[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 06-16641 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ May 5, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
D. C. Docket No. 06-00040-CR-KD CLERK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JASON HARDY HUNT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 5, 2008)
Before BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI*, Judge.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Jane A. Restani, United States Court of International Trade Chief Judge,
sitting by designation.
Following a jury trial, Jason Hardy Hunt was convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1519 for knowingly making a false entry into a police incident report with the
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence an FBI investigation. Hunt raises three
issues on appeal. First, he says § 1519 is constitutionally wanting because it did
not put him on fair notice his behavior was proscribed. Second, he asserts the
evidence was insufficient to convict him. Third, he says his ten-month sentence is
unreasonable. Each of these arguments fail; therefore, we affirm his conviction
and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts were adduced at trial and are substantially undisputed.
On March 22, 2005, officers from the Prichard, Alabama police department were
patrolling a neighborhood known for drug activity. Hunt, at that time a detective
in the narcotics unit, joined other officers on patrol that evening. The officers
observed James Woodard engaging in suspicious activity and stopped him to
question him.
Woodard became agitated and resisted the officers’ attempt to detain him.
Officer Waite handcuffed Woodard and brought him over to a car where Hunt and
other officers awaited. The officers searched Woodard and checked for any
outstanding warrants. Finding nothing, they released him.
2
Woodard remained agitated and berated the group of officers, which now
included Hunt, Jonathan Waite, Walter Knight, and George Lyons. He cursed
them and threatened them. The officers responded. Hot words were exchanged,
with Hunt in particular arguing with Woodard. After Knight tried to defuse the
situation, Woodard persisted in yelling at the officers, focusing specifically on
Hunt. Knight then ordered Woodard arrested.
Hunt and Waite moved towards Woodard to place him under arrest. Hunt
reached him first. He grabbed Woodard, placed him in a bearhug, and threw him
to the ground. Woodard’s head hit the concrete, and he required medical attention
as a result. Other officers administered first aid to Woodard and summoned an
ambulance. Woodard was hospitalized for eight days and suffered permanent
hearing loss from the incident.
The night of Woodard’s arrest, Hunt returned to the station with Knight and
filled out a use of force report. In the report, Hunt made the following statement:
“when I (Det. Hunt) got between 2-3 feet to him (Mr. Woodard) he grabbed me
(Det. Hunt) and tried to slam me, but I (Det. Hunt) was strong enough to get my
hands free around his and take him (Mr. Woodard) to the ground.”
The FBI launched an investigation into the circumstances surrounding
Woddard’s arrest. On February 8, 2006, Hunt met with FBI Agent George Glaser
3
to discuss his conduct during the arrest. At the meeting, Hunt reiterated the
statement made in his original report – that Woodard grabbed Hunt first, wrapping
his arms around his waist near his weapon. According to Hunt, he grabbed
Woodard in an attempt to defend himself.
Two days later, Glaser again met with Hunt. Glaser had interviewed others
present at the March 22 incident and found a number of inconsistencies between
their recollections and Hunt’s version of events. During the meeting, Hunt
admitted his statement in the police report – and his statement two days prior –
was inaccurate. Woodard had not initiated contact; Hunt grabbed Woodard first
by wrapping his arms around his waist and pinning his arms to his side.
Ultimately, a grand jury indicted Hunt on several counts related to his
conduct on March 22, including the § 1519 charge for knowingly making a false
statement in his police report with the intent to impede a federal investigation. At
trial, the Government presented evidence that Hunt (while undergoing training)
had attended a civil rights course, where he learned the federal government would
investigate and prosecute civil rights violations such as willful uses of excessive
force. Glaser also testified. He noted Hunt stuck to his original version of events
during the February 8 meeting and only changed his story after Glaser confronted
Hunt with inconsistencies during the February 10 meeting.
4
Hunt testified in his own defense. He conceded the statement in the report
was false: Woodard had not grabbed Hunt first; rather, Hunt was the first to make
the move on Woodard. Hunt testified that, when he filled out the report following
the incident, he was still in the “heat of the moment” and simply made an error.
He said the falsity in the report was not an intentional lie.
Knight also testified to a conversation he and Hunt had together while
traveling back to the police station after Hunt’s takedown of Woodard but before
Hunt filed the report. Knight said Hunt told him Woodard had grabbed him first
and asked if he had done anything wrong. Knight responded by saying that, if
Woodard indeed had grabbed him first, then Hunt’s behavior was appropriate.
