United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-2281
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United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* District of Nebraska.
Eddie Garcia, *
*
Appellant. *
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Submitted: March 9, 2010
Filed: July 21, 2010
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Before SMITH, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Eddie Navarro Garcia pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to
distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1). He
reserved the right to appeal the district court’s1 denial of his motion to suppress. He
argues that the officer illegally detained him and performed a warrantless search
without consent. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
1
The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States Judge for the District of
Nebraska.
I.
At 1:55 p.m., Officer Aaron Wayne Hanson stopped Garcia for view
obstructions hanging from the windshield of his truck, which was pulling a trailer.
Advising Garcia and his passenger, Nancy Martin Perez, of the reason for the stop,
Hanson obtained identification, registration, and proof of insurance. For safety and
better hearing, Hanson asked Garcia to move behind the trailer. Garcia claimed they
were traveling to Des Moines to start a restaurant.
At 2:01 p.m., Hanson returned to the truck, compared the vehicle identification
number to the registration, and talked to Perez. She stated they were going to Illinois
for two months. Hanson noted they had only two duffel bags, which seemed
inconsistent with a two-month stay.
Around 2:04 p.m., Hanson performed data checks. Waiting for the results,
Hanson asked to look inside the trailer. Garcia responded, “sure, sure.” He unlocked
the trailer. Both men went inside it for about 30 seconds. Hanson observed a table,
sink, and other heavy, metal objects there.
Hanson then received partial results from the data checks but had to repeat
Garcia’s license check. At 2:16 p.m., Hanson confirmed that Garcia had a felony
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, and Perez had been convicted
recently of attempted murder.
At 2:20 p.m., seconds after completing the data checks, Hanson returned
Garcia’s paperwork and issued a verbal warning for the traffic offense. Garcia asked
for the location of a pharmacy. The two men shook hands. Garcia started to turn
away.
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At 2:21 p.m., Hanson said, “I have another question for you, if you don’t
mind?” Garcia stopped and leaned toward Hanson. Hanson asked if he had any
contraband in the vehicle or trailer. Garcia denied having any, except cash for gas.
At 2:22 p.m., Hanson asked to search the truck and trailer because of the “huge drug
problem” on the interstate. Garcia responded, “ok, ok, sure,” and waved his hand
toward the trailer.
Hanson then told Perez that she and Garcia were free to go. He asked if there
was contraband in the truck or trailer. Perez said, “no, nothing.” Hanson asked for
permission to search the truck and trailer. She said, “yes.” He directed Perez to stand
by Garcia off the roadway.
Hanson examined the trailer’s front exterior wall, which had a bump and
sounded different when tapped. Measuring the wall from inside the trailer, he found
that the interior wall appeared to be 18 inches shorter. Behind the interior wall he
discovered a second wall. Hanson pulled it back, revealing packages of marijuana.
He placed Garcia and Perez under arrest.
II.
Garcia argues that the marijuana should be suppressed because (1) the initial
stop was unconstitutionally prolonged, (2) the post-stop encounter was not
consensual, and (3) the illegal detention tainted his consent to the search.
For a denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews findings of fact for clear
error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McGlothen, 556 F.3d 698, 701
(8th Cir. 2009). “This court will affirm the district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous
interpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was
made.” United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 2010).
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Garcia acknowledges that the initial stop was lawful but contends that Officer
Hanson’s questions turned the stop into an unlawful investigative detention. “A
seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket can become
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that
mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). During a stop, the officer
may detain the driver while completing “a number of routine but somewhat time-
consuming tasks related to the traffic violation.” United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S.
Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999). “[T]he officer may ask the motorist
routine questions such as his destination, the purpose of the trip, or whether the officer
may search the vehicle.” Id. These questions may be unrelated to the initial stop. See
United States v. Suitt, 569 F.3d 867, 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2009), distinguishing United
States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1120–21 (8th Cir. 2008) (officer unjustifiably more
than doubled the time of traffic stop by interspersing drug interdiction questions with
routine inquiries).
Officer Hanson’s questions were reasonable. While running routine data
checks, he asked Garcia’s destination, the purpose of his trip, and to “take a quick
peek” in the trailer, to which Garcia consented. “When a motorist gives consent to
search his vehicle, he necessarily consents to an extension of the traffic stop while the
search is conducted.” United States v. Rivera, 570 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2009).
Seconds after receiving the data check results, he returned Garcia’s paperwork and
issued a warning. Hanson did not transform a routine stop into an investigative
detention.
Garcia next asserts that he was illegally detained after receiving the warning
because he did not consent to the post-stop encounter. Once an officer issues a
warning, the stop is over. Peralez, 526 F.3d at 1120. “If the encounter becomes
consensual it is not a seizure, ‘the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, and the
officer is not prohibited from asking questions unrelated to the traffic stop or seeking
consent to search the vehicle.’” United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir.
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2010), quoting United States v. Flores, 474 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 2007). A
seizure occurs if “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.” United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2001); see Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“[M]ere police questioning does not constitute a
seizure”). In Munoz, this court found consent where Munoz assented to the trooper’s
request “for a moment of your time” after Munoz reached for the door handle to exit
the trooper’s car. Munoz, 590 F.3d at 921. Likewise, in Suitt, the deputy asked for
“half a minute” to answer a few questions as Suitt was walking away. Suitt, 569 F.3d
at 869.
The post-stop encounter here was consensual. After receiving the warning,
Garcia asked about a pharmacy, shook hands with Hanson, and started to leave. Only
then did Hanson ask, “I have another question for you, if you don’t mind?” Garcia
stopped, leaned into Hanson, and answered the question, indicating consent to further
discussion. Until then, Hanson had detained Garcia as part of a valid traffic stop.
Garcia’s behavior indicated he felt free to leave. Because the initial stop was not
unconstitutionally prolonged, and Garcia consented to the post-stop encounter, this
court need not consider whether Hanson also had reasonable suspicion to prolong the
stop. See United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir. 2002) (if
encounter is consensual, then even without reasonable suspicion, officer may ask
questions unrelated to stop and seek consent to search vehicle).
Finally, Garcia contends he did not consent to the search of the trailer. Whether
consent is voluntary is a question of fact, reviewed for clear error, considering whether
from the totality of the circumstances the officer reasonably believed the search was
consensual. See United States v. Gallardo, 495 F.3d at 982, 988 (8th Cir. 2007). The
totality of the circumstances includes age, intelligence, education, influence of drugs,
awareness of rights, length of detention, police threats, promises, or
misrepresentations, whether the person was under arrest, where the consent occurs,
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and any objection to the search. See United States v. Esquivel, 507 F.3d 1154, 1159
(8th Cir. 2007).
Garcia consented to the search, saying, “ok, ok, sure.” He was an adult who
understood English, was not under the influence of drugs, and had prior arrest
experience. The whole encounter lasted less than 30 minutes. Hanson made no
threats, promises, or misrepresentations, and Garcia was not under arrest. They were
on a busy highway during the day. Hanson told Perez that they were free to go and
obtained her consent for the search. Garcia watched silently during the search. The
district court properly held that Garcia’s consent was voluntary.
III.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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