In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-3690
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSE B EDOLLA-Z AVALA ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:09-cr-00051-RTR-2—Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.
A RGUED F EBRUARY 17, 2010—D ECIDED JULY 2, 2010
Before R IPPLE, M ANION and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
R IPPLE, Circuit Judge. Jose Bedolla-Zavala pleaded guilty
to one count of distribution of cocaine in excess of 500
grams, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).
The district court sentenced him to 78 months’ imprison-
ment. Mr. Bedolla-Zavala now appeals his sentence,
contending that the district court erred in applying a
sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. See
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 4(h). Because we con-
clude that the district court’s application of the obstruc-
2 No. 09-3690
tion enhancement was correct, we affirm Mr. Bedolla-
Zavala’s sentence.
I
BACKGROUND
A.
On February 7, 2009, law enforcement received infor-
mation about a likely impending drug transaction in-
volving Edwin Dejesus. In response, they set up surveil-
lance outside of a home where a car registered to Dejesus
was parked. They observed a silver minivan, occupied by
two men, enter an alley behind the home and depart a
short time later. Minutes later, Dejesus himself exited the
home carrying a white bag and drove away. Police fol-
lowed Dejesus’s car, conducted a traffic stop and, during
a search, recovered a white bag containing two kilograms
of cocaine. Dejesus then agreed to cooperate with the
authorities. He placed a recorded call to the man who
had delivered him the drugs. During the call, Dejesus
stated that he had “it”—the money for the drug transac-
tion—and told the man on the other end of the line that
he should come and pick it up. R.30, Attach. A.
While police surveillance continued, the same silver
minivan seen earlier at the residence returned. In it, police
found three men, including Mr. Bedolla-Zavala, who
was carrying the cell phone to which Dejesus earlier
had placed the call. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Bedolla-
Zavala identified himself as Benino Jesus Arroyo-Arroyo
and also provided a false date of birth. Prior to his arraign-
ment, Mr. Bedolla-Zavala (then known to law enforce-
No. 09-3690 3
ment as Arroyo-Arroyo) met with a pretrial services
officer who prepared a bail report for the court. He again
repeated his alias and false date of birth, gave false
names for his parents and also represented himself to be
a legal resident of the United States. These false facts
appear in the bail report prepared for the court.
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s time as Arroyo-Arroyo was short-
lived; prior to his initial appearance, his fingerprints
readily revealed his true identity and the fact of his
previous deportation.
B.
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala was charged with a single count
of distribution of a controlled substance in violation of
8 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He pleaded guilty, and
the Government agreed to recommend a two-level reduc-
tion to his offense level for acceptance of responsibility
if his conduct continued to be cooperative, as well as an
additional one-level reduction in consideration of his
timely notification of his intention to plead guilty. See
U.S.S.G. § 3G1.1(a) & (b). No representations were made
in the agreement by either party with respect to the
obstruction of justice enhancement in § 3C1.1.
The presentence report (“PSR”) recommended a two-
level enhancement for obstruction of justice. Mr. Bedolla-
Zavala objected that his conduct in providing a false
name was not properly classified as obstruction, and the
Government concurred, noting that the conduct did not
significantly hinder the prosecution, and the deception
was uncovered quickly and through normal processes.
4 No. 09-3690
The district court denied the objection, finding that
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s conduct was expressly covered by
the relevant Application Note. Consequently, the court
accepted the recommendation of the PSR and applied
the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala now appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s sole contention is that the
district court erred in applying the obstruction of justice
enhancement. He claims that there is no evidence that
his statements were made with an intent to deceive,
as he had been using the alias that he provided to the
authorities throughout his time in the United States. He
further claims that his false information was not “mate-
rial[],” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 4(h), because
it had no effect on the outcome of any issue in the case
and did not cause any significant hindrance in the in-
vestigation or prosecution. Because his challenge con-
cerns only the correct application of the Guidelines, our
review is de novo. United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d
645, 649 (7th Cir. 2010).
We begin with the language of the guideline. Section
3C1.1 provides:
If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or im-
peded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the ad-
ministration of justice with respect to the inves-
tigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive
No. 09-3690 5
conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of
conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a
closely related offense, increase the offense level
by 2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
The district court, accepting the recommendations of
the PSR, ruled that Application Note 4(h) instructed that
the enhancement applied under the circumstances. Ap-
plication Note 4 provides a “non-exhaustive list of exam-
ples of the types of conduct” to which the obstruction
enhancement applies. Id., Application Note 4. Among
the other conduct listed, the note specifically references
“providing materially false information to a probation
officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation
for the court.” Id., Application Note 4(h).
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala contends that the district court
should not have applied the obstruction guideline
because, by its terms, it applies only to “willfully” ob-
structing conduct. Mr. Bedolla-Zavala maintains that
he had no purpose to deceive when he identified himself
as Arroyo-Arroyo because he had been living in the
United States under that alias for some time.
We see no merit in this argument. As we have held, “the
Guidelines provide that furnishing false information to
a probation officer during a presentence [or other] investi-
gation is itself conduct which constitutes obstruction of
justice.” United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 1392, 1400 (7th
Cir. 1993). “Therefore, if the defendant willfully pro-
vided false information, then he willfully obstructed or
attempted to obstruct the administration of justice.” Id.
