Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KEITH LANCE, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. GIGI DENNIS,
COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
No. 05–555. Decided February 21, 2006
PER CURIAM.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by
“state-court losers” challenging “state-court judgments ren-
dered before the district court proceedings commenced.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544
U. S. 280, 284 (2005). In this case, the District Court
dismissed plaintiffs’ suit on the ground that they were in
privity with a state-court loser. We hold that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiffs from proceeding,
and vacate the District Court’s judgment.
I
This is the latest of several rounds of litigation involving
the State of Colorado’s congressional redistricting after
the 2000 census, under which the State gained a seat in
the House of Representatives. Lance v. Davidson, 379
F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121 (2005). The first round began in
May 2001. When the Colorado General Assembly failed to
pass a redistricting plan for the 2002 congressional elec-
tions by the close of its regular session, a group of Colo-
rado voters asked the state courts to create a plan. The
courts agreed, drawing a new map reflecting the addi-
tional district. See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P. 3d 642 (Colo.
2002) (en banc). The 2002 elections were held using this
court-ordered plan.
The General Assembly passed its own redistricting plan
in the spring of 2003, prompting further litigation—this
2 LANCE v. DENNIS
Per Curiam
time about which electoral map was to govern, the legisla-
ture’s or the court’s. Two suits were filed seeking to enjoin
the legislature’s plan: an original action in the Colorado
Supreme Court by the state attorney general seeking to
require the secretary of state to use the court-ordered
plan, and a similar action brought in a lower state court
by several proponents of the court-ordered plan. 379
F. Supp. 2d, at 1121. After the Colorado General Assem-
bly intervened to defend its plan in the first case, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the plan violated Arti-
cle V, §44, of the State Constitution, which the court con-
strued to limit congressional redistricting to “once per
decade.” People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P. 3d 1221,
1231 (2003) (en banc). It therefore ordered the secretary
of state to use the court-created plan. We denied certio-
rari. 541 U. S. 1093 (2004).
The second suit was removed to federal court by the
defendants on the basis of plaintiffs’ federal-law claims.
See Keller v. Davidson, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1175 (Colo.
2004). Once Salazar was decided by the Colorado Su-
preme Court, the viability of the defendants’ counter-
claims was the only remaining issue. A three-judge Dis-
trict Court held that the defendants were barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine from amending their counter-
claims to assert additional challenges to the decision in
Salazar. It also held that the defendants’ original coun-
terclaims, while not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine, were precluded under Colorado law by the judgment
in Salazar. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case.
Finally, this suit: Before the dismissal in Keller, several
Colorado citizens unhappy with Salazar filed an action in
the District Court seeking to require the secretary of state
to use the legislature’s plan.1 The plaintiffs argued that
——————
1 Although the secretary of state defended the legislature’s plan in
Salazar, following that decision she agreed to defend the court-ordered
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Per Curiam
Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted
by the Colorado Supreme Court, violated the Elections
Clause of Article I, §4, of the U. S. Constitution (“The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof”), and the First Amendment’s
Petition Clause (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances”). The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and Colorado preclusion law barred any attack on
the Colorado Supreme Court’s judgment in Salazar and
that the plaintiffs had failed to state a valid Petition
Clause claim.
The three-judge District Court ruled that under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it had no jurisdiction to hear
the Elections Clause claim. 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1127. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court explained, includes
three requirements: (1) “the party against whom the doc-
trine is invoked must have actually been a party to the
prior state-court judgment or have been in privity with
such a party”; (2) “the claim raised in the federal suit must
have been actually raised or inextricably intertwined with
the state-court judgment”; and (3) “the federal claim must
not be parallel to the state-court claim.” 379 F. Supp. 2d,
at 1124. The District Court found the first requirement
satisfied on the ground that the citizen plaintiffs were in
privity with the Colorado General Assembly—a losing
party in Salazar. Relying on our decisions in Washington
v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Assn., 443 U. S. 658 (1979), and Tacoma v. Taxpayers of
Tacoma, 357 U. S. 320 (1958), the court stated that “when
a state government litigates a matter of public concern,
——————
plan in this litigation and to allow the state attorney general to repre
-
sent her. 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122, n. 3 (Colo. 2005).
