United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 13, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-40603
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. M-02-CR-789-1
Before JONES, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jose Garcia was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to
distribute more than 100 but less than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846. The
district court sentenced Garcia to concurrent terms of 97 months of
imprisonment and concurrent terms of four years of supervised
release.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Prior to trial, Garcia unsuccessfully moved to suppress
evidence that was discovered as a result of a traffic stop, a
warrantless search of a tractor-trailer that was registered in
Garcia’s name, and a warrantless search of a residence that was
leased to Garcia. Garcia appeals the district court’s denial of
his motions to suppress.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Mendoza-
Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 666 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1049
(2003). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and findings of
fact are reviewed for clear error. Id.
Garcia states that the traffic stop was illegal.
However, he does not brief the issue as is required by FED. R. APP.
P. 28(a)(9). Garcia also does not brief any issue related to the
search of his residence. Garcia, therefore, has waived any
challenge to the validity of the traffic stop and the search of his
residence. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 867 (5th
Cir. 1998).
Garcia concedes that he is not challenging the officer’s
entry to the trailer and the inspection of the outside of the
boxes. Garcia asserts that he is challenging only the unstacking
and opening of the boxes in the trailer. He contends that the
truck driver did not have actual or apparent authority to consent
to a search of the interior of the boxes.
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The district court concluded that the driver’s consent
authorized the search of the boxes inside the trailer. The
district court concluded alternatively that the police had probable
cause to stop the tractor-trailer and to search it for contraband.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search of
a vehicle except in the case of valid consent from the owner or
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or
other evidence of a crime. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d at 666.
When there is probable cause to justify the search of a lawfully
stopped vehicle, the police may search every part of the vehicle
including containers and passengers’ belongings that may conceal
the object of the search. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307
(1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800, 822-23 (1982).
Garcia, who is represented by counsel, does not challenge
the district court’s probable cause determination. He does not
attempt to refute the Government’s contention that the police had
probable cause to search the trailer.
We are “a court of review, not of original error.”
United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 1998)
(en banc). We review “only those issues presented”; we do not
“craft new issues or otherwise search for them in the record.” Id.
Because Garcia has not argued that the district court erred in
concluding that the police had probable cause to search the
contents of the trailer, he has waived any challenge to the issue.
See United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1015 n.9 (5th Cir. 1987)
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(arguments not briefed are deemed waived). We may affirm on any
grounds supported by record. United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d
684, 687 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
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