
by wrongdoing, the Sixth Amendment operates to exclude
Amy Hammon’s affidavit. The Indiana courts may (if they
are asked) determine on remand whether such a claim of
forfeiture is properly raised and, if so, whether it is meri
torious.
* * *
We affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wash
ington in No. 05–5224. We reverse the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Indiana in No. 05–5705, and remand
the case to that Court for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 05–5224 and 05–5705
_________________

ADRIAN MARTELL DAVIS, PETITIONER
05–5224 v.
WASHINGTON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

WASHINGTON

HERSHEL HAMMON, PETITIONER
05–5705 v.
INDIANA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

INDIANA

[June 19, 2006]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part.
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), we
abandoned the general reliability inquiry we had long
employed to judge the admissibility of hearsay evidence
under the Confrontation Clause, describing that inquiry as
“inherently, and therefore permanently, unpredictable.”
Id., at 68, n. 10 (emphasis in original). Today, a mere two
years after the Court decided Crawford, it adopts an
equally unpredictable test, under which district courts are
charged with divining the “primary purpose” of police
interrogations. Ante, at 7. Besides being difficult for
courts to apply, this test characterizes as “testimonial,”
and therefore inadmissible, evidence that bears little
resemblance to what we have recognized as the evidence
targeted by the Confrontation Clause. Because neither of
the cases before the Court today would implicate the
2 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

Confrontation Clause under an appropriately targeted
standard, I concur only in the judgment in Davis v. Wash
ington, No. 05–5224, and dissent from the Court’s resolu
tion of Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05–5705.
I

A

The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all crimi
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U. S.
Const., Amdt. 6. We have recognized that the operative
phrase in the Clause, “witnesses against him,” could be
interpreted narrowly, to reach only those witnesses who
actually testify at trial, or more broadly, to reach many or
all of those whose out-of-court statements are offered at
trial. Crawford, supra, at 42–43; White v. Illinois, 502
U. S. 346, 359–363 (1992) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). Because the narrowest
interpretation of the Clause would conflict with both the
history giving rise to the adoption of the Clause and this
Court’s precedent, we have rejected such a reading. See
Crawford, supra, at 50–51; White, supra, at 360 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.).
Rejection of the narrowest view of the Clause does not,
however, require the broadest application of the Clause to
exclude otherwise admissible hearsay evidence. The
history surrounding the right to confrontation supports
the conclusion that it was developed to target particular
practices that occurred under the English bail and com
mittal statutes passed during the reign of Queen Mary,
namely, the “civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused.” Crawford, supra, at 43, 50; White,
supra, at 361–362 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242 (1895). “The predomi
nant purpose of the [Marian committal] statute was to
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

institute systematic questioning of the accused and the
witnesses.” J. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Ren
aissance 23 (1974) (emphasis added). The statute re
quired an oral examination of the suspect and the accus
ers, transcription within two days of the examinations,
and physical transmission to the judges hearing the case.
Id., at 10, 23. These examinations came to be used as
evidence in some cases, in lieu of a personal appearance by
the witness. Crawford, supra, at 43–44; 9 W. Holdsworth,
A History of English Law 223–229 (1926). Many state
ments that would be inadmissible as a matter of hearsay
law bear little resemblance to these evidentiary practices,
which the Framers proposed the Confrontation Clause to
prevent. See, e.g., Crawford, supra, at 51 (contrasting
“[a]n off-hand, overheard remark” with the abuses tar
geted by the Confrontation Clause). Accordingly, it is
unlikely that the Framers intended the word “witness” to
be read so broadly as to include such statements. Cf.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., con
curring in result) (rejecting the “assumption that the core
purpose of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend
ment is to prevent overly broad exceptions to the hearsay
rule”).
In Crawford, we recognized that this history could be
squared with the language of the Clause, giving rise to a
workable, and more accurate, interpretation of the Clause.
“ ‘[W]itnesses,’ ” we said, are those who “ ‘bear testimony.’ ”
541 U. S., at 51 (quoting 1 N. Webster, An American Dic
tionary of the English Language (1828)). And “ ‘[t]esti
mony’ ” is “ ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ” Ibid.
(quoting Webster, supra). Admittedly, we did not set forth
a detailed framework for addressing whether a statement
is “testimonial” and thus subject to the Confrontation
Clause. But the plain terms of the “testimony” definition
we endorsed necessarily require some degree of solemnity
4 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