4 LANCE v. DENNIS
Per Curiam
that state’s citizens will be deemed to be in privity with
the government for preclusion purposes.” 379 F. Supp. 2d,
at 1125. This principle, the court reasoned, applies “with
equal force in the Rooker-Feldman context.” Ibid. The
court went on to conclude that the Elections Clause claim
was actually raised in Salazar, or inextricably intertwined
with that decision, and was not parallel to the claims
presented in Salazar. As to the Petition Clause claim, the
court ruled that neither Rooker-Feldman nor Colorado
preclusion law prevented the court from proceeding to the
merits, but that plaintiffs failed to state a claim. 379
F. Supp. 2d, at 1132; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6).
The plaintiffs appealed. See 28 U. S. C. §1253. We now
note jurisdiction, and address whether the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars the plaintiffs from proceeding
because they were in privity with a party in Salazar. We
conclude it does not, and vacate the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court.
II
This Court is vested, under 28 U. S. C. §1257, with
jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court judgments.
We have held that this grant of jurisdiction is exclusive:
“Review of such judgments may be had only in this Court.”
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U. S. 462, 482 (1983) (emphasis added); see also Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281,
286 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 416
(1923). Accordingly, under what has come to be known as
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are
precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final
state-court judgments.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from the
only two cases in which we have applied this rule to find
that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction. In Rooker,
a party who had lost in the Indiana Supreme Court, and
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Per Curiam
failed to obtain review in this Court, filed an action in
federal district court challenging the constitutionality of
the state-court judgment. We viewed the action as tanta-
mount to an appeal of the Indiana Supreme Court deci-
sion, over which only this Court had jurisdiction, and said
that the “aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do
indirectly what he no longer can do directly.” 263 U. S., at
416. Feldman, decided 60 years later, concerned slightly
different circumstances, with similar results. The plain-
tiffs there had been refused admission to the District of
Columbia bar by the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, and sought review of these decisions in federal
district court. Our decision held that to the extent plain-
tiffs challenged the Court of Appeals decisions them-
selves—as opposed to the bar admission rules promul-
gated nonjudicially by the Court of Appeals—their sole
avenue of review was with this Court. 460 U. S., at 476.
Neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated a rationale for a
wide-reaching bar on the jurisdiction of lower federal
courts, and our cases since Feldman have tended to em-
phasize the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule. See
Exxon Mobil, 544 U. S., at 292 (Rooker-Feldman does not
apply to parallel state and federal litigation); Verizon Md.
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644, n. 3
(2002) (Rooker-Feldman “has no application to judicial
review of executive action, including determinations made
by a state administrative agency”); Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U. S. 997, 1005–1006 (1994) (Rooker-Feldman does
not bar actions by a nonparty to the earlier state suit).
Indeed, during that period, “this Court has never applied
Rooker-Feldman to dismiss an action for want of jurisdic-
tion.” Exxon Mobil, supra, at 287.
In Exxon Mobil, decided last Term, we warned that the
lower courts have at times extended Rooker-Feldman “far
beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases,
overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction
6 LANCE v. DENNIS
Per Curiam
concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and
superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1738.” 544 U. S., at 283. Rooker-
Feldman, we explained, is a narrow doctrine, confined to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of inju-
ries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” 544 U. S.,
at 284.
Although we have never addressed the precise question
before us, we have held Rooker-Feldman inapplicable
where the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was
not a party to the underlying state-court proceeding. See
De Grandy, supra, at 1006. In De Grandy, the State of
Florida sought, using Rooker-Feldman, to prevent the
United States from bringing a challenge under §2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the reapportionment of state
electoral districts. The Florida Supreme Court, in an
action initiated by the state attorney general, had already
declared the law valid under state and federal law. We
held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the United States
from bringing its own action in federal court because the
United States “was not a party in the state court,” and
“was in no position to ask this Court to review the state
court’s judgment and has not directly attacked it in this
proceeding.” 512 U. S., at 1006.
In the case before us, plaintiffs were plainly not parties
to the underlying state-court proceeding in Salazar.
