Marshall v. Marshall

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–1544. Argued February 28, 2006—Decided May 1, 2006
Among longstanding limitations on federal-court jurisdiction otherwise
properly exercised are the so-called “domestic relations” and “pro
bate” exceptions. Neither is compelled by the text of the Constitution
or federal statute. Both are judicially created doctrines stemming in
large measure from misty understandings of English legal history.
In view of lower federal-court decisions expansively interpreting the
two exceptions, this Court reined in the domestic relations exception
in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689, and endeavored similarly
to curtail the probate exception in Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490.
Petitioner, Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie), a.k.a. Anna Nicole
Smith, is the surviving widow of J. Howard Marshall II (J. Howard),
who died without providing for Vickie in his will. According to
Vickie, J. Howard intended to provide for her through a gift in the
form of a “catch-all” trust. Respondent, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce),
J. Howard’s son, was the ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard’s estate
plan. While the estate was subject to ongoing Texas Probate Court
proceedings, Vickie filed for bankruptcy in California. Pierce filed a
proof of claim in the federal bankruptcy court, alleging that Vickie
had defamed him when, shortly after J. Howard’s death, her lawyers
told the press that Pierce had engaged in forgery, fraud, and over
reaching to gain control of his father’s assets. Pierce sought a decla
ration that his claim was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Vickie
answered, asserting truth as a defense. She also filed counterclaims,
among them a claim that Pierce had tortiously interfered with a gift
she expected from J. Howard. Vickie’s tortious interference counter
claim turned her objection to Pierce’s claim into an adversary pro
ceeding, see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3007, in which the Bankruptcy
Court granted summary judgment for Vickie on Pierce’s claim and,
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Syllabus

after a trial on the merits, entered judgment for Vickie on her coun
terclaim. The court also held that both Vickie’s objection to Pierce’s
claim and her counterclaim qualified as “core proceedings” under 28
U. S. C. §157, which meant that the court had authority to enter a fi
nal judgment disposing of those claims. It awarded Vickie substan
tial compensatory and punitive damages. Pierce then filed a post
trial motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, assert
ing that Vickie’s tortious interference claim could be tried only in the
Texas probate proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court denied the mo
tion. Relying on Markham, the Bankruptcy Court observed that a
federal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in probate property,
so long as its final judgment does not interfere with the state court’s
possession of the property. Subsequently, the Texas Probate Court
declared that J. Howard’s estate plan was valid.
Back in the federal forum, Pierce sought district-court review of the
Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. Among other things, the District
Court held that the probate exception did not reach Vickie’s counter
claim. Citing Markham, 326 U. S., at 494, the court said that the ex
ception would bar federal jurisdiction only if such jurisdiction would
“interfere” with the probate proceedings. It would not do so, the court
concluded, because: (1) success on Vickie’s counterclaim did not ne
cessitate any declaration that J. Howard’s will was invalid, and (2)
under Texas law, probate courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction to
entertain claims of the kind Vickie’s counterclaim asserted. The
court also held that Vickie’s claim did not qualify as a “core pro
ceedin[g]” over which a bankruptcy court may exercise plenary
power, see 28 U. S. C. §157(b)–(c). Accordingly, the District Court
treated the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment as proposed, rather than
final, and undertook de novo review. Adopting and supplementing
the Bankruptcy Court’s findings, the District Court determined that
Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy by, inter
alia, conspiring to suppress or destroy the inter vivos trust instru
ment J. Howard had directed his lawyers to prepare for Vickie, and to
strip J. Howard of his assets by backdating, altering, and otherwise
falsifying documents and presenting them to J. Howard under false
pretenses. The District Court awarded Vickie some $44.3 million in
compensatory damages and, based on “overwhelming” evidence of
Pierce’s willfulness, maliciousness, and fraud, an equal amount in
punitive damages.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Although the Court of Appeals recog
nized that Vickie’s claim does not involve the administration of an es
tate, the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter, it
nonetheless held that the probate exception bars federal jurisdiction
in this case. It read the exception broadly to exclude from the federal
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Syllabus

courts’ adjudicatory authority not only direct challenges to a will or
trust, but also questions which would ordinarily be decided by a pro
bate court in determining the validity of the decedent’s estate plan
ning instrument, whether those questions involve fraud, undue influ
ence, or tortious interference with the testator’s intent. The court
also held that a State’s vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over probate
matters in a special court strips federal courts of jurisdiction to enter
tain any probate related matter, including claims respecting tax li
ability, debt, gift, and tort. Noting that the Probate Court had ruled
it had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie’s claims, the Ninth Cir
cuit held that ruling binding on the Federal District Court.
Held: The Ninth Circuit had no warrant from Congress, or from this
Court’s decisions, for its sweeping extension of the probate exception
recognized in those decisions. Because this case does not fall within
the exception’s scope, the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction
over Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce. Pp. 8–18.
(a) Ankenbrandt addressed the domestic relations exception’s deri
vation and limits. Among other things, the Court, 504 U. S., at 693–
695, traced the current exception to Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582,
584–589, in which the Court had announced in dicta—without cita
tion or discussion—that federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits for
divorce or alimony. Finding no Article III impediment to federal-
court jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, 504 U. S., at 695–697,
the Ankenbrandt Court, id., at 698–701, anchored the exception in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which, until 1948, provided circuit court
diversity jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature at common law
or in equity.” The Barber majority, the Ankenbrandt Court acknowl
edged, 504 U. S., at 698, did not expressly tie its announcement of a
domestic relations exception to the text of the diversity statute, but
the Barber dissenters made the connection. Because English chan
cery courts lacked authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees, the
dissenters stated, United States courts similarly lacked authority to
decree divorces or award alimony, 21 How., at 605. The Ankenbrandt
Court was “content” “to rest [its] conclusion that a domestic relations
exception exists as a matter of statutory construction not on the accu
racy of [Barber’s] historical justifications, but, “rather,” on “Congress’
apparent acceptance of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction
provisions in the years prior to 1948,” 504 U. S., at 700. Ankenbrandt
further determined that Congress did not intend to terminate the ex
ception in 1948 when it “replace[d] the law/equity distinction with
the phrase ‘all civil actions.’ ” Id., at 700. The Ankenbrandt Court
nevertheless emphasized that the exception covers only “a narrow
range of domestic relations issues.” Id., at 701. Noting that some
lower federal courts had applied the exception “well beyond the cir
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Syllabus

