United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 09-1906
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
RUBEN SANCHEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Jonathan Shapiro, Alexandra Deal, and Stern, Shapiro,
Weissberg & Garin, LLP on brief for appellant.
Kelly Begg Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, and
Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
July 9, 2010
*
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal proves the venerable
adage that the shortest distance between two points is a straight
line. Although the appeal potentially presents a variety of
issues, it is most easily resolved by resort to an elementary
principle of constitutional law: the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The tale follows.
Before us, defendant-appellant Ruben Sanchez challenges
an order denying his motion to suppress evidence — a gun and
ammunition — seized during an inventory search of a motorcycle
impounded by the police. Setting to one side more exotic theories,
we apply the plain view doctrine, which affords a solid basis for
the refusal to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the challenged
order.
The facts are largely undisputed and, to the extent that
the district court has engaged in interstitial factfinding to fill
gaps or resolve conflicts, its findings are not clearly erroneous.
The critical events occurred in Melrose, Massachusetts,
on September 22, 2006. At that time, two municipal police officers
were separately patronizing a local restaurant (one had stopped for
a take-out order; the other had stopped to eat). Spotting each
other, the officers chatted inside the restaurant. As they
conversed, a motorcycle pulled into the restaurant's parking lot.
The operator entered the restaurant and began speaking with a
female customer.
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A few hours before, one of the officers, Roy, had perused
a photographic printout prepared in connection with an arrest
warrant issued the previous day for one "Ruben Sanchez." Roy told
his fellow officer, Slaney, that the motorcyclist looked like
Sanchez. Roy further related that the warrant had issued following
an allegation of domestic violence by Sanchez's girlfriend.
Slaney left the restaurant and went to his police
cruiser, which was parked nearby. Using the car's computer, he ran
the motorcycle's license plate number through a data bank
maintained by the Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV).1
After Slaney obtained the information, he informed Roy
that the license plate and the motorcycle did not fit together.
The plate had been issued for a 1976 Honda motorcycle. The
motorcycle in the parking lot was not a 1976 Honda, but a 2002
Harley-Davidson. In addition, the registration of the 1976 Honda
had been revoked for failure of the owner (a man other than
Sanchez) to maintain compulsory insurance. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
90, § 34H.
The officers, having reasonably (and, as matters turned
out, correctly) concluded that Ruben Sanchez and the appellant were
1
This initial check of a plainly visible license plate number
through public records is not itself a search within the
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment because there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in such a number. See United
States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007)
(collecting cases).
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one and the same, waited in the parking lot. They planned to
arrest the appellant on the outstanding warrant when he emerged
from the restaurant. During this interlude, Roy called the officer
who had investigated the domestic violence complaint. That officer
furnished a description of the complainant that matched the woman
whom the appellant had encountered inside the restaurant.
Moments later, the appellant and the woman repaired to
the parking lot. They were talking with each other. Roy and
Slaney approached, calling the woman's name. When she acknowledged
her identity, the officers asked the appellant if he was Ruben
Sanchez. He responded affirmatively, and the officers arrested him
pursuant to the outstanding warrant.
After effecting the arrest, the officers decided to
impound the motorcycle. In accordance with standard Melrose police
procedure, Roy called the officer in charge for permission to
impound and tow the motorcycle. He subsequently testified that he
chose this course of action because "the wrong plate was on [the
motorcycle]" and "it wasn't legally there" because it was neither
properly registered nor insured as it should have been "to be in
that parking lot."
The district court credited this account. United States
v. Sanchez, 535 F. Supp. 2d 216, 224 (D. Mass. 2008). Roy's
actions at the time further confirm the account: he issued a
citation to the appellant for the violations that he had described.
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See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 9 (operating with invalid
registration); id. § 23 (attaching false license plate with intent
to conceal vehicle's identity); id. § 34J (operating without
insurance).
Roy received permission from his superior to impound and
tow the motorcycle. Following standard practice, he performed an
inventory search incident to the impoundment before the tow truck
arrived. He discovered a loaded handgun in an unlocked saddlebag
at the rear of the motorcycle.
