Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska v. Salazar

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 7, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court

IOWA TRIBE OF KANSAS AND
NEBRASKA; MARK PARKINSON,
Governor of State of Kansas,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

SAC AND FOX NATION OF
MISSOURI; PRAIRIE BAND OF
POTAWATOMI INDIANS, No. 08-3277
Plaintiffs,

v.

KENNETH LEE SALAZAR, Secretary of
the Interior,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 5:96-CV-04129-RDR-DJW)

Mark S. Gunnison, Payne & Jones, Chartered, Overland Park, Kansas, (Michael Leitch,
Office of the Attorney General for the State of Kansas, Topeka, Kansas, with him on the
briefs) for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Allen M. Brabender, United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural
Resources Division, Washington, DC, (Marietta Parker, Acting United States Attorney,
and Jackie A. Rapstine, Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas; John C.
Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and William Lazarus, United States
Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, DC
with him on the briefs) for Defendant–Appellee.

Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is part of a long-running dispute over whether the Secretary of the

Interior (the “Secretary”) properly took a small tract of land into trust on behalf of the

Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma. Because the Secretary has already taken the land at issue

into trust, sovereign immunity precludes the relief sought by plaintiffs. Consequently, we

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

I

We have previously described the underlying dispute in this matter and will recite

only the details directly relevant to this appeal.1 This case arises from a dispute over the

status of a 0.52-acre parcel of land in Wyandotte County, Kansas, known as the Shriner

Tract. The Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma sought to purchase the Shriner Tract in 1996

so that the United States could place the land into trust on behalf of the tribe. A gaming

facility was to be built on the tract. Notice of intent to take the land into trust pursuant to

1
For more expansive accounts, see Governor of Kansas v. Kempthorne, 516 F.3d
833 (10th Cir. 2008), and Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250 (10th
Cir. 2001).

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Public Law 98-602, 98 Stat. 3149 (1984), was published by the Secretary on June 12,

1996. Congress provided that $100,000 of the funds appropriated by Public Law 98-602

“shall be used for the purchase of real property which shall be held in trust by the

Secretary for the benefit of” the Wyandotte Tribe. 98 Stat. at 3151, § 105(b)(1). The

tribe represented that it intended to acquire the Shriner Tract using these Public Law 98-

602 funds.

Shortly thereafter, the Governor of Kansas, the Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri,

the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, and the Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians sued

under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., to enjoin the

Secretary’s planned course of action. Plaintiffs were signatories to a tribal-state compact

that permitted the tribes to operate gaming establishments in Kansas; the opening of a

casino on the Shriner Tract by the Wyandotte Tribe could affect the plaintiff tribes’ plans

to operate their own gaming facilities. Plaintiffs argued inter alia that the funds used by

the Wyandotte Tribe to acquire the Shriner Tract did not come exclusively from Public

Law 98-602 funds. If the Wyandotte Tribe used other funding to purchase the Shriner

Tract, the Secretary’s decision to acquire the land was arguably improper.

And thus began a case that would spawn recurring trips from the district court to

the Tenth Circuit and back. Shortly after plaintiffs filed their initial complaint, the

district court granted them a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining the Secretary

from taking the Shriner Tract into trust on behalf of the Wyandotte Tribe. The

Wyandotte Tribe intervened for the purpose of challenging the TRO and appealed the
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matter to the Tenth Circuit. Before this court, plaintiffs argued that the TRO was

necessary because the district court would be deprived of jurisdiction to review the

Secretary’s actions once the Shriner Tract was actually taken into trust. The Wyandotte

Tribe and United States Attorney countered that an emergency stay of the TRO was

needed because, otherwise, the tribe would lose its right to acquire the Shriner Tract

pursuant to a land contract. They also represented that lifting the TRO would “not affect

or bar the ultimate resolution of whether [the Shriner Tract] can be used for Class III

gaming pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.” Determining that dissolution

would best preserve the status quo, we ordered the TRO dissolved:

subject to the conditions which constitute the law of this case, that the
respective rights of the parties to obtain judicial review of all issues which
have been raised in the complaint below shall be preserved, including
standing of all parties, jurisdiction, compliance by the Secretary with all
requirements of law, and the ultimate question of whether gaming shall be
permitted on the subject land.

