(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. ET AL. v. CUNO ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 04–1704. Argued March 1, 2006—Decided May 15, 2006*
The city of Toledo and State of Ohio sought to encourage DaimlerChrys
ler Corp. to expand its Toledo operations by offering it local property
tax exemptions and a state franchise tax credit. A group of plaintiffs
including Toledo residents who pay state and local taxes sued in state
court, alleging that the tax breaks violated the Commerce Clause.
The taxpayer plaintiffs claimed injury because the tax breaks de
pleted the state and local treasuries to which they contributed. De
fendants removed the action to District Court. Plaintiffs moved to
remand to state court because, inter alia, they doubted whether they
satisfied either the constitutional or prudential limitations on stand
ing in federal court. The District Court declined to remand the case,
concluding that plaintiffs had standing under the “municipal tax
payer standing” rule articulated in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S.
447. On the merits, the court found that neither tax benefit violated
the Commerce Clause. Without addressing standing, the Sixth Cir
cuit agreed as to the municipal tax exemption, but held that the state
franchise tax credit violated the Commerce Clause. Defendants
sought certiorari to review the invalidation of the franchise tax
credit, and plaintiffs sought certiorari to review the upholding of the
property tax exemption. This Court granted review to consider
whether the franchise tax credit violates the Commerce Clause, and
directed the parties to address the issue of standing.
Held: Plaintiffs have not established their standing to challenge the
state franchise tax credit. Because they have no standing to chal
lenge that credit, the lower courts erred by considering their claims
——————
* Together with No. 04–1724, Wilkins, Tax Commissioner for State of
Ohio, et al. v. Cuno et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
2 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Syllabus
on the merits. Pp. 4–18.
1. State taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge
state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as
taxpayers. Pp. 4–13.
(a) Before this Court can address the merits of plaintiffs’ chal
lenge, it has an obligation to assure itself that the merits question is
presented in a proper Article III “case” or “controversy.” Lujan v. De
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560. The case-or-controversy limita
tion is crucial in maintaining the “ ‘tripartite allocation of power’ ” set
forth in the Constitution. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 474.
“Article III standing . . . enforces the . . . case-or-controversy re
quirement.” Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 11.
The requisite elements of standing are familiar: “A plaintiff must al
lege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”
Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751. Plaintiffs, as the parties now as
serting federal jurisdiction, must carry the burden of establishing
their standing. Pp. 4–6.
(b) Plaintiffs’ principal claim that the franchise tax credit de
pletes state funds to which they contribute through their taxes, and
thus diminishes the total funds available for lawful uses and imposes
disproportionate burdens on them, is insufficient to establish stand
ing under Article III. This Court has denied federal taxpayers stand
ing under Article III to object to a particular expenditure of federal
funds simply because they are taxpayers. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian College, supra, at 476–482. The animating principle behind
cases such as Valley Forge was announced in Frothingham v. Mellon,
decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, in which the
Court observed that a federal taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of
the Treasury . . . is shared with millions of others; is comparatively
minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of
any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain,
that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a
court of equity.” Id., at 486–487. This rationale applies with undi
minished force to state taxpayers who allege simply that a state fiscal
decision will deplete the fisc and “impose disproportionate burdens on
them.” See Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429, 433–
434. Because state budgets frequently have an array of tax and
spending provisions that may be challenged on a variety of bases, af
fording state taxpayers standing to press such challenges simply be
cause their tax burden gives them an interest in the state treasury
would interpose the federal courts as “ ‘virtually continuing monitors
of the wisdom and soundness’ ” of state fiscal administration, con
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Syllabus
trary to the more modest role Article III envisions for federal courts.
See Allen, supra, at 760–761. Pp. 7–11.
(c) Also rejected is plaintiffs’ argument that they have state tax
payer standing on the ground that their Commerce Clause challenge
is just like the Establishment Clause challenge this Court permitted
in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 105–106. Flast allowed an Estab
lishment Clause challenge by federal taxpayers to a congressional ac
tion under Art. I, §8. Although Flast held out the possibility that
“specific [constitutional] limitations” other than the Establishment
Clause might support federal taxpayer standing, id., at 105, 85, only
the Establishment Clause has been held to do so since Flast, see, e.g.,
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 618. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Flast is
misguided: Whatever rights plaintiffs have under the Commerce
Clause, they are fundamentally unlike the right not to contribute
even “three pence” to support a religious establishment that was up
held in Flast, 392 U. S., at 103. Indeed, plaintiffs compare the two
Clauses at such a high level of generality that almost any constitu
tional constraint on government power could be likened to the Estab
lishment Clause as interpreted in Flast. Id., at 105. And a finding
that the Commerce Clause satisfies the Flast test because it often
implicates governments’ fiscal decisions would leave no principled
way of distinguishing other constitutional provisions that also con
strain governments’ taxing and spending decisions. See, e.g., Arkan
sas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221. Yet such a broad
application of Flast’s exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer
standing would be at odds with Flast’s own promise that it would not
transform federal courts into forums for taxpayers’ “generalized
grievances.” 392 U. S., at 106. Pp. 11–13.