cumscribed situations posed by Barber and its progeny,” ibid., the
Court clarified that only “divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”
remain outside federal jurisdictional bounds, id., at 703, 704. While
recognizing state tribunals’ “special proficiency” in handling issues
arising in the granting of such decrees, id., at 704, the Court viewed
federal courts as equally equipped to deal with complaints alleging
torts, ibid. Pp. 8–11.
(b) This Court has recognized a probate exception, kin to the do
mestic relations exception, to otherwise proper federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Markham, the Court’s most recent and pathmarking pro
nouncement on the subject. Among other things, the Markham Court
first stated that, although “a federal court has no jurisdiction to pro
bate a will or administer an estate[,] it has [long] been established
. . . that federal courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits ‘in
favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other claimants against a
decedent’s estate ‘to establish their claims’ so long as the federal
court does not interfere with the probate proceedings or assume gen
eral jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in the cus
tody of the state court.” 326 U. S., at 494. The Court next described a
probate exception of distinctly limited scope: “[W]hile a federal court
may not exercise its jurisdiction to disturb or affect the possession of
property in the custody of a state court, . . . it may exercise its juris
diction to adjudicate rights in such property where the final judgment
does not undertake to interfere with the state court’s possession save
to the extent that the state court is bound by the judgment to recog
nize the right adjudicated by the federal court.” Ibid. The first of
these quoted passages is not a model of clear statement, and some
lower federal courts have read the words “interfere with the probate
proceedings” to block federal jurisdiction over a range of matters well
beyond probate of a will or administration of a decedent’s estate, in
cluding an executor’s breach of fiduciary duty. This Court reads
Markham’s enigmatic words, in sync with the second above-quoted
passage, to proscribe “disturb[ing] or affect[ing] the possession of
property in the custody of a state court.” Ibid. Though that reading
renders the first-quoted passage in part redundant, redundancy in
this context is preferable to incoherence. This Court therefore com
prehends Markham’s “interference” language as essentially a reitera
tion of the general principle that, when one court is exercising in rem
jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdic
tion over the same res. See, e.g., Penn General Casualty Co. v. Penn
sylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S. 189, 195–196. Thus, the probate
exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment
of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate; it also pre
cludes federal courts from disposing of property that is in the custody
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Syllabus

of a state probate court. But it does not bar federal courts from adju
dicating matters outside those confines and otherwise within federal
jurisdiction. Pp. 11–15.
(c) Vickie’s claim does not involve the administration of an estate,
the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter. Provoked
by Pierce’s claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, Vickie’s claim al
leges the widely recognized tort of interference with a gift or inheri
tance. She seeks an in personam judgment against Pierce, not the
probate or annulment of a will. Cf. Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. 199,
208. Nor does she seek to reach a res in a state court’s custody. See
Markham, 326 U. S., at 494. Furthermore, no “sound policy consid
erations” militate in favor of extending the probate exception to cover
this case. Cf. Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 703. Trial courts, both fed
eral and state, often address conduct of the kind Vickie alleges. State
probate courts possess no “special proficiency” in handling such is
sues. Cf. id., at 704. P. 15.
(d) This Court rejects the Ninth Circuit’s alternate rationale that
the Texas Probate Court’s jurisdictional ruling bound the Federal
District Court. Texas courts have recognized a state-law tort action
for interference with an expected gift or inheritance. It is clear, un
der Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, that Texas law governs the
substantive elements of Vickie’s tortious interference claim. But it is
also clear that Texas may not reserve to its probate courts the exclu
sive right to adjudicate a transitory tort. See Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 360. Jurisdiction is determined “by
the law of the court’s creation and cannot be defeated by the extrater
ritorial operation of a [state] statute . . . , even though it created the
right of action.” Ibid. Directly on point, the Court has held that fed
eral-court jurisdiction, “having existed from the beginning of the Fed
eral government, [can] not be impaired by subsequent state legisla
tion creating courts of probate.” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268,
281. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106, on which the Ninth Circuit relied,
is not to the contrary. Durfee stands only for the proposition that a
state court’s final judgment determining its own jurisdiction ordinar
ily qualifies for full faith and credit, so long as the jurisdictional issue
was fully and fairly litigated in the court that rendered the judgment.
See id., at 111, 115. At issue here, however, is not the Texas Probate
Court’s jurisdiction, but the federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain
Vickie’s tortious interference claim. Under our federal system, Texas
cannot render its probate courts exclusively competent to entertain a
claim of that genre. Pp. 15–17.
(e) The Ninth Circuit may address on remand the questions
whether Vickie’s claim was “core” and Pierce’s arguments concerning
claim and issue preclusion. P. 17–18.
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Syllabus