The Wyandotte Tribe then closed on the Shriner Tract, and the Secretary took the land

into trust on the tribe’s behalf.2

The district court then dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint, determining that the

Wyandotte Tribe was a necessary and indispensible party that could not be joined due to

sovereign immunity. Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Babbitt, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129 (D.

2
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d), we take judicial notice of a
warranty deed demonstrating that the Wyandotte Tribe conveyed the Shriner Tract to the
United States “in trust for the benefit of the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma” on July 15,
1996.

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Kan. 2000). We reversed that ruling on appeal. See Norton, 240 F.3d at 1259-60.

Further, we concluded that the Secretary acted arbitrarily in finding that the Wyandotte

Tribe used only Public Law 98-602 funds to purchase the Shriner Tract. Norton, 240

F.3d at 1263-64. Accordingly, we remanded “to the district court with directions to enter

partial judgment consistent with our holdings and to remand in part to the Secretary for

further consideration of whether Pub. L. 98-602 funds were used for the acquisition.”

Norton, 240 F.3d at 1253. The issue of the United States’ sovereign immunity was not

discussed.

On remand, the district court entered partial judgment, remanded to the Secretary,

and closed the case. See Kempthorne, 516 F.3d at 838. Reaffirming an earlier decision,

the Secretary determined that only Public Law 98-602 funds were used to acquire the

Shriner Tract. See id. at 839. After a new lawsuit was filed, the district court upheld the

Secretary’s determination under the APA. See id. at 839-40. However, we vacated the

district court’s judgment on appeal, holding that sovereign immunity barred plaintiffs’

second lawsuit. We reasoned that Congress had not waived sovereign immunity for

challenges to the United States’ title to real property held in trust for an Indian tribe. Id.

at 841-46 (interpreting the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a). At the same

time, we expressly reserved the question of “whether the United States could divest a

court of jurisdiction if it took this land into trust for the Wyandotte Tribe after the

complaint was filed and served.” Kempthorne, 516 F.3d at 844 n.5.

Plaintiffs then successfully moved the district court to re-open their original
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lawsuit—which was filed before the Shriner Tract was taken into trust—pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Plaintiffs’ success, however, was short-lived:

the district court later dismissed the initial lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Kempthorne, No. 96-4129-RDR, 2008 WL 4186890 (D.

Kan. Sept. 10, 2008) (unpublished). It determined that the United States had not waived

its sovereign immunity vis-à-vis plaintiffs’ claim because plaintiffs challenged the United

States’ title to real property held in trust for an Indian tribe. In so holding, the court

declined to adopt plaintiffs’ position that sovereign immunity determinations should be

made by reference to the facts in existence at the time a complaint was filed. The

Governor of Kansas and the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska timely appealed.

II

A

Before proceeding to our analysis, we note that the issue of whether the

Wyandotte Tribe may open a gaming facility on the Shriner Tract is not before us. In

dissolving the TRO in 1996, we explicitly referenced the position of the United States

Attorney and the Wyandotte Tribe that dissolution would “not affect or bar the ultimate

resolution” of that issue, which is now the subject of separate proceedings. See

Wyandotte Nation v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Kan.

2006) (remanding to the Secretary the question of whether gaming may be conducted on

the Shriner Tract). Therefore, the sole issue before us is whether we retain jurisdiction

over plaintiffs’ challenge to the Secretary’s acquisition of the Shriner Tract in trust on
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behalf of the Wyandotte Tribe.

To evaluate this limited question, we must begin by classifying plaintiffs’ cause of

action. At the time they filed their complaint, plaintiffs sought review of a decision made

by an agency: the Secretary’s decision to take the Shriner Tract into trust. This type of

suit is authorized by the APA, which provides both a cause of action and a waiver of

sovereign immunity for claims in which a plaintiff has suffered “a legal wrong because of

agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Consequently, when their complaint was filed and

served, sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiffs’ claim.