2. Plaintiffs’ status as municipal taxpayers does not give them
standing to challenge the state franchise tax credit at issue.
This Court has noted with approval the standing of municipal tax
payers to enjoin the illegal use of a municipal corporation’s funds.
See, e.g., Frothingham, supra, at 486–487. But plaintiffs’ attempts to
leverage the notion of municipal taxpayer standing into standing to
challenge the state tax credit are unavailing. Pp. 13–18.
(a) Plaintiffs argue that because state law requires revenues
from the franchise tax to be distributed to local governments, the
award of a credit to DaimlerChrysler reduced such distributions and
thus depleted the funds of local governments to which plaintiffs pay
taxes. But plaintiffs’ challenge is still to the state law and state deci
sion, not those of plaintiffs’ municipality. Their argument thus suf
fers from the same defects that the claim of state taxpayer standing
exhibits. Pp. 14–15.
(b) Also rejected is plaintiffs’ claim that their standing to chal
4 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Syllabus
lenge the municipal property tax exemption supports jurisdiction
over their challenge to the franchise tax credit under the “supplemen
tal jurisdiction” recognized in Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715.
Gibbs held that federal-question jurisdiction over a claim may au
thorize a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims
that may be viewed as part of the same case because they “derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact” as the federal claim. Id., at
725. Plaintiffs assume that Gibbs stands for the proposition that fed
eral jurisdiction extends to all claims sufficiently related to a claim
within Article III to be part of the same case, regardless of the defi
ciency that would keep the former claims out of federal court if pre
sented on their own. This Court’s general approach to the applica
tion of Gibbs has been markedly more cautious. See, e.g., Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. ___, ___. The Court
has never applied Gibbs’ rationale to permit a federal court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that does not itself satisfy
those elements of the Article III inquiry, such as constitutional stand
ing, that “serv[e] to identify those disputes which are appropriately
resolved through the judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U. S. 149, 155. There is no reason to read Gibbs’ language as broadly as
plaintiffs urge, particularly since the Court’s standing cases confirm
that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to
press, see, e.g., Allen, supra, at 752. If standing were commutative,
as plaintiffs claim, the Court’s insistence that a plaintiff must dem
onstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought, see, e.g.,
Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
528 U. S. 167, 185, would make little sense when all claims for relief
derive from a “common nucleus of operative fact,” as they appear to
have in cases like Laidlaw.
Such a reading of Gibbs would have remarkable implications. The
doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate in
Article III’s “case” or “controversy” language, no less than standing
does. See, e.g., National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Department of In
terior, 538 U. S. 803, 808. Yet if Gibbs’ “common nucleus” formula
tion announced a new definition of “case” or “controversy” for all Arti
cle III purposes, a federal court would be free to entertain moot or
unripe claims, or claims presenting a political question, if they “de
rived from” the same “operative fact[s]” as another federal claim suf
fering from none of these defects. Plaintiffs’ reading of Gibbs, there
fore, would amount to a significant revision of the Court’s precedent
interpreting Article III. With federal courts thus deciding issues they
would not otherwise be authorized to decide, the “ ‘tripartite alloca
tion of power’ ” that Article III is designed to maintain, Valley Forge,
supra, at 474, would quickly erode, and the Court’s emphasis on the
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Syllabus
standing requirement’s role in maintaining this separation would be
rendered hollow rhetoric, see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 357.
Pp. 15–18.
386 F. 3d 738, vacated in part and remanded.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined.
GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 04–1704 and 04–1724
_________________
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
04–1704 v.
CHARLOTTE CUNO ET AL.
WILLIAM W. WILKINS, TAX COMMISSIONER FOR
THE STATE OF OHIO, ET AL., PETITIONERS
04–1724 v.
CHARLOTTE CUNO ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 15, 2006]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Jeeps were first mass-produced in 1941 for the U. S.
Army by the Willys-Overland Motor Company in Toledo,
Ohio. Nearly 60 years later, the city of Toledo and State of
Ohio sought to encourage the current manufacturer of
Jeeps—DaimlerChrysler—to expand its Jeep operation in
Toledo, by offering local and state tax benefits for new
investment. Taxpayers in Toledo sued, alleging that their
local and state tax burdens were increased by the tax
breaks for DaimlerChrysler, tax breaks that they asserted
violated the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals
agreed that a state tax credit offered under Ohio law
violated the Commerce Clause, and state and local officials
2 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
and DaimlerChrysler sought review in this Court. We are
obligated before reaching this Commerce Clause question
to determine whether the taxpayers who objected to the
credit have standing to press their complaint in federal
court. We conclude that they do not, and we therefore can
proceed no further.
