United States v. Hunt

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 06-16641 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ May 5, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
D. C. Docket No. 06-00040-CR-KD CLERK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JASON HARDY HUNT,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________

(May 5, 2008)

Before BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI*, Judge.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

*
Honorable Jane A. Restani, United States Court of International Trade Chief Judge,
sitting by designation.
 Following a jury trial, Jason Hardy Hunt was convicted under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1519 for knowingly making a false entry into a police incident report with the

intent to impede, obstruct, or influence an FBI investigation. Hunt raises three

issues on appeal. First, he says § 1519 is constitutionally wanting because it did

not put him on fair notice his behavior was proscribed. Second, he asserts the

evidence was insufficient to convict him. Third, he says his ten-month sentence is

unreasonable. Each of these arguments fail; therefore, we affirm his conviction

and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts were adduced at trial and are substantially undisputed.

On March 22, 2005, officers from the Prichard, Alabama police department were

patrolling a neighborhood known for drug activity. Hunt, at that time a detective

in the narcotics unit, joined other officers on patrol that evening. The officers

observed James Woodard engaging in suspicious activity and stopped him to

question him.

Woodard became agitated and resisted the officers’ attempt to detain him.

Officer Waite handcuffed Woodard and brought him over to a car where Hunt and

other officers awaited. The officers searched Woodard and checked for any

outstanding warrants. Finding nothing, they released him.

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 Woodard remained agitated and berated the group of officers, which now

included Hunt, Jonathan Waite, Walter Knight, and George Lyons. He cursed

them and threatened them. The officers responded. Hot words were exchanged,

with Hunt in particular arguing with Woodard. After Knight tried to defuse the

situation, Woodard persisted in yelling at the officers, focusing specifically on

Hunt. Knight then ordered Woodard arrested.

Hunt and Waite moved towards Woodard to place him under arrest. Hunt

reached him first. He grabbed Woodard, placed him in a bearhug, and threw him

to the ground. Woodard’s head hit the concrete, and he required medical attention

as a result. Other officers administered first aid to Woodard and summoned an

ambulance. Woodard was hospitalized for eight days and suffered permanent

hearing loss from the incident.

The night of Woodard’s arrest, Hunt returned to the station with Knight and

filled out a use of force report. In the report, Hunt made the following statement:

“when I (Det. Hunt) got between 2-3 feet to him (Mr. Woodard) he grabbed me

(Det. Hunt) and tried to slam me, but I (Det. Hunt) was strong enough to get my

hands free around his and take him (Mr. Woodard) to the ground.”

The FBI launched an investigation into the circumstances surrounding

Woddard’s arrest. On February 8, 2006, Hunt met with FBI Agent George Glaser

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to discuss his conduct during the arrest. At the meeting, Hunt reiterated the

statement made in his original report – that Woodard grabbed Hunt first, wrapping

his arms around his waist near his weapon. According to Hunt, he grabbed

Woodard in an attempt to defend himself.

Two days later, Glaser again met with Hunt. Glaser had interviewed others

present at the March 22 incident and found a number of inconsistencies between

their recollections and Hunt’s version of events. During the meeting, Hunt

admitted his statement in the police report – and his statement two days prior –

was inaccurate. Woodard had not initiated contact; Hunt grabbed Woodard first

by wrapping his arms around his waist and pinning his arms to his side.

Ultimately, a grand jury indicted Hunt on several counts related to his

conduct on March 22, including the § 1519 charge for knowingly making a false

statement in his police report with the intent to impede a federal investigation. At

trial, the Government presented evidence that Hunt (while undergoing training)

had attended a civil rights course, where he learned the federal government would

investigate and prosecute civil rights violations such as willful uses of excessive

force. Glaser also testified. He noted Hunt stuck to his original version of events

during the February 8 meeting and only changed his story after Glaser confronted

Hunt with inconsistencies during the February 10 meeting.

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 Hunt testified in his own defense. He conceded the statement in the report

was false: Woodard had not grabbed Hunt first; rather, Hunt was the first to make

the move on Woodard. Hunt testified that, when he filled out the report following

the incident, he was still in the “heat of the moment” and simply made an error.

He said the falsity in the report was not an intentional lie.

Knight also testified to a conversation he and Hunt had together while

traveling back to the police station after Hunt’s takedown of Woodard but before

Hunt filed the report. Knight said Hunt told him Woodard had grabbed him first

and asked if he had done anything wrong. Knight responded by saying that, if

Woodard indeed had grabbed him first, then Hunt’s behavior was appropriate.

