UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4031
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DABIAM JAMARR PHARR, a/k/a Boo Boo,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00467-TDS-1)
Submitted: May 20, 2010 Decided: June 15, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram,
First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang, Assistant
United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dabiam Jamarr Pharr pled guilty in accordance with a
written plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute five or more
grams of cocaine base (“crack”), 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was
sentenced to 155 months in prison. Pharr now appeals. His
attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the
sentence is reasonable but stating that there are no meritorious
issues for review. Pharr was advised of his right to file a pro
se supplemental brief but has not filed such a brief. We
affirm.
After thoroughly reviewing the transcript of the Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we conclude that the district court
fully complied with the Rule. Further, we find that Pharr
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and that there
was a factual basis for the plea.
Pharr’s total offense level was 31, his criminal
history category was VI, and his advisory Guidelines range was
188-235 months. There were no objections to the presentence
investigation report. However, Pharr contended that his
background warranted a sentence at the low end of the range. He
also requested a sentence below that range based on the
sentencing disparity between offenses involving cocaine base and
those involving powder cocaine. The United States acknowledged
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that the court had discretion to vary downward based on the
disparity but took no position on whether the court should
impose a variant sentence.
At sentencing, after hearing from counsel and Pharr,
and considering both the advisory Guidelines range and the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing factors, the court sentenced
Pharr to 155 months in prison. The court observed that the
instant offense involved numerous drug sales, and the court took
note of Pharr’s criminal history, which included drug offenses
and violent crimes. The court also commented on Pharr’s
difficult childhood, his lack of a significant employment
history, his not having a high school diploma, and his need for
substance abuse treatment. Finally, the court acknowledged the
crack/powder disparity, stating that if the instant offense had
involved powder cocaine, the advisory Guidelines range would
have been 151 to 188 months.
We conclude that the sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). The court properly calculated Pharr’s advisory
Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and
sufficiently explained the variant sentence. See id.; United
States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 476 (2008).
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After reviewing the entire record in accordance with
Anders, we conclude that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Pharr’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing,
of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel=s motion must state that a
copy of the motion was served on his client. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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