PUBLISHED
Filed: July 13, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
THE NEWS AND OBSERVER
PUBLISHING COMPANY; THE DURHAM
HERALD COMPANY; THE NEW YORK
TIMES COMPANY, GANNETT
COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, No. 09-1010
v.
RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT
AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
RDU’s petition for rehearing en banc is before the Court.
A poll of the Court was requested, and failed to garner the
approval of a majority of the qualified active judges. Judges
Niemeyer, Motz, Gregory and Davis voted in favor of rehear-
ing en banc. Chief Judge Traxler, Judges Wilkinson, King,
Shedd, Duncan, Agee and Keenan voted to deny. Judge
Michael did not participate. Rehearing en banc is therefore
denied.
2 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT
Entered at the direction of Judge Duncan for the Court.
For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc:
I was pleased to join Judge Duncan’s fine opinion for the
court, News and Observer Publ’g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Air-
port Auth., 597 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2010), and add only these
few words to the thoughtful discussion of my two colleagues
on the panel. This case involves the total absence of any
newspaper dispensers at a public facility of a sort where such
newsracks often are present, the unwillingness of the Author-
ity even to consider the expressive interests at stake, and the
further unwillingness of the Authority to explore alternatives
that would be entirely compatible with the facility’s custom-
ary operations. The upshot of all this is to subordinate the
clear First Amendment interest in the dissemination of ideas
to the slightest administrative inconvenience, an odd and
diminished place indeed for our foremost enumerated right.
Publications like newspapers are near the First Amend-
ment’s core; the Framers in fact thought to mention the press.
Further, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "[l]iberty of
circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publish-
ing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be
of little value." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938) (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
For that reason, the Court has twice before struck down
restrictions on newsracks. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT 3
The only reason this case gives any pause is because it con-
cerns an airport, which is not considered a "public forum" for
First Amendment purposes. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc. v. Lee [ISKCON v. Lee], 505 U.S. 672, 680-
83 (1992). But the fact "[t]hat airports are not public fora,
however, does not mean that the government can restrict
speech in whatever way it likes." Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in ISKCON v. Lee and concurring in the judgment
in Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness [Lee v. ISK-
CON], 505 U.S. 830 (1992)). For while airports should not be
confused with Speaker’s Corner, the First Amendment has not
wholly passed them by. Judged only by our airports, we might
well appear a more informed people than we are. Airports
typically offer a variety of publications for travelers to pur-
chase, reflecting the fact that travel is one of those times when
Americans are particularly desirous of the opportunity to read.
After all, travelers dealing with not infrequent flight delays
have more time with the paper than they might at the break-
fast table.
Thus a ban on all newsracks at an airport is anything but
trivial. Resolution of the issue on summary judgment was
entirely appropriate—after all, that is exactly what the
Supreme Court did in the ISKCON cases. See ISKCON v. Lee,
505 U.S. at 677. The record presented to us in this case estab-
lishes two propositions beyond dispute: that the publishers
were denied access to many potential readers and that the Air-
port Authority provided little more than speculation to justify
so sweeping a restriction.
The hit-or-miss availability of papers in retail shops serves
only to underscore the barriers the Authority’s policy places
in the way of newspaper publishers and readers. Here the
record indicated that the retailers championed by the Author-
ity not infrequently opened without papers in the morning, ran
out during the day, and closed before the last passengers
arrived or departed. The reality of the burden was further cor-
roborated by complaints received from newspaper customers
4 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT
who lamented their inability to buy papers at the Airport.
Although the parties dispute exactly where to pin the blame
for some of these difficulties, it is beyond dispute that the ban
on newsracks was a total one and that the current system sim-
ply is not working in a manner consistent with the rudimen-
tary promise of the First Amendment.
The Authority claimed its total newsrack ban was justified
by revenue, security, congestion, and aesthetic concerns. But
those claims suffered from the fact that the Authority allowed
installations dispensing every other item a traveler might con-
ceivably buy. In the secure portion of the Airport, these
included prepaid telephone card dispensers, shoe shine stands,
ATMs, pay e-mail machines, spa stations, and payphones.
The Authority even had plans to add iPod vending machines.