Once the Secretary took the Shriner Tract into trust, however, the nature of

plaintiffs’ claim changed. Unlike their complaint, which sought to prevent the Shriner

Tract from being taken into trust, “there appears to be no dispute that the relief plaintiffs

have in mind at the present time is to remove the Shriner Tract from being held in trust or

to somehow encumber how the land will be used while it remains in trust.” Sac & Fox

Nation of Mo. v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 4186890, at *3.

It has long been the rule that the QTA provides the “exclusive means by which

adverse claimants [may] challenge the United States’ title to real property.” Block v.

North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983) (emphasis

added).3 Moreover, it is equally well settled that the QTA’s “prohibition of suits

challenging the United States’ title in Indian trust land may prevent suit even when a

3
28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) provides district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over
QTA actions for which the United States has waived sovereign immunity under § 2409a.

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plaintiff does not characterize its action as a quiet title action.” Neighbors for Rational

Dev., Inc. v. Norton, 379 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also

United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841-42 (1986). These stringent rules are

designed to protect the “solemn obligations and specific commitments that the Federal

Government ha[s] made to the Indians regarding Indian lands.” Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 843

n.6 (quotations omitted).

In determining whether a suit must be treated as a quiet title action sufficient to

invoke the QTA, we “focus on the relief sought by the plaintiffs.” Kempthorne, 516 F.3d

at 842 (citation omitted). Seeking to remove land currently held in trust by the United

States or to encumber that land constitutes a challenge to the government’s title sufficient

to bring a claim within the ambit of the QTA, despite the fact that plaintiffs do not

themselves seek title to the land. See id.; Neighbors, 379 F.3d at 961-62. Consequently,

if plaintiffs’ case is to proceed, it must do so exclusively under the QTA; the APA is no

longer relevant given the relief sought.

B

Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the Shiner Tract is not

“fully” in trust. They do not contend that the United States lacks title to the Shriner

Tract, but rather argue that the land is not in trust within the meaning of the QTA for

three reasons. First, plaintiffs claim the land was taken into trust subject to “a condition

subsequent”: the “resolution on the merits of the issues timely raised in the complaint.”

According to the plaintiffs, this condition subsequent is evident from the Secretary’s prior
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representations to this court and the wording of our 1996 stay of the district court’s TRO.

We note that the primary purpose of the “conditions” language in our 1996 stay was to

allow resolution of “the ultimate question of whether gaming shall be permitted on the

subject land.” In any event, we decline to consider plaintiffs’ condition subsequent

argument because they did not advance it before the district court. Although sovereign

immunity and thus subject matter jurisdiction are at issue in this case, “our responsibility

to ensure even sua sponte that we have subject matter jurisdiction before considering a

case differs from our discretion to eschew untimely raised legal theories which may

support that jurisdiction. We have no duty under the general waiver rule to consider the

latter.” Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

Second, plaintiffs argue that in Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, the

Secretary represented that the Shriner Tract is not in trust for the purposes of the QTA,

and that this representation constitutes the Department of the Interior’s interpretation of

25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b).4 Plaintiffs contend we should uphold this interpretation unless it

is plainly erroneous. See City of Colo. Springs v. Solis, 589 F.3d 1121, 1135 (10th Cir.

2009). Yet even assuming the Secretary’s representations to this court constitute agency

interpretation, the issue here is not the effect of § 151.12(b), but of the QTA. Plaintiffs

fail to make any reasoned argument that we should defer to agency interpretation of the

4
Section 151.12(b) provides that the Secretary must provide public notice at least
thirty days before acquiring land in trust on behalf of a tribe, and establishes that a
decision to acquire land in trust constitutes final agency action.

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QTA. Moreover, for Chevron deference to apply to an agency’s interpretation of a

statute, the agency must be responsible for its administration. See Hydro Res., Inc. v.

EPA, 562 F.3d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 2009). Congress has not delegated the

administration of the QTA to the Department of the Interior. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a.

Thus, the agency’s interpretation of the QTA is not entitled to deference.

Third, plaintiffs argue that the Shriner Tract is not in trust because the Secretary’s

decision regarding acquisition was not authorized by law. For purposes of the QTA,

however, the Secretary need only make a colorable claim that the land is held in trust on

behalf of an Indian tribe. Wildman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.