I
Ohio levies a franchise tax “upon corporations for the
privilege of doing business in the state, owning or using a
part or all of its capital or property in [the] state, or hold
ing a certificate of compliance authorizing it to do business
in [the] state.” Wesnovtek Corp. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St.
3d 312, 313, 2005–Ohio–1826, ¶2, 825 N. E. 2d 1099, 1100;
see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5733.01 (Lexis 2005). A tax
payer that purchases “new manufacturing machinery and
equipment” and installs it at sites in the State receives a
credit against the franchise tax. See §5733.33(B)(1) (Lexis
1999).1 Municipalities in Ohio may also offer partial
property tax waivers to businesses that agree to invest
in qualifying areas. See §5709.62(C)(1)(a) (Lexis 2005).
With consent from local school districts, the partial prop
erty tax waiver can be increased to a complete exemption.
See §5709.62(D)(1).
In 1998, DaimlerChrysler entered into a contract with
the city of Toledo. Under the contract, DaimlerChrysler
agreed to expand its Jeep assembly plant at Stickney
Avenue in Toledo. In exchange, the city agreed to waive
the property tax for the plant, with the consent of the two
school districts in which the plant is located. Because
DaimlerChrysler undertook to purchase and install “new
——————
1 Ohio has begun phasing out the franchise tax and has discontinued
offering new credits against the tax like the one DaimlerChrysler
received. See §§5733.01(G), 5733.33(B)(1) (Lexis 2005). Where rele
vant, therefore, the citations in this opinion are to the statutes in effect
at the time DaimlerChrysler made its investment.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of the Court
manufacturing machinery and equipment,” it was also
entitled to a credit against the state franchise tax. See
§5733.33(B)(1) (Lexis 1999).
Plaintiffs filed suit against various state and local offi
cials and DaimlerChrysler in state court, alleging that
these tax benefits violated the Commerce Clause. Most of
the plaintiffs were residents of Toledo, who paid taxes to
both the city of Toledo and State of Ohio. They claimed
that they were injured because the tax breaks for Daim
lerChrysler diminished the funds available to the city and
State, imposing a “disproportionate burden” on plaintiffs.
App. 18a, 23a, 28a.2
Defendants removed the action to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. See 28
U. S. C. §1441. Plaintiffs filed motions to remand the case
to state court. See §1447(c). One of the grounds on which
they sought remand concerned their standing. They pro
fessed “substantial doubts about their ability to satisfy
either the constitutional or the prudential limitations on
standing in the federal court,” and urged the District
Court to avoid the issue entirely by remanding. Plaintiffs’
Supplemental Motion for Remand to State Court in No.
3:00cv7247, p. 13, Record Doc. 17 (footnote omitted).
The District Court declined to remand the case, conclud
ing that, “[a]t the bare minimum, the Plaintiffs who are
taxpayers have standing to object to the property tax
exemption and franchise tax credit statutes under the
——————
2 Other plaintiffs were residents of Toledo who claimed they were
injured because they were displaced by the DaimlerChrysler expansion
and Michigan residents who claimed injury because DaimlerChrysler
would have expanded its operations in Michigan but for the Ohio
investment tax credit. Plaintiffs neither identified these allegations as
a basis for standing in their merits brief before this Court nor referred
to them at oral argument. Any argument based on these allegations is
therefore abandoned. See, e.g., United States v. International Business
Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855, and n. 3 (1996).
4 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
‘municipal taxpayer standing’ rule articulated in Massa
chusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).” App. 78a (citations
omitted). On the merits, the District Court found that
neither tax benefit violated the Commerce Clause. See
154 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (2001). The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit agreed with the District Court as to the
municipal property tax exemption, but held that the state
franchise tax credit violated the Commerce Clause. See
386 F. 3d 738 (2004). The Court of Appeals did not ad
dress the issue of standing.
Defendants sought certiorari to review the Sixth Cir
cuit’s invalidation of the franchise tax credit and plaintiffs
sought certiorari to review the upholding of the property
tax exemption. We granted certiorari to consider whether
the franchise tax credit violates the Commerce Clause, 545
U. S. ___ (2005); the Michigan Supreme Court had decided
a similar question contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s analysis
here. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury, 440 Mich.
400, 488 N. W. 2d 182 (1992). We also asked the parties to
address whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the
franchise tax credit in this litigation.
II
We have “an obligation to assure ourselves” of litigants’
standing under Article III. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laid-
law Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180
(2000). We therefore begin by addressing plaintiffs’ claims
that they have standing as taxpayers to challenge the fran
chise tax credit.
A
Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803), grounded the Federal Judiciary’s
authority to exercise judicial review and interpret the
Constitution on the necessity to do so in the course of
carrying out the judicial function of deciding cases. As
Marshall explained, “[t]hose who apply the rule to particu
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of the Court
lar cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule.” Id., at 177. Determining that a matter before the
federal courts is a proper case or controversy under Article
III therefore assumes particular importance in ensuring
that the Federal Judiciary respects “ ‘the proper—and
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic soci
ety,’ ” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975)). If a dispute is
not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no busi
ness deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of
doing so.
