[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15714 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 3, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 08-00772-CV-T-24-TBM
RENEE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 3, 2010)
Before BLACK, MARTIN and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Renee Anderson, a former high school student at Riverview High School,
brought this suit against the Hillsborough County School Board under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Anderson claims that her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were
violated both by a temporary removal from Riverview High School and, ultimately,
her change in placement to an alternative school. The district court granted the
Board summary judgment, and Anderson appeals.
On May 13, 2005, during the last week of school, Anderson was suspended for
ten days for fighting and battery on Assistant Principal Massena. Ultimately, the
Board removed Anderson from Riverview High School, calling for her placement in
an “alternative school” rather than a “regular” high school.
Anderson claims that the Board deprived her of her constitutional right to a
public education. The district court’s opinion correctly notes that the federal
constitution does not create a right to a public education, but that Florida’s
constitution and statutory law creates a right to a public education, and federal law
treats that right as a property or liberty interest protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 576, 95 S. Ct. 729,
736, 737(1975). Florida law does not, however, create a right to attend a high school
of your choice, and this court has never decided that a Florida student has a property
or liberty interest in attending a particular high school. And, we doubt that the
transfer of a student to an alternative school deprives a Florida student of an interest
that is cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. But this is not a case where we
need decide this question because we conclude that if due process was due Anderson
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for her temporary suspension and her alternative school placement, she was not
deprived of the process due. We assume arguendo, therefore, that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to both Anderson’s temporary
suspension and the Boards’s decision to place her in an alternative school.
Anderson’s briefs present her arguments in three numbered sections –
captioned Issue I, Issue II, and Issue III. The thrust of the Issue I argument seems to
be that Anderson was permanently expelled from all Hillsborough County public
schools on June 7, 2005, and that the district court erred in concluding that she was
not. The district court determined that the Board clearly stated that Anderson was
only “expelled” until a hearing could be held, and instructed Anderson’s parents to
reschedule an administrative hearing that had been disrupted. (R.1-47 at 10-12.) The
district court’s conclusion is supported by the record. No rational fact-finder could
conclude that the Board permanently “expelled” Anderson on June 7 from all
Hillsborough County public schools. An “expulsion” pending a hearing is not
permanent expulsion.
The thrust of the Issue II arguments is that (1) the Board did not afford
Anderson the process due before or after her initial suspension pending a hearing; and
(2) the Board did not offer Anderson the process due her prior to its decision to
change her placement to an alternative school. The district court’s opinion (R.1-47)
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carefully addresses both of these arguments and finds them meritless. (Id. at 10-14.)
We find no error in the court’s resolution of these issues. And, we reject Anderson’s
argument under “Issue II” that she was entitled, prior to the scheduling of a final
placement hearing, to be provided more procedural protections than she received.
The district court properly resolved this issue as well. (Id. at 14-15.)
Anderson was suspended from Riverview High for about a week. School was
ending, and she neither sought nor was denied school attendance in Hillsborough
County during the summer. The Board’s ultimate decision to change her placement
to an alternative school came after Anderson was offered the process the due process
clause requires.
Lastly, we have considered Anderson’s argument under Issue III. She argues
that in granting summary judgment, the district court relied upon facts not supported
by competent evidence. None of Anderson’s arguments are compelling. Many of the
factual statements which Anderson questions are not relevant to our resolution of the
issues before us. Some of the facts questioned are clearly supported by the record.
And, most importantly, Anderson’s response to the Board’s motion for summary
judgment did not challenge the admissibility of any of the evidence submitted in
support of the Board’s motion for summary judgment. (Anderson’s Response, R.1-
45.) We have long held that we do not consider an issue that was not raised in district
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court but raised for the first time of appeal. Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793
(11th Cir. 1991).
Finding no error, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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