1987). To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the Indian lands exception. “The

very purpose of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is to prevent a judicial examination

of the merits of the government’s position.” Id. The United States has made such a

colorable claim: It has presented a facially valid title showing that it holds the Shriner

Tract in trust for the Wyandotte Tribe. Accordingly, the Shriner Tract is in trust for the

purposes of the QTA, and if plaintiffs are to proceed, they must do so under the QTA.

III

We must next consider the district court’s conclusion that Congress has not

waived sovereign immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ challenge to the trust acquisition.

A district court’s evaluation of sovereign immunity and its decision to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior

Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1998).
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 “The concept of sovereign immunity means that the United States cannot be sued

without its consent.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jacks, 960 F.2d 911,

913 (10th Cir. 1992). Courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against the

United States for which sovereign immunity has not been waived. Normandy

Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 554 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir.

2009). Consequently, plaintiffs may not proceed unless they can establish that the United

States has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to their claim. See Pennhurst State

Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Sydnes v. United States, 523 F.3d

1179, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2008).

A

As discussed supra, the APA provided a waiver of sovereign immunity for

plaintiffs’ action when they sought to prevent the Secretary from taking the Shriner Tract

into trust. After the land was actually taken into trust, however, the nature of plaintiffs’

claim changed. They now seek to remove the land from trust or otherwise encumber

title. Although the QTA waives sovereign immunity for cases “to adjudicate a disputed

title to real property in which the United States claims an interest,” that waiver “does not

apply to trust or restricted Indian lands.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). Thus, we must decide

whether a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity should be examined as of the time

plaintiffs filed and served their complaint. If not, and sovereign immunity must be

reassessed after filing, this court lacks jurisdiction.

1
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 Plaintiffs contend a time-of-filing rule applies because the Supreme Court has

“consistently held that if jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such

jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events.” Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. KN

Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) (citations omitted). But in Freeport-McMoRan,

the Supreme Court was referring to diversity jurisdiction—the context in which the time-

of-filing rule originated, see Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539 (1824). Subsequent to

Freeport-McMoRan, the Supreme Court has clarified that the time-of-filing rule applies

to “all challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction premised upon diversity of citizenship.”

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004) (emphasis added).

The time-of-filing rule is a judge-made doctrine, supported in the diversity context

by sound policy considerations. See id. at 583 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In diversity

cases, litigants are free to move between the states; no court may enjoin a civil litigant

from changing her citizenship solely because she filed a complaint in federal court or had

the misfortune to be sued. Thus, reassessing diversity jurisdiction after a complaint is

filed and served would waste judicial resources and encourage manipulation. Cf.

ConnectU, LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 92 (1st Cir. 2008) (time-of-filing rule

applies in diversity actions because “heightened concerns about forum-shopping and

strategic behavior offer special justifications for it”); New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v.

Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1503 (3d Cir. 1996) (“From the

outset, the underlying concern of the time of filing rule was the risk that parties would

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deploy procedural tactics to manipulate federal jurisdiction.”).5

In contrast, the time-of-filing rule “has been applied only rarely to federal question

cases.” Kabakjian v. United States, 267 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation

omitted); see also ConnectU, 522 F.3d at 92 (although there are outliers, “courts have

been careful not to import the time-of-filing rule indiscriminately into the federal

question realm”). “The only consistent use of the time-of-filing rule in federal question

cases occurs in the area of removal—an area in which the danger of manipulation is

high.” ConnectU, 522 F.3d at 92 n.8. Even in diversity cases, “a district court can

sometimes, after suit is filed, permit the destruction of subject matter jurisdiction.”

Kabakjian, 267 F.3d at 212. Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that the

Supreme Court’s statements regarding the time-of-filing rule in diversity cases control

our analysis.