This Court has recognized that the case-or-controversy
limitation is crucial in maintaining the “ ‘tripartite alloca
tion of power’ ” set forth in the Constitution. Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968)). Marshall again
made the point early on, this time in a speech in the House
of Representatives. “A case in law or equity,” Marshall
remarked,
“was a term . . . of limited signification. It was a con
troversy between parties which had taken a shape for
judicial decision. If the judicial power extended to
every question under the constitution it would involve
almost every subject proper for legislative discussion
and decision; if to every question under the laws and
treaties of the United States it would involve almost
every subject on which the executive could act. The
division of power [among the branches of government]
could exist no longer, and the other departments
would be swallowed up by the judiciary.” 4 Papers of
John Marshall 95 (C. Cullen ed. 1984).
As this Court has explained, “ ‘[n]o principle is more fun
damental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of
government than the constitutional limitation of federal
6 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’ ” Raines
v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 37 (1976)).
The case-or-controversy requirement thus plays a criti
cal role, and “Article III standing . . . enforces the Consti
tution’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Elk Grove
Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 11 (2004). The
“core component” of the requirement that a litigant have
standing to invoke the authority of a federal court “is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992). The requisite elements of this
“core component derived directly from the Constitution”
are familiar: “A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen,
supra, at 751. We have been asked to decide an important
question of constitutional law concerning the Commerce
Clause. But before we do so, we must find that the
question is presented in a “case” or “controversy” that
is, in James Madison’s words, “of a Judiciary Nature.” 2
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 430
(M. Farrand ed. 1966). That requires plaintiffs, as the
parties now asserting federal jurisdiction, to carry the
burden of establishing their standing under Article III.3
——————
3 Becausedefendants removed the case from state court to District
Court, plaintiffs were not initially the parties that invoked federal
jurisdiction. Indeed, plaintiffs initially expressed doubts as to their
standing. Nonetheless, because “[w]e presume that federal courts lack
jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record,”
Renne v. Geary, 501 U. S. 312, 316 (1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted), the party asserting federal jurisdiction when it is challenged
has the burden of establishing it. Whatever the parties’ previous
positions on the propriety of a federal forum, plaintiffs, as the parties
seeking to establish federal jurisdiction, must make the showings
required for standing.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of the Court
B
Plaintiffs principally claim standing by virtue of their
status as Ohio taxpayers, alleging that the franchise tax
credit “depletes the funds of the State of Ohio to which the
Plaintiffs contribute through their tax payments” and thus
“diminish[es] the total funds available for lawful uses and
impos[es] disproportionate burdens on” them. App. 28a;
see also Brief for Respondents 24. On several occasions,
this Court has denied federal taxpayers standing under
Article III to object to a particular expenditure of federal
funds simply because they are taxpayers. Thus the al
leged “deprivation of the fair and constitutional use of [a
federal taxpayer’s] tax dollar” cannot support a challenge
to the conveyance of Government land to a private reli
gious college, Valley Forge, supra, at 476–482 (internal
quotation marks and some brackets omitted), and “the
interest of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury
furnishes no basis” to argue that a federal agency’s loan
practices are unconstitutional, Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
302 U. S. 464, 478 (1938); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974).
The animating principle behind these cases was an
nounced in their progenitor, Frothingham v. Mellon, de
cided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
In rejecting a claim that improper federal appropriations
would “increase the burden of future taxation and thereby
take [the plaintiff’s] property without due process of law,”
the Court observed that a federal taxpayer’s
“interest in the moneys of the Treasury . . . is shared
with millions of others; is comparatively minute and
indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of
any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating
and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal
to the preventive powers of a court of equity.” Id., at
486–487.
8 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
This logic is equally applicable to taxpayer challenges to
expenditures that deplete the treasury, and to taxpayer
challenges to so-called “tax expenditures,” which reduce
amounts available to the treasury by granting tax credits
or exemptions. In either case, the alleged injury is based
on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal activity on
public revenues, to which the taxpayer contributes.
Standing has been rejected in such cases because the
alleged injury is not “concrete and particularized,” Defend
ers of Wildlife, supra, at 560, but instead a grievance the
taxpayer “suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally,” Frothingham, supra, at 488. In addi
tion, the injury is not “actual or imminent,” but instead
“conjectural or hypothetical.” Defenders of Wildlife, supra,
at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As
an initial matter, it is unclear that tax breaks of the sort
at issue here do in fact deplete the treasury: The very
point of the tax benefits is to spur economic activity, which
in turn increases government revenues. In this very ac
tion, the Michigan plaintiffs claimed that they were in
jured because they lost out on the added revenues that
would have accompanied DaimlerChrysler’s decision to
expand facilities in Michigan. See n. 2, supra.
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is also “conjectural or hypotheti
cal” in that it depends on how legislators respond to a reduc
tion in revenue, if that is the consequence of the credit.