392 F. 3d 1118, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–1544
_________________

VICKIE LYNN MARSHALL, PETITIONER v. E. PIERCE
MARSHALL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 1, 2006]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall famously
cautioned: “It is most true that this Court will not take
jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it
must take jurisdiction, if it should . . . . We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,
than to usurp that which is not given.” 6 Wheat. 264, 404
(1821). Among longstanding limitations on federal juris
diction otherwise properly exercised are the so-called
“domestic relations” and “probate” exceptions. Neither is
compelled by the text of the Constitution or federal stat
ute. Both are judicially created doctrines stemming in
large measure from misty understandings of English legal
history. See, e.g., Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in
Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdic
tion, 35 Hastings L. J. 571, 584–588 (1984); Spindel v.
Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802 (EDNY 1968) (collecting
cases and commentary revealing vulnerability of historical
explanation for domestic relations exception); Winkler,
The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 Probate
L. J. 77, 125–126, and n. 256 (1997) (describing historical
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Opinion of the Court

explanation for probate exception as “an exercise in my
thography”). In the years following Marshall’s 1821 pro
nouncement, courts have sometimes lost sight of his ad
monition and have rendered decisions expansively
interpreting the two exceptions. In Ankenbrandt v. Rich
ards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), this Court reined in the “do
mestic relations exception.” Earlier, in Markham v. Allen,
326 U. S. 490 (1946), the Court endeavored similarly to
curtail the “probate exception.”
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit in the instant case read
the probate exception broadly to exclude from the federal
courts’ adjudicatory authority “not only direct challenges
to a will or trust, but also questions which would ordinar
ily be decided by a probate court in determining the valid
ity of the decedent’s estate planning instrument.” 392
F. 3d 1118, 1133 (2004). The Court of Appeals further
held that a State’s vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over
probate matters in a special court strips federal courts of
jurisdiction to entertain any “probate related matter,”
including claims respecting “tax liability, debt, gift, [or]
tort.” Id., at 1136. We hold that the Ninth Circuit had no
warrant from Congress, or from decisions of this Court, for
its sweeping extension of the probate exception.
I
Petitioner, Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie), also known as
Anna Nicole Smith, is the surviving widow of J. Howard
Marshall II (J. Howard). Vickie and J. Howard met in
October 1991. After a courtship lasting more than two
years, they were married on June 27, 1994. J. Howard
died on August 4, 1995. Although he lavished gifts and
significant sums of money on Vickie during their courtship
and marriage, J. Howard did not include anything for
Vickie in his will. According to Vickie, J. Howard intended
to provide for her financial security through a gift in the
form of a “catch-all” trust.
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Opinion of the Court

Respondent, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce), one of J. How
ard’s sons, was the ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard’s
estate plan, which consisted of a living trust and a
“pourover” will. Under the terms of the will, all of J.
Howard’s assets not already included in the trust were to
be transferred to the trust upon his death.
Competing claims regarding J. Howard’s fortune ignited
proceedings in both state and federal courts. In January
1996, while J. Howard’s estate was subject to ongoing
proceedings in Probate Court in Harris County, Texas,
Vickie filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bank
ruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. §1101 et seq., in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
See 275 B. R. 5, 8 (CD Cal. 2002). In June 1996, Pierce
filed a proof of claim in the federal bankruptcy proceeding,
id., at 9; see 11 U. S. C. §501, alleging that Vickie had
defamed him when, shortly after J. Howard’s death, law
yers representing Vickie told members of the press that
Pierce had engaged in forgery, fraud, and overreaching to
gain control of his father’s assets. 275 B. R., at 9. Pierce
sought a declaration that the debt he asserted in that
claim was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Ibid.1 Vickie
answered, asserting truth as a defense. She also filed
counterclaims, among them a claim that Pierce had tor
tiously interfered with a gift she expected. Ibid.; see App.
23–25. Vickie alleged that Pierce prevented the transfer
of his father’s intended gift to her by, among other things:
effectively imprisoning J. Howard against his wishes;
surrounding him with hired guards for the purpose of
preventing personal contact between him and Vickie;
making misrepresentations to J. Howard; and transferring
property against J. Howard’s expressed wishes. Id., at 24.
——————
1 Among debts not dischargeable in bankruptcy, see 11 U. S. C.

§523(a), are those arising from “willful and malicious injury by the
debtor,” §523(a)(6).
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Opinion of the Court

Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim turned her
objection to Pierce’s claim into an adversary proceeding.
Id., at 39; see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3007. In that pro
ceeding, the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judg
ment in favor of Vickie on Pierce’s claim and, after a trial
on the merits, entered judgment for Vickie on her tortious
interference counterclaim. See 253 B. R. 550, 558–559
(2000). The Bankruptcy Court also held that both Vickie’s
objection to Pierce’s claim and Vickie’s counterclaim quali
fied as “core proceedings” under 28 U. S. C. §157, which
meant that the court had authority to enter a final judg
ment disposing of those claims. See 257 B. R. 35, 39–40
(2000). The court awarded Vickie compensatory damages
of more than $449 million—less whatever she recovered in
the ongoing probate action in Texas—as well as $25 mil
lion in punitive damages. Id., at 40.
Pierce filed a post-trial motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that Vickie’s tortious
interference claim could be tried only in the Texas probate
proceedings. Id., at 36. The Bankruptcy Court held that
“the ‘probate exception’ argument was waived” because it
was not timely raised. Id., at 39. Relying on this Court’s
decision in Markham, the court observed that a federal
court has jurisdiction to “adjudicate rights in probate
property, so long as its final judgment does not undertake
to interfere with the state court’s possession of the prop
erty.” 257 B. R., at 38 (citing Markham, 326 U. S., at 494).
Meanwhile, in the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a
declaration that the living trust and his father’s will were
valid. 392 F. 3d, at 1124–1125. Vickie, in turn, chal
lenged the validity of the will and filed a tortious interfer
ence claim against Pierce, ibid., but voluntarily dismissed
both claims once the Bankruptcy Court entered its judg
ment, id., at 1128. Following a jury trial, the Probate
Court declared the living trust and J. Howard’s will valid.
Id., at 1129.
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Opinion of the Court