A jury convicted Hunt of the § 1519 charge. At sentencing, the judge noted
the calculated guidelines range was 10 to 16 months. The judge found Hunt’s
behavior was aberrant, but also recognized deterrence was an important factor in
the case. In light of this, the judge sentenced Hunt to five months’ imprisonment
followed by five months’ home confinement. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process Challenge
Hunt argues application of § 1519 in this context deprived him of due
process because his conduct is not the type contemplated by Congress when it
5
passed the statute and, therefore, he was not placed on fair notice that his conduct
was criminal. We review such a constitutional challenge de novo. United States
v. Knight, 490 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007).
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause harbors within its scope the
notion of fair warning: a statute cannot be enforced “if it is so vague that ‘men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.’” United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127
(1926)). Put another way, the statute must be sufficiently clear to give a “person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly.” Bama Tomato Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 112
F.3d 1542, 1547 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972)). The touchstone of the inquiry is the
meaning of the statute in light of common understanding and practice. Mena, 863
F.2d at 1527.
The question of fair warning must begin with the language of the statute
itself. Section 1519 states as follows:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
6
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . , or
in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be [in
violation of this statute].
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (emphasis added). Nothing here suggests the statute is, in the
context before us, vague. This statute rather plainly criminalizes the conduct of an
individual who (1) knowingly (2) makes a false entry in a record or document
(3) with intent to impede or influence a federal investigation. The statute
unambiguously describes the precise conduct the jury found Hunt engaged in
when he made a false statement in his police report following Woodard’s arrest. A
person of ordinary intelligence would understand a police report to be a “record”
or “document,” and would also read the language “any matter within the
jurisdiction of [a] department . . . of the United States” to include an FBI
investigation. Moreover, there is nothing ambiguous or unclear about the word
“false” or the requirement that the statement be made knowingly and with an
intent to impede said investigation. By its plain text, the statute placed Hunt on
notice his conduct was unlawful.
Hunt’s arguments in large part ignore the language of the statute and
attempt to channel this Court’s analysis into the unwelcome morass of legislative
history and Congressional intent. When the text of a statute is plain, however, we
7
need not concern ourselves with contrary intent or purpose revealed by the
legislative history. See Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (holding courts should follow clear statutory language even where an
inquiry into legislative history might reveal contrary Congressional intent); United
States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding legislative history
is irrelevant unless the plain meaning produces absurd results). Hunt makes much
of the fact that § 1519 was passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was
targeted at corporate fraud and executive malfeasance. Indeed, the broad language
of § 1519 suggests it can be a useful tool in such arenas. But that same breadth
bears no hint of any limiting principle cabining § 1519 to corporate fraud cases,
and Congress is free to pass laws with language covering areas well beyond the
particular crisis du jour that initially prompted legislative action. Section 1519
covered Hunt’s behavior; the context of passage is of no moment.
Hunt also points to the legislative history to argue § 1519 was concerned
primarily with evidence preservation. Here Hunt attempts to tie his argument into
the text of the statute by suggesting the language “alters, destroys, mutilates,
conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry” assumes there is evidence
already existing upon which these acts could be performed. The language of the
statute does not support Hunt’s reading. Alteration, destruction, mutilation and
8
concealment certainly suggest § 1519 is concerned partially with evidence
destruction, but it is not solely concerned with destruction or tampering. While
Hunt created the document in which he made the false statement, such an act
clearly is covered by the language of the statute. Nothing suggests the document
mentioned in § 1519 must be already existing at the time the false entry was made.
Hunt “ma[de] a false entry” into a “document,” all that § 1519 required.
Hunt cannot avoid the result compelled by the plain language by selectively
citing legislative history. We hold § 1519’s plain language placed Hunt on notice
that his action of knowingly making a false statement about the circumstances of
Woodard’s arrest with the intent to impede an FBI investigation was conduct
sufficiently proscribed by § 1519. Hunt’s due process right to fair notice was
satisfied.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Hunt argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him under § 1519
because the evidence shows he simply made a misstatement in his report and did
not intentionally make the false statement with the intent to influence, obstruct or
impede the federal investigation. Hunt’s challenge to the district court’s denial of
his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and drawing all reasonable
9
inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Acosta, 421 F.3d 1195,
1197 (11th Cir. 2005).2
“A factual finding will be sufficient to sustain a conviction if, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quotations omitted). The evidence need not be inconsistent with every reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt, and we allow the jury to choose among several
reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Browne,
505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007).
Adequate circumstantial evidence exists to support the jury’s conclusion.