Establishing injury requires speculating that elected offi
cials will increase a taxpayer-plaintiff’s tax bill to make up a
deficit; establishing redressability requires speculating that
abolishing the challenged credit will redound to the benefit
of the taxpayer because legislators will pass along the sup
posed increased revenue in the form of tax reductions.
Neither sort of speculation suffices to support standing. See
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 614 (1989) (opinion
of KENNEDY, J.) (“[I]t is pure speculation whether the law
suit would result in any actual tax relief for respondents”);
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
Opinion of the Court
Warth, 422 U. S., at 509 (criticizing a taxpayer standing
claim for the “conjectural nature of the asserted injury”).
A taxpayer-plaintiff has no right to insist that the gov
ernment dispose of any increased revenue it might experi
ence as a result of his suit by decreasing his tax liability or
bolstering programs that benefit him. To the contrary, the
decision of how to allocate any such savings is the very
epitome of a policy judgment committed to the “broad and
legitimate discretion” of lawmakers, which “the courts
cannot presume either to control or to predict.” ASARCO,
supra, at 615 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Under such cir
cumstances, we have no assurance that the asserted in
jury is “imminent”—that it is “certainly impending.”
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 158 (1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U. S., at 564–565, n. 2.
The foregoing rationale for rejecting federal taxpayer
standing applies with undiminished force to state taxpay
ers. We indicated as much in Doremus v. Board of Ed. of
Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429 (1952). In that case, we noted our
earlier holdings that “the interests of a taxpayer in the
moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable,
remote, uncertain and indirect” to support standing to
challenge “their manner of expenditure.” Id., at 433. We
then “reiterate[d]” what we had said in rejecting a federal
taxpayer challenge to a federal statute “as equally true
when a state Act is assailed: ‘The [taxpayer] must be able to
show . . . that he has sustained . . . some direct injury . . .
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally.’” Id., at 433–434 (quoting
Frothingham, supra, at 488); see ASARCO, supra, at 613–
614 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) (“[W]e have likened state
taxpayers to federal taxpayers” for purposes of taxpayer
standing (citing Doremus, supra, at 434)).
The allegations of injury that plaintiffs make in their
complaint furnish no better basis for finding standing
10 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
than those made in the cases where federal taxpayer
standing was denied. Plaintiffs claim that DaimlerChrys
ler’s tax credit depletes the Ohio fisc and “impos[es] dis
proportionate burdens on [them].” App. 28a. This is no
different from similar claims by federal taxpayers we have
already rejected under Article III as insufficient to estab
lish standing. See, e.g., Frothingham, 262 U. S., at 486
(allegation of injury that the effect of government spend
ing “will be to increase the burden of future taxation and
thereby take [plaintiff’s] property without due process of
law”).
State policymakers, no less than their federal counter
parts, retain broad discretion to make “policy decisions”
concerning state spending “in different ways . . . depend
ing on their perceptions of wise state fiscal policy and
myriad other circumstances.” ASARCO, supra, at 615
(opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Federal courts may not assume
a particular exercise of this state fiscal discretion in estab
lishing standing; a party seeking federal jurisdiction
cannot rely on such “[s]peculative inferences . . . to connect
[his] injury to the challenged actions of [the defendant],”
Simon, 426 U. S., at 45; see also Allen, 468 U. S., at 759.
Indeed, because state budgets frequently contain an array
of tax and spending provisions, any number of which may
be challenged on a variety of bases, affording state tax
payers standing to press such challenges simply because
their tax burden gives them an interest in the state treas
ury would interpose the federal courts as “ ‘virtually con
tinuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness’ ” of state
fiscal administration, contrary to the more modest role
Article III envisions for federal courts. See id., at 760–761
(quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15 (1972)).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that state taxpayers
have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax
or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11
Opinion of the Court
taxpayers.4
C
Plaintiffs argue that an exception to the general prohibi
tion on taxpayer standing should exist for Commerce
Clause challenges to state tax or spending decisions,
analogizing their Commerce Clause claim to the Estab
lishment Clause challenge we permitted in Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83. Flast held that because “the Establishment
Clause . . . specifically limit[s] the taxing and spending
power conferred by Art. I, §8,” “a taxpayer will have stand
ing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial
power when he alleges that congressional action under the
taxing and spending clause is in derogation of ” the Estab
lishment Clause. Id., at 105–106. Flast held out the
possibility that “other specific [constitutional] limitations”
on Art. I, §8, might surmount the “barrier to suits against
Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert
only the interest of federal taxpayers.” 392 U. S., at 105,
85. But as plaintiffs candidly concede, “only the Estab
lishment Clause” has supported federal taxpayer suits
since Flast. Brief for Respondents 12; see Bowen v. Ken
drick, 487 U. S. 589, 618 (1988) (“Although we have con
sidered the problem of standing and Article III limitations
on federal jurisdiction many times since [Flast], we have
consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow exception it
——————
4 The majority of the Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue
have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Booth v. Hvass, 302 F. 3d
849 (CA8 2002); Board of Ed. of Mt. Sinai Union Free School Dist. v.