Back in the federal forum, Pierce sought district-court
review of the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. While reject
ing the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Pierce had
forfeited any argument based on the probate exception,
the District Court held that the exception did not reach
Vickie’s claim. 264 B. R. 609, 619–625 (CD Cal. 2001).
The Bankruptcy Court “did not assert jurisdiction gener
ally over the probate proceedings . . . or take control over
[the] estate’s assets,” the District Court observed, id., at
621, “[t]hus, the probate exception would bar federal
jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim only if such juris
diction would ‘interfere’ with the probate proceedings,”
ibid. (quoting Markham, 326 U. S., at 494). Federal juris
diction would not “interfere” with the probate proceedings,
the District Court concluded, because: (1) success on
Vickie’s counterclaim did not necessitate any declaration
that J. Howard’s will was invalid, 264 B. R., at 621; and
(2) under Texas law, probate courts do not have exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain claims of the kind asserted in
Vickie’s counterclaim, id., at 622–625.
The District Court also held that Vickie’s claim did not
qualify as a “core proceedin[g] arising under title 11, or
arising in a case under title 11.” 28 U. S. C. §157(b)(1); see
264 B. R., at 625–632. A bankruptcy court may exercise
plenary power only over “core proceedings.” See §157(b)–
(c).2 In non-core matters, a bankruptcy court may not
——————
2 “Core proceedings include, but are not limited to—
“(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
“(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemp
tions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests
for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title
11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for
purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
“(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate;
“(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
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Opinion of the Court

enter final judgment; it has authority to issue only pro
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are
reviewed de novo by the district court. See §157(c)(1).
Accordingly, the District Court treated the Bankruptcy
Court’s judgment as “proposed[,] rather than final,” and
undertook a “comprehensive, complete, and independent
review of” the Bankruptcy Court’s determinations. 264
B. R., at 633.
Adopting and supplementing the Bankruptcy Court’s
findings, the District Court determined that Pierce had
tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy. Specifi
cally, the District Court found that J. Howard directed his
lawyers to prepare an inter vivos trust for Vickie consist
ing of half the appreciation of his assets from the date of
their marriage. See 275 B. R., at 25–30, 51–53. It further
found that Pierce conspired to suppress or destroy the
trust instrument and to strip J. Howard of his assets by
——————
“(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
“(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
“(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
“(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent convey
ances;
“(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
“(J) objections to discharges;
“(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
“(L) confirmations of plans;
“(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use
of cash collateral;
“(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property result
ing from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not
filed claims against the estate;
“(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the
estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security
holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims; and
“(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under chap
ter 15 of title 11.” 28 U. S. C. A. §157(b)(2) (1993 ed. and July 2005
Supp.).
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Opinion of the Court

backdating, altering, and otherwise falsifying documents,
arranging for surveillance of J. Howard and Vickie, and
presenting documents to J. Howard under false pretenses.
See id., at 36–50, 57–58; see also 253 B. R., at 554–556,
559–560. Based on these findings, the District Court
awarded Vickie some $44.3 million in compensatory dam
ages. 275 B. R., at 53–57. In addition, finding “over
whelming” evidence of Pierce’s “willfulness, maliciousness,
and fraud,” the District Court awarded an equal amount
in punitive damages. Id., at 57–58.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The appeals court recognized that Vickie’s claim “does not
involve the administration of an estate, the probate of a
will, or any other purely probate matter.” 392 F. 3d, at
1133. Nevertheless, the court held that the probate excep
tion bars federal jurisdiction in this case. In the Ninth
Circuit’s view, a claim falls within the probate exception if
it raises “questions which would ordinarily be decided by a
probate court in determining the validity of the decedent’s
estate planning instrument,” whether those questions
involve “fraud, undue influence[, or] tortious interference
with the testator’s intent.” Ibid.
The Ninth Circuit was also of the view that state-court
delineation of a probate court’s exclusive adjudicatory
authority could control federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
In this regard, the Court of Appeals stated: “Where a state
has relegated jurisdiction over probate matters to a special
court and [the] state’s trial courts of general jurisdiction
do not have jurisdiction to hear probate matters, then
federal courts also lack jurisdiction over probate matters.”
Id., at 1136. Noting that “[t]he [P]robate [C]ourt ruled it
had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie[’s] claims,” the
Ninth Circuit held that “ruling . . . binding on the United
States [D]istrict [C]ourt.” Ibid. (citing Durfee v. Duke, 375
U. S. 106, 115–116 (1963)).
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Opinion of the Court