We fast-forward to the prosecution that undergirds this
appeal. The seized firearm eventually formed the basis for federal
felon-in-possession charges. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (8). The
appellant initially maintained his innocence and moved to suppress,
among other things, the handgun and ammunition. The district court
held a two-day evidentiary hearing and, ruling ore tenus, denied
the motion. The court subsequently issued a rescript in which it
explained that the officers' decision to impound the motorcycle was
a reasonable exercise of their community caretaking function.2
Sanchez, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 219-21. Impoundment was, therefore,
2
The community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement allows the police to impound a vehicle for
noninvestigatory purposes when it is reasonable to do so (say, to
remove an impediment to traffic or to protect a vehicle from theft
or vandalism). See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441
(1973); United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 238 (1st Cir. 2006);
United States v. Rodríguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 784-86 (1st Cir.
1991).
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lawful despite the absence of a search warrant. Id. Relatedly,
the police department's written inventory protocol, id. at 220,
gave the officers effective guidance in making the decision to
impound and tow. Id. at 220-22. Finally, the court found that the
towing of the motorcycle was not barred under state law. Id. at
222-24.
With the prospect of a trial looming, the appellant
entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to seek
appellate review of the suppression issue. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to a 180-month
incarcerative term, to be followed by five years of supervised
release. This timely appeal ensued.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, we accept the court's factual findings to the extent that
they are not clearly erroneous. United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d
1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001). We review its legal conclusions de novo.
Id.
This appeal is narrow in its scope: neither the arrest
nor the inventory search procedure itself is challenged. Rather,
the appellant challenges only the seizure of the motorcycle,
arguing that the police impounded it in derogation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. Accordingly, his thesis runs, the objects seized
in the ensuing inventory search are subject to suppression as
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fruit of a poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484-85 (1963).
Mindful that a decision to impound is analytically
distinct from a decision to undertake an inventory search incident
to a lawful impoundment, United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351
(7th Cir. 1996), our task is to determine whether the impoundment
itself offended the Fourth Amendment. In carrying out this task,
we are not bound by the lower court's rationale but, rather, may
affirm its order on any alternate basis made manifest by the
record. Chhien, 266 F.3d at 7 n.4. We avail ourselves of this
flexibility here.
It is common ground that the Fourth Amendment forbids
"unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Although this ordinarily means that a seizure of property by a
police officer requires a warrant, exceptions exist. One of these
exceptions is for items in plain view. See, e.g., Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990); Vega-Rodríguez v. P.R.
Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 181 (1st Cir. 1997). Although the district
court eschewed reliance on the plain view doctrine in favor of a
different rationale, we think that this doctrine offers the
simplest basis on which to resolve this appeal.
The desirability of this approach is enhanced by the fact
that no further factual findings are needed to invoke this
doctrine. The only pertinent question is whether, on an objective
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view of the record, the impoundment (a form of seizure) was
premised on evidence lawfully discovered and seized while in plain
view. See United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir.
1990).
A warrantless seizure is lawful under the plain view
doctrine as long as (I) the police officer who effects the seizure
lawfully reaches the vantage point from which he sees an object in
plain view; (ii) probable cause exists to support his seizure of
that object; and (iii) he has a right of access to the object
itself. United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2009);
United States v. Antrim, 389 F.3d 276, 283 (1st Cir. 2004).
It is beyond serious question that the first element of
this test is satisfied here. The officers were in a parking lot
where they had a right to be, and both the motorcycle and its
license plate were easily visible to the naked eye. Thus, the
officers had lawfully reached the position from which they saw the
objects that they subsequently seized.
The second element of the test concerns whether probable
cause existed for the seizure, not whether probable cause existed
for the arrest. As the district court explained, the objects
seized were not evidence of the crime for which the appellant was
arrested. Sanchez, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 224. Thus, for purposes of
the plain view doctrine, the relevant question is whether the
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officers had probable cause to believe that the seized objects were
evidence of some other crime.
As a general matter, probable cause exists when the
police have (I) reliable information that a crime has been
committed and (ii) sufficient reason to believe that they have come
across evidence of it. See United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210,
220 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742
(1983)). In the "plain view" context, this means that probable
cause exists when the incriminating character of an object is
immediately apparent to the police. United States v. Hamie, 165
F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality op.). Probable cause is
determined under an objective standard. Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983); United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020,
1023 (1st Cir. 1987). The seizing officers' conclusion, taking
into account the totality of the circumstances, need not be
certain, but it must be based on no less than a "fair probability."
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Hamie, 165 F.3d at
83.
Here — prior to the seizure — Slaney had checked with the
RMV and discovered that the motorcycle was being operated with a
bogus license plate (that is, a revoked plate that corresponded to
a motorcycle of a different make, model, and year). By then, he
also had a solid basis for believing that the motorcycle had been
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parked where it was by the appellant, who was not the registered
owner of the motorcycle corresponding to the license plate number.
Under Massachusetts law, attaching a false license plate
to a motor vehicle with the intent to conceal the vehicle's
identity is a crime. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 23. Similarly
(with exceptions not pertinent here), operating a motor vehicle
without proper license plates is a crime. See id. § 9.
Prosecuting a case under either statute requires proof of both the
existence of the vehicle and the manner of its (unauthorized)
registration.
Given the discrepancies between the license plate affixed
to the appellant's motorcycle and the registration information
gleaned from Slaney's computer check of the RMV files, it was
immediately apparent to the officers that one or both of these
offenses had been committed.3 The vehicle, with the plate
attached, was the best evidence of the licensing infractions. The
police, therefore, had probable cause to believe both that crimes
had been committed and that the motorcycle and license plate
constituted evidence of those crimes. Seizure would preserve this
evidence. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008);
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817-18 (1996); see also 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.3, at 147 (4th ed. Supp.
3
Indeed, the appellant concedes that he perpetrated at least
one of these crimes. See Appellant's Br. at 11 (conceding
violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 23).
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2009-2010) (citing authority for the proposition "that impoundment
is permissible whenever the vehicle is parked in violation of
traffic regulations, even those having to do with identification
tags"). Consequently, the second element of the plain view test is
satisfied.
Before leaving our discussion of probable cause, we lay
to rest two straw men. First, the appellant maintains that, at
best, the police used the licensing violations as a subterfuge to
allow a broader investigation into the domestic violence charge.
This argument is impuissant.
When, as in this case, a seizure of items in plain view
is supported by probable cause, an inquiring court will not look
behind that justification. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 817-18; see
also United States v. Baker, 50 F. App'x 237, 238-39 (6th Cir.
2002). Put another way, determining the existence vel non of
probable cause requires a court to look at the objective facts, not
at the actors' subjective intent.4 See Hadfield, 918 F.2d at 993
(explaining that "an officer's state of mind or subjective intent
in conducting a search is inapposite as long as the circumstances,
4
Although subjective intent is not the issue, we note for the
sake of completeness that the district court, as a matter of fact,
rejected the premise that the officers were engaging in a charade.
Sanchez, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 224. These factual findings are not
clearly erroneous and, if material, would demand our deference.
See United States v. Ruidiaz, 529 F.3d 25, 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2008).
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viewed objectively, justify the action taken"); see also Whren, 517
U.S. at 813.
Second, the appellant asserts that the relevant question
under Massachusetts law is whether the motorcycle was impeding
traffic or posing a hazard. Appellant's Br. at 12 n.5 (citing
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Brinson, 800 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (Mass. 2003)). In support of this
assertion, he notes that the motorcycle was in a private lot and
did not provoke any such concerns. But those facts are irrelevant
where, as here, seizure is justified under the plain view doctrine.
This brings us to the third, and last, element of the
plain view test. For aught that appears, the officers in this case
had a lawful right to seize the motorcycle where it stood. No more
is exigible to satisfy the third element. Horton, 496 U.S. at 137
& n.7; Jones, 187 F.3d at 221 n.10.
In an effort to blunt the force of this reasoning, the
appellant asseverates that Massachusetts law prohibited the police
from removing the motorcycle from a private parking lot without a
request to that effect from the lot's owner. See Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 266, § 120D. The implication is that because there was no such
request here, the seizure fails the third element of the plain view
test. We reject that implication.
The third element of the plain view test asks, in effect,
whether the police had to commit a trespass in order to gain access
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to an object in plain view. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 137 & n.7;
Jones, 187 F.3d at 221 n.10. Here, the officers were lawfully in
the parking lot and could access the motorcycle without
trespassing.
Of course, it can be argued that state law made removing
the motorcycle from the parking lot akin to a trespass to a
chattel. Under the third prong of the plan view test, it is
unclear whether this sort of intrusion is a relevant consideration.
See, e.g., Horton, 496 U.S. at 137 & n.7.