A jury convicted Hunt of the § 1519 charge. At sentencing, the judge noted

the calculated guidelines range was 10 to 16 months. The judge found Hunt’s

behavior was aberrant, but also recognized deterrence was an important factor in

the case. In light of this, the judge sentenced Hunt to five months’ imprisonment

followed by five months’ home confinement. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Challenge

Hunt argues application of § 1519 in this context deprived him of due

process because his conduct is not the type contemplated by Congress when it

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passed the statute and, therefore, he was not placed on fair notice that his conduct

was criminal. We review such a constitutional challenge de novo. United States

v. Knight, 490 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007).

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause harbors within its scope the

notion of fair warning: a statute cannot be enforced “if it is so vague that ‘men of

common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

application.’” United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1989)

(quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127

(1926)). Put another way, the statute must be sufficiently clear to give a “person

of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so

that he may act accordingly.” Bama Tomato Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 112

F.3d 1542, 1547 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.

104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972)). The touchstone of the inquiry is the

meaning of the statute in light of common understanding and practice. Mena, 863

F.2d at 1527.

The question of fair warning must begin with the language of the statute

itself. Section 1519 states as follows:

Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the

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 investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . , or
in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be [in
violation of this statute].

18 U.S.C. § 1519 (emphasis added). Nothing here suggests the statute is, in the

context before us, vague. This statute rather plainly criminalizes the conduct of an

individual who (1) knowingly (2) makes a false entry in a record or document

(3) with intent to impede or influence a federal investigation. The statute

unambiguously describes the precise conduct the jury found Hunt engaged in

when he made a false statement in his police report following Woodard’s arrest. A

person of ordinary intelligence would understand a police report to be a “record”

or “document,” and would also read the language “any matter within the

jurisdiction of [a] department . . . of the United States” to include an FBI

investigation. Moreover, there is nothing ambiguous or unclear about the word

“false” or the requirement that the statement be made knowingly and with an

intent to impede said investigation. By its plain text, the statute placed Hunt on

notice his conduct was unlawful.

Hunt’s arguments in large part ignore the language of the statute and

attempt to channel this Court’s analysis into the unwelcome morass of legislative

history and Congressional intent. When the text of a statute is plain, however, we

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need not concern ourselves with contrary intent or purpose revealed by the

legislative history. See Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2002) (en

banc) (holding courts should follow clear statutory language even where an

inquiry into legislative history might reveal contrary Congressional intent); United

States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding legislative history

is irrelevant unless the plain meaning produces absurd results). Hunt makes much

of the fact that § 1519 was passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was

targeted at corporate fraud and executive malfeasance. Indeed, the broad language

of § 1519 suggests it can be a useful tool in such arenas. But that same breadth

bears no hint of any limiting principle cabining § 1519 to corporate fraud cases,

and Congress is free to pass laws with language covering areas well beyond the

particular crisis du jour that initially prompted legislative action. Section 1519

covered Hunt’s behavior; the context of passage is of no moment.

Hunt also points to the legislative history to argue § 1519 was concerned

primarily with evidence preservation. Here Hunt attempts to tie his argument into

the text of the statute by suggesting the language “alters, destroys, mutilates,

conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry” assumes there is evidence

already existing upon which these acts could be performed. The language of the

statute does not support Hunt’s reading. Alteration, destruction, mutilation and

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concealment certainly suggest § 1519 is concerned partially with evidence

destruction, but it is not solely concerned with destruction or tampering. While

Hunt created the document in which he made the false statement, such an act

clearly is covered by the language of the statute. Nothing suggests the document

mentioned in § 1519 must be already existing at the time the false entry was made.

Hunt “ma[de] a false entry” into a “document,” all that § 1519 required.

Hunt cannot avoid the result compelled by the plain language by selectively

citing legislative history. We hold § 1519’s plain language placed Hunt on notice

that his action of knowingly making a false statement about the circumstances of

Woodard’s arrest with the intent to impede an FBI investigation was conduct

sufficiently proscribed by § 1519. Hunt’s due process right to fair notice was

satisfied.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Hunt argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him under § 1519

because the evidence shows he simply made a misstatement in his report and did

not intentionally make the false statement with the intent to influence, obstruct or

impede the federal investigation. Hunt’s challenge to the district court’s denial of

his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and drawing all reasonable

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inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Acosta, 421 F.3d 1195,

1197 (11th Cir. 2005).2

“A factual finding will be sufficient to sustain a conviction if, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007)

(quotations omitted). The evidence need not be inconsistent with every reasonable

hypothesis other than guilt, and we allow the jury to choose among several

reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Browne,

505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007).

Adequate circumstantial evidence exists to support the jury’s conclusion.

