UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5210
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RODNEY PATRICK HUNT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00010-WO-1)
Submitted: June 15, 2010 Decided: June 29, 2010
Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner,
United States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rodney Patrick Hunt pled guilty in accordance with a
plea agreement to possession of a firearm by a person subject to
a domestic violence court order, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8), 924(a)
(2006), and was sentenced to seventy months in prison. He
appeals his sentence. We affirm.
Hunt contends that his sentence is unreasonable. We
review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). In conducting our review, we first examine the sentence
for “significant procedural error,” including “failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [2006] factors, selecting a sentence based
on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence. . . .” Id. We next “consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed . . . , [taking] into
account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. In imposing
sentence, the district court must provide an “individualized
assessment” based upon the specific facts before it. United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
Here, the district court correctly calculated Hunt’s
advisory Guidelines range, performed an individualized
assessment of the § 3553(a) factors as they applied to the case,
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and stated in open court the reasons for the sentence. In this
regard, the court found that, although Hunt was illiterate, he
was obligated to learn that the domestic violence court order
prohibited his possession of firearms. The court also concluded
that certain positive aspects of Hunt’s life did not outweigh
his lengthy criminal history, including relatively recent
serious offenses. Additionally, the court observed that the
prior sentences Hunt had received had not served to deter his
criminal behavior.
We reject Hunt’s contention that the district court
did not adequately address the various § 3553(a) factors and, in
particular, was obligated to explain how a matter addressed at a
bench conference impacted the chosen sentence. “Where a
[sentencing] matter is . . . conceptually simple . . . and the
record makes clear that the sentencing court considered the
evidence and arguments,” extensive explanation of the sentence
is not required. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359
(2007). Nor is it necessary that the sentencing court address
every § 3553(a) factor on the record. United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
Hunt’s sentence, which falls within his advisory
Guidelines range of 70-87 months, is presumptively reasonable.
See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
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We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in imposing a seventy-month sentence.
We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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