United States v. Stone

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 10a0182p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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Plaintiff-Appellant, -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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No. 10-1618
v.
,
>
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DAVID BRIAN STONE; JOSHUA MATTHEW
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STONE; JOSHUA JOHN CLOUGH; MICHAEL
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DAVID MEEKS; THOMAS WILLIAM PIATEK,
Defendants-Appellees. -
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 10-20123-001—Victoria A. Roberts, District Judge.
Argued: June 8, 2010
Decided and Filed: June 22, 2010
Before: MARTIN, KETHLEDGE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Kathleen Moro Nesi, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit,
Michigan, for Appellant. Arthur Jay Weiss, ARTHUR J. WEISS & ASSOCIATES,
Farmington Hills, Michigan, James C. Thomas, PLUNKETT COONEY, Detroit, Michigan,
Randall C. Roberts, LAW OFFICE, Ann Arbor, Michigan, William W. Swor, LAW
OFFICES, Detroit, Michigan, Mark A. Satawa, KIRSCH & SATAWA, P.C., Southfield,
Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Patricia Gaedeke, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Arthur Jay Weiss, ARTHUR J. WEISS &
ASSOCIATES, Farmington Hills, Michigan, James C. Thomas, PLUNKETT COONEY,
Detroit, Michigan, Randall C. Roberts, LAW OFFICE, Ann Arbor, Michigan, William W.
Swor, LAW OFFICES, Detroit, Michigan, Mark A. Satawa, KIRSCH & SATAWA, P.C.,
Southfield, Michigan, for Appellees.

MARTIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KETHLEDGE, J., joined.
WHITE, J. (pp. 19-21), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

1
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 2

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OPINION
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BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. The government appeals the district
court’s decision to release defendants David Stone, Sr., Joshua Stone, Joshua Clough,
Michael Meeks, and Thomas Piatek on bail pending their trial for conspiracy to levy war
against or to oppose by force the authority of the United States government and related
offenses. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s decision and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Over a period of about 18 months, the government investigated defendants, who are
members of a group called the Michigan Hutaree. Members of the Hutaree acquired a
significant arsenal of weapons, including components of pipe bombs, and trained as a
paramilitary organization. The Hutaree solicited the assistance of an explosives expert, who
was an undercover FBI agent. After the government obtained information that the Hutaree
were planning and preparing for what they referred to as a “real op”, which specifically
contemplated murdering civilians and law enforcement officers, the FBI brought its evidence
before a grand jury. On March 23, 2010, the grand jury found probable cause to believe that
defendants had: (1) agreed to oppose by force the government and the laws of the United
States; (2) attempted to obtain the explosive devices and weapons of mass destruction that
would be used to carry out the planned attacks; and (3) used, carried, and possessed firearms
in furtherance of these crimes.

1
In the original indictment, defendants were charged with seditious conspiracy in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (count one), attempt to use weapons of mass destruction
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2) (count two), and two counts of carrying and

1
On June 2, 2010, the grand jury handed down a superseding indictment in this case. Because
(1) the district court’s order was based upon the original indictment and the evidence adduced at the
hearing upon the original indictment, and (2) the government has not requested a new bond hearing based
upon the superseding indictment—indeed, as of the date of oral argument, defendants had not even been
arraigned on the superseding indictment—we restrict our inquiry to the charges as described in the original
indictment and the record as was before the district court.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 3

using firearms during and in relation to the crimes of violence charged in counts one and
two, as well as possessing firearms in furtherance of those predicate crimes of violence
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (counts four and five).2 David Stone, Sr., was also
charged in count three with teaching/demonstrating the use of destructive devices in
furtherance of the federal crime of violence charged in count one.

Defendants were arrested over the weekend of March 27-28, 2010, except for
Joshua Stone, who was not arrested until the night of March 29, 2010 after a two-day
standoff with the authorities. All defendants but Piatek appeared in Detroit for their
arraignments and a bond determination on March 30, 2010. After a two-day hearing, the
magistrate judge ordered that defendants be detained pending trial. Piatek appeared in
the Northern District of Indiana and was ordered detained by a magistrate judge there.

