Saranchak v. Beard

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-9000

DANIEL M. SARANCHAK,

Appellee

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections; DAVID DIGUGLIELMO, Superintendent of
the State Correctional Institution at Graterford; FRANK
TENNIS, Superintendent
of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA;
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY,

Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 05-cv-00317
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
 Argued October 14, 2009

Before: SLOVITER, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 3, 2010)

Matthew C. Lawry
Stuart B. Lev
Shawn Nolan (Argued)
Defender Association of Philadelphia
Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit
The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West
Independence Square West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee

James P. Barker (Argued)
Jennifer A. Buck
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Appeals & Legal Services
Strawberry Square
16 th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120

Stuart Suss
234 Yorkminister Road
West Chester, PA 19382
Counsel for Appellants

2
 OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

After fatally shooting his grandmother and uncle, Daniel
Saranchak (“Saranchak”) was quickly arrested and later
convicted of first degree murder in the Court of Common Pleas
of Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. He was then sentenced to
death. Saranchak took a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction and sentence.
After being denied collateral relief in the Pennsylvania state
court system, he sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
system. The District Court granted his petition in part, reaching
issues related only to the guilt phase of his trial. The
Commonwealth appeals.1 For the reasons expressed below, we
will reverse.

1
Defendants/Appellants are Jeffrey Beard, Commissioner of
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; David DiGuglielmo,
Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford; and
Frank Tennis, Superintendent at the State Correctional Institution at
Rockview; the Attorney General of Pennsylvania; and the District
Attorney for Schuylkill County. We refer to them collectively as “the
Commonwealth.”

3
 I.

The facts of the underlying crimes have been extensively
set forth by several courts during the course of a lengthy
collateral review process. We recount them below because they
are critical to an understanding of our resolution of the
petitioner’s attack on the guilt phase of his trial. Daniel
Saranchak lived in an apartment above Mickey Courtney’s
Sportsmen Bar (“Courtney’s Bar”) in Pottsville, Pennsylvania.
At about 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 1993, Saranchak and his
neighbor Julian Spirko (“Spirko”) illegally dumped garbage on
a mountain near Courtney’s Bar, performing the task as a favor
to the bar’s owner. On their way home, Saranchak and Spirko
stopped by the home shared by Saranchak’s grandmother Stella
Saranchok (“Stella”) 2 and uncle Edmund Saranchak
(“Edmund”), where Saranchak consumed several bottles of beer.
Saranchak and Spirko returned to their respective apartments at
about 5:00 p.m. At about 7:00 p.m., Saranchak met James
Steiner (“Steiner”), another neighbor, to collect discarded
furniture from a nearby apartment and haul it to a dumping area.
After unloading the furniture, the two went to a bar and
consumed three to four drinks each. When they left the bar, they
drove to a cemetery so that Saranchak could visit his father’s
grave. Standing at the grave, Saranchak could be seen speaking
in the direction of the headstone for five to ten minutes.

2
Saranchak’s grandmother Stella spelled her surname
differently than her son Edmund and her grandson, the Appellee.

4
Saranchak and Steiner proceeded to a friend’s house, where
Saranchak consumed another drink, eventually ending up at
Courtney’s Bar sometime after 8:00 p.m. Around this time,
Spirko entered the bar and again saw Saranchak. Both Steiner
and Spirko noticed that Saranchak was visibly intoxicated.
Steiner later described Saranchak as “more aggressive” and also
“[g]iggling and talking strange stuff.”

At Courtney’s Bar, Saranchak spent time conversing with
his friend Roy Miles (“Miles”). Saranchak asked Miles if he
knew where they could get some money, but Miles answered
that he did not. Saranchak then replied that he knew of a source,
but that it might be necessary to shoot someone. After
consuming several more drinks, the pair left the bar at 11:30
p.m. With Saranchak driving, they stopped at a store and
purchased beer. Having consumed several more drinks,
Saranchak and Miles stopped at the house of Saranchak’s
stepfather and brother to obtain a rifle. Leaving the house with
a .22 caliber rifle in hand, Saranchak encountered his wife and
his brother outside. The two tried to persuade Saranchak not to
leave with the rifle, but were unsuccessful. Saranchak said he
was going hunting and asked his brother to come along. When
his brother declined the invitation, Saranchak drove with Miles
to another bar and purchased two quarts of beer.