The Government put forth evidence Hunt knew claims of excessive force would
be investigated by the FBI, and the evidence indicated Hunt stuck to his false
statements well after he filed the police report. Agent Glaser’s testimony
2
We note Hunt actually raises his sufficiency challenge in two contexts. Aside from
appealing the district court’s refusal to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal, he also frames
his sufficiency challenge in terms of Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 33, arguing the district court erred in
failing to grant his request for a new trial because the verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence. See United States v. Sullivan, 1 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1993). We review a denial
of a request for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Pedrick, 181
F.3d 1264, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 1999). For the same reasons our de novo review of the evidence
leads us to conclude the evidence was sufficient to convict Hunt, we find the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to grant him a new trial.
10
demonstrated Hunt continued to support his false statements one year after filing
the report and only changed his story after being confronted by Glaser. Hunt’s
statement to Knight immediately after the incident and shortly before filling out
the police report–asking Knight whether he had done anything wrong–also
provides circumstantial support for the jury’s determination on the intent element.
A reasonable jury could infer from this exchange that Hunt was aware he may
have engaged in wrongful behavior and that this awareness–being close in time to
the false statement–influenced the statement in the report.
Moreover, Hunt testified in his own defense. “[W]hen a defendant chooses
to testify, he runs the risk that if disbelieved the jury might conclude the opposite
of his testimony is true.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir.
1995) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319,
1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Defendants in criminal trials are not obliged to testify.
And a defendant who chooses to present a defense runs a substantial risk of
bolstering the Government’s case.” (quotations omitted)). The defendant’s own
testimony can be considered by the jury as substantive evidence of his guilt.
Williams, 390 F.3d at 1325. Hunt says he offered an alternative explanation for
the false statement: it was made unintentionally in the heat of the moment. But the
jury simply disbelieved him–as it was free to do–and the circumstantial evidence
11
supports its conclusion. As Glaser’s testimony indicated, Hunt reiterated the
police report’s version of the incident in February 2006–nearly one year after the
incident occurred. The fact that Hunt reiterated his false version of events so long
after they transpired would permit a reasonable jury to conclude his false assertion
was not motivated simply by the “heat of the moment.” Further casting doubt on
Hunt’s testimony as to his intent is the fact that the false statement went to one of
the most important issues as regards the exercise of force: whether or not Woodard
touched Hunt first. A reasonable jury could conclude Hunt’s innocent explanation
for misstating the paramount fact at issue simply was unworthy of credence. The
parties provided evidence of two competing explanations for Hunt’s false
statement; the jury chose to disbelieve Hunt.
Hunt points to a statement made by the district court at sentencing as
supporting his argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him beyond
a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, the judge stated “the evidence would have
sufficiently supported either way” the jury’s verdict. Hunt takes this to mean the
judge believed the evidence was in equipose, which, citing to Cosby v. Jones, 682
F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), means a jury could not find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. See id. at 1383 (“[I]f the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt
12
or a theory of innocence of the crime charged, then a reasonable jury must
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.”). Read in context, however, the judge’s
comments are little more than the unexceptional observation that the jury could
have reasonably reached either conclusion based on the evidence. The judge
merely recognized the jury chose amongst several reasonable explanations for
Hunt’s behavior. Moreover, our de novo review of the sufficiency question leads
us to conclude there was sufficient evidence for a jury to determine Hunt’s
misstatement was made knowingly with an intent to impede a federal
investigation.
C. Reasonableness of the Sentence
Hunt also argues his 10-month sentence was unreasonable. Hunt does not
dispute the court properly calculated his guideline range. The district court
calculated the range at 15-21 months, departed downward due to “aberrant
behavior” to reach a new range of 10-16 months, and then sentenced Hunt to five
months’ imprisonment followed by five months’ home confinement. Rather, Hunt
argues the sentence is unreasonable because, under his circumstances, the only
reasonable sentence would be one of probation with no incarceration. We review
the substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed by the district court for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).
13
Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the guidelines range
is reasonable, we “ordinarily . . . expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to
be reasonable.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
Hunt’s 10-month sentence was not an abuse of discretion. The district court
concluded some prison time would be necessary in order to reflect the seriousness
of the offense and provide deterrence to keep other officers from writing false
reports: “There needs to be a deterrence in this case, a deterrence to other police
officers not to do this again. . . . That’s why I’m not going to give you a straight
probation sentence.” The court then sentenced Hunt to the low end of his adjusted
range. We reject Hunt’s argument that any jail time would be per se unreasonable,
as the court’s concerns with the serious nature of the crime and the need to deter
others were clearly articulated, legitimate concerns factoring into the sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Hunt’s conviction and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
14