All defendants appealed the detention orders to the district court, which
conducted a two-day de novo hearing on April 27-28, 2010. The district court reversed
the magistrates’ rulings and ordered that defendants be released, subject to specified
conditions. The government moved for a stay of the district court’s order releasing
defendants pending appeal to this court. The district court granted a limited stay, but it
then dissolved that stay and again ordered that defendants be released.

The government immediately appealed and also sought a temporary stay of the
district court’s order pending a review of the merits. A panel of this Court granted a
temporary stay on May 10, 2010. At issue now is the order releasing defendants,3 for
whom the government contends that there are no conditions of release that will
reasonably assure the safety of the community.

2
Piatek was not charged in count five.
3
The government originally also appealed the release of defendants David Stone, Jr., Tina Stone,
Kristopher Sickles, and Jacob Ward, but it moved to dismiss those claims voluntarily. This Court granted
that request on June 2, 2010.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 4

II.

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, but we consider
mixed questions of law and fact—including the ultimate question whether detention is
warranted—de novo. United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985).

III.

Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, upheld by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), a defendant may be detained pending trial
only if a judicial officer “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). A judicial officer’s finding of
dangerousness must be “supported by clear and convincing evidence.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f)(2)(b). The default position of the law, therefore, is that a defendant should be
released pending trial.

That default is modified, however, for certain, particularly dangerous defendants.
Specifically, when a “judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe” that
a defendant committed one of the crimes listed in section 3142(e)(3), there is a
presumption in favor of detention: “Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be
presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community[.]” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e)(3). A grand jury indictment, by itself, establishes probable cause to believe
that a defendant committed the crime with which he is charged. Hazime, 762 F.2d at 37.
Thus, when the government presents an indictment including charges listed in section
3142(e)(3), it has fulfilled its burden to establish the presumption in favor of detention.

As our sister circuits have found, section 3142(e)(3)’s presumption in favor of
detention imposes only a “burden of production” on the defendant, and the government
retains the “burden of persuasion.” See, e.g., United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433,
436 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 1985). A
defendant satisfies his burden of production when he “com[es] forward with evidence
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 5

that he does not pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” Mercedes, 254 F.3d
at 436. Although a defendant’s burden of production “is not heavy,” he must introduce
at least some evidence. United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991);
see also United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] defendant must
introduce some evidence contrary to the presumed fact in order to rebut the
presumption.”).

Even when a defendant satisfies his burden of production, however, “the
presumption favoring detention does not disappear entirely, but remains a factor to be
considered among those weighed by the district court.” Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436. The
presumption remains as a factor because it is not simply an evidentiary tool designed for
the courts. Instead, the presumption reflects Congress’s substantive judgment that
particular classes of offenders should ordinarily be detained prior to trial. See United
States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 384 (1st Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by
United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990), (“Congress intended magistrates
and judges, who typically focus only upon the particular cases before them, to take
account of the more general facts that Congress found”); see also United States v.
Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he presumption of
dangerousness . . . represents Congressional findings that certain offenders . . . are likely
to continue to engage in criminal conduct undeterred either by the pendency of charges
against them or by the imposition of monetary bond or other release conditions.”). To
rebut the presumption, therefore, a defendant should “present all the special features of
his case” that take it outside “the congressional paradigm[.]” Jessup, 757 F.2d at 387.

Regardless of whether the presumption applies, the government’s ultimate
burden is to prove that no conditions of release can assure that the defendant will appear
and to assure the safety of the community. In determining whether the government has
met that burden of persuasion, the court must consider certain factors:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including
whether the offense is a crime of violence, . . . a Federal crime of
terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm,
explosive, or destructive device;
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 6

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including—
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition,
family ties, employment, financial resources, length of
residence in the community, community ties, past
conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse,
criminal history, and record concerning appearance at
court proceedings; and
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest,
the person was on probation, on parole, or on other
release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of
sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law;
and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release. . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). However, consideration of these factors shall not be construed to
modify or limit the presumption of innocence. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j).

In cases like this one, involving multiple defendants who are not necessarily
similarly situated, the dangerousness inquiry must be an individualized one. Just as at
trial, in which courts and juries must resist the urge to find guilt or innocence by
association, each defendant is entitled to an individualized determination of bail
eligibility.