5
Concerns regarding jurisdictional manipulation are not so pressing in Indian trust
acquisition cases, however. Absent a time-of-filing rule, the government’s discretion to
manipulate jurisdiction is constrained. In contrast to courts’ impotence in the face of a
party who wishes to move to a new state, district courts do possess the power to restrain
the Secretary from taking land into trust on behalf of a tribe. The Secretary is required to
announce his intention to acquire land in trust on behalf of a tribe at least thirty days
before trust acquisition. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b). During that thirty-day period, an APA
challenge may be mounted, and a district court may issue a preliminary injunction
preventing the land from being taken into trust. Of course, as this case demonstrates, the
availability of injunctive relief will not always preserve a plaintiff’s access to review.
Injunctive relief is a creature of equity, and countervailing considerations may sometimes
trump a plaintiff’s interest in having her complaint adjudicated on the merits. See Winter
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 377-78, 381 (2008) (“An injunction is
a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter
of course.”).

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 2

Relatively few cases have directly addressed the question of whether the existence

of sovereign immunity must be assessed at the time of filing. However, the Supreme

Court did discuss that issue in the relatively early case of Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20

How.) 527, 529 (1857). There, plaintiff Beers sued the State of Arkansas in Arkansas

state court to collect interest due on state bonds. Id. at 528. While the suit was pending,

the Arkansas Legislature passed an act requiring state-bond claimants to present the

bonds at issue to the court or face dismissal. Id. When Beers failed to produce the

bonds, the state court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. The

Court’s 1857 rationale regarding the supremacy of the doctrine of sovereign immunity

guides our analysis today6:

It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the
sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its
consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks proper, waive this privilege,
and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit by individuals, or by
another State. And as this permission is altogether voluntary on the part of
the sovereignty, it follows that it may prescribe the terms and conditions on
which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be

6
Beers dealt with state, rather than federal, sovereign immunity. State sovereign
immunity is based on the Eleventh Amendment, while the precise constitutional or
historical basis for federal sovereign immunity remains a hotly contested matter. See
Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107
Mich. L. Rev. 1207, 1208-09 & n.6 (2009). Although differences between these
doctrines exist, principles of state sovereign immunity are helpful in the federal context,
and vice versa. See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 506 (1998).
Beers is particularly instructive in the context of federal sovereign immunity because it
relies upon the inherent nature of sovereignty instead of the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. See 61 U.S. at 529-30.

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 conducted, and may withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that
justice to the public requires it.

Id. at 529 (emphasis added).

Although the focus of the Court in Beers was the contention that Arkansas’ actions

violated the Contracts Clause, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, we may not lightly

disregard the holding that a waiver of sovereign immunity may be withdrawn “whenever

[a sovereign] may suppose that justice to the public requires it,” Beers, 61 U.S. at 529.

The Supreme Court aimed this language squarely at post-filing withdrawals of consent to

be sued, further stating that courts cannot “inquire whether the law operated hardly or

unjustly upon the parties whose suits were then pending. . . . [The Legislature] might

have repealed the prior law altogether, and put an end to the jurisdiction of their courts in

suits against the State, if they had thought proper to do so . . . .” Id. at 530.

There is an irreconcilable conflict between the Court’s holding that a state may

withdraw a waiver of sovereign immunity in the throes of litigation and the time-of-filing

rule plaintiffs ask us to endorse. If the existence of sovereign immunity were determined

at the time a complaint is filed, a sovereign could not withdraw its consent after filing, as

was permitted in Beers.7

7
Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, we do not read Department of the Interior v.
South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996), to stand for the proposition that a time-of-filing rule
applies to sovereign immunity determinations. In South Dakota, plaintiffs challenged the
Secretary’s taking of land into trust on behalf of an Indian tribe pursuant to a statute
giving the Secretary broad discretionary authority to acquire “any interest in lands . . . for
the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. Plaintiffs argued that § 465
Continued . . .
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 The logic of Beers has withstood the test of time. Eleven years ago, the Supreme

Court confirmed its continued adherence to Beers, noting, “We have even held that a

State may, absent any contractual commitment to the contrary, alter the conditions of its

waiver [of sovereign immunity] and apply those changes to a pending suit.” Coll. Sav.

Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (citing

Beers). And seven years ago, the First Circuit—relying in part on Beers—rejected a

time-of-filing rule with respect to sovereign immunity determinations. Maysonet-Robles

v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2003).