Having consumed more beer, Saranchak next drove the
pair to his grandmother’s house. Saranchak told Miles that he
was going inside to get some money from his grandmother.

5
Miles accompanied Saranchak, who was carrying the rifle,
through an unlocked basement door. There, they saw
Saranchak’s uncle Edmund asleep on a couch in the basement.
Saranchak walked directly to the sofa and shot his uncle in the
center of his forehead, killing him instantly. Saranchak rolled
the body over while Miles went through the victim’s pockets.
They took his wallet, which contained a sum of cash, and then
went upstairs to Stella Saranchok’s second floor bedroom where
they found her sleeping. Saranchak asked Miles to shoot his
grandmother, but Miles refused. Awakened, Stella called out:
“Danny, is that you? It’s getting late. You can go downstairs if
you want.” At this point, Saranchak shot his grandmother once
in the center of her forehead. The two men then lowered the
blinds and searched the room for money. Saranchak located a
safe, but was unable to open it. He and Miles then found Stella
Saranchok’s purse, and stole money from it. Saranchak next
went downstairs, ate some candy, and petted his dog, which
lived at the house. After saying that he was hungry, Saranchak
looked for food in the refrigerator. Finally, before leaving the
residence, Saranchak and Miles searched for the shell casing in
the basement but were unable to find it.

With Saranchak driving, the pair returned to Courtney’s
Bar at about 1:00 a.m. on October 16 and remained there until
it closed. They consumed several drinks at the bar, and then
more at the owner’s apartment upstairs. At about 4:00 a.m.,
Saranchak and Miles left Courtney’s Bar. Saranchak drove
them to a nearby diner where they ate breakfast and eventually

6
parted ways.

Edmund Saranchak had scheduled a breakfast meeting
with his employer for that morning. When Edmund failed to
show up, the employer went to his home and spoke to a
neighbor. The employer and neighbor entered the house through
the basement, where they discovered Edmund’s body. They
called a neighbor who was a nurse, and she confirmed that
Edmund was dead. Shortly thereafter, they found Stella’s body
upstairs. Following a call to 911, an ambulance and paramedic
responded, as did Pennsylvania State Police officers, who began
photographing the crime scene and collecting physical evidence.
Responders located a shell casing underneath Edmund’s body.
Police also canvassed the neighborhood and learned that
Saranchak had stated the night before that he was going
shooting. The officers obtained a warrant and seized a .22
caliber rifle from Saranchak’s apartment. The Pennsylvania
State Police Laboratory later matched the shell casing found
under Edmund’s body to the rifle seized from Saranchak’s
apartment. In the evening hours of October 16, state troopers
located Saranchak at Courtney’s Bar and arrested him.
Although his eyes were glassy and he had obviously been
drinking heavily, Saranchak was coherent when arrested.

The State Police advised Saranchak of his Miranda rights
when they placed him in the police car and again when they
arrived at the State Police Barracks at 9:00 p.m. During the
interrogation that ensued, Saranchak gave a statement admitting

7
to illegally dumping trash for the owner of Courtney’s Bar. The
statement contained no reference to the murders. Corporal
Reynold O. Wagner of the Pennsylvania State Police testified
that, upon further questioning, Saranchak’s posture became rigid
and militaristic. Saranchak acted as if the officers questioning
him were drill sergeants, responding to their questions with
formal “Yes, Sir” or “No, Sir” answers. He soon admitted that
he had been present at Stella’s house, but then rebuffed the
officers’ follow-up questions by explaining that he was part of
a classified military mission. After further questioning, he
characterized the scene at Stella’s house as “not a pretty sight.”
Saranchak eventually admitted to the state trooper interrogating
him that he had shot Edmund. He described the shooting in
detail, but refused to answer any questions about Stella’s death,
maintaining firmly that such information was classified.

