UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6369
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM CARL WELSH,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:11-hc-02209-D-JG)
Submitted: March 31, 2014 Decided: April 3, 2014
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, R.A.
Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Michael E.
Lockridge, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Carl Welsh appeals the district court’s order
committing him as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248
(2012). We affirm.
To civilly commit a person pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248, the government must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual “(1) has engaged or attempted to
engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation . . . ,
(2) suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder, and (3) as a result would have serious difficulty
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released.” United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 519 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
“When applying the clear and convincing standard, the court must
identify credible supporting evidence that renders its factual
determination highly probable.” United States v. Antone, 742
F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Clear and convincing evidence is that which supports
“a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth
of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, we review a district court’s factual
findings under § 4248 for clear error and its legal conclusions
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de novo. United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir.
2012). Accordingly, “[i]f the district court’s account of the
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, [we] may not reverse it.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Nevertheless, . . . we may set aside a
district court’s factual findings if the court failed to
properly take into account substantial evidence to the contrary
or its factual findings are against the clear weight of the
evidence considered as a whole.” United States v. Springer, 715
F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
Welsh first argues that the district court clearly
erred by focusing on his past criminal conduct and ignoring the
fact that he had been able to refrain from sexually violent
conduct and child molestation while unsupervised in the
community. We conclude that the district court did not err by
emphasizing Welsh’s past criminal conduct, as it provided
valuable insight on Welsh’s likelihood of reoffending. See
Wooden, 693 F.3d at 458 (describing prior criminal conduct as “a
critical part of the answer” in civil commitment proceedings).
Welsh’s prior criminal conduct demonstrated that: (1) strict
supervision is not a deterrent to Welsh; (2) Welsh is willing to
go to elaborate measures to avoid detection; (3) Welsh has a
pattern of giving gifts or money to his victims in exchange for
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sexual favors and silence; and (4) Welsh has spent little time
in the community between sanctions.
We also conclude that the court did not ignore Welsh’s
recent conduct. Rather, the record reveals that Welsh has
repeated the same patterns and has shown little to no signs of
reform. Specifically, Welsh’s fantasies have not subsided, as
he reported having fantasies about prepubescent males as
recently as 2009. Welsh has also continued his pattern of
giving gifts to groom potential victims by buying commissary
items for younger-looking inmates. His grooming of younger-
looking inmates while awaiting the civil commitment hearing also
establishes that Welsh’s behavior has remained unmodified by the
threat of sanctions. Thus, far from ignoring recent events, the
court found that Welsh’s recent behavior was consistent with
Welsh’s “abysmal” criminal history.
Although Welsh attempts to place a positive spin on
his time in Belize by noting that he did not engage in any
sexual activity with children while unsupervised there, we
conclude that the district court did not clearly err by
rejecting that interpretation of the evidence. See Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (holding that,
“[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”).
Indeed, Welsh’s flight demonstrates that he is still willing to
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go to elaborate measures to avoid detection. Moreover, his
activities with prostitutes in Belize only confirm the district
court’s conclusions that Welsh is still sexually preoccupied and
that Welsh lied about his sexual urges at the commitment
hearing.
We further conclude that Welsh’s citation to the
opinion of Dr. Plaud is also unavailing, as the district court
discredited Dr. Plaud’s opinion and found more credible the
opinions of Drs. Arnold and Perkins. Welsh has not provided any
reason to second guess the district court’s credibility
determination. See United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462
(4th Cir. 2012) (noting that this court is “especially
reluctant” to second guess district courts’ evaluation of expert
credibility and assessment of conflicting expert opinions
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Welsh next argues that the district court clearly
erred by not giving enough weight to the fact that Welsh will be
subject to lifetime supervision if released. We conclude that
the district court adequately weighed the potential effect of
Welsh’s lifetime term of supervised release and thoroughly
considered Welsh’s options for treatment inside and outside the
prison environment. It was not clear error for the district
court to: (1) conclude that Welsh would receive better treatment
in prison; and (2) minimize the effect of the lifetime term of
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supervised release in light of Welsh’s utter failure to abide by
the terms of supervision in the past.
Because Welsh has failed to demonstrate clear error,
we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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