before a statement can be deemed “testimonial.”
This requirement of solemnity supports my view that
the statements regulated by the Confrontation Clause
must include “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depo
sitions, prior testimony, or confessions.” White, supra, at
365 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Affidavits, depositions, and
prior testimony are, by their very nature, taken through a
formalized process. Likewise, confessions, when extracted
by police in a formal manner, carry sufficient indicia of
solemnity to constitute formalized statements and, accord
ingly, bear a “striking resemblance,” Crawford, supra, at
52, to the examinations of the accused and accusers under
the Marian statutes.1 See generally Langbein, supra, at
21–34.
Although the Court concedes that the early American
cases invoking the right to confrontation or the Confronta
tion Clause itself all “clearly involve[d] testimony” as
defined in Crawford, ante, at 9, it fails to acknowledge
that all of the cases it cites fall within the narrower cate
gory of formalized testimonial materials I have proposed.
See ante, at 9, n. 3.2 Interactions between the police and
——————
1 Like the Court, I presume the acts of the 911 operator to be the acts

of the police. Ante, at 8, n. 2. Accordingly, I refer to both the operator
in Davis and the officer in Hammon, and their counterparts in similar
cases, collectively as “the police.”
2 Our more recent cases, too, nearly all hold excludable under the

Confrontation Clause materials that are plainly highly formal. See
White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 365, n. 2 (1992) (THOMAS, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment). The only exceptions involve
confessions of codefendants to police, and those confessions appear to
have either been formal due to their occurrence in custody or to have
been formalized into signed documents. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U. S. 415, 416 (1965) (signed confession); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S.
1 (1966) (signed confession taken after accomplice’s arrest, see Brief for
Petitioner in Brookhart v. Janis, O. T. 1965, No. 657, pp. 10–11);
Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 124 (1968) (custodial interroga
tion); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293 (1968) (per curiam) (custodial
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

an accused (or witnesses) resemble Marian proceedings—
and these early cases—only when the interactions are
somehow rendered “formal.” In Crawford, for example,
the interrogation was custodial, taken after warnings
given pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966). 541 U. S., at 38. Miranda warnings, by their
terms, inform a prospective defendant that “ ‘anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law.’ ”
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 435 (2000)
(quoting Miranda, supra, at 479). This imports a solem
nity to the process that is not present in a mere conversa
tion between a witness or suspect and a police officer.3
The Court all but concedes that no case can be cited for
its conclusion that the Confrontation Clause also applies
to informal police questioning under certain circum
stances. Ante, at 9–11. Instead, the sole basis for the
Court’s conclusion is its apprehension that the Confronta
tion Clause will “readily be evaded” if it is only applicable
to formalized testimonial materials. Ante, at 11. But the
Court’s proposed solution to the risk of evasion is need
lessly overinclusive. Because the Confrontation Clause
sought to regulate prosecutorial abuse occurring through
use of ex parte statements as evidence against the accused,
it also reaches the use of technically informal statements
when used to evade the formalized process. Cf. ibid. That
is, even if the interrogation itself is not formal, the produc
tion of evidence by the prosecution at trial would resemble
the abuses targeted by the Confrontation Clause if the
——————
interrogation following a warning that the co-defendant’s statement
could be used against her at trial, see Brief in Opposition, O. T. 1967,
No. 920, pp. 5–6).
3 The possibility that an oral declaration of past fact to a police officer,

if false, could result in legal consequences to the speaker, see ante, at
11–12, may render honesty in casual conversations with police officers
important. It does not, however, render those conversations solemn or
formal in the ordinary meanings of those terms.
6 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

prosecution attempted to use out-of-court statements as a
means of circumventing the literal right of confrontation,
see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012 (1988). In such a case, the
Confrontation Clause could fairly be applied to exclude the
hearsay statements offered by the prosecution, preventing
evasion without simultaneously excluding evidence offered
by the prosecution in good faith.
The Court’s standard is not only disconnected from
history and unnecessary to prevent abuse; it also yields no
predictable results to police officers and prosecutors at
tempting to comply with the law. Cf. Crawford, supra, at
68, n. 10 (criticizing unpredictability of the pre-Crawford
test); White, 502 U. S., at 364–365 (THOMAS, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (limiting the Confron
tation Clause to the discrete category of materials histori
cally abused would “greatly simplify” application of the
Clause). In many, if not most, cases where police respond
to a report of a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from
the victim or otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation,
viewed from the perspective of the police, are both to
respond to the emergency situation and to gather evi
dence. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 656 (1984)
(“Undoubtedly most police officers [deciding whether to
give Miranda warnings in a possible emergency situation]
would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely
unverifiable motives—their own safety, the safety of oth
ers, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating
evidence from the suspect”). Assigning one of these two
“largely unverifiable motives,” ibid., primacy requires
constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be
present—and is not reliably discernible. It will inevitably
be, quite simply, an exercise in fiction.
The Court’s repeated invocation of the word “objec
tiv[e]” to describe its test, see ante, at 7, 11–13, 15, how
ever, suggests that the Court may not mean to reference
purpose at all, but instead to inquire into the function
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