A. Government’s Burden to Show Probable Cause

All five defendants here are charged with very serious offenses, some of which
trigger the presumption in favor of detention.4 Count two, attempt to use weapons of
mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2), qualifies for the presumption
under section 3142(e)(3)(C), and counts four and five, carrying, using, and possessing
a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of

4
Although the charges have changed slightly in the superseding indictment, all defendants remain
subject to the presumption.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 7

18 U.S.C.§ 924(c)(1), qualify under section 3142(e)(3)(B).5 Thus, the indictment on
counts two, four, and five satisfies the government’s preliminary burden to show
probable cause for all defendants and to establish the presumption of detention.

B. Defendants’ Burden to Rebut the Presumption of Dangerousness

Here, each defendant has satisfied his burden of producing some evidence
tending to demonstrate that he is not dangerous. The district court opinion discusses
favorable information about each defendant’s character and criminal history.
Additionally, each defendant also produced a third-party custodian or other character
witness to testify on his behalf. While defendants’ evidence focuses mainly on their
potential risk of flight rather than on the danger that they may pose to the community,
their burden is relatively light. Therefore, each defendant has put forward sufficient
evidence to satisfy his burden of production.

C. The Government’s Burden of Persuasion to Show Dangerousness

1. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offenses Charged

The charges here are undeniably serious. The seditious-conspiracy and weapons
of mass destruction charges arise from the defendants’ plot to kill law-enforcement
officers in a particularly heinous manner: by first killing a single officer and then
placing improvised-explosive devices (IEDs) along the path of his funeral procession.
The purpose of the planned attack was apparently to weaken the officers’ morale and to
spark a revolution against the government. The firearm charges relate to various training
sessions, during which defendants allegedly prepared for the upcoming revolution.
Thus, these charges, on their face, indicate a strong threat to society.6 Compare

5
All of the defendants are charged with count four and all of the defendants but Piatek are charged
with count five.
6
The appropriateness of detention here is underscored, moreover, by comparing these five
defendants to other categories of cases where pre-trial detention is routinely ordered. For example, drug
dealers are also subject to the statutory presumption in favor of detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A).
And our Court routinely affirms, on dangerousness grounds, the pre-trial detention of run-of-the-mill drug
dealers, even without any indication that the defendant has engaged in violence. See, e.g., United States
v. Hinton, 113 F. App’x 76 (6th Cir. 2004) (unspecified drug trafficking charges); United States v. Ortiz,
71 F. App’x 542 (6th Cir. 2003) (conspiracy to distribute and possess over five kilograms of cocaine);
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 8

Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 437 (the crime of “conspiracy to commit armed robbery of a drug
dealer . . . weighs heavily against release”).

In terms of dangerousness, Congress also thought it was especially significant
if the charges include “a crime of violence, . . . a Federal crime of terrorism, . . . or
involve[] a . . . firearm, explosive, or destructive device.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). The
charges here possess those elements. The seditious-conspiracy and weapons of mass
destruction charges are each crimes of violence; the weapons of mass destruction charge
involves explosives; and the firearms charges, naturally, involve firearms. The weapons
of mass destruction charge also likely qualifies as a Federal crime of terrorism. See
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (defining that phrase as including a violation of the weapons
of mass destruction statute, if the violation is “calculated to influence or affect the
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct”). As the district court (under)stated, “this factor . . . weighs in favor of
detention.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 12.)7

As discussed in some detail below, each defendant here has a demonstrated
interest in committing actual, physical violence against law enforcement and several
have shown a lack of concern about the likelihood of killing civilians, through the use