We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. ___ (2005), to resolve
the apparent confusion among federal courts concerning
the scope of the probate exception. Satisfied that the
instant case does not fall within the ambit of the narrow
exception recognized by our decisions, we reverse the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
II
In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), we
addressed both the derivation and the limits of the “do
mestic relations exception” to the exercise of federal juris
diction. Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, brought
suit in Federal District Court on behalf of her daughters,
naming as defendants their father (Ankenbrandt’s former
husband) and his female companion, both citizens of Lou
isiana. Id., at 691. Ankenbrandt’s complaint sought
damages for the defendants’ alleged sexual and physical
abuse of the children. Ibid. Federal jurisdiction was
predicated on diversity of citizenship. Ibid. (citing 28
U. S. C. §1332). The District Court dismissed the case for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that Anken
brandt’s suit fell within “the ‘domestic relations’ exception
to diversity jurisdiction.” 504 U. S., at 692. The Court of
Appeals agreed and affirmed. Ibid. We reversed the
Court of Appeals’ judgment. Id., at 706–707.
Holding that the District Court improperly refrained
from exercising jurisdiction over Ankenbrandt’s tort claim,
id., at 704, we traced explanation of the current domestic
relations exception to Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582
(1859). See Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 693–695. In Bar
ber, the Court upheld federal-court authority, in a diver
sity case, to enforce an alimony award decreed by a state
court. In dicta, however, the Barber Court announced—
without citation or discussion—that federal courts lack
jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of ali
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

mony. 21 How., at 584–589; see Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S.,
at 693–695.
Finding no Article III impediment to federal-court juris
diction in domestic relations cases, id., at 695–697, the
Court in Ankenbrandt anchored the exception in Congress’
original provision for diversity jurisdiction, id., at 698–
701. Beginning at the beginning, the Court recalled:
“The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that ‘the circuit
courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with
the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, where the matter
in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value
of five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a party, or
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit
is brought, and a citizen of another State.’ ” Id., at 698
(quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §11, 1 Stat. 78; empha
sis added in Ankenbrandt).
The defining phrase, “all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity,” the Court stressed, remained in succes
sive statutory provisions for diversity jurisdiction until
1948, when Congress adopted the more economical phrase,
“all civil actions.” 504 U. S., at 698; 1948 Judicial Code
and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930, 28 U. S. C. §1332.
The Barber majority, we acknowledged in Ankenbrandt,
did not expressly tie its announcement of a domestic rela
tions exception to the text of the diversity statute. 504
U. S., at 698. But the dissenters in that case made the
connection. They stated that English courts of chancery
lacked authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees.
Because “the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
in chancery is bounded by that of the chancery in Eng
land,” Barber, 21 How., at 605 (opinion of Daniel, J.), the
dissenters reasoned, our federal courts similarly lack
authority to decree divorces or award alimony, ibid. Such
relief, in other words, would not fall within the diversity
10 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

statute’s original grant of jurisdiction over “all suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity.” We concluded in
Ankenbrandt that “it may be inferred fairly that the juris
dictional limitation recognized by the [Barber] Court
rested on th[e] statutory basis” indicated by the dissenters
in that case. 504 U. S., at 699.
We were “content” in Ankenbrandt “to rest our conclu
sion that a domestic relations exception exists as a matter
of statutory construction not on the accuracy of the his
torical justifications on which [the exception] was seem
ingly based.” Id., at 700. “[R]ather,” we relied on “Con
gress’ apparent acceptance of this construction of the
diversity jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 1948,
when the statute limited jurisdiction to ‘suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity.’” Ibid. (quoting 1 Stat.
78). We further determined that Congress did not intend
to terminate the exception in 1948 when it “replace[d] the
law/equity distinction with the phrase ‘all civil actions.’ ”
504 U. S., at 700. Absent contrary indications, we pre
sumed that Congress meant to leave undisturbed “the
Court’s nearly century-long interpretation” of the diversity
statute “to contain an exception for certain domestic rela
tions matters.” Ibid.
We nevertheless emphasized in Ankenbrandt that the
exception covers only “a narrow range of domestic rela
tions issues.” Id., at 701. The Barber Court itself, we
reminded, “sanctioned the exercise of federal jurisdiction
over the enforcement of an alimony decree that had been
properly obtained in a state court of competent jurisdic
tion.” 504 U. S., at 702. Noting that some lower federal
courts had applied the domestic relations exception “well
beyond the circumscribed situations posed by Barber and
its progeny,” id., at 701, we clarified that only “divorce,
alimony, and child custody decrees” remain outside federal
jurisdictional bounds, id., at 703, 704. While recognizing
the “special proficiency developed by state tribunals . . . in
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of the Court

handling issues that arise in the granting of [divorce,
alimony, and child custody] decrees,” id., at 704, we
viewed federal courts as equally equipped to deal with
complaints alleging the commission of torts, ibid.
III
Federal jurisdiction in this case is premised on 28
U. S. C. §1334, the statute vesting in federal district
courts jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases and related pro
ceedings. Decisions of this Court have recognized a “pro
bate exception,” kin to the domestic relations exception, to
otherwise proper federal jurisdiction. See Markham v.
Allen, 326 U. S., at 494; see also Sutton v. English, 246
U. S. 199 (1918); Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank &
Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33 (1909). Like the domestic relations
exception, the probate exception has been linked to lan
guage contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Markham, the Court’s most recent and pathmarking
pronouncement on the probate exception, stated that “the
equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789
. . . , which is that of the English Court of Chancery in
1789, did not extend to probate matters.” 326 U. S., at
494. See generally Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A
Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal Jurisdic
tion, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1479 (2001). As in Ankenbrandt, so
in this case, “[w]e have no occasion . . . to join the histori
cal debate” over the scope of English chancery jurisdiction
in 1789, 504 U. S., at 699, for Vickie Marshall’s claim falls
far outside the bounds of the probate exception described
in Markham. We therefore need not consider in this case
whether there exists any uncodified probate exception to
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction under §1334.3
——————
3 We note that the broad grant of jurisdiction conferred by §1334(b) is
subject to a mandatory abstention provision applicable to certain state-
law claims. Section 1334(c)(2) provides:
12 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

