United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-2623
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United States of America, *
*
Appellee, * Appeal from the United States
* District Court for the
v. * Southern District of Iowa.
*
Chad Michael Lee Welsh, * [TO BE PUBLISHED]
*
Appellant. *
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Submitted: June 1, 2010
Filed: June 11, 2010
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Before LOKEN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Chad Welsh pleaded guilty to receiving and distributing child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); and possessing child pornography, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Granting Welsh a downward variance from the
advisory Guidelines imprisonment range of 151-188 months, the district court1
sentenced him to concurrent terms of 100 months in prison and 10 years of supervised
release that included a number of special conditions. Welsh timely appeals. His
counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
1
The HONORABLE JOHN A. JARVEY, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.
U.S. 738 (1967), raising two issues, the reasonableness of Welsh’s sentence and the
constitutionality of a supervised-release condition imposing a lifetime requirement to
register as a sex offender.
First, after careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court
committed no procedural sentencing error, made an individualized assessment of facts
relevant to sentencing, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and did
not impose an unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849
(8th Cir. 2009).
Second, counsel advises that he raised the lifetime registry issue at Welsh’s
request but believes that Welsh does not understand that the court only required, in
both an express and a special condition of supervised release, that he “register with
the state sex offender registration agency” in the State where he resides or works, and
“comply with all sex offender laws” in that State. Counsel is correct. These
conditions of supervised release are limited to the ten-year period of supervised
release. Whether Welsh will be subject to sex-offender registration requirements after
that term will depend upon applicable state and federal statutes, not this judgment. If
Welsh is also contending that the district court abused its discretion in imposing these
registration conditions, the contention is without merit because Congress has
mandated their inclusion for those convicted of sex offenses. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d); 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(1), 16913(a); United States v. Rhone, 535 F.3d 812,
813 (8th Cir. 2008).
Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,
80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm, and we
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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