United States v. Miller, 39 F. App’x 278 (6th Cir. 2002) (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
marijuana); United States v. Lattner, 23 F. App’x 363 (6th Cir. 2001) (unspecified “drug trafficking
charges”); United States v. Gray, 20 F. App’x 473 (6th Cir. 2001) (conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute seven kilograms of cocaine, testimony from family members insufficient to overcome the
presumption). To be sure, drug trafficking is a serious offense that, in itself, poses a danger to the
community. See United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that “[t]he risk of
continued narcotics trafficking on bail constitutes a risk to the community,” cited approvingly in many of
the previously listed cases); see also United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[I]t is clear
that the harm to society caused by narcotics trafficking is encompassed within Congress’ definition of
‘danger’”). But drug dealers do not necessarily pose the immediate risk of serious violence that the
defendants here do, and therefore detention appears all the more warranted here.
7
Our Court has also affirmed pre-trial detention in cases where the statutory presumption does
not apply. In United States v. Ramsey, for instance, the defendant was charged with “conspiracy,
possession of stolen mail, and making a false statement to a postal inspector.” 110 F.3d 65 (table), 1997
WL 135443, at *1 (6th Cir. 1997). We upheld a finding of dangerousness based on factors including
Ramsey’s “access to firearms” and his commission of “criminal acts while on release from other charges.”
Id. Likewise, the defendant in United States v. Abboud, 42 F. App’x 784 (6th Cir. 2002), ran a check-
kiting scheme and kept several guns at home. We affirmed his detention on both flight-risk grounds and
“the danger of further illegal activity” if he was released. In neither case did the court address the
defendant’s propensity for violence.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 9

of weapons of mass destruction, firearms, and other means. Thus, the nature and
circumstances of the charges against all defendants weigh in favor of detention.

2. The Weight of the Evidence Against Defendants

This factor goes to the weight of the evidence of dangerousness, not the weight
of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt. See Hazime, 762 F.2d at 37 (noting that the
weight of evidence against the person “deals with the factors to be considered in
determining whether there are conditions which will assure the appearance of the
accused and safety of the community”); see also United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118,
1121 (9th Cir. 1991) (Section 3142(g) “neither requires nor permits a pretrial
determination of guilt”). At the bail hearings before the magistrate and before the
district court, the government introduced evidence in the form of transcripts of
conversations among defendants before the undercover FBI agent, lists of the items
seized at defendants’ homes (including weapons,8 bomb-making implements, and
military rations), and proffer of what the undercover FBI agent would testify to at trial.
When the district court ordered that the government present a witness who could be
cross-examined, the government brought forth an FBI agent with little or no firsthand
knowledge of the events. However, conducting a bail hearing by proffer is acceptable
under the law and at the discretion of the district court. See United States v. Webb, 238
F.3d 426 (table), 2000 WL 1721060, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]the government may
proceed in a detention hearing by proffer or hearsay.”); see also United States v. Smith,
79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Every circuit to have considered the matter . . .
[has] permitted the Government to proceed by way of proffer.”). Thus, we will examine

8
Based on the record before the district court, it appears that each of the hundred or so weapons
recovered when defendants’ homes were searched were legally purchased and registered. However, this
is not dispositive to our consideration of dangerousness. It is also legal to purchase and own fertilizer and
diesel fuel, but if a person who has made threats against the government purchases large quantities of both,
it creates a different, more dangerous, implication. Compare United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1090
(9th Cir. 2008) (affirming pre-trial detention of terrorism-financing suspect based in part on “large cache
of firearms and ammunition found in searches” of the defendant’s home); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d
758, 765 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that the defendant was dangerous for reasons including that “agents found
three dangerous weapons: a forty-five caliber handgun, a three-fifty-seven magnum, and a two-shot
derringer” in his home).
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 10

the evidence before the district court to determine how convincing the government’s
evidence of dangerousness is.

a. David Stone, Sr.

When Stone’s home was searched, the FBI found at least 37 firearms,
ammunition for the seized weapons, and military gear and uniforms. The FBI also found
components for IEDs, including threaded pipes, shrapnel, electronic matches, cannon
fuse, and explosive powder. He led seventeen training sessions and events for the
Hutaree, as its leader, between September 2008 and March 2010, including those at
which explosive devices were demonstrated. When making plans for the “real op,”
David Stone stated that any member of the team who encountered a civilian while on the
mission was to “handle it as a hostile situation. That means you put them on the ground.
Either putting bullets in them, or if they just willingly get down on the ground, and let
you leave the area peacefully, great.” (R. 157.) He went on to note that “Putting bullets
through bodies ain’t an easy thing, but hey you do it a couple of times it don’t bother
ya.” (Id.) He also instructed the Hutaree to wipe down all bullets and casings that they
were bringing on the mission. This evidence weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.

b. Joshua Stone

After Joshua Stone heard that his eight co-defendants had been arrested, he
“sought weapons, sought cash, sought vehicles, [and] sought to arm himself and other
Hutaree members who rallied around him[.]” (R. 85 at 67.) He then engaged in an
armed stand-off with federal agents for two days. He ultimately surrendered without
incident, but only after his wife and step-mother made a video asking him to come out
peacefully. (Id. at 72.) Aside from surrender, his actions were consistent with the
Hutaree’s 10-step protocol for resisting the government; Joshua Stone simply failed to
execute the last step, known as “Point of No Return.” (R. 157 at 23.)