In Maysonet-Robles, a group of plaintiffs filed suit against a corporate entity

created by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to liquidate the proceeds of the Puerto Rico

Urban Renewal and Housing Corporation. Id. at 46. While suit was pending, the Puerto

was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. See South Dakota v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Circuit ruled in favor
of plaintiffs on the basis of § 465, declining to decide whether the QTA “precludes APA
review of agency action by which the United States acquires title.” South Dakota, 69
F.3d at 881 n.1 (emphasis omitted). Under then-existing agency regulations, the
plaintiffs did not have meaningful access to judicial review prior to the trust acquisition.
Id. at 880.

In response to the Eight Circuit’s decision, the Department of the Interior adopted
25 C.F.R. § 151.12 to allow judicial review of the Secretary’s decision to take land into
trust before acquisition took place. See South Dakota, 519 U.S. at 920-21 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In light of the new regulation, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated
the Eighth Circuit opinion, and remanded the matter back to the Secretary. Id. at 919.
The Court provided no explanation for its decision. Because the Court did not provide
any analysis and because application of the QTA was not the sole issue in the case, we
cannot presume the Court’s rejection of the Eighth Circuit’s judgment was based on
application of a time-of-filing rule.

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Rico Legislature passed an act dissolving the defendant entity and transferring all of its

assets to the Department of Housing, which, as an arm of Puerto Rico, was entitled to

sovereign immunity. Id. After substituting the Department for the original defendant, the

district court dismissed the suit on sovereign immunity grounds, and the First Circuit

affirmed. Id. at 46-47. Although the court acknowledged that the time-of-filing rule was

well-established for certain jurisdictional inquiries, it held that “Plaintiffs’ attempted

analogies to the current case’s context [were] ultimately unconvincing” because,

“[u]nlike a private individual or corporation, a State retains its sovereign immunity as a

personal privilege and, whether it is the original defendant or is added as a party later, it

cannot be sued involuntarily.” Id. at 50 (quotation omitted).

Noting that “it does not require a particularly jaundiced eye” to recognize that the

Puerto Rico Legislature passed the act “with the precise goal of raising the shield of

immunity” and that “[s]uch jurisdictional game-playing would be beyond the pale for any

private litigant,” the First Circuit nonetheless recognized that a judicially created doctrine

cannot eclipse sovereign immunity. Id. at 51. “[I]t has been nearly a century and a half

since Beers held that because the waiver of such immunity is entirely within the

sovereign’s prerogative, a State may alter the conditions of waiver and apply those

changes to torpedo even pending litigation.” Id. at 51-52 (citation omitted).

Despite its unequivocal holding, plaintiffs contend that Beers does not control this

suit because executive, not legislative, action resulted in the withdrawal of the QTA

sovereign-immunity waiver—and only legislative action can effectuate or withdraw a
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waiver of sovereign immunity. See Jacks, 960 F.2d at 913. Their argument is

misdirected. Congress designed the QTA in such a manner that its waiver of sovereign

immunity necessarily turns on executive action in cases dealing with Indian trust lands:

If the executive branch purchases land, the QTA waives sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2409a(a). If the executive branch purchases land in trust for an Indian tribe, the QTA

waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply. Id. Even outside the Indian trust context,

executive action may dictate an answer to the sovereign immunity question: If the

executive branch purchases land but later disclaims any interest in it, the QTA waiver of

sovereign immunity does not apply. § 2409a(e).

Thus, as in Beers, legislative action is at issue. Congress provided within the text

of the QTA itself that its waiver of sovereign immunity could be withdrawn, and that the

conditions for withdrawal turned on executive branch action. In Beers, the legislature

provided for a withdrawal of a waiver of sovereign immunity in a separate statute. We

see no reason to treat these two situations differently.

In light of Beers, we cannot endorse a rule that freezes sovereign immunity status

at the time a complaint is filed. Like the Maysonet-Robles court, we acknowledge that

such a rule allows the government to manipulate pending cases in a manner prohibited in

private litigation. Nonetheless, “we trust Congress, unlike any other entity, to set the

rules of the game. . . . Congress may not always resolve the waiver issue wisely;

nevertheless, the Constitution vests that decision in majoritarian hands. . . .” Harold J.

Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1531 (1992).
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 3

We recognize that we must inevitably weigh in on an existing circuit split and that

this opinion puts us at odds with two of our sister circuits, which have held that “the

presence of a waiver of sovereign immunity [under the QTA] should be determined as of

the date the complaint was filed.” Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661, 665

(9th Cir. 1981); see also Delta Savings & Loan Ass’n v. IRS, 847 F.2d 248, 249 n.1 (5th

Cir. 1988) (adopting the Bank of Hemet rule without discussion).8 In applying a time-of-

filing rule, these circuits were of the opinion that “[t]he time is long past when the bar of

sovereign immunity should be preserved through strained and hyper-technical

interpretations of the relevant acts of Congress.” Bank of Hemet, 643 F.2d at 665.

We disagree with Bank of Hemet and instead adopt the First Circuit’s approach,

which takes a view of sovereign immunity that is consistent with the Supreme Court’s

jurisprudence. Bank of Hemet and Delta Savings & Loan were decided during an era

when many courts took an erroneously lax approach to interpreting waivers of sovereign

immunity. Cf. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676 (describing a 1964 case as the

“nadir” of the Court’s approach to sovereign immunity and waiver). After these cases

were decided, the Court has reaffirmed its historically strict approach to sovereign

8
In addition, two other circuits have applied a time-of-filing rule to assess the
United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 2410. See Kabakjian,
267 F.3d at 212; Kulawy v. United States, 917 F.2d 729, 733-34 (2d Cir. 1990) (adopting
Bank of Hemet without discussion).

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immunity. In Lane v. Pena, it clarified that courts must construe waivers of sovereign

immunity narrowly:

A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and will not be implied.
Moreover, a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign. . . . A
statute’s legislative history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear
clearly in any statutory text; the unequivocal expression of elimination of
sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.

518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citations omitted); accord Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596,

601-02 (2005). This more-recent jurisprudence demonstrates that a narrow construction

of a sovereign-immunity waiver is not “strained and hyper-technical,” Bank of Hemet,

643 F.2d at 665; rather, such interpretation properly provides due deference to

congressional will. The Ninth Circuit itself appears to have stepped back from its earlier

reasoning by limiting Bank of Hemet to its facts, albeit in an unpublished decision. Ricks

v. Whitney, 77 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 96-1438 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 1996) (unpublished).

As these more recent cases underline, waiver of sovereign immunity does not turn

on judge-made rules but on congressional intent.9 In enacting the QTA, Congress sought

to preclude the relief plaintiffs pursue. “Congress’ intent in excluding Indian trust lands

from the Quiet Title Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity was to prevent adverse

9
Courts generally look only to the plain text of a statute to determine whether
Congress has waived the United States’ sovereign immunity. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192.
However, congressional intent is highly relevant when analyzing procedural matters
surrounding waivers of sovereign immunity. See Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 596
F.3d 538, 550 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity can be
ascertained only by reference to the congressional policy underlying the statute.”).

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claimants from interfering with the United States’ obligations to the Indians.” Neighbors,

379 F.3d at 962. Suits challenging the United States’ title to land held in trust on behalf

of an Indian tribe inherently implicate not only the interest of the United States but also

the interests of beneficiary tribes. As a result, “[a] unilateral waiver of the Federal

Government’s immunity” after land has been taken into trust would result in “abridgment

of solemn obligations and specific commitments that the Federal Government ha[s] made

to the Indians regarding Indian lands.” Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 843 n.6 (quotations omitted).

Such a waiver “would subject those lands to suit without the Indians’ consent”—an

outcome that Congress sought to avoid. Id.