served by the interrogation. Certainly such a test would
avoid the pitfalls that have led us repeatedly to reject
tests dependent on the subjective intentions of police
officers.4 It would do so, however, at the cost of being
even more disconnected from the prosecutorial abuses
targeted by the Confrontation Clause. Additionally, it
would shift the ability to control whether a violation
occurred from the police and prosecutor to the judge,
whose determination as to the “primary purpose” of a
particular interrogation would be unpredictable and not
necessarily tethered to the actual purpose for which the
police performed the interrogation.
B
Neither the 911 call at issue in Davis nor the police
questioning at issue in Hammon is testimonial under the
appropriate framework. Neither the call nor the question
ing is itself a formalized dialogue.5 Nor do any circum
stances surrounding the taking of the statements render
those statements sufficiently formal to resemble the
Marian examinations; the statements were neither
Mirandized nor custodial, nor accompanied by any similar
indicia of formality. Finally, there is no suggestion that
the prosecution attempted to offer the women’s hearsay

——————
4 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 655–656, and n. 6 (1984)

(subjective motivation of officer not relevant in considering whether the
public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), is
applicable); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301 (1980) (subjective
intent of police officer to obtain incriminatory statement not relevant to
whether an interrogation has occurred); Whren v. United States, 517
U. S. 806, 813 (1996) (refusing to evaluate Fourth Amendment reason
ableness in light of the officers’ actual motivations).
5 Although the police questioning in Hammon was ultimately reduced

to an affidavit, all agree that the affidavit is inadmissible per se under
our definition of the term “testimonial.” Brief for Respondent in No.
05–5705, p. 46; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 05–
5705, p. 14.
8 DAVIS v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

evidence at trial in order to evade confrontation. See 829
N. E. 2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005) (prosecution subpoenaed
Amy Hammon to testify, but she was not present); 154
Wash. 2d 291, 296, 111 P. 3d 844, 847 (2005) (en banc)
(State was unable to locate Michelle McCottry at the time
of trial). Accordingly, the statements at issue in both
cases are nontestimonial and admissible under the Con
frontation Clause.
The Court’s determination that the evidence against
Hammon must be excluded extends the Confrontation
Clause far beyond the abuses it was intended to prevent.
When combined with the Court’s holding that the evidence
against Davis is perfectly admissible, however, the Court’s
Hammon holding also reveals the difficulty of applying the
Court’s requirement that courts investigate the “primary
purpose[s]” of the investigation. The Court draws a line
between the two cases based on its explanation that
Hammon involves “no emergency in progress,” but in
stead, mere questioning as “part of an investigation into
possibly criminal past conduct,” ante, at 14–15, and its
explanation that Davis involves questioning for the “pri
mary purpose” of “enabl[ing] police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency,” ante, at 13. But the fact that the
officer in Hammon was investigating Mr. Hammon’s past
conduct does not foreclose the possibility that the primary
purpose of his inquiry was to assess whether Mr. Hammon
constituted a continuing danger to his wife, requiring
further police presence or action. It is hardly remarkable
that Hammon did not act abusively towards his wife in the
presence of the officers, ante, at 15, and his good judgment
to refrain from criminal behavior in the presence of police
sheds little, if any, light on whether his violence would
have resumed had the police left without further question
ing, transforming what the Court dismisses as “past con
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

duct” back into an “ongoing emergency.” Ante, at 13, 15.6
Nor does the mere fact that McCottry needed emergency
aid shed light on whether the “primary purpose” of gather
ing, for example, the name of her assailant was to protect
the police, to protect the victim, or to gather information
for prosecution. In both of the cases before the Court, like
many similar cases, pronouncement of the “primary”
motive behind the interrogation calls for nothing more
than a guess by courts.
II
Because the standard adopted by the Court today is
neither workable nor a targeted attempt to reach the
abuses forbidden by the Clause, I concur only in the judg
ment in Davis v. Washington, No. 05–5224, and respect
fully dissent from the Court’s resolution of Hammon v.
Indiana, No. 05–5705.

——————
6 Some of the factors on which the Court relies to determine that the

police questioning in Hammon was testimonial apply equally in Davis.
For example, while Hammon was “actively separated from the [victim]”
and thereby “prevented . . . from participating in the interrogation,”
Davis was apart from McCottry while she was questioned by the 911
operator and thus unable to participate in the questioning. Ante, at 2,
15. Similarly, “the events described [by McCottry] were over” by the
time she recounted them to the 911 operator. Ibid. See 154 Wash. 2d
291, 295–296, 111 P. 3d 844, 846–847 (2005) (en banc).