New York State Teachers Retirement System, 60 F. 3d 106 (CA2 1995);
Colorado Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F. 2d 1394 (CA10 1992);
Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F. 2d 912 (CA6 1988); Korioth v. Briscoe, 523
F. 2d 1271 (CA5 1974); but cf. Arakaki v. Lingle, 423 F. 3d 954, 967–
969 (CA9 2005) (finding state taxpayer standing in light of Hoohuli
v. Ariyoshi, 741 F. 2d 1169 (CA9 1984), but noting that JUSTICE
KENNEDY’s opinion in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605 (1989),
would “carry persuasive value” absent Hoohuli).
12 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
created to the general rule against taxpayer standing”).
Quite apart from whether the franchise tax credit is
analogous to an exercise of congressional power under Art.
I, §8, plaintiffs’ reliance on Flast is misguided: Whatever
rights plaintiffs have under the Commerce Clause, they
are fundamentally unlike the right not to “ ‘contribute
three pence . . . for the support of any one [religious] estab
lishment.’ ” 392 U. S., at 103 (quoting 2 Writings of James
Madison 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)). Indeed, plaintiffs com
pare the Establishment Clause to the Commerce Clause at
such a high level of generality that almost any constitu
tional constraint on government power would “specifically
limit” a State’s taxing and spending power for Flast pur
poses. 392 U. S., at 105; see Brief for Respondents 14 (“In
each case, the harm to be avoided by [the two clauses] is
the loss of governmental neutrality”). And even if the two
clauses are similar in that they often implicate govern
ments’ fiscal decisions, see id., at 13–14, a finding that the
Commerce Clause satisfies the Flast test would leave no
principled way of distinguishing those other constitutional
provisions that we have recognized constrain govern
ments’ taxing and spending decisions. See, e.g., Arkansas
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221 (1987)
(invalidating state sales tax under the Free Press Clause).
Yet such a broad application of Flast’s exception to the
general prohibition on taxpayer standing would be quite at
odds with its narrow application in our precedent and
Flast’s own promise that it would not transform federal
courts into forums for taxpayers’ “generalized grievances.”
392 U. S., at 106.
Flast is consistent with the principle, underlying the
Article III prohibition on taxpayer suits, that a litigant
may not assume a particular disposition of government
funds in establishing standing. The Flast Court discerned
in the history of the Establishment Clause “the specific
evils feared by [its drafters] that the taxing and spending
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13
Opinion of the Court
power would be used to favor one religion over another or
to support religion in general.” Id., at 103. The Court
therefore understood the “injury” alleged in Establishment
Clause challenges to federal spending to be the very “ex
tract[ion] and spen[ding]” of “tax money” in aid of religion
alleged by a plaintiff. Id., at 106. And an injunction
against the spending would of course redress that injury,
regardless of whether lawmakers would dispose of the
savings in a way that would benefit the taxpayer-plaintiffs
personally. See Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 514 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ invocation of the Estab
lishment Clause was of decisive importance in resolving the
standing issue in [Flast] ”).
Plaintiffs thus do not have state taxpayer standing on
the ground that their Commerce Clause challenge is just
like the Establishment Clause challenge in Flast.
III
Plaintiffs also claim that their status as municipal
taxpayers gives them standing to challenge the state
franchise tax credit at issue here. The Frothingham Court
noted with approval the standing of municipal residents to
enjoin the “illegal use of the moneys of a municipal corpo
ration,” relying on “the peculiar relation of the corporate
taxpayer to the corporation” to distinguish such a case
from the general bar on taxpayer suits. 262 U. S., at 486–
487; see ASARCO, 490 U. S., at 613–614 (opinion of
KENNEDY, J.) (reiterating distinction). Plaintiffs here
challenged the municipal property tax exemption as mu
nicipal taxpayers. That challenge was rejected by the
Court of Appeals on the merits, and no issue regarding
plaintiffs’ standing to bring it has been raised. In plain
tiffs’ challenge to the state franchise tax credit, however,
they identify no municipal action contributing to any
claimed injury. Instead, they try to leverage the notion of
municipal taxpayer standing beyond challenges to munici
14 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
pal action, in two ways.
A
First, plaintiffs claim that because state law requires
revenues from the franchise tax to be distributed to local
governments, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5733.12 (Lexis 2005),
the award of a credit to DaimlerChrysler reduced such
distributions and thus depleted the funds of “local gov
ernments to which Respondents pay taxes.” Brief for
Respondents 16. But plaintiffs’ challenge is still to the
state law and state decision, not those of their municipal
ity. We have already explained why a state taxpayer lacks
standing to challenge a state fiscal decision on the grounds
that it might affect his tax liability. All plaintiffs have
done in recasting their claims as ones brought by munici
pal taxpayers whose municipalities receive funding from
the State—the level of which might be affected by the
same state fiscal decision—is introduce yet another level
of conjecture to their already hypothetical claim of injury.
