IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-51080
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MARTIN GARCIA, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-00-CR-589-ALL
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June 6, 2002
Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Martin Garcia, Jr., convicted of possession with intent to
distribute in excess of 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a four-
hour search of his trailer-truck. At issue is the voluntariness
of his consent to the search of the contents of the trailer-
truck.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-51080
-2-
Trooper Juan DeLeon conducted a random, regulatory stop of
Garcia’s truck pursuant to Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 644.103.
Shortly after the initial regulatory inspection, Trooper DeLeon
searched the cab of the truck and found a second bill of lading
with different origination and destination points than the bill
of lading initially presented by Garcia. In light of the second
bill of lading, as well as Garcia’s origination point in McAllen,
Texas, a border town through which narcotics are commonly
smuggled, and Garcia’s indirect route to his destination which
would allow him to avoid a narcotics checkpoint which used
canines for every search, Trooper DeLeon asked to search the
contents of the trailer again, and Garcia reopened the rear of
the trailer for him. However, Trooper DeLeon could not do a
complete inspection due to the way the trailer was loaded and the
packages being covered in cellophane. When Trooper DeLeon asked
Garcia to drive the truck to a nearby grocery store, Garcia
complied. Upon arrival at the grocery store, the manager,
Trooper DeLeon, and back-up Officers Kite and Frederick began
unloading the contents of the trailer. Garcia did not stop them
or withdraw his consent.
Once the unloading began, the extended duration of the
detention was foreseeable. Garcia, knowing the contents of the
vehicle and its various containers at the time he gave his
consent, had the responsibility to limit the scope of the consent
if he deemed it necessary to do so. United States v. Rich, 992
No. 01-51080
-3-
F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1993). His failure to object to the
breadth or continuation of the search once consent was freely
given was properly considered an indication that the search was
within the scope of the initial consent. Id. at 506-07; United
States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Petty, 601 F.2d 883, 899-90 (5th Cir. 1979); Mason v.
Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United
States v. Gonzalez-Basulto, 898 F.2d 1011, 1012-13 (5th Cir.
1990).
As for Garcia’s objection to the duration of the search, the
four-hour detention is insufficient to show a violation of the
Fourth Amendment because Trooper DeLeon had probable cause for
the search. See McSween, 53 F.3d at 686; Petty, 601 F.2d at 890.
The district court did not err in denying Garcia’s motion to
suppress. The conviction is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.