Outside the security cordon, the Authority made room for
racks with free publications, vending machines offering floral
bouquets, soft drinks, snacks, and luggage carts, and even for
a display motorcycle. The Authority supplied no reason capa-
ble of withstanding even light scrutiny to think that core polit-
ical speech should be uniquely disfavored relative to the
cornucopia of other commercial products and services travel-
ers could obtain outside the retail shops.
ISKCON v. Lee itself held similarly based on the view that
the authority "is operating a shopping mall as well as an air-
port." Lee v. ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 688-89 (O’Connor, J. con-
curring in Lee v. ISKCON and concurring in the judgment in
ISKCON v. Lee) (noting that the airport housed "restaurants,
cafeterias, snack bars, coffee shops, cocktail lounges, post
offices, banks, telegraph offices, clothing shops, drug stores,
food stores, nurseries, barber shops, currency exchanges, art
exhibits, commercial advertising displays, bookstores, news-
stands, dental offices, and private clubs."). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the distribution of First
Amendment materials is entitled to protection that ordinary
commercial activities are not. "Newspapers are in the business
of expression, while soda vendors are in the business of sell-
NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT 5
ing soft drinks." City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 761. Here,
however, that relationship was inverted. I have the greatest
respect for the Airport Authority’s desire to provide an array
of amenities to travelers, but there does come a point when
public restriction of political speech should not take a com-
plete backseat to lemonade and motorcycles.
In defending its newsrack ban, the Authority put particular
emphasis on revenue generation. It generally is appropriate to
defer to the business judgment of administrators who manage
quasi-commercial government enterprises—but only when
that judgment has actually been exercised. When managers
say "no" simply because saying "no" is easier than having
even to think about the First Amendment, we may not rubber-
stamp decisions. Asked how inanimate and unobtrusive news-
racks would be less compatible with Airport operations than
other vending machines, the Authority’s Business Develop-
ment Officer replied, "I don’t know that they would interfere
more or differently. But for me that’s not really the point. I
think the point is that we make decisions to limit how much
and what we put where." J.A. 950.
The Authority tried to substantiate its revenue claims by
noting that its "master concession plan" did not call for news-
racks. But the Authority conceded that the consultants who
devised the plan never considered the costs or benefits of
newsracks. And once it is understood that the plan did not
address the issue, we have no basis to conclude the Authori-
ty’s ban reflected anything other than "a bureaucratic unwill-
ingness to explore alternatives." Multimedia Publishing Co. of
South Carolina v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport District,
991 F.2d 154, 163 (4th Cir. 1993). Indeed, the record was
clear on this point. The Authority’s Airport Director
explained that the decision to reject the publishers’ request
was made for a very simple reason: "until we see a good rea-
son to change the practice that we have been following, we’re
going to stick with that practice." J.A. 979. And apparently,
the First Amendment did not qualify as a "good reason."
6 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT
I do recognize there may be some inconvenience to the
Authority in having to consider the First Amendment interest.
But it is blackletter law that free speech is not to be wholly
subordinated to administrative convenience. "[T]he First
Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for
efficiency." Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795
(1988). Instead, some accommodation of expressive rights
and governmental interests is the touchstone of that Amend-
ment, even in those instances where the strictest scrutiny is
not applied. Indeed, to place a judicial imprimatur on the
sweeping refusal of a public entity to concede the slightest
value to the role of political speech would be to permit the
marketplace of ideas to be converted to a regulated industry
like insurance or electricity—precisely what the First Amend-
ment has long refused to countenance.
The Authority contends that our decision will "take from
public airport authorities control over their passenger termi-
nals." Pet. Reh’g at 3. Nothing could be further from the truth.
This is an entirely equitable matter, there having been no
request for damages, and the bench trial our friend in dissent
would require seems scarcely different from the remedial pro-
ceedings that will follow in any event. At the remedial phase,
the Authority’s altogether legitimate interests in revenue,
security, congestion, and aesthetics must be taken into
account. In Lee v. ISKCON, the Supreme Court required an
airport to accommodate live pamphleteers. See Lee v.
