Burgess v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BURGESS v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum
sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previ-
ously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A).
Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “of-
fense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while
§802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n]
an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year under any law of the United States or
of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an
offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession convic-
tion, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classi-
fied as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government
argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced
to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction
was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess
countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term
“felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense
does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both
(1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction,
per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprison-
ment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court
ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug of-
fense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined
exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition
2 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year
qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the of-
fense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used
“felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without ref-
erence to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares
what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not
stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392–393, n. 10.
Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C.
§3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense
. . . punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no
blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug of-
fense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could
have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means
a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
. . . .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise
if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s
sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and
state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign of-
fense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in
§841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony
drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of
drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label of-
fenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of
§802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section
serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that un-
adorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In
1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an
offense that is a felony under . . . any law of a State” (emphasis
added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its pre-
sent form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “fel-
ony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of
the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent
state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal stan-
dard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast,
Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-
imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designa-
tion of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would at-
tribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formi-
dable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in
determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s
 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Syllabus

definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity
is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381,
387. Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a
manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is
no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 06–11429
_________________

KEITH LAVON BURGESS, PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[April 16, 2008]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
For certain federal drug offenses, the Controlled Sub-
stances Act mandates a minimum sentence of imprison-
ment for 10 years. 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). That mini-
mum doubles to 20 years for defendants previously
convicted of a “felony drug offense.” Ibid. The question in
this case is whether a state drug offense classified as a
misdemeanor, but punishable by more than one year’s
imprisonment, is a “felony drug offense” as that term is
used in §841(b)(1)(A).
Two statutory definitions figure in our decision. Section
802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any
“offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a
felony.” Section 802(44) defines the compound term “fel-
ony drug offense” to mean an offense involving specified
drugs that is “punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year under any law of the United States or of a State
or foreign country.”
The term “felony drug offense” contained in
§841(b)(1)(A)’s provision for a 20-year minimum sentence,
we hold, is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not
2 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony.” A state drug
offense punishable by more than one year therefore quali-
fies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies
the offense as a misdemeanor.
I
Petitioner Keith Lavon Burgess pleaded guilty in the
United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U. S. C.
§§841(a) and 846.1 A violation of §841(a) involving that
quantity of cocaine base ordinarily carries a mandatory
minimum sentence of 10 years. §841(b)(1)(A). The mini-
mum sentence increases to 20 years, however, if the crime
follows a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense.” Ibid.
Burgess had previously been convicted of possessing
cocaine in violation of S. C. Code Ann. §44–53–370(c) and
(d)(1) (2002 and Supp. 2007). Although that offense car-
ried a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment,
South Carolina classified it as a misdemeanor. §44–53–
370(d)(1). Burgess’ prior South Carolina conviction, the
Government urged, raised the minimum sentence for his
federal conviction to 20 years. The enhancement was
mandatory, the Government maintained, because Con-
gress defined “felony drug offense” to include state cocaine
offenses “punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year.” 21 U. S. C. §802(44).2
Burgess contested the enhancement of his federal sen-
——————
1 Although Title 21 of the United States Code has not been enacted as

positive law, we refer to it rather than the underlying provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U. S. C. §801
et seq., for the sake of simplicity. The relevant provisions of Title 21
have not changed from the time of Burgess’ offense, and all citations
are to the 2000 edition through Supplement V.
2 Burgess received a one-year suspended sentence for his South Caro-

lina conviction, but does not dispute that the offense was “punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year.” §802(44) (emphasis added).
 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Opinion of the Court

tence. The term “felony drug offense,” he argued, incorpo-
rates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in
§802(13) to mean “any Federal or State offense classified
by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” A prior
drug offense does not rank as a “felony drug offense,” he
contended, unless it is (1) classified as a felony under the
law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2)
punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per
§802(44).
Rejecting Burgess’ argument, the District Court ruled
that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug
offense” as that term is used in §841(b)(1)(A). Although
the District Court’s ruling subjected Burgess to a 20-year
minimum sentence, the Government moved for a down-
ward departure based on Burgess’ substantial assistance
in another prosecution. See 18 U. S. C. §3553(e) (2000 ed.,
Supp. V). The court granted the motion and sentenced
Burgess to 156 months’ imprisonment followed by ten
years’ supervised release.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed. The “ ‘commonsense way to interpret
“felony drug offense,” ’ ” that court said, “ ‘is by reference to
the definition in §802(44).’ ” 478 F. 3d 658, 662 (2007)
(quoting United States v. Roberson, 459 F. 3d 39, 52 (CA1
2006)). The Fourth Circuit found nothing in the “plain
language or statutory scheme . . . to indicate that Con-
gress intended ‘felony drug offense’ also to incorporate the
definition [of ‘felony’] in §802(13).” 478 F. 3d, at 662.
Burgess, proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of cer-
tiorari. We granted the writ, 552 U. S. ___ (2007), to
resolve a split among the Circuits on the question Burgess
presents: Does a drug crime classified as a misdemeanor
by state law, but punishable by more than one year’s
imprisonment, rank as a “felony drug offense” under 21
U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A)? Compare 478 F. 3d 658 (case be-
low), and Roberson, 459 F. 3d 39 (§802(44) provides exclu-
4 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

sive definition of “felony drug offense”), with United States
v. West, 393 F. 3d 1302 (CADC 2005) (both §802(13) and
§802(44) limit meaning of “felony drug offense”).
II

A

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U. S. C. §801
et seq., contains two definitions central to the dispute
before us; they bear repetition in full. Section 802(13)
provides:
“The term ‘felony’ means any Federal or State offense
classified by applicable Federal or State law as a fel-
ony.”
Section 802(44) states:
“The term ‘felony drug offense’ means an offense that
is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
under any law of the United States or of a State or
foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct re-
lating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids,
or depressant or stimulant substances.”
Burgess argues here, as he did below, that “felony drug
offense,” as used in §841(b)(1)(A), should be construed to
incorporate both the definition of “felony” in §802(13) and
the definition of “felony drug offense” in §802(44). Under
his reading, the §841(b)(1)(A) enhancement is triggered
only when the prior conviction is both “classified by appli-
cable Federal or State law as a felony,” §802(13), and
“punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,”
§802(44).
The Government, in contrast, reads §802(44) to provide
the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense.” Under the
Government’s reading, all defendants whose prior drug
crimes were punishable by more than one year in prison
would be subject to the §841(b)(1)(A) enhancement, re-
gardless of the punishing jurisdiction’s classification of the
 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Opinion of the Court

offense.
The Government’s reading, we are convinced, correctly
interprets the statutory text and context. Section 802(44)
defines the precise phrase used in §841(b)(1)(A)—“felony
drug offense.” “Statutory definitions control the meaning
of statutory words . . . in the usual case.” Lawson v. Su-
wannee Fruit & S. S. Co., 336 U. S. 198, 201 (1949). See
also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When
a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow
that definition . . . .”); 2A N. Singer & J. Singer, Statutes
and Statutory Construction §47:7, pp. 298–299, and nn. 2–
3 (7th ed. 2007) (hereinafter Singer).
The CSA, to be sure, also defines the term “felony.” The
language and structure of the statute, however, indicate
that Congress used the phrase “felony drug offense” as a
term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to
§802(13). First, Congress stated that “[t]he term ‘felony
drug offense’ means an offense that is punishable by im-
prisonment for more than one year.” §802(44) (emphasis
added). “As a rule, [a] definition which declares what a
term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated.”
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392–393, n. 10 (1979)
(some internal quotation marks omitted). See also Gro-
man v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 82, 86 (1937); 2A Singer
§47:7, p. 306, and n. 20.
Second, the term “felony” is commonly defined to mean a
crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a) (classifying crimes with a
maximum term of more than one year as felonies); Black’s
Law Dictionary 651 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “felony” as “[a]
serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year or by death”). Section 802(44)’s defini-
tion of “felony drug offense” as “an offense . . . punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year,” in short, leaves
no blank to be filled by §802(13) or any other definition of
“felony.”
6 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incor-
porate the definition of “felony” in §802(13), it easily could
have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug
offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year . . . .” See Roberson, 459
F. 3d, at 52. Congress has often used that drafting tech-
nique—i.e., repeating a discretely defined word—when it
intends to incorporate the definition of a particular word
into the definition of a compound expression. See, e.g., 15
U. S. C. §1672(a)–(b) (defining “earnings” and then defin-
ing “disposable earnings” as “that part of the earnings”
meeting certain criteria); 18 U. S. C. §1956(c)(3)–(4) (defin-
ing “transaction” and then defining “financial transaction”
as “a transaction which” meets other criteria); §1961(1),
(5) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (defining “racketeering activity”
and then defining “pattern of racketeering activity” to
require “at least two acts of racketeering activity”).3
——————
3 Burgess offers four examples of defined words nested within defined

phrases where, he asserts, the definition of the word is embraced
within the phrase, although the word is not repeated in the definition of
the phrase. See Reply Brief 11–12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 11–12. In all but
one of these examples, however, the definition of the phrase is intro-
duced by the word “includes.” See 2 U. S. C. §1301(4), (6), (7); 18
U. S. C. §2266(3)–(4). “[T]he word ‘includes’ is usually a term of
enlargement, and not of limitation.” 2A Singer §47:7, p. 305 (some
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus “[a] term whose statutory
definition declares what it ‘includes’ is more susceptible to extension of
meaning . . . than where”—as in §802(44)—“the definition declares
what a term ‘means.’ ” Ibid. See also Groman v. Commissioner, 302
U. S. 82, 86 (1937) (“[W]hen an exclusive definition is intended the
word ‘means’ is employed, . . . whereas here the word used is ‘in-
cludes.’ ”).
Burgess’ fourth example is also inapposite. The definition of “debtor’s
principal residence” in the Bankruptcy Code, he notes, does not repeat
the word “debtor,” itself a discretely defined term. See 11 U. S. C.
§101(13), (13A) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Section 101(13A) states: “The term
‘debtor’s principal residence’—(A) means a residential structure,
including incidental property, without regard to whether that structure
is attached to real property; and (B) includes an individual condomin-
 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

Opinion of the Court

Fourth, our reading avoids anomalies that would arise if
both 21 U. S. C. §802(13) and §802(44) governed applica-
tion of the sentencing enhancement in §841(b)(1)(A).
Notably, §802(44) includes foreign offenses punishable by
more than one year, while §802(13) includes only federal
and state offenses. Incorporation of §802(13) into
§841(b)(1)(A) would exclude enhancement based on a
foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of
foreign offenses in §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug
offense.” Furthermore, some States and many foreign
jurisdictions do not label offenses as felonies or misde-
meanors. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:1–4 (West 2005); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §1252 (Supp. 2007); Brief for
United States 35. Burgess’ compound definition of “felony
drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classifi-
cation of drug convictions in those jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 937 F. 2d 68, 70 (CA2 1991) (rely-
ing on New Jersey common law to determine that the
State classifies offenses punishable by more than one year
as felonies). No such uncertainty arises under the precise
definition Congress provided in §802(44).
Finally, reading §802(44) as the exclusive definition of

——————
ium or cooperative unit, a mobile or manufactured home, or trailer.”
That definition, unlike 21 U. S. C. §802(44), is incomplete on its face
because nothing in the definition of “debtor’s principal residence”
elucidates the word “debtor’s.” Given that void and 11 U. S. C.
§101(13A)’s placement in the Bankruptcy Code, it is reasonable to
assume that Congress wanted courts to read the phrase “debtor’s
principal residence” in light of the separate definition of “debtor.”
Indeed, a contrary reading would yield the absurd result that every
residential structure is a “debtor’s principal residence.”
At most, therefore, Burgess’ fourth example illustrates the impor-
tance of considering context in applying canons of statutory construc-
tion. There may well be other examples lurking in the United States
Code of nested terms that draw their meaning from two different
statutory provisions without repeating one term in the definition of the
other. But “felony drug offense” is not among them.
8 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

“felony drug offense” hardly renders §802(13) extraneous.
Section 802(13) serves to define “felony” for many CSA
provisions using that unadorned term. See, e.g.,
§§824(a)(2) (revocation of license to manufacture con-
trolled substances upon conviction of a felony), 843(b) (use
of a communication facility to commit a felony), 843(d)(1)–
(2) (sentencing enhancements), 843(e) (prohibition on
engaging in transactions involving listed chemicals upon
conviction of a felony involving those chemicals), 848(c)(1)
(definition of “continuing criminal enterprise”),
848(e)(1)(B) (mandatory minimum term for killing a law
enforcement officer to avoid prosecution for a felony),
853(d) (rebuttable presumption that property acquired
during commission of certain felonies is subject to criminal
forfeiture), 878(a)(3) (authority to make warrantless arrest
where there is probable cause to believe a felony has been
committed).
B
The drafting history of the CSA reinforces our reading of
§802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug of-
fense.” In 1988, Congress first used the term “felony drug
offense” to describe the type of prior conviction that would
trigger a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under
§841(b)(1)(A). See National Narcotics Leadership Act,
Pub. L. 100–690, §6452(a), 102 Stat. 4371. The 1988
definition of the term was placed within §841(b)(1)(A)
itself; the definition covered “an offense that is a felony
under any . . . Federal law . . . or . . . any law of a State or
a foreign country” prohibiting or restricting conduct relat-
ing to certain types of drugs. §6452(a)(2), ibid.4 But in
——————
4 The full definition stated:

“For purposes of this subparagraph, the term ‘felony drug offense’
means an offense that is a felony under any provision of this title or any
other Federal law that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic
drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances or a felony
 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

Opinion of the Court

1994, Congress amended the definition, replacing “an
offense that is a felony under . . . any law of a State,” ibid.
(emphasis added), with “an offense that is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year under any law . . . of
a State,” Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act,
Pub. L. 103–322, §90105(c)–(d), 108 Stat. 1988 (emphasis
added). In lieu of incorporation within §841(b)(1)(A), the
new definition was placed in a discrete §802 definition
section. Ibid.
This alteration lends considerable support to our read-
ing of the statute. Before 1994, the definition of “felony
drug offense” depended on the vagaries of state-law classi-
fications of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. The
1994 amendments replaced that definition with a uniform
federal standard based on the authorized length of impris-
onment. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive defini-
tion of “felony drug offense,” our reading serves an evident
purpose of the 1994 revision: to bring a measure of uni-
formity to the application of §841(b)(1)(A) by eliminating
disparities based on divergent state classifications of
offenses.
By contrast, Burgess reads the 1994 alteration as
merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a
definition that already required—and, he contends, con-
tinues to require—designation of an offense as a felony by
the punishing jurisdiction. That view, however, is difficult
to square with Congress’ deletion of the word “felony” and
substitution of the phrase “punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year.”
If Burgess were correct, moreover, the sole effect of the
1994 change would have been to exclude from the compass

——————

under any law of a State or a foreign country that prohibits or restricts

conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimu-
lant substances.” National Narcotics Leadership Act of 1988, Pub. L.

100–690, §6452(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4371.

10 BURGESS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

of §841(b)(1)(A) the few drug offenses classified as felonies
under the law of the punishing jurisdiction but subject to a
sentence of one year or less. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–8.5 See
also Brief for Petitioner 15 (purpose of 1994 alteration was
to eliminate enhancement for “truly minor offenses” none-
theless classified as felonies). Burgess concedes that
under his reading of the statute “the language that Con-
gress added [in 1994] has very little practical effect,” but
defends his interpretation on the ground that Congress
labeled the changes “conforming amendments.” Tr. of
Oral Arg. 8. See also 108 Stat. 1987; Brief for Petitioner
12.
Burgess places more weight on the “Conforming
Amendments” caption than it can bear. Congress did not
disavow any intent to make substantive changes; rather,
the amendments were “conforming” because they harmo-
nized sentencing provisions in the CSA and the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act, 84 Stat. 1285, 21
U. S. C. §951 et seq. Treating the amendments as nonsub-
stantive would be inconsistent with their text, not to
mention Burgess’ own view that §802(44) added a new
length-of-imprisonment requirement to the definition of
“felony drug offense.”
In sum, the 1994 alteration replaced a patchwork of
state and foreign classifications with a uniform federal
standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment.
Burgess’ argument that Congress added something—the
definition now in §802(44)—but subtracted nothing en-
counters formidable impediments: the text and history of
the statute.
——————
5 The examples provided by Burgess of such atypical categorization,

Brief for Petitioner 22, all carry maximum sentences of exactly one
year. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§13–701(C)(5) (West 2001), 13–
3405(B)(1) (West Supp. 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2925.11(C) (Lexis
2007 Cum. Supp.), 2929.14(A)(5) (Lexis Supp. 2007); N. C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. §§15A–1340.17, 90–95(d) (Lexis 2007).
 Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008)
11

Opinion of the Court

C

Burgess urges us to apply the rule of lenity in determin-
ing whether the term “felony drug offense” incorporates
§802(13)’s definition of “felony.” “[T]he touchstone of the
rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U. S. 381, 387 (1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “The rule comes into operation at the end
of the process of construing what Congress has expressed,”
Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961), and
“applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of
statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous
statute,” United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 17 (1994).
Here, Congress expressly defined the term “felony drug
offense.” The definition is coherent, complete, and by all
signs exclusive. Accordingly, there is no ambiguity for the
rule of lenity to resolve.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is
Affirmed.