Salazar was an action brought by the state attorney gen-
eral against the secretary of state, in which the Colorado
General Assembly intervened. 79 P. 3d, at 1227. The four
citizen-plaintiffs here did not participate in Salazar, and
were not in a “position to ask this Court to review the
state court’s judgment.” De Grandy, supra, at 1006; see
Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 77 (1987) (“[T]he general rule
[is] that one who is not a party or has not been treated as a
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Per Curiam
party to a judgment has no right to appeal therefrom”).
Although the District Court recognized the “general
rule” that “Rooker-Feldman may not be invoked against a
federal-court plaintiff who was not actually a party to the
prior state-court judgment,” 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1123, it
nevertheless followed Tenth Circuit precedent in allowing
application of Rooker-Feldman against parties who were
in privity with a party to the earlier state-court action.
379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1123 (citing Kenmen Eng. v. Union,
314 F. 3d 468, 481 (2002)). In determining whether priv-
ity existed, the court looked to cases concerning the pre-
clusive effect that state courts are required to give federal-
court judgments. 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1125 (citing Wash-
ington, 443 U. S., at 693, n. 32; Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357
U. S., at 340–341). It concluded that—for Rooker-Feldman
as well as preclusion purposes—“the outcome of the gov-
ernment’s litigation over a matter of public concern binds
its citizens.” 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1125.
The District Court erroneously conflated preclusion law
with Rooker-Feldman. Whatever the impact of privity
principles on preclusion rules, Rooker-Feldman is not
simply preclusion by another name. The doctrine applies
only in “limited circumstances,” Exxon Mobil, supra, at
291, where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an
unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by
nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply
because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be
considered in privity with a party to the judgment.2
A more expansive Rooker-Feldman rule would tend to
——————
2 In holding that Rooker-Feldman does not bar plaintiffs here from
proceeding, we need not address whether there are any circumstances,
however limited, in which Rooker-Feldman may be applied against a
party not named in an earlier state proceeding—e.g., where an estate
takes a de facto appeal in a district court of an earlier state decision
involving the decedent.
8 LANCE v. DENNIS
Per Curiam
supplant Congress’ mandate, under the Full Faith and
Credit Act, 28 U. S. C. §1738, that federal courts “ ‘give the
same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those
judgments would be given in the courts of the State from
which the judgments emerged.’ ” Baker v. General Motors
Corp., 522 U. S. 222, 246 (1998) (quoting Kremer v. Chemi-
cal Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 466 (1982)); see Exxon
Mobil, supra, at 293. Congress has directed federal courts
to look principally to state law in deciding what effect to
give state-court judgments. Incorporation of preclusion
principles into Rooker-Feldman risks turning that limited
doctrine into a uniform federal rule governing the preclu-
sive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full
Faith and Credit Act.3
* * *
The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
——————
3 Our holding also disposes of the claim, which the District Court did
not reach, that plaintiffs were barred by Rooker-Feldman because they
were in privity with the secretary of state, the other losing party in
People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P. 3d 1221 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).
We do not pass on the District Court’s resolution of the merits of
plaintiffs’ Petition Clause claim.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
GINSBURG, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KEITH LANCE, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. GIGI DENNIS,
COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
No. 05–555. Decided February 21, 2006
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins,
concurring.
I agree in full with the Court’s correction of the District
Court’s Rooker-Feldman error, and therefore join the
Court’s opinion. Although JUSTICE STEVENS has persua-
sively urged that issue preclusion warrants affirmance,
see post, at 2–3 (dissenting opinion), that question of
Colorado law seems to me best left for full airing and
decision on remand.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
STEVENS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KEITH LANCE, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. GIGI DENNIS,
COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
No. 05–555. Decided February 21, 2006
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Rooker and Feldman are strange bedfellows. Rooker, a
unanimous, three-page opinion written by Justice Van
Devanter in 1923, correctly applied the simple legal propo-
sition that only this Court may exercise appellate jurisdic-
tion over state-court judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 416. Feldman, a nonunanimous,
25-page opinion written by Justice Brennan in 1983, was
incorrectly decided and generated a plethora of confusion
and debate among scholars and judges.* See District
——————
*See, e.g., Comment, Collateral Estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine: The Problematic Effect These Preclusion and Jurisdictional
Principles Have on Bankruptcy Law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 579
(2005); Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable
Role, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1555 (2001); Proctor, Wirth, & Spencer,
Rooker-Feldman and the Jurisdictional Quandary, 2 Fla. Coastal L. J.