In Markham, the plaintiff Alien Property Custodian4
commenced suit in Federal District Court against an
executor and resident heirs to determine the Custodian’s
asserted rights regarding a decedent’s estate. 326 U. S., at
491–492. Jurisdiction was predicated on §24(1) of the
Judicial Code, now 28 U. S. C. §1345, which provides for
federal jurisdiction over suits brought by an officer of the
United States. At the time the federal suit commenced,
the estate was undergoing probate administration in a
state court. The Custodian had issued an order vesting in
himself all right, title, and interest of German legatees.
He sought and gained in the District Court a judgment
——————
“Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State
law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11
but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with
respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of
the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district
court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is com
menced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate
jurisdiction.”
That provision is, in turn, qualified: “Non-core proceedings under
section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, shall not be subject
to the mandatory abstention provisions of section 1334(c)(2).”
§157(b)(4). Because the Bankruptcy Court rejected Pierce’s motion for
mandatory abstention as untimely, 257 B. R. 35, 39 (CD Cal. 2000), we
need not consider whether these provisions might have required ab
stention upon a timely motion.
4 Section 6 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 415, 50

U. S. C. App., authorizes the President to appoint an official known as
the “alien property custodian,” who is responsible for “receiv[ing,] . . .
hold[ing], administer[ing], and account[ing] for” “all money and prop
erty in the United States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of
enemy . . . .” The Act was originally enacted during World War I “to
permit, under careful safeguards and restrictions, certain kinds of
business to be carried on” among warring nations, and to “provid[e] for
the care and administration of the property and property rights of
enemies and their allies in this country pending the war.” Markham v.
Cabell, 326 U. S. 404, 414, n. 1 (1945) (Burton, J., concurring) (quoting
S. Rep. No. 113, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1 (1917)).
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

determining that the resident heirs had no interest in the
estate, and that the Custodian, substituting himself for
the German legatees, was entitled to the entire net estate,
including specified real estate passing under the will.
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, which had ordered the case
dismissed for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
this Court held that federal jurisdiction was properly
invoked. The Court first stated:
“It is true that a federal court has no jurisdiction
to probate a will or administer an estate . . . . But it
has been established by a long series of decisions of
this Court that federal courts of equity have jurisdic
tion to entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees
and heirs’ and other claimants against a decedent’s
estate ‘to establish their claims’ so long as the federal
court does not interfere with the probate proceedings
or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or con
trol of the property in the custody of the state court.”
326 U. S., at 494 (quoting Waterman, 215 U. S., at 43).
Next, the Court described a probate exception of distinctly
limited scope:
“[W]hile a federal court may not exercise its jurisdic
tion to disturb or affect the possession of property in
the custody of a state court, . . . it may exercise its ju
risdiction to adjudicate rights in such property where
the final judgment does not undertake to interfere
with the state court’s possession save to the extent
that the state court is bound by the judgment to rec
ognize the right adjudicated by the federal court.” 326
U. S., at 494.
The first of the above-quoted passages from Markham is
not a model of clear statement. The Court observed that
federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits to de
termine the rights of creditors, legatees, heirs, and other
14 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

claimants against a decedent’s estate, “so long as the
federal court does not interfere with the probate proceed
ings.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Lower federal courts have
puzzled over the meaning of the words “interfere with the
probate proceedings,” and some have read those words to
block federal jurisdiction over a range of matters well
beyond probate of a will or administration of a decedent’s
estate. See, e.g., Mangieri v. Mangieri, 226 F. 3d 1, 2–3
(CA1 2000) (breach of fiduciary duty by executor); Golden
ex rel. Golden v. Golden, 382 F. 3d 348, 360–362 (CA3
2004) (same); Lepard v. NBD Bank, 384 F. 3d 232–237
(CA6 2004) (breach of fiduciary duty by trustee); Storm v.
Storm, 328 F. 3d 941, 943–945 (CA7 2003) (probate excep
tion bars claim that plaintiff’s father tortiously interfered
with plaintiff’s inheritance by persuading trust grantor to
amend irrevocable inter vivos trust); Rienhardt v. Kelly,
164 F. 3d 1296, 1300–1301 (CA10 1999) (probate exception
bars claim that defendants exerted undue influence on
testator and thereby tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s
expected inheritance).
We read Markham’s enigmatic words, in sync with the
second above-quoted passage, to proscribe “disturb[ing] or
affect[ing] the possession of property in the custody of a
state court.” 326 U. S., at 494. True, that reading renders
the first-quoted passage in part redundant, but redun
dancy in this context, we do not doubt, is preferable to
incoherence. In short, we comprehend the “interference”
language in Markham as essentially a reiteration of the
general principle that, when one court is exercising in rem
jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in
rem jurisdiction over the same res. See, e.g., Penn General
Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S.
189, 195–196 (1935); Waterman, 215 U. S., at 45–46.
Thus, the probate exception reserves to state probate
courts the probate or annulment of a will and the admini
stration of a decedent’s estate; it also precludes federal
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of the Court

courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in
the custody of a state probate court. But it does not bar
federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those
confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.
A
As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, Vickie’s
claim does not “involve the administration of an estate,
the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter.”
392 F. 3d, at 1133. Provoked by Pierce’s claim in the
bankruptcy proceedings, Vickie’s claim, like Carol Anken
brandt’s, alleges a widely recognized tort. See King v.
Acker, 725 S. W. 2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1987); Restate
ment (Second) of Torts §774B (1977) (“One who by fraud,
duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents
another from receiving from a third person an inheritance
or gift that [s]he would otherwise have received is subject
to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.”).
Vickie seeks an in personam judgment against Pierce, not
the probate or annulment of a will. Cf. Sutton, 246 U. S.,
at 208 (suit to annul a will found “supplemental to the
proceedings for probate of the will” and therefore not
cognizable in federal court). Nor does she seek to reach a
res in the custody of a state court. See Markham, 326
U. S., at 494.
Furthermore, no “sound policy considerations” militate
in favor of extending the probate exception to cover the
case at hand. Cf. Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 703. Trial
courts, both federal and state, often address conduct of the
kind Vickie alleges. State probate courts possess no “spe
cial proficiency . . . in handling [such] issues.” Cf. id., at
704.
B
The Court of Appeals advanced an alternate basis for its
conclusion that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over
16 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

Vickie’s claim. Noting that the Texas Probate Court
“ruled it had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie Lynn
Marshall’s claims against E. Pierce Marshall,” the Ninth
Circuit held that “ruling . . . binding on the United States
[D]istrict [C]ourt.” 392 F. 3d, at 1136. We reject that
determination.
Texas courts have recognized a state-law tort action for
interference with an expected inheritance or gift, modeled
on the Restatement formulation. See King, 725 S. W. 2d,
at 754; Brandes v. Rice Trust, Inc., 966 S. W. 2d 144, 146–
147 (Tex. App. 1998).5 It is clear, under Erie R. Co. v.
——————
5 Texas appellate courts have on occasion held claims of tortious in

terference with an expected inheritance “barred” by a prior probate
court judgment, apparently applying ordinary principles of preclusion.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Deloitte & Touche, 902 S. W. 2d 13, 16 (Tex. App.
1995) (final probate court judgment bars claim of tortious interference
with inheritance expectancy because probate court “necessarily found
that [the decedent] signed the will with testamentary capacity, and
that it reflected his intent, was not the result of coercion or undue
influence, and was valid”); Neill v. Yett, 746 S. W. 2d 32, 35–36 (Tex.
App. 1988) (complaint alleging fraud and tortious interference with
inheritance expectancy, filed more than two years after will was admit
ted to probate, was barred by both the statute of limitations and the
final probate judgment, and failed to state the elements of the claim).
Neither Thompson nor Neill questions the Texas trial courts’ subject-
matter jurisdiction over the claims in question.
Pierce maintains that Thompson, Neill, and other Texas decisions
support his contention that preclusion principles bar Vickie’s claim.
See Brief for Respondent 36–38. Vickie argues to the contrary. See
Brief for Petitioner 42 n. 30 (urging that preclusion does not apply
because (1) Vickie’s claim was not litigated to final judgment in the
Texas probate proceedings; (2) having presented her claim in the
Bankruptcy Court years before she joined the Texas will contest, Vickie
was not obliged to present her claim in the Texas proceedings; (3) the
Bankruptcy Court’s judgment preceded the Probate Court judgment;
and (4) the Texas Probate Court did not have before it important
evidence). See also Tex. Rule Civ. Proc. 97; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
Valero Energy Corp., 997 S. W. 2d 203, 206–207 (Tex. 1999). The
matter of preclusion remains open for consideration on remand. See
infra, at 18.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17

Opinion of the Court

Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), that Texas law governs the
substantive elements of Vickie’s tortious interference
claim. It is also clear, however, that Texas may not re
serve to its probate courts the exclusive right to adjudicate
a transitory tort. We have long recognized that “a State
cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the same
time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of
action in any court having jurisdiction.” Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 360 (1914). Juris
diction is determined “by the law of the court’s creation
and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of
a [state] statute . . . , even though it created the right of
action.” Ibid. Directly on point, we have held that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, “having existed from the
beginning of the Federal government, [can] not be im
paired by subsequent state legislation creating courts of
probate.” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 281 (1910)
(upholding federal jurisdiction over action by heirs of
decedent, who died intestate, to determine their rights in
the estate (citing Waterman, 215 U. S. 33)).
Our decision in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106 (1963),
relied upon by the Ninth Circuit, 392 F. 3d, at 1136, is not
to the contrary. Durfee stands only for the proposition
that a state court’s final judgment determining its own
jurisdiction ordinarily qualifies for full faith and credit, so
long as the jurisdictional issue was fully and fairly liti
gated in the court that rendered the judgment. See 375
U. S., at 111, 115. At issue here, however, is not the Texas
Probate Court’s jurisdiction, but the federal courts’ juris
diction to entertain Vickie’s tortious interference claim.
Under our federal system, Texas cannot render its probate
courts exclusively competent to entertain a claim of that
genre. We therefore hold that the District Court properly
18 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

asserted jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim against
Pierce.
IV
After determining that Vickie’s claim was not a “core
proceeding,” the District Court reviewed the case de novo
and entered its final judgment on March 7, 2002. 275
B. R., at 5–8. The Texas Probate Court’s judgment be
came final on February 11, 2002, nearly one month ear
lier. App. to Pet. for Cert. 41. The Court of Appeals con
sidered only the issue of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction. It did not address the question whether
Vickie’s claim was “core”; nor did it address Pierce’s argu
ments concerning claim and issue preclusion. 392 F. 3d,
at 1137. These issues remain open for consideration on
remand.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–1544
_________________

VICKIE LYNN MARSHALL, PETITIONER v. E. PIERCE
MARSHALL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 1, 2006]