And in fact events have highlighted the peril of assum
ing that any revenue increase resulting from a taxpayer
suit will be put to a particular use. Ohio’s General As
sembly suspended the statutory budget mechanism that
distributes franchise tax revenues to local governments in
2001 and again in its subsequent biennial budgets.
See Amended Substitute H. B. 94, 124th General Assem
bly §140 (2001), available at http://www.legislature.state.
oh.us/BillText124/124_HB_94_ENR.pdf (all Internet ma-
terials as visited May 12, 2006, and available in
Clerk of Court’s case file); Amended Substitute H. B.
95, 125th General Assembly §139 (2003), available at
http:// www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText125/125_HB_95
_EN2_N.pdf; Amended Substitute H. B. 66, 126th Gen-
eral Assembly §557.12 (2005), available at http://www.
legislature.state.oh.us/BillText126/126_HB_66_EN2d.pdf. Any
effect that enjoining DaimlerChrysler’s credit will have on
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15
Opinion of the Court
municipal funds, therefore, will not result from automatic
operation of a statutory formula, but from a hypothesis
that the state government will choose to direct the sup
posed revenue from the restored franchise tax to munici
palities. This is precisely the sort of conjecture we may
not entertain in assessing standing. See ASARCO, supra,
at 614 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.).
B
The second way plaintiffs seek to leverage their stand
ing to challenge the municipal property tax exemption into
a challenge to the franchise tax credit is by relying on
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966). According to
plaintiffs, the “supplemental jurisdiction” recognized in
that case supports jurisdiction over all their claims, once
the District Court determined they had standing to chal
lenge the property tax exemption. Brief for Respondents
17–18.
Gibbs held that federal-question jurisdiction over a
claim may authorize a federal court to exercise jurisdiction
over state-law claims that may be viewed as part of the
same case because they “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact” as the federal claim. 383 U. S., at 725.
Plaintiffs assume that Gibbs stands for the proposition
that federal jurisdiction extends to all claims sufficiently
related to a claim within Article III to be part of the same
case, regardless of the nature of the deficiency that would
keep the former claims out of federal court if presented on
their own.
Our general approach to the application of Gibbs, how
ever, has been markedly more cautious. For example, as a
matter of statutory construction of the pertinent jurisidic
tional provisions, we refused to extend Gibbs to allow
claims to be asserted against nondiverse parties when
jurisdiction was based on diversity, see Owen Equipment
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365 (1978), and we
16 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
refused to extend Gibbs to authorize supplemental juris
diction over claims that do not satisfy statutory amount-
in-controversy requirements, see Finley v. United States,
490 U. S. 545 (1989). As the Court explained just last
Term, “[w]e have not . . . applied Gibbs’ expansive inter
pretive approach to other aspects of the jurisdictional
statutes.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,
545 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 5) (applying 28 U. S. C.
§1367, enacted in 1990, to allow a federal court in a diver
sity action to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over addi
tional diverse plaintiffs whose claims failed to meet the
amount-in-controversy threshold).
What we have never done is apply the rationale of Gibbs
to permit a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdic
tion over a claim that does not itself satisfy those elements
of the Article III inquiry, such as constitutional standing,
that “serv[e] to identify those disputes which are appro
priately resolved through the judicial process.” Whitmore,
495 U. S., at 155. We see no reason to read the language of
Gibbs so broadly, particularly since our standing cases
confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for
each claim he seeks to press. See Allen, 468 U. S., at 752
(“[T]he standing inquiry requires careful judicial examina
tion of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the
particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the
particular claims asserted” (emphasis added)). We have
insisted, for instance, that “a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing separately for each form of relief sought.” Laid-
law, 528 U. S., at 185; see Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S.
95, 109 (1983). But if standing were commutative, as
plaintiffs claim, this insistence would make little sense
when all claims for relief derive from a “common nucleus
of operative fact,” as they certainly appear to have in both
Laidlaw, supra, at 175–179, and Lyons, supra, at 97–98.
Plaintiffs’ reading of Gibbs to allow standing as to one
claim to suffice for all claims arising from the same “nu
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17
Opinion of the Court
cleus of operative fact” would have remarkable implica
tions. The doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political
question all originate in Article III’s “case” or “contro
versy” language, no less than standing does. See, e.g.,
National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Department of Interior,
538 U. S. 803, 808 (2003) (ripeness); Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 67 (1997) (mootness);
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 215 (po
litical question). Yet if Gibbs’ “common nucleus” formula
tion announced a new definition of “case” or “controversy”
for all Article III purposes, a federal court would be free to
entertain moot or unripe claims, or claims presenting a
political question, if they “derived from” the same “opera
tive fact[s]” as another federal claim suffering from none
of these defects. Plaintiffs’ reading of Gibbs, therefore,
would amount to a significant revision of our precedent
interpreting Article III. With federal courts thus deciding
issues they would not otherwise be authorized to decide,
the “ ‘tripartite allocation of power’ ” that Article III is
designed to maintain, Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 474, would
quickly erode; our emphasis on the standing requirement’s
role in maintaining this separation would be rendered
hollow rhetoric. As we have explained, “[t]he actual-injury
requirement would hardly serve the purpose . . . of pre
venting courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the
political branches[,] if once a plaintiff demonstrated harm
from one particular inadequacy in government admini
stration, the court were authorized to remedy all inade
quacies in that administration.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S.