Saranchak was incarcerated pending trial. While held at
the Schuylkill County Prison, Saranchak met on occasion with
caseworkers from Schuylkill County Children and Youth
Services (“CYS”) regarding his three minor children. Laurie
Garber was one such caseworker who was assigned to oversee
the welfare of Saranchak’s children. Prior to a hearing in the
CYS matter, Garber met with Saranchak to explain to him the
purpose of the hearing and to answer Saranchak’s questions.

She visited him again after the hearing had been
conducted. This meeting lasted approximately 45 minutes. For
the first 15 minutes, Garber and Saranchak discussed his

8
children and matters regarding court hearings and visitation.
Garber told him that letters to his children could be sent to CYS,
which would review them and then forward them to the
children. Saranchak stated that he would not include anything
in the letters that could be harmful for his children to read, but
that he would simply explain that he had done something bad
and would be in jail for a very long time. Garber then stated that
neither she nor a CYS worker previously assigned to
Saranchak’s children’s case could understand how the murders
happened. At this point, Saranchak explained to Garber the
nature of both killings. He admitted that he killed Edmund
because of Edmund’s greed and because he talked down to
Saranchak. Saranchak said that his uncle “had married a whore”
and that their children had received a portion of an inheritance
that rightfully should have gone to Saranchak and his siblings.
Saranchak admitted that he had consumed a few beers by the
time he shot Edmund, but said that he was not intoxicated.
According to Saranchak, he just “snapped.”

Saranchak also admitted to Garber that he shot Stella.
When Garber inquired why he told the judge presiding over the
CYS matter that he would plead not guilty to the criminal
charges, Saranchak explained that he was willing to serve time
for the murders but not for other offenses because he did not
steal anything. Saranchak emphasized that Edmund’s greed
drove him to kill his uncle and he also conveyed the impression
that he believed he did Stella a favor in killing her because she
was very sick. Garber later testified at the degree of guilt

9
hearing that Saranchak was very matter of fact in his description
of the killing of Edmund.

Saranchak was represented in the criminal proceedings
by Kent Watkins, Esq. Watkins requested the state trial court to
appoint a mental health expert to examine Saranchak as to his
ability to assist in his own defense, his competency to stand trial,
and issues relating to his diminished capacity to form the
specific intent to kill. The court granted the motion in part,
appointing Dr. Stefan P. Kruszewski, a psychiatrist, to examine
Saranchak and render an opinion regarding his ability to assist
in his defense, his competency to stand trial, and whether
statements given to the police were voluntary or involuntary as
the result of any psychiatric dysfunction. The court did not,
however, order Dr. Kruszewski to examine Saranchak regarding
diminished capacity, nor did Watkins ever renew a request for
such an examination. Dr. Kruszewski found Saranchak
competent to stand trial. Watkins later testified that he never
sought a second evaluation regarding diminished capacity
because he concluded that Dr. Kruszewski’s report contained
nothing to indicate that a diminished capacity exam would be
fruitful.

Saranchak eventually entered an open plea of guilty to
murder generally. Under Pennsylvania criminal procedure rules,
Saranchak was permitted to plead guilty generally to the murder
of Edmund and Stella, and could then contest his degree of guilt
during a trial limited to that issue. Pa. R. Crim. P. 803(A). The

10
non-jury degree of guilt hearing was held before Judge Cyrus
Palmer Dolbin of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill
County, Pennsylvania and consolidated with a non-jury trial on
the merits of the burglary, aggravated assault, robbery, theft, and
conspiracy charges filed in connection with the murders. That
proceeding took place in early September of 1996.

The Commonwealth’s case in chief included the evidence
recounted above. Saranchak asserted a diminished capacity
defense to the murder charges, but Watkins presented no expert
testimony on this issue. Rather, he relied on the testimony of
Saranchak’s family, friends, and neighbors to establish that the
defendant consumed a considerable amount of alcohol on the
night of the murders and that his conduct was so outside the
ordinary that it demonstrated his diminished capