UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4348
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NATHANIEL FRANK DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (7:08-cr-00081-BR-1)
Submitted: April 22, 2010 Decided: May 21, 2010
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research
and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Nathaniel Frank Davis appeals the 188-month sentence
imposed by the district court after Davis pled guilty to bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). On appeal,
Davis argues that the district court committed procedural error
by failing to address his contention that his severe and long-
standing drug addiction and need for effective treatment
required a sentence below the career offender guideline range.
Davis also argues that the district court placed too much
emphasis on his criminal history when rendering the sentence.
We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, using an
abuse of discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review requires
us to ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 476 (2008). Procedural
errors include “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors” and
“failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552
U.S. at 51. The district court must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented by applying the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors to the circumstances of the case. Id.
While the district court need not “robotically tick
through § 3553(a)’s every subsection,” particularly when
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imposing a within-guidelines sentence, United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006), the district judge “‘should
set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). In cases
where, as here, the district court imposes a within-guidelines
sentence, the district court may “provide a less extensive . . .
explanation.” United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 639 (4th
Cir. 2009). However, the explanation must still be sufficient
to allow for “meaningful appellate review” such that we need
“not guess at the district court’s rationale.” Carter, 564 F.3d
at 329-30.
We recently addressed the appropriate standards of
appellate review for the sort of procedural error that Davis
alleges here. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir.
2010). In Lynn, we held that a procedural sentencing objection
raised for the first time on appeal is reviewed for plain error.
Id. at 575 On the other hand, when a party lodges a procedural
objection in the district court, we review the claim for abuse
of discretion. Id.
The manner in which a party may preserve a claim of
procedural error in the district court is governed by Fed. R.
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Crim. P. 51(b), which provides that “[a] party may preserve a
claim of error by informing the court — when the court ruling or
order is made or sought — of the action the party wishes the
court to take, or the party’s objection to the court’s action
and the grounds for that objection.” “By drawing arguments from
§ 3553 for a sentence different than the one ultimately imposed,
an aggrieved party sufficiently alerts the district court of its
responsibility to render an individualized explanation
addressing those arguments, and thus preserves it claim.” Lynn,
592 F.3d at 578. A party may do this through either its written
papers or its in-court arguments prior to the district court’s
imposition of sentence. See id. at 583-84.
A review of the record lead us to conclude that Davis
preserved his objection by arguing for a sentence below the
guideline range before the district court imposed sentence.
Thus, we review the district court’s consideration of Davis’s
argument and the sufficiency of its explanation of the chosen
sentence for abuse of discretion.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Davis. The court explained that it
imposed a sentence at the high end of the sentencing range in
light of Davis’s extensive criminal record and poor performance
on supervised release, and the need to protect the public. This
explanation satisfies the requirements of § 3553 and Gall. The
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district court’s denial of the Government’s motion for an upward
departure, the fact it ordered a reduced fine, and its
recommendation that Davis receive substance abuse treatment at
FCI Butner, all measures requested by Davis, reflect the court’s
earnest consideration of his drug problems.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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