United States v. Georgia

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–1203. Argued November 9, 2005—Decided January 10, 2006*
Goodman, petitioner in No. 04–1236, is a paraplegic who sued respon-
dent state defendants and others, challenging the conditions of his
confinement in a Georgia prison under, inter alia, 42 U. S. C. §1983
and Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990. As relevant
here, the Federal District Court dismissed the §1983 claims because
Goodman’s allegations were vague, and granted respondents sum-
mary judgment on the Title II money damages claims because they
were barred by state sovereign immunity. The United States, peti-
tioner in No. 04–1203, intervened on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s judgment as to the Title II claims, but
reversed the §1983 ruling, finding that Goodman had alleged facts
sufficient to support a limited number of Eighth Amendment claims
against state agents and should be permitted to amend his com-
plaint. This Court granted certiorari to decide the validity of Title
II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Held: Insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages
against States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.
Pp. 5–8.
(a) Because this Court assumes that the Eleventh Circuit correctly
held that Goodman had alleged actual Eighth Amendment violations
for purposes of §1983, and because respondents do not dispute Good-
man’s claim that this same conduct violated Title II, Goodman’s Title
II money damages claims were evidently based, at least in part, on
conduct that independently violated §1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
——————
* Together with No. 04–1236, Goodman v. Georgia et al., also on cer-
tiorari to the same court.
2 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA

Syllabus

ment. No one doubts that §5 grants Congress the power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions by creating private remedies
against the States for actual violations of those provisions. This in-
cludes the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authoriz-
ing private suits for damages against the States. Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit erred in dismissing those of Goodman’s claims based on con-
duct that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 5–7.
(b) Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the lower courts will be
best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim
basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title
II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth
Amendment; and (3) insofar as such conduct violated Title II but did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s pur-
ported abrogation of sovereign immunity in such contexts is never-
theless valid. Pp. 7–8.
120 Fed. Appx. 785, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. STEVENS, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 04–1203 and 04–1236
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
04–1203 v.
GEORGIA ET AL.

TONY GOODMAN, PETITIONER
04–1236 v.
GEORGIA ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January 10, 2006]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a disabled inmate in a state prison
may sue the State for money damages under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat.
337, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and
Supp. II).
I
A
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” §12132
(2000 ed.). A “ ‘qualified individual with a disability’ ” is
defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or
2 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA

Opinion of the Court

without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids
and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements
for the receipt of services or the participation in programs
or activities provided by a public entity.” §12131(2). The
Act defines “ ‘public entity’ ” to include “any State or local
government” and “any department, agency, . . . or other
instrumentality of a State,” §12131(1). We have previ-
ously held that this term includes state prisons. See
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206,
210 (1998). Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for
money damages against public entities that violate
§12132. See 42 U. S. C. §12133 (incorporating by refer-
ence 29 U. S. C. §794a).
In enacting the ADA, Congress “invoke[d] the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §12101(b)(4).
Moreover, the Act provides that “[a] State shall not be
immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this
chapter.” §12202. We have accepted this latter statement
as an unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity. See Board of Trustees of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 363–364 (2001).
B
Petitioner in No. 04–1236, Tony Goodman, is a paraple-
gic inmate in the Georgia prison system who, at all rele-
vant times, was housed at the Georgia State Prison in
Reidsville. After filing numerous administrative griev-
ances in the state prison system, Goodman filed a pro se
complaint in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia challenging the conditions of
his confinement. He named as defendants the State of
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections (state
defendants) and several individual prison officials. He
brought claims under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983,
Title II of the ADA, and other provisions not relevant here,
seeking both injunctive relief and money damages against
all defendants.
Goodman’s pro se complaint and subsequent filings in
the District Court included many allegations, both grave
and trivial, regarding the conditions of his confinement in
the Reidsville prison. Among his more serious allegations,
he claimed that he was confined for 23-to-24 hours per day
in a 12-by-3-foot cell in which he could not turn his wheel-
chair around. He alleged that the lack of accessible facili-
ties rendered him unable to use the toilet and shower
without assistance, which was often denied. On multiple
occasions, he asserted, he had injured himself in attempt-
ing to transfer from his wheelchair to the shower or toilet
on his own, and, on several other occasions, he had been
forced to sit in his own feces and urine while prison offi-
cials refused to assist him in cleaning up the waste. He
also claimed that he had been denied physical therapy and
medical treatment, and denied access to virtually all
prison programs and services on account of his disability.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that the allegations in the complaint
were vague and constituted insufficient notice pleading as
to Goodman’s §1983 claims. It therefore dismissed the
§1983 claims against all defendants without providing
Goodman an opportunity to amend his complaint. The
District Court also dismissed his Title II claims against all
individual defendants. Later, after our decision in
Garrett, the District Court granted summary judgment to
the state defendants on Goodman’s Title II claims for
money damages, holding that those claims were barred by
state sovereign immunity.
Goodman appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
4 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA

Opinion of the Court

peals for the Eleventh Circuit. The United States, peti-
tioner in No. 04–1203, intervened to defend the constitu-
tionality of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immu-
nity. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the District
Court had erred in dismissing all of Goodman’s §1983
claims, because Goodman’s multiple pro se filings in the
District Court alleged facts sufficient to support “a limited
number of Eighth-Amendment claims under §1983”
against certain individual defendants. App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 04–1236, p. 17a, judgt. order reported at 120
Fed. Appx. 785 (2004). The Court of Appeals held that the
District Court should have given Goodman leave to amend
his complaint to develop three Eighth Amendment claims
relating to his conditions of confinement:
“First, Goodman alleges that he is not able to move
his wheelchair in his cell. If Goodman is to be be-
lieved, this effectively amounts to some form of total
restraint twenty-three to twenty-four hours-a-day
without penal justification. Second, Goodman has al-
leged several instances in which he was forced to sit
in his own bodily waste because prison officials re-
fused to provide assistance. Third, Goodman has al-
leged sufficient conduct to proceed with a §1983 claim
based on the prison staff’s supposed ‘deliberate indif-
ference’ to his serious medical condition of being par-
tially paraplegic . . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
04–1236, pp. 18a–19a (citation and footnote omitted).
The Court remanded the suit to the District Court to
permit Goodman to amend his complaint, while cautioning
Goodman not to reassert all the §1983 claims included in
his initial complaint, “some of which [we]re obviously
frivolous.” Id., at 18a.
The Eleventh Circuit did not address the sufficiency of
Goodman’s allegations under Title II. Instead, relying on
its prior decision in Miller v. King, 384 F. 3d 1248 (2004),
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding
that Goodman’s Title II claims for money damages against
the State were barred by sovereign immunity. We granted
certiorari to consider whether Title II of the ADA validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to the
claims at issue here. 544 U. S. ___ (2005).
II
In reversing the dismissal of Goodman’s §1983 claims,
the Eleventh Circuit held that Goodman had alleged
actual violations of the Eighth Amendment by state
agents on the grounds set forth above. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 04–1236, pp. 18a–19a. The State does not
contest this holding, see Brief for Respondents 41–44, and
we did not grant certiorari to consider the merits of Good-
man’s Eighth Amendment claims; we assume without
deciding, therefore, that the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment
of these claims was correct. Moreover, Goodman urges,
and the State does not dispute, that this same conduct
that violated the Eighth Amendment also violated Title II
of the ADA. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 04–1236, p. 46;
Brief for Respondents 41–44. In fact, it is quite plausible
that the alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to
accommodate Goodman’s disability-related needs in such
fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and
virtually all other prison programs constituted “exclu[sion]
from participation in or . . . den[ial of] the benefits of” the
prison’s “services, programs, or activities.” 42 U. S. C.
§12132; see also Yeskey, 524 U. S., at 210 (noting that the
phrase “services, programs, or activities” in §12132 in-
cludes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational
prison programs). Therefore, Goodman’s claims for money
damages against the State under Title II were evidently
based, at least in large part, on conduct that independ-
ently violated the provisions of §1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
6 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA

Opinion of the Court

329 U. S. 459, 463 (1947) (the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amend-
ment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment).
In this respect, Goodman differs from the claimants in our
other cases addressing Congress’s ability to abrogate
sovereign immunity pursuant to its §5 powers. See Ten-
nessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 543, n. 4 (2004) (Rehnquist,
C. J., dissenting) (respondents were not actually denied
constitutional rights); Nevada Dept. of Human Resources
v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 752, 755 (2003) (KENNEDY, J.,
dissenting) (Nevada provided family leave “on a gender-
neutral basis”—“a practice which no one contends suffers
from a constitutional infirmity”); Garrett, 531 U. S., at
362, 367–368 (failure to make the special accommodations
requested by disabled respondents was not unconstitu-
tional); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 69–
70, 83–84 (2000) (most petitioners raised nonconstitu-
tional disparate-impact challenges to the State’s age-
related policies); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Ex-
pense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 643–
644, and n. 9 (1999) (Florida satisfied due process by
providing remedies for patent infringement by state ac-
tors); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 512 (1997)
(church building permit denied under neutral law of gen-
eral applicability).
While the Members of this Court have disagreed regard-
ing the scope of Congress’s “prophylactic” enforcement
powers under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g.,
Lane, 541 U. S., at 513 (majority opinion of STEVENS, J.);
id., at 538 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id., at 554
(SCALIA, J., dissenting), no one doubts that §5 grants
Congress the power to “enforce . . . the provisions” of the
Amendment by creating private remedies against the
States for actual violations of those provisions. “Section 5
authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through
which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amend-
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

ment rights.” Id., at 559–560 (SCALIA, J., dissenting)
(citing the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat.
13); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976)
(“In [§5] Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce
. . . the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment” by providing actions for money damages against the
States (emphasis added)); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,
346 (1880) (“The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are directed to the States . . . . It is these which
Congress is empowered to enforce . . .”). This enforcement
power includes the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity by authorizing private suits for damages
against the States. See Fitzpatrick, supra, at 456. Thus,
insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for
damages against the States for conduct that actually
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abro-
gates state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit
erred in dismissing those of Goodman’s Title II claims that
were based on such unconstitutional conduct.
From the many allegations in Goodman’s pro se com-
plaint and his subsequent filings in the District Court, it is
not clear precisely what conduct he intended to allege in
support of his Title II claims. Because the Eleventh Cir-
cuit did not address the issue, it is likewise unclear to
what extent the conduct underlying Goodman’s constitu-
tional claims also violated Title II. Moreover, the Elev-
enth Circuit ordered that the suit be remanded to the
District Court to permit Goodman to amend his complaint,
but instructed him to revise his factual allegations to
exclude his “frivolous” claims—some of which are quite far
afield from actual constitutional violations (under either
the Eighth Amendment or some other constitutional pro-
vision), or even from Title II violations. See, e.g., App. 50
(demanding a “steam table” for Goodman’s housing unit).
It is therefore unclear whether Goodman’s amended com-
plaint will assert Title II claims premised on conduct that
8 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA

Opinion of the Court

does not independently violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the lower
courts will be best situated to determine in the first in-
stance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the
State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent
such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II
but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether
Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as
to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.
* * *
The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and
the suit is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

STEVENS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

Nos. 04–1203 and 04–1236
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
04–1203 v.
GEORGIA ET AL.

TONY GOODMAN, PETITIONER
04–1236 v.
GEORGIA ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January 10, 2006]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
concurring.
The Court holds that Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity at least insofar as it creates a private cause of
action for damages against States for conduct that violates
the Constitution. Ante, at 7. And the state defendants
have correctly chosen not to challenge the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s holding that Title II is constitutional insofar as it
authorizes prospective injunctive relief against the State.
See Brief for Respondents 6; see also Miller v. King, 384 F.
3d 1248, 1264 (CA11 2004). Rather than attempting to
define the outer limits of Title II’s valid abrogation of state
sovereign immunity on the basis of the present record, the
Court’s opinion wisely permits the parties, guided by
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509 (2004), to create a factual
record that will inform that decision.* I therefore join the
——————
* Such definition is necessary because Title II prohibits “ ‘a somewhat
broader swath of conduct’ ” than the Constitution itself forbids. Lane,
2 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA

STEVENS, J., concurring

opinion.
It is important to emphasize that although petitioner
Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims provide a sufficient
basis for reversal, our opinion does not suggest that this is
the only constitutional right applicable in the prison con-
text and therefore relevant to the abrogation issue. As we
explain, when the District Court and the Court of Appeals
revisit that issue, they should analyze Goodman’s claims
to see whether they state “actual constitutional violations
(under either the Eighth Amendment or some other consti-
tutional provision),” ante, at 7 (emphasis added), and to
evaluate whether “Congress’s purported abrogation of
sovereign immunity in such contexts is nevertheless
valid,” ante, at 8. This approach mirrors that taken in
Lane, which identified a constellation of “basic constitu-
tional guarantees” that Title II seeks to enforce and ulti-
mately evaluated whether Title II was an appropriate
response to the “class of cases” at hand. 541 U. S., at 522–
523, 531. The Court’s focus on Goodman’s Eighth
Amendment claims arises simply from the fact that those
are the only constitutional violations the Eleventh Circuit
found him to have alleged properly. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 04–1236, pp. 18a–19a.
Moreover, our approach today is fully consistent with
our recognition that the history of mistreatment leading to
Congress’ decision to extend Title II’s protections to prison
inmates was not limited to violations of the Eighth

——————

541 U. S., at 533, n. 24 (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528

U. S. 62, 81 (2000)). While a factual record may not be absolutely
necessary to our resolution of the question, it will surely aid our under-
standing of issues such as how, in practice, Title II’s “reasonableness”
requirement applies in the prison context, cf. Lane, 541 U. S., at 531–
532 (explaining that Title II requires only “ ‘reasonable modifications’ ”),
and therefore whether certain of Goodman’s claims are even covered by
Title II, cf. App. 83 (complaining of lack of access to, among other
things, “television, phone calls, [and] entertainment”).
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

STEVENS, J., concurring

Amendment. See Lane, 541 U. S., at 524–525 (describing
“backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment” leading to
enactment of Title II); see also, e.g., Board of Trustees of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 391–424 (2001)
(Appendixes to opinion of BREYER, J., dissenting) (listing
submissions made to Congress by the Task Force on the
Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities
showing, for example, that prisoners with developmental
disabilities were subject to longer terms of imprisonment
than other prisoners); 2 House Committee on Education
and Labor, Legislative History of Public Law 101–336:
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., p. 1331 (Comm. Print 1990) (stating that persons
with hearing impairments “have been arrested and held in
jail over night without ever knowing their rights nor what
they are being held for”); id., at 1005 (stating that police
arrested a man with AIDS and “[i]nstead of putting the
man in jail, the officers locked him inside his car to spend
the night”); California Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s
Commission on Disability: Final Report 103 (Dec. 1989)
(finding that inmates with disabilities were unnecessarily
“confined to medical units where access to work, job train-
ing, recreation and rehabilitation programs is limited”).
In fact, as the Solicitor General points out in his brief
arguing that Title II’s damage remedy constitutes appro-
priate prophylactic legislation in the prison context, the
record of mistreatment of prison inmates that Congress
reviewed in its deliberations preceding the enactment of
Title II was comparable in all relevant respects to the
record that we recently held sufficient to uphold the appli-
cation of that title to the entire class of cases implicating
the fundamental right of access to the courts. See Lane,
541 U. S., at 533–534. And while it is true that cases
involving inadequate medical care and inhumane condi-
tions of confinement have perhaps been most numerous,
courts have also reviewed myriad other types of claims by
4 UNITED STATES v. GEORGIA

STEVENS, J., concurring

disabled prisoners, such as allegations of the abridgment
of religious liberties, undue censorship, interference with
access to the judicial process, and procedural due process
violations. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980)
(procedural due process); May v. Sheahan, 226 F. 3d 876
(CA7 2000) (access to judicial process, lawyers, legal mate-
rials, and reading materials); Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.
2d 729 (CA10 1981) (access to reading and writing materi-
als); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715 (WDNY
1991) (access to law library and religious services).
Indeed, given the constellation of rights applicable in
the prison context, it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit has
erred in identifying only the Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment in performing
the first step of the “congruence and proportionality”
inquiry set forth in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507
(1997). See Miller, 384 F. 3d, at 1272, and n. 28 (declining
to entertain United States’ argument that Lane requires
consideration of constitutional rights beyond those pro-
vided by the Eighth Amendment); App. to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 04–1236, p. 19a (relying on Miller to find Goodman’s
Title II claims for money damages barred by the Eleventh
Amendment). By reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in this case and remanding for further proceedings, we not
only provide the parties an opportunity to create a more
substantial factual record, but also provide the District
Court and the Court of Appeals the opportunity to apply
the Boerne framework properly. Given these benefits, I
agree with the Court’s decision to await further proceed-
ings before trying to define the extent to which Title II
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity in the prison
context.