[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-14620 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 7, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00315-CR-T-24TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL ANGEL VELASQUEZ-SANTOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 7, 2010)
Before BLACK, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Miguel Velasquez-Santos appeals his sentence to 42 months of
imprisonment for reentering the United States after being convicted of an
aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). Velasquez-Santos argues that his
sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.
The presentence investigation report increased Velasquez-Santos’s base
offense level by 16 points because he previously had been deported after his
conviction for a violent felony. United States Sentencing Guideline §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (Nov. 2008). The report provided a guideline range of 37 to 46
months of imprisonment. The report stated that Velasquez-Santos had been
convicted in a Florida court in 1999 of attempted second-degree murder and
sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, but that sentence had been suspended for
Velasquez-Santos to serve 90 days in jail and eight years of probation. Over the
next six years, Velasquez-Santos was convicted of trespass, disorderly conduct,
and driving under the influence, and he was deported in 2004 after a Florida court
revoked his probation for driving with a suspended license.
The presentence report also described Velasquez-Santos’s earlier
convictions and arrests. Between 1989 and 1996, Velasquez-Santos had been
convicted of four counts of battery, three counts of resisting an officer, two counts
of disorderly intoxication, assault, and improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon,
and he received suspended sentences, probation, and counseling. Between 1981
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and 1985, Velasquez-Santos had been arrested for ten offenses: three instances of
aggravated assault, maiming “with intent,” aggravated battery with a firearm,
battery, domestic assault, possession of marijuana, driving under the influence, and
drunkenness.
Velasquez-Santos objected to a 16-point enhancement of his base offense
level. Velasquez-Santos argued that application of the enhancement would yield a
sentence greater than necessary. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Velasquez-Santos argued
that his 1999 conviction was stale and the enhancement was disproportionate to the
nature and circumstances of his offense.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court commented that Velasquez-
Santos had received a “very light sentence” for the “serious crime” of attempted
murder. The district court stated that Velasquez-Santos had a “substantial criminal
history,” and the court recited his prior convictions. The district court remarked
that, because Velasquez-Santos’s “criminal history” was “awful,” it was “hard . . .
to say that he doesn’t deserve a sentence within the guidelines.”
Velasquez-Santos’s daughter testified, and the district court stated that it was
“affected” by her testimony and acknowledged that the sentence would be “hardest
on the family.” The district court concluded that Velasquez-Santos “knew he
could not come back into the United States” and he had “to be [held] responsible
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for his own actions.” The district court, “having considered the advisory
guidelines” and the sentencing factors, sentenced Velasquez-Santos to 42 months
of imprisonment.
Velasquez-Santos argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable, but we disagree. The district court considered the sentencing
factors, Velasquez-Santos’s arguments, and imposed a sentence within the
guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), (c); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). The district court reasonably determined
that a sentence of 42 months of imprisonment would address Velasquez-Santos’s
“substantial criminal history,” punish him for his willful reentry into the United
States, and deter similar future conduct. The district court did not abuse its
discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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