The Government put forth evidence Hunt knew claims of excessive force would

be investigated by the FBI, and the evidence indicated Hunt stuck to his false

statements well after he filed the police report. Agent Glaser’s testimony

2
We note Hunt actually raises his sufficiency challenge in two contexts. Aside from
appealing the district court’s refusal to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal, he also frames
his sufficiency challenge in terms of Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 33, arguing the district court erred in
failing to grant his request for a new trial because the verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence. See United States v. Sullivan, 1 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1993). We review a denial
of a request for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Pedrick, 181
F.3d 1264, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 1999). For the same reasons our de novo review of the evidence
leads us to conclude the evidence was sufficient to convict Hunt, we find the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to grant him a new trial.

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demonstrated Hunt continued to support his false statements one year after filing

the report and only changed his story after being confronted by Glaser. Hunt’s

statement to Knight immediately after the incident and shortly before filling out

the police report–asking Knight whether he had done anything wrong–also

provides circumstantial support for the jury’s determination on the intent element.

A reasonable jury could infer from this exchange that Hunt was aware he may

have engaged in wrongful behavior and that this awareness–being close in time to

the false statement–influenced the statement in the report.

Moreover, Hunt testified in his own defense. “[W]hen a defendant chooses

to testify, he runs the risk that if disbelieved the jury might conclude the opposite

of his testimony is true.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir.

1995) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319,

1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Defendants in criminal trials are not obliged to testify.

And a defendant who chooses to present a defense runs a substantial risk of

bolstering the Government’s case.” (quotations omitted)). The defendant’s own

testimony can be considered by the jury as substantive evidence of his guilt.

Williams, 390 F.3d at 1325. Hunt says he offered an alternative explanation for

the false statement: it was made unintentionally in the heat of the moment. But the

jury simply disbelieved him–as it was free to do–and the circumstantial evidence

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supports its conclusion. As Glaser’s testimony indicated, Hunt reiterated the

police report’s version of the incident in February 2006–nearly one year after the

incident occurred. The fact that Hunt reiterated his false version of events so long

after they transpired would permit a reasonable jury to conclude his false assertion

was not motivated simply by the “heat of the moment.” Further casting doubt on

Hunt’s testimony as to his intent is the fact that the false statement went to one of

the most important issues as regards the exercise of force: whether or not Woodard

touched Hunt first. A reasonable jury could conclude Hunt’s innocent explanation

for misstating the paramount fact at issue simply was unworthy of credence. The

parties provided evidence of two competing explanations for Hunt’s false

statement; the jury chose to disbelieve Hunt.

Hunt points to a statement made by the district court at sentencing as

supporting his argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him beyond

a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, the judge stated “the evidence would have

sufficiently supported either way” the jury’s verdict. Hunt takes this to mean the

judge believed the evidence was in equipose, which, citing to Cosby v. Jones, 682

F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), means a jury could not find guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. See id. at 1383 (“[I]f the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt

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or a theory of innocence of the crime charged, then a reasonable jury must

necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.”). Read in context, however, the judge’s

comments are little more than the unexceptional observation that the jury could

have reasonably reached either conclusion based on the evidence. The judge

merely recognized the jury chose amongst several reasonable explanations for

Hunt’s behavior. Moreover, our de novo review of the sufficiency question leads

us to conclude there was sufficient evidence for a jury to determine Hunt’s

misstatement was made knowingly with an intent to impede a federal

investigation.

C. Reasonableness of the Sentence

Hunt also argues his 10-month sentence was unreasonable. Hunt does not

dispute the court properly calculated his guideline range. The district court

calculated the range at 15-21 months, departed downward due to “aberrant

behavior” to reach a new range of 10-16 months, and then sentenced Hunt to five

months’ imprisonment followed by five months’ home confinement. Rather, Hunt

argues the sentence is unreasonable because, under his circumstances, the only

reasonable sentence would be one of probation with no incarceration. We review

the substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed by the district court for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).

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Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the guidelines range

is reasonable, we “ordinarily . . . expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to

be reasonable.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).

Hunt’s 10-month sentence was not an abuse of discretion. The district court

concluded some prison time would be necessary in order to reflect the seriousness

of the offense and provide deterrence to keep other officers from writing false

reports: “There needs to be a deterrence in this case, a deterrence to other police

officers not to do this again. . . . That’s why I’m not going to give you a straight

probation sentence.” The court then sentenced Hunt to the low end of his adjusted

range. We reject Hunt’s argument that any jail time would be per se unreasonable,

as the court’s concerns with the serious nature of the crime and the need to deter

others were clearly articulated, legitimate concerns factoring into the sentence.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Hunt’s conviction and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

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