That plaintiffs’ suit was authorized at the time of filing does not alter our

conclusion. A lawsuit challenging an unconsummated decision to take land into trust

does not implicate a present interest of a tribe; it only implicates the tribe’s potential

interest in becoming a beneficiary at a future date. Moreover, Congress did not intend its

waiver of sovereign immunity under the APA to swallow other statutory regimes. It

specifically stated that nothing within the APA “confers authority to grant relief if any

other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is

sought.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. A challenge to the United States’ interest in land held in trust

for an Indian tribe is such a suit: relief is forbidden by the QTA. We therefore conclude

that sovereign immunity is an ongoing inquiry rather than a determination to be made

based on the existence of a waiver at the time of filing.

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 B

Plaintiffs advance three other arguments in their effort to avoid the sovereign

immunity bar. First, they claim that we need not decide the issue of sovereign immunity

because they are suing the Secretary, rather than the United States. They argue that the

Secretary exceeded his authority in taking the Shriner Tract into trust, and that this ultra

vires action strips the Secretary of the protections of sovereign immunity. The Supreme

Court, however, has expressly disallowed officer suits that challenge the United States’

title to Indian trust lands, noting, “If we were to allow claimants to try the Federal

Government’s title to land under an officer’s-suit theory, the Indian lands exception to the

QTA would be rendered nugatory.” Block, 461 U.S. at 285. Consequently, plaintiffs

may not avoid the question of sovereign immunity by naming the Secretary, rather than

the United States, as defendant—even assuming the Secretary exceeded his statutory

authority in acquiring the Shriner Tract.

Second, plaintiffs imply that our 1996 stay demonstrates that we retained

jurisdiction over the case, and that we should give our retention of jurisdiction continuing

effect. As noted supra, the “conditions” language in our 1996 stay was primarily

intended to preserve review of the “ultimate question” of whether gaming would be

permitted on the Shriner Tract. Regardless, this argument is plainly foreclosed by our

opinion in Kempthorne, which held that this court’s 1996 stay cannot serve to retain

jurisdiction if sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs’ claim. 516 F.3d at 845 (“Only

Congress, not the courts, can waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.
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Therefore, in the absence of clear congressional consent . . . [we lack the] jurisdiction to

entertain suits against the United States.” (quotation and alteration omitted)). In no

uncertain terms, we held that “the previous orders of this court . . . are simply irrelevant”

to the question of sovereign immunity. Id. at 846 (emphasis added).

Finally, plaintiffs urge us to apply equitable principles to avoid the bar of

sovereign immunity. They argue that judicial estoppel should prevent the Secretary from

altering his position—asserted by the United States Attorney during the Wyandotte

Tribe’s emergency appeal of the TRO and continued to some degree during subsequent

litigation—that staying the TRO would not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction.

Nothing in the record suggests, however, that in urging this court to vacate the TRO in

1996, the Secretary represented we would retain jurisdiction over the trust-acquisition

issue. The record demonstrates only that the Secretary asserted we would retain

jurisdiction over the ultimate dispute between the parties: whether or not gaming can

occur on the Shriner Tract. As noted supra, that issue is alive and is being resolved.

More fundamentally, we again stress that prior representations to this court cannot

impact our assessment of sovereign immunity. In Kempthorne, we held that

representations made by the Secretary—indeed, the very same representations at issue in

this case—could not overcome congressional retention of sovereign immunity:

Nor can the actions of the Secretary, or any government official or attorney,
act as a waiver or abandonment of the United States’ sovereign immunity.
Because waiver must be unequivocally expressed by Congress, officers of
the United States possess no power through their actions to waive an
immunity of the United States or to confer jurisdiction on a court. The
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 federal government’s appearance in court through its officers and agents,
therefore, does not waive the government’s sovereign immunity. . . .

As a result of the strict jurisdictional nature of sovereign immunity,
our waiver analysis is necessarily constrained to consideration of whether
the Quiet Title Act itself waived the United States’ sovereign immunity.
Having already answered this question in the negative, . . . the conduct of
the Secretary during litigation [is] simply irrelevant; without a valid
congressional waiver, neither the district court nor this court possess
jurisdiction to hear this case.

Id. at 845-46 (quotation and citations omitted). Because we look only to the words and

the will of Congress when evaluating sovereign immunity, plaintiffs’ equitable arguments

have no merit.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court’s dismissal for want of

jurisdiction was proper. The appeal is DISMISSED.

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