Joshua Stone also demonstrated his dangerousness through his role as second-in-
command of the Hutaree. In planning the “real op”, Joshua Stone told his patrol squad,
“don’t be afraid to pull the trigger on anybody, if we have to,” and “welcome
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 11

to . . . being in the business of shooting people.” (Gov’t App’x at 57.) This evidence
weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.

c. Michael Meeks

When Meeks’ home was searched, the FBI found 16 long guns and thousands of
rounds of ammunition, in addition to substantial food stockpiles and gas masks. He had
been tasked to get component materials for IEDs, though no explosive devices were
found in his home. He has spoken frequently about different ways to kill police officers,
owns five semi-automatic weapons and has stated that he has a thousand tracer rounds
for his AR-15 that he would be “doling [] out” to the Hutaree. He voiced plans to die
by “copicide,” which he has explained means killing a law enforcement officer while
dying at the hands of another officer. On a single day in June 2009, Meeks suggested
blowing up a local bridge “when the enemy came”; he “discussed capping a member of
law enforcement and seizing that person’s weapons”; and he stated that members of
Congress “think they’re different” but “[w]ait until they found out that they bleed
exactly the same.” (R. 87 at 8.) Meeks also declared: “We got to start over man. We
got to get rid of the judicial system, everybody. They need to die.” (Id.) In February
2010, another Hutaree member suggested killing a judge, and Meeks chimed in: “I’m
lookin’ at enough people right here to take out virtually anybody. And I mean virtually
anybody. You just got to be motivated enough to go do it.” (Gov’t App’x at 52.) This
evidence weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.

d. Thomas Piatek

When Piatek’s home was searched, the government seized, among other things,
46 firearms, 13,000 rounds of ammunition, smoke grenades, a ballistic vest and helmet,
a cross-bow, and a CD regarding explosives. (R. 91 at 29-35.) During a trip with
several Hutaree members to a Kentucky militia conference, after David Stone
“guaranteed” that he would “pop” a police officer, Piatek then “expressed his own hatred
for law enforcement.” (Id. at 25); see United States v. Gomez-Fernandez, 198 F.3d 259
(table), 1999 WL 992985, at *2 (10th Cir. 1999) (a single threat to a police officer is
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 12

sufficient to show a danger to the community). This evidence weighs strongly in favor
of dangerousness.

e. Joshua Clough

The government has proffered that Clough knows how to construct trip-wire
detection systems, and he was likely responsible for one used during the Hutaree’s
training. (R. 157 at 10-11, R. 85 at 80.) Moreover, Clough’s own statements reflect a
desire to kill federal officials. Upon seeing a list of “federal judges, elected officials,
business leaders and educational leaders,” Clough remarked that “it looked like a ready-
made hit list for the Hutaree.” (R. 85 at 27-28.) Clough also posted, on a militia
website, a message promoting violence against ATF agents: “ATF Agents were at our
local [firearms dealer] today looking for all paperwork specifically relating to our
commander. . . . We have and will return fire. The question is, will you? Hutaree.com.”
(Id. at 13.) This evidence weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.

3. The History and Characteristics of the Defendants

While the district court did not make findings as to the dangerousness of the
defendants, the court did make findings as to defendants’ individual histories and
characteristics. While only Piatek and Meeks have prior criminal histories, courts have
never required a prior criminal record before ordering detention. See Rodriguez, 950
F.2d at 89 (“Although a prior record of violence eases the government’s burden of
showing dangerousness, it is not essential.”).

a. David Stone, Sr.