We need not probe this point, however, because the
district court correctly held that state law did not impose a
prohibition on removal of the motorcycle in the circumstances of
this case. See Sanchez, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 223-24 (stating that
the "ongoing violation" of a criminal statute is a circumstance
that overrides any state law limits on seizing a vehicle from a
private lot). The Massachusetts courts appear to condone the
impoundment of uninsured, unregistered vehicles as a general
matter. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daley, 672 N.E.2d 101, 103
(Mass. 1996); Commonwealth v. Horton, 827 N.E.2d 1257, 1263 n.4
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005); see also Brinson, 800 N.E.2d at 1036
(concluding that "[a]ttendant circumstances" may justify an
impoundment from a private lot).
To recapitulate, the officers had probable cause to
believe that crimes in the nature of licensing violations had
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occurred. The motorcycle and its bogus license plate were in plain
view and were evidence of those crimes. The officers decided to
seize them. They did not need a warrant to do so. The ensuing
inventory search, which uncovered the loaded handgun, is not
independently challenged. There is, therefore, no constitutional
insult.
We need go no further. The district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
— Separate Opinion Follows —
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LYNCH, Chief Judge, concurring. The question presented
in this case is whether the police could impound Sanchez's
motorcycle without a warrant after learning that the motorcycle
violated several Massachusetts laws, could not lawfully be driven,
and likely would be left unattended for days because of Sanchez's
arrest. Sanchez concedes that if the impoundment was lawful, the
subsequent inventory search was also lawful. The parties and the
district court understood this case to turn on the
community-caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
on warrantless searches. Because that theory justified the
seizure, I would affirm on that basis.
Courts have regularly upheld warrantless vehicle
impoundments when police are acting not as investigators but as
community caretakers, responsible for protecting public safety and
preventing hazards by removing vehicles that impede traffic, risk
vandalism, or create inconvenience. See South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976); United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233,
237-39 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ramos-Morales, 981 F.2d
625, 626 (1st Cir. 1992). Courts sustain these impoundments as
long as the police acted reasonably under the circumstances, for
instance because state laws or standard police procedures
authorized the impoundment for noninvestigatory reasons. See
Coccia, 446 F.3d at 238-39; United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929
F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Sanchez claims the community-caretaker exception does not
apply because neither state law nor local police procedures
provided adequate standards justifying impoundment on these facts.
Further, he argues, the police did not need to remove his
motorcycle to protect public safety or prevent vandalism because
the motorcycle was in a private lot and Sanchez could have arranged
to have it moved himself. Both arguments plainly fail.
Before the seizure, the police had learned, through a
computer check of the license plate, that Sanchez was driving an
uninsured motorcycle to which the affixed licensed plates did not
belong and that his motorcycle failed to display an appropriate
license plate and registration number. It was likely, and indeed
Sanchez concedes, that he unlawfully attached a different plate to
his motorcycle "with intent to conceal the identity" of the
vehicle, a violation of Massachusetts General Law ch. 90, § 23.
Massachusetts also prohibits driving an uninsured or improperly
registered vehicle on the roadway. Id. § 9; id. § 34J.
Massachusetts law sets clear, specific criteria
authorizing impoundment under these circumstances. Because police
cannot permit people to continue to operate unlawful and
potentially dangerous uninsured, unregistered vehicles with
attached plates belonging to another vehicle on the roads, police
presumptively can impound the vehicles. See Commonwealth v. Daley,
672 N.E.2d 101, 103 (Mass. 1996); Commonwealth v. Horton, 827
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N.E.2d 1257, 1263 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). Relying on state law,
local police regularly impound vehicles under those circumstances.
The officers in this case consulted their superior, who approved
the seizure, confirming that Sanchez's motorcycle fell into this
category. Their decision to impound his vehicle was a reasonable
choice. These facts alone would meet the community-caretaker
exception.
Further facts only reinforce the reasonableness of the
officers' impoundment decision. The fact that Sanchez's motorcycle
was parked in a private lot, not blocking traffic on a public road
or parked in the middle of a high-crime area, does not show that
its impoundment had nothing to do with protecting public safety,
preventing vandalism, or promoting public convenience. See Ramos-
Morales, 981 F.2d at 626-27. Sanchez parked his motorcycle in a
restaurant lot intended only for short-term diners. The officers
knew that neither Sanchez nor anyone else could lawfully drive the
vehicle without a proper license plate and registration and that
state law prohibited Sanchez from having the motorcycle towed
himself. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 9. Sanchez was under arrest;
given his criminal history, the officers knew he would not likely
be released soon and the motorcycle would be left unattended in the
meantime. On these facts, the police reasonably acted as community
caretakers when impounding the motorcycle. I agree that the proper
outcome is an affirmance.
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