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 830. What the publishers requested here
is far more innocuous, and in any event, their wishes are not
the Constitution’s command. Nothing in our decision dictates
to the Authority how many newsracks it must allow or how
they must be accommodated. The panel took pains to "stress
the limited nature of our inquiry. We consider only whether
banning all newsracks inside the terminals violated the First
Amendment. Such issues as number, placement, and cost are
beyond the scope of our analysis." News and Observer, 597
F.3d at 580 n.6; see also id. at 575 n.4.
NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT 7
The point is not to establish a policy of favoritism in this
setting, but simply to hold fast to the principle that free speech
is not to be uniquely disfavored. It must be remembered that
a newsrack ban like the one in place primarily restricts politi-
cal speech and that "[p]olitical speech, of course, is at the core
of what the First Amendment is designed to protect." Morse
v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). An informed citizenry
is at the heart of this democracy, and narrowing the arteries
of information in the manner sought by the Authority will
only serve to impair our country’s coronary health.
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
With profound respect, I must question why an appeal
which the dissent characterizes as presenting "a rather pedes-
trian issue" would warrant en banc review. Our circuit prece-
dent squarely holds that a total ban on newsracks implicates
the First Amendment. And while undoubtedly there are many
factual questions that inhere in a determination of the appro-
priate relief for a constitutional violation, there remains no
factual dispute whatsoever about the current existence of what
the Supreme Court, in another context, has characterized as
"the inexorable zero." Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977) (internal quotations
omitted).
DAVIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc:
Despite its profound constitutional trappings, this appeal
presents a rather pedestrian issue: whether the summary judg-
ment record reflects the existence of genuine disputes of
material fact regarding the reasonableness of the Airport
Authority’s ban on newspaper racks (not newspapers them-
selves, of course) under our precedent in Multimedia Publ’g
Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154
(4th Cir. 1993). I believe (as did the district court, before,
8 NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT
inexplicably, it changed its mind) that such disputes are pres-
ented. Therefore, the Airport Authority is entitled to a trial.
This case is not about whether a Jehovah’s Witness can be
required to obtain a permit to pamphlet on a city street. Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938). Furthermore,
it is more than a stretch to make the blanket statement that
"the [Supreme] Court has twice before struck down restric-
tions on newsracks." Statement of Wilkinson, J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing en banc (citing Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), and Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988)). In fact, Dis-
covery Network simply prohibited discrimination among
newsrack owners based on the relative "commercialness" of
the items distributed by newsrack. 507 U.S. at 430 ("The reg-
ulation is not a permissible regulation of commercial speech,
for on this record it is clear that the interests that Cincinnati
has asserted are unrelated to any distinction between ‘com-
mercial handbills’ and ‘newspapers.’"). And in Lakewood, a
plurality of four justices simply concluded that, "those por-
tions of the Lakewood ordinance giving the mayor unfettered
discretion to deny a permit application [for newsracks in the
city’s business district] and unbounded authority to condition
the permit on any additional terms he deems ‘necessary and
reasonable,’ to be unconstitutional." 486 U.S. at 772 (brackets
added). Notably in the latter case, Justices Stevens and
O’Connor joined Justice White’s dissenting opinion, in which
he stated: "The Court quite properly does not establish any
constitutional right of newspaper publishers to place news-
racks on municipal property. . . . [O]ur precedents suggest that
an outright ban on newsracks on city sidewalks would be con-
stitutional, particularly where (as is true here) ample alterna-
tive means of 24-hour distribution of newspapers exist." Id. at
773 (White, J., dissenting) (ellipsis and brackets added).
But neither in my dissenting opinion nor in this brief state-
ment do I intend to project the final outcome of the merits of
the dispute in this case. Rather, I simply emphasize that, prop-
NEWS AND OBSERVER v. RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT 9
erly viewed, where there exist genuine disputes of material
fact, a trial is neither a nuisance nor a triviality, because,
under the rule of law, process matters. And this is true
whether or not the outcome of a trial is "scarcely different,"
Statement of Wilkinson, J., concurring in the denial of rehear-
ing en banc, from the result reached by some other means of
reasoned judgment. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
62 (2004) ("Dispensing with confrontation because testimony
is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial
because a defendant is obviously guilty.").
I regret the denial of rehearing en banc.