113 (2000); Rowley, Tenth Circuit Survey, The Rooker-Feldman Doc-
trine: A Mere Superfluous Nuance or a Vital Civil Procedure Doctrine?
An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Johnson v. Rodrigues, 78
Denver U. L. Rev. 321 (2000); Symposium, The Rooker-Feldman Doc-
trine, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1081 (1999); Pfander, An Intermediate
Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review
of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 161
(1998); Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Ignores Principles of Federalism and
the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Bates v. Jones, 131 F. 3d 843 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc), 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 881 (1998); Schmucker,
Possible Applications of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to State Agency
Decisions: The Seventh Circuit’s Decision in Van Harken v. City of
Chicago, 17 J. Nat. Assn. Admin. L. Judges 333 (1997); Casenote,
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis of the Rooker-
2 LANCE v. DENNIS
STEVENS, J., dissenting
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462;
id., at 488 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Last Term, in
JUSTICE GINSBURG’s lucid opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280 (2005), the
Court finally interred the so-called “Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.” And today, the Court quite properly disap-
proves of the District Court’s resuscitation of a doctrine
that has produced nothing but mischief for 23 years.
My disagreement with the majority arises not from
what it actually decides, but from what it fails to address.
Even though the District Court mistakenly believed it had
no jurisdiction to hear this matter, its judgment dismiss-
ing the cause with prejudice was correct and should be
affirmed. See Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117,
1132 (Colo. 2005). The Elections Clause claim advanced
by citizen-appellants in this case is the same as that ad-
vanced by their official representatives and decided by the
Colorado Supreme Court in People ex rel. Salazar v.
Davidson, 79 P. 3d 1221, 1231–1232 (Colo. 2003) (en
banc). See 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1126. As appellee points
out, appellants’ second question presented “is literally the
same question presented by the General Assembly on
certiorari review (and denied) in Salazar.” Motion to
Affirm 12. And, as a matter of Colorado law, appellants
are clearly in privity with both then-Colorado Attorney
General Salazar, who brought the suit on behalf of the
people of Colorado, and the Colorado General Assembly,
which was also a party to the Salazar litigation. See
McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 322,
74 P. 2d 99, 102 (1937) (en banc) (finding privity between
taxpayers seeking to challenge the validity of a bond issue
——————
Feldman Doctrine’s Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. Miami L.
Rev. 627 (1987); Comment, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts
on the Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court Proceedings, 54
Ford. L. Rev. 767 (1986).
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
STEVENS, J., dissenting
and a public official “charged with ministerial and execu-
tive duties in connection” with the issuance of the bonds
who already brought such a suit); Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co. v. Board of County Comm’rs of County of Fremont, 95
Colo. 435, 441, 37 P. 2d 761, 764 (1934) (en banc) (explain-
ing that taxpayers are in privity with a political division of
the State or its official representative if the case involves
“a matter of general interest to all the people”). Thus, all
of the requirements under Colorado law for issue preclu-
sion have been met, and appellants’ Elections Clause
claim should therefore be dismissed. See generally 28
U. S. C. §1738; Michaelson v. Michaelson, 884 P. 2d 695,
700–701 (Colo. 1994) (setting forth requirements for issue
preclusion under Colorado law).
Appellants’ spurious Petition Clause claim was also
properly dismissed by the District Court. See 379 F. Supp.
2d, at 1130–1132. Nothing in the Colorado Constitution
prevents appellants from petitioning the Colorado General
Assembly with their grievances, id., at 1131; nothing in
the United States Constitution guarantees that such a
petition will be effective, Smith v. Highway Employees,
441 U. S. 463, 465 (1979) (per curiam); see also Minnesota
State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U. S. 271,
285 (1984). Moreover, as the District Court recognized,
appellants’ interpretation of the Petition Clause would
lead to absurd results. See 379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1131–1132.
As such, appellants’ Petition Clause claim was correctly
dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See generally Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 12(b)(6).
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.