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
The administration of decedents’ estates typically is
governed by rules of state law and conducted by state
probate courts. Occasionally, however, disputes between
interested parties arise, either in the probate proceeding
itself or elsewhere, that qualify as cases or controversies
that federal courts have jurisdiction to decide. See, e.g.,
Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). In her opinion for the
Court, JUSTICE GINSBURG has cogently explained why this
is such a case. I write separately to explain why I do not
believe there is any “probate exception” that ousts a federal
court of jurisdiction it otherwise possesses.
The familiar aphorism that hard cases make bad law
should extend to easy cases as well. Markham v. Allen,
326 U. S. 490 (1946), like this case, was an easy case. In
Markham, as here, it was unnecessary to question the
historical or logical underpinnings of the probate exception
to federal jurisdiction because, whatever the scope of the
supposed exception, it did not extend to the case at hand.
But Markham’s obiter dicta—dicta that the Court now
describes as redundant if not incoherent, ante, at 14—
generated both confusion and abdication of the obligation
Chief Justice Marshall so famously articulated, see
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821); see also
2 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

ante, at 1. While the Court today rightly abandons much
of that dicta, I would go further.
The Court is content to adopt the approach it followed in
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), and to
accept as foundation for the probate exception Markham’s
bald assertion that the English High Court of Chancery’s
jurisdiction did not “extend to probate matters” in 1789.
326 U. S., at 495; see ante, at 11. I would not accept that
premise. Not only had the theory Markham espoused
been only sporadically and tentatively cited as justification
for the exception,1 but the most comprehensive article on
the subject has persuasively demonstrated that Mark
ham’s assertion is “an exercise in mythography.”2
Markham’s theory apparently is the source of the
Court’s reformulated exception, which “reserves to state
probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the
administration of a decedent’s estate.” Ante, at 14. Al
though undoubtedly narrower in scope than Markham’s
ill-considered description of the probate carve-out, this
description also sweeps too broadly. For the Court has
correctly upheld the exercise of federal jurisdiction over
actions involving the annulment of wills and the admini
——————
1 Notably, Justice Joseph Bradley, a strong proponent of the theory

that federal courts sitting in equity cannot exercise jurisdiction over
probate matters because in England in 1789 such jurisdiction belonged
to the ecclesiastical courts, see Case of Broderick’s Will, 21 Wall. 503
(1875), Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 24-25 (1876) (dissenting opinion),
urged that “even in matters savoring of [e]cclesiastical process, after an
issue has been formed between definite parties,” the controversy should be
heard by a federal court. See Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S. 450, 460-461
(1887) (dissenting opinion) (citing Gaines, 92 U. S., at 17, and Hess v.
Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73 (1885)).
2 Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 Probate

L. J. 77, 126 (1997); see ante, at 1–2 (acknowledging Winkler’s analy
sis). Winkler also observes, citing Charles Dickens’ Bleak House
(1853), that Markham’s “suggestion that the High Court of Chancery
had lacked jurisdiction to ‘administer an estate’ was preposterous.” 14
Probate L. J., at 125, and n. 256.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

stration of decedents’ estates. In Gaines v. Fuentes, 92
U. S. 10 (1876), for example, the Court held that a defen
dant in an action to annul a will should be permitted to
remove the case to federal court. In so doing, it explained:
“[W]henever a controversy in a suit . . . arises respect
ing the validity or construction of a will, or the en
forcement of a decree admitting it to probate, there is
no more reason why the Federal courts should not
take jurisdiction of the case than there is that they
should not take jurisdiction of any other controversy
between the parties.” Id., at 22.
Likewise, in Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425 (1869), the Court
explained that it was “well settled that a court of chan
cery, as an incident to its power to enforce trusts, and
make those holding a fiduciary relation account, has juris
diction to compel executors and administrators to account
and distribute the assets in their hands.” Id., at 431. (In
that same case, a federal court later appointed a Special
Master to administer the estate. This Court upheld some
of the Master’s determinations and rejected others. See
Hook v. Payne, 14 Wall. 252, 255 (1872).)
To be sure, there are cases that support limitations on
federal courts’ jurisdiction over the probate and annul
ment of wills and the administration of decedents’ estates.
But careful examination reveals that at least most of the
limitations so recognized stem not from some sui generis
exception, but rather from generally applicable jurisdic
tional rules. Cf. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 497 (1883)
(“Jurisdiction as to wills, and their probate as such, is
neither included in nor excepted out of the grant of judicial
power to the courts of the United States”). Some of those
rules, like the rule that diversity jurisdiction will not
attach absent an inter partes controversy, plainly are still
relevant today. See, e.g., Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana
Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33, 44–45 (1909); see also id.,
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Opinion of STEVENS, J.

at 46 (reaffirming the in gremio legis principle). Others,
like the rule that a bill in equity will lie only where there
is no adequate remedy elsewhere, have less straightfor
ward application in the wake of 20th-century jurisdic
tional developments. See, e.g., Case of Broderick’s Will, 21
Wall. 503, 510–512 (1875); Ellis, 109 U. S., at 503 (deny
ing relief where plaintiff had “a plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law”); see also Winkler, supra, n.2, at
112–113. Whatever the continuing viability of these indi
vidual rules, together they are more than adequate to the
task of cabining federal courts’ jurisdiction. They require
no helping hand from the so-called probate exception.
Rather than preserving whatever vitality that the “ex
ception” has retained as a result of the Markham dicta, I
would provide the creature with a decent burial in a grave
adjacent to the resting place of the Rooker-Feldman doc
trine. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. ___, ___ (2006)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2–3).