The district court made the following factual findings about this defendant:

David Stone is 45-years-old, and is married to co-Defendant Tina
Stone. He is the father of four adult children.
David Stone worked at Performance Engineering in Adrian,
Michigan from July 2007 until July 2008. In 2008, he worked for a few
months at Iott Farms in Petersburg, Michigan. He currently works as a
Forklift Driver for Demlow Products in Clayton, Michigan.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 13

He does not have any physical or mental health problems. He
does not drink alcohol or use illegal drugs. The results of his drug test
were negative.
David Stone has no criminal history.

(Dist. Ct. Op. at 25).
Thus, this factor weighs slightly against dangerousness.
b. Joshua Stone
The district court made the following factual findings about this defendant:
Joshua Stone is 21-years-old, and is married to Shannon Stone
(Shannon had some involvement in the Hutaree). Shannon indicated that
Joshua Stone helped her graduate from high school, and she wants to
help Joshua Stone get his GED. Shannon also wants to help Joshua
Stone get out of the “militia mess.”
Joshua Stone has seasonal employment.
Joshua Stone does not have any physical or mental heath
problems. He does not drink alcohol or use illegal drugs.
He has no criminal history.

(Dist. Ct. Op. at 26).
Thus, this factor weighs slightly against dangerousness.
c. Michael Meeks
The district court made the following factual findings about this defendant:
Meeks is a 40-year-old single man. He does not have children.
Meeks attended Washtenaw Community College, earning a
paramedic certification.
Meeks was in the United States Marines from 1988-1992,
including combat service in Desert Storm. Before he was discharged
from active duty, he earned a Rifle Expert Badge, a Certificate of
Appreciation, a Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one star, a
National Defense Service Medal, a Combat Action Ribbon, a Southwest
Asia Service Medal, a Good Conduct Medal, a Meritorious Mast, and a
Kuwait Liberation Medal.
Meeks works as a truck driver for Interactive Metals in Adrian,
Michigan (his driving is confined to a two-hour radius around the City
of Adrian). Meeks’ employer, Matthew Anderson, describes Meeks as
“a valuable part of our business team,” and “dedicated, hard-working and
very loyal as an employee.” According to Mr. Anderson, “It would be
a great disappointment for us to lose [Meeks].”
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 14

At the bond review hearing, the Government stated that David
Stone allegedly asked Meeks to obtain metal pieces for IEDs. However,
no evidence was presented that Meeks actually obtained metal from his
employer.
Meeks’ mother, Sylvia Meeks, testified at the bond review
hearing and indicated that Meeks uses her address for mail, instead of
listing his address with the United States Postal Service, because it is
more convenient for Meeks to get his mail when he visits his parents.
Although Meeks has not lived at the address listed on his driver’s
license for over five years, Meeks says he provided the agents his current
address when he was arrested on these charges.
Meeks proffered a newspaper article that says he helped search
for two missing citizens with the Bridgewater Township Officers.
Meeks does not have any physical or mental problems. He does
not use drugs, but his mother believes he drinks alcohol to excess.
Meeks has a misdemeanor conviction from 1997 for drunk
driving.

(Dist. Ct. Op. at 27-28).
Thus, this factor weighs slightly against dangerousness.
d. Thomas Piatek
The district court made the following factual findings about this defendant:
Piatek is a 47-year-old single man. He has a 25-year-old daughter
and two grand daughters, whom he helps support.
Piatek has worked as a truck driver for Meyer Industrial
Container in Chicago, Illinois for 17 years.
Piatek is the primary caregiver for his special needs brother,
participates in the Fourth of July parade, and is an associate member of
the Fraternal Order of Police.
People describe Piatek as “a down-to-earth person,” someone
who would “help anybody,” someone who does not engage in
“aggressive” behavior or “any kind of violence,” someone who “goes to
work every day,” and someone who would “probably be the first one to
render aid [if there was somebody hurt].”
Piatek does not have any physical or mental health problems. He
does not use drugs or drink alcohol. His urinalysis results were negative.
In 1990, Piatek was charged with Aggravated Assault and
Driving on a Median. Piatek successfully completed one year of
supervision, and the case was dismissed.

