IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 97-60262
Summary Calender
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WILLIAM R. WILLIAMS
and
ROBIN M. WILLIAMS,
Petitioners-Appellants,
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from a Decision of
the United States Tax Court
(20980-95)
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May 13, 1998
Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
William and Robin Williams (“taxpayers”) appeal the Tax
Court's denial of their motion to vacate its decision. Finding no
abuse of discretion, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I.
The IRS notified taxpayers of a deficiency in the computation
of their income for tax years 1990 and 1991. The taxpayers filed
in the Tax Court a petition for a redetermination of the
deficiencies. Thereafter, the taxpayers and IRS entered into a
stipulation before the Tax Court, agreeing to the deficiencies
originally assessed; the Tax Court entered the stipulated decision.
About a month later, taxpayers retained new counsel, who
immediately filed a “motion for reconsideration and rehearing.”
The Tax Court, construing this as a motion to vacate under Tax
Court Rule 162, denied the motion.
II.
A.
We review the Tax Court's refusal to alter or amend its
judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Westbrook v.
Commissioner, 68 F.3d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 1995). “This court on
review may reverse a discretionary denial by the Tax Court of post-
opinion motions only if there are shown to be 'extraordinary
circumstances' justifying reversal.” Wilson v. Commissioner, 500
F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).
B.
Taxpayers' argument is based on the contention that their
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previous counsel misinformed them about the stipulation agreement
and that, in the stipulated judgment, they therefore were forced to
pay taxes on income they had not earned. For them, this c-
onstituted a per se “extraordinary circumstance” that mandated
reopening the judgment.
We disagree. The taxpayers' first counsel's alleged,
unilateral error is not enough to grant relief from a stipulated
agreement. See Stamm Int'l Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315,
321-22 (1988). “[T]he mistakes of counsel, who is the legal agent
of the client, are chargeable to the client.” Pryor v. United
States Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation
omitted). “Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our
system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed
bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have
'notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the
attorney.'” Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting
Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)).
AFFIRMED.
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