343, 357 (1996).
Lewis emphasized that “[t]he remedy must of course be
limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact
that the plaintiff has established.” Ibid. Plaintiffs’ theory
of ancillary standing would contravene this principle.
Plaintiffs failed to establish Article III injury with respect
to their state taxes, and even if they did do so with respect
18 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of the Court
to their municipal taxes, that injury does not entitle them
to seek a remedy as to the state taxes. As the Court
summed up the point in Lewis, “standing is not dispensed
in gross.” Id., at 358, n. 6.5
* * *
All the theories plaintiffs have offered to support their
standing to challenge the franchise tax credit are unavail
ing. Because plaintiffs have no standing to challenge that
credit, the lower courts erred by considering their claims
against it on the merits. The judgment of the Sixth Cir
cuit is therefore vacated in part, and the cases are re
manded for dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenge to the fran
chise tax credit.
It is so ordered.
——————
5 In defending the contrary position, plaintiffs rely on three cases
from the Courts of Appeals. But two of those cases hold only that, once
a litigant has standing to request invalidation of a particular agency
action, it may do so by identifying all grounds on which the agency may
have “ ‘failed to comply with its statutory mandate.’ ” Sierra Club v.
Adams, 578 F. 2d 389, 392 (CADC 1978) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U. S. 727, 737 (1972)); see also Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of
Governors of Fed. Reserve, 511 F. 2d 1288, 1293–1294 (CADC 1975). They
do not establish that the litigant can, by virtue of his standing to challenge
one government action, challenge other governmental actions that did not
injure him. In the third case, the Court of Appeals relied substantially on
the fact that “all courts possess an inherent power to prevent unprofes
sional conduct by those attorneys who are practicing before them” in
allowing the Government to contest the division of a damages award it
was ordered to pay between a plaintiff and his attorney. Jackson v.
United States, 881 F. 2d 707, 710–711 (CA9 1989). That situation is
rather far afield from the question before us.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of GINSBURG, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
Nos. 04–1704 and 04–1724
_________________
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
04–1704 v.
CHARLOTTE CUNO ET AL.
WILLIAM W. WILKINS, TAX COMMISSIONER FOR
THE STATE OF OHIO, ET AL., PETITIONERS
04–1724 v.
CHARLOTTE CUNO ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 15, 2006]
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
Today’s decision, the Court rightly points out, is solidly
grounded in longstanding precedent, Frothingham v.
Mellon (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon), 262 U. S.
447 (1923), and Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne,
342 U. S. 429 (1952), decisions that antedate current
jurisprudence on standing to sue. See ante, at 7, 9. Froth
ingham held nonjusticiable a federal taxpayer’s suit chal
lenging a federal-spending program. See 262 U. S., at 487
(describing taxpayer’s interest as “minute and indeter
minable”). Doremus applied Frothingham’s reasoning to a
state taxpayer’s suit. 342 U. S., at 434. These decisions
exclude from federal-court cognizance claims, not deline
ated by Congress, presenting generalized grievances. An
exception to Frothingham’s rule, recognized post-Doremus
in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), covers certain al
2 DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. v. CUNO
Opinion of GINSBURG, J.
leged violations of the Establishment Clause. The Flast
exception has not been extended to other areas. See Bo
wen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 618 (1988); cf. Enrich,
Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 377, 417–418 (1996).
One can accept, as I do, the nonjusticiability of Froth
ingham-type federal and state taxpayer suits in federal
court without endorsing as well the limitations on stand
ing later declared in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976) (EKWRO), Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464 (1982), Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984), and Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992). See EKWRO, 426 U. S., at
54–66 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Valley Forge,
454 U. S., at 513–515 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Allen, 468
U. S., at 783–795 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), and the over
turned Court of Appeals opinion, Wright v. Regan, 656
F. 2d 820, 828–832 (CADC 1981) (Ginsburg, J.); Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 582–585 (STEVENS, J., concurring
in judgment); Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev.
163, 203–205, 228–229 (1992) (contrasting Lujan, Allen,
and EKWRO with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U. S. 265 (1978)); Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
Yale L. J. 221, 267–270 (1988) (commenting on Flast and
Valley Forge). Noting this large reservation, I concur in
the judgment, and in the balance of the Court’s opinion.