(Dist. Ct. Op. at 28-29).
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 15

Also before the court, but not mentioned in its opinion, is the government’s
evidence that Piatek’s former girl-friend made a police report on February 26, 2010,
indicating that she was afraid of him because he had recently taken a gun from behind
the driver’s seat of his vehicle and said, while in the process of loading the weapon,”If
you ever break up with me . . . I’ll pop you.” Additionally, “in early March, upon
learning that she was pregnant with his child, Piatek said that she would never see her
20-year-old son get married if she went through with the pregnancy.” (Gov’t Letter Br.
at 8-9.)

Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dangerousness.

e. Joshua Clough

The district court made the following factual findings about this defendant:

Clough is a 28-year-old single man who lives with his parents.
Clough was a self-employed videographer for nine years before
he became a security guard at a shopping mall in Adrian, Michigan (he
may no longer have this job due to his arrest on these charges).
Clough does not have any physical or mental health problems. He
does not drink alcohol or use illegal drugs.
Clough has no criminal history.

(Dist. Ct. Op. at 27).

Thus, this factor weighs slightly against dangerousness.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 16

4. The Nature and Seriousness of the Danger to Any Person or the
Community
a. David Stone, Sr.9

The evidence proffered at the detention hearing tended to show that David Stone
conducted a number of trainings that involved explosives and trip-wire devices. He
knows how to construct them and was at least interested in learning about their
construction and use before the federal agent intervened. He had a hit list of government
employees, an extensive arsenal of weapons in his home, and a number of items used
in the construction of explosive devices were found in his home. He made repeated
threats against federal and judicial employees and was involved in planning a “real op”
in which he planned to kill law enforcement officers and civilians. Thus, this factor
weighs in favor of finding that David Stone would pose a serious danger to the
community if released.

Viewing all of the factors together, we conclude that, as to David Stone, Sr., no
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of the community.

b. Joshua Stone

Joshua Stone already demonstrated his willingness to evade the police; after
hearing about the arrests of other Hutaree members, he engaged in a two-day armed
standoff with police before surrendering peacefully. He attempted to obtain weapons
and cash from other members of the Hutaree and militia members. As second-in-
command of the Hutaree, he planned the “real op”, made threatening statements
regarding law enforcement officers, and made statements planning the death of civilians
that got in the way. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of finding that Joshua Stone would
pose a serious danger to the community if released.

9
It has been argued that, because their weapons were seized, defendants’ possession of legal
weapons should not be held against them. However, as the government proffered, there are approximately
25 Hutaree members at large who still have access to weapons. (R. 157 at 22); cf. United States v. Trosper,
809 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[W]e find it reasonable to conclude from the significant amount of
false identification material . . . that other such documents exist and are available to [the defendant]”).
Thus, it seems likely that defendants would be able to obtain weapons should they desire to do so.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 17

Viewing all of the factors together, we conclude that, as to Joshua Stone, no
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of the community.

c. Michael Meeks

Meeks made a number of statements evincing an interest in killing judges and
law enforcement officers, in addition to civilians. Furthermore, authorities found a
substantial arsenal of weapons, including 1000 tracer rounds, at his home. That type of
weapons cache, combined with repeated statements about killing judges and law-
enforcement officers, supports a finding of dangerousness. Moreover, his stated desire
to die by “copicide” demonstrates an unacceptable risk that, if Meeks knows when the
police are coming to bring him in, he might take some action. Thus, this factor weighs
in favor of dangerousness.

Viewing all of the factors together, we conclude that, as to Michael Meeks, no
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of the community.

d. Thomas Piatek

Piatek was heavily involved with the Hutaree, made a statement in favor of
killing agents/civilians, and possessed a substantial arsenal of weapons. Moreover, he
has made statements indicating a violent intent toward his girlfriend, which we may
consider as evidence of dangerousness although it does not relate to the offenses
charged. See United States v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 917 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e
reject Quartermaine’s suggestion that his acts of ‘domestic’ violence do not support a
finding of dangerousness to the community. A willingness to strike loved ones offers
probative evidence of a tendency to violence and dangerousness toward others”). Thus,
this factor weighs in favor of dangerousness.

Viewing all of the factors together, we conclude that, as to Thomas Piatek, no
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of the community.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 18

e. Joshua Clough

Clough knows how to construct trip-wire detection systems, and he was likely
responsible for one used during the Hutaree’s training. This knowledge, coupled with
his stated interest in killing federal agents and his posting on the Hutaree website that
he “will return fire”, demonstrates that Clough is a danger to society. Thus, this factor
weighs in favor of dangerousness.