6 No. 09-3690
Contrary to his suggestion, the fact that Mr. Bedolla-
Zavala used the alias in his private life hardly evinces that
he was not being deceptive by employing it. It certainly
does not establish that his statements to the pretrial
services officer preparing the bail report were anything
other than willful. There is simply nothing in the record
to suggest that his provision of a false identity—including
family and immigration information—was made by
“mistake or negligence.” Cf. Thomas, 11 F.3d at 1400.1
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s attempted comparison to United
States v. Elliott, 467 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2006), is unavailing.
Although we did reject the application of the obstruc-
tion enhancement in the case of a defendant who gave
an alias, we did so for reasons inapplicable to the
present case. In addition to offense-specific considera-
tions relevant in Elliott,2 we noted that Application
1
Nor do we see any merit to the cursory argument Mr. Bedolla-
Zavala advances that it is “incredibly unjust” to hold him ac-
countable for the misstatements since his English is non-fluent
and he was not provided with an interpreter during his
first meeting with pretrial services. Mr. Bedolla-Zavala ap-
parently understood the questions sufficiently to provide
names and dates of birth—although they were not his own.
2
In United States v. Elliott, 467 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2006), the
offense itself included an escape, and, therefore, we noted that
deception was an inherent part of the criminal act, already
taken into account in the normal guidelines range; to consider
it again in determining whether to apply an obstruction en-
hancement generally would be double counting in such cases.
Id. at 691. The Guidelines themselves recognize as much. See
(continued...)
No. 09-3690 7
Note 5(a) instructs sentencing courts not to apply the
enhancement for “providing a false name or identifica-
tion document at arrest, except where such conduct
actually resulted in a significant hindrance to the investi-
gation or prosecution of the instant offense,” but this
note does not govern in the present case. Note 5(a) limits
the reach of the obstruction enhancement to cases in
which the investigation is significantly hindered, but
only when the conduct upon which the enhancement
is sought is the provision of false information at the time
of arrest. It does not limit the instruction of Application
Note 4(h) regarding the provision of false information
to a probation officer preparing an investigation for the
court. This distinction in the application note embodies
the Commission’s reasoned—and realistic—judgment
that a false statement to a court officer, in the prepara-
tion of a specific report to be used by the court for a
specific decision, is a far more serious matter than an
opportunistic lie made during the confrontation of an
arrest situation.
Finally, Mr. Bedolla-Zavala contends that his statement
was not “material,” and, therefore, Application Note 4(h)
2
(...continued)
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 7 (noting that the enhance-
ment shall not apply to various offenses involving deceit). The
district court in Elliott had applied the enhancement based on
the proviso that, even in escape cases, the enhancement is
appropriate where “significant further obstruction” has oc-
curred. We held that providing an alias that law enforcement
immediately knew to be false was not within the scope of the
relevant note.
8 No. 09-3690
does not apply by its terms. Mr. Bedolla-Zavala’s argu-
ment relies on the fact that his “alias actually had no
effect” on the “case or its outcome.” Appellant’s Br. 14.
His true identity became known by the time the court
decided the bail issue.
We already have rejected this understanding of the
materiality inquiry. The application notes define “material”
in relevant part as “information that, if believed, would
tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.”
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 6 (emphasis added);
see United States v. Owolabi, 69 F.3d 156, 163 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting that whether “the government was still able to
ascertain” the truth despite the defendant’s attempted
deception did not control whether false statements were
“material”). The relevant considerations are the kind
of information provided and its tendency to influence
the court, not the actual effect of a particular misstate-
ment. Personal information is a highly relevant factor in
determining whether a defendant should remain in
custody or be granted bond, and thus is material not
only at sentencing, but at arraignment.3 Mr. Bedolla-
3
We have held that information concerning a date of birth and
even a date of high school graduation is “material” within the
meaning of the guideline, because such false information can
“thwart[] the probation officer from investigating the defen-
dant’s personal and criminal history, which are major factors in
determining a defendant’s sentence.” United States v. Thomas,
11 F.3d 1392, 1400-01 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Ojo,
916 F.2d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant’s
(continued...)
No. 09-3690 9
Zavala’s concealment of his true identity, when coupled
with deception about his legal status in the United
States, certainly could have influenced the district court’s
decision about whether or not to detain him following
his arraignment.
Under these circumstances, the false information
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala provided was material, and his
conduct “falls squarely within the application note.”
United States v. Ojo, 916 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir. 1990).
Conclusion
The district court did not err in applying the obstruc-
tion of justice enhancement of § 3C1.1 in sentencing
Mr. Bedolla-Zavala. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence
imposed by the district court.
A FFIRMED
3
(...continued)
false information to a pretrial services officer including “her
name, date of birth, length of residence in the United States,
current address, family history, financial status and arrest
record” supported the enhancement); United States v.
Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1259 n.11 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that
“[c]learly the identification of the defendant is a material fact,”
and upholding the enhancement although the authorities
were not foiled by the defendant’s deception).
7-2-10