Viewing all of the factors together, we conclude that, as to Joshua Clough, no
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of the community.

IV.

Thus, we find that each defendant poses a danger to the community and that no
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of the community. We therefore
REVERSE the order of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 19

_____________________________________________________

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
_____________________________________________________

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to David Stone, Sr., Joshua Stone, and Michael Meeks, and dissent as to
Thomas Piatek and Joshua Clough. I also write separately to observe that I find this to
be a far closer call than the majority opinion would indicate.

The district court took seriously the government’s burden to establish by clear
and convincing evidence, as to each defendant, that no combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the safety of the community. The government chose to proceed by
proffer, consisting of both assertions of fact and broad conclusions, with sometimes
vague references to the sources of the proffered information. The government witness
presented for cross-examination was unable to provide meaningful answers to the
questions posed by defendants’ attorneys and the court.

The majority’s account is not inaccurate, but it gives little attention to the
concerns underlying the district court’s decision. The FBI was following the activities
of the Hutaree for approximately two years, during which time the group maintained a
website, conducted field training activities, possessed vast quantities of ammunition and
firearms (which, with the exception of three to four firearms, were not shown to the court
to be illegal,1 and which in one defendant’s case were collected over twenty years),
talked of the members’ dislike of the United Nations, the government and government
officials, especially law enforcement officers, and discussed various scenarios for killing
law enforcement officers. However, the group and its members had never taken any
action except for field training, and some of the taped conversations appeared to be in
jest.

1
The district court acknowledged that the government proffered that David Stone, Sr., possessed
three to four firearms that appeared not to be of the legal length.
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 20

The tapes did not reveal a specific plan or plot to commit any of the charged
offenses, but rather indicated an interest in doing so; the same interest that had been
present for some time, and upon which none of the defendants had acted. It was against
this backdrop that the district court determined that the conditions imposed would
reasonably assure the safety of others and the community.

Notwithstanding the foregoing observations, I agree with the majority that taking
into consideration the Congressional presumption of dangerousness that attaches to
certain of the charged offenses, which presumption does not disappear in the face of
contrary evidence, but must be considered in the calculus of dangerousness, no
conditions of release will reasonably assure that defendants Stone, Sr., Stone, and Meeks
will not present a danger to the community.

As to Piatek, the evidence showed that he has worked for the same company as
a truck driver for seventeen years and is a valued employee, that he participates in
community organizations, that he supports his family, and that the weapons found at his
home were registered and were collected over the course of twenty years. Were it not
for the government’s proffer of his girlfriend’s complaint to law enforcement authorities
that he threatened her, I would affirm the district court’s decision. Piatek’s counsel
responded to the government’s allegations by asserting that Piatek was never arrested
or charged, that he is still dating the complainant, and that she had planned a joint
birthday party for Piatek and her brother to be held the weekend after Piatek’s arrest.
The district court did not address the girlfriend’s complaint in assessing Piatek’s
dangerousness. I agree with the majority that unrelated conduct evincing dangerousness
can be considered in assessing whether a defendant can safely be released pending trial.
However, given the conflicting contentions, and the importance of the girlfriend’s
complaint to the evaluation of Piatek’s dangerousness, I would not reverse the district
court’s determination, but rather, would vacate and remand for reconsideration, taking
into account the allegations and Piatek’s response, together with any further information.

As to Clough, I would affirm the district court. The trip-wire detection system
is designed to detect intruders. Although the government argues that the same
No. 10-1618 United States v. Stone, et al. Page 21

technology can be used to set off devices, there is no indication that Clough used or
intended to use it in that manner. The posting on the website was the general posting at
the bottom of the group’s website, and should be viewed in that context, not as a
statement of Clough’s intent. Further, the reference to returning fire assumes that the
group is being fired upon, and does not suggest an offensive attack. The other
statements attributed to Clough are more in the nature of observations than threats — the
list of elected officials looked like a “hit list” for the Hutaree; observing during a
conversation regarding killing police officers that “it would not be a pretty day for any
officers coming down here.” The government has not met its burden of persuasion that
no conditions of Clough’s release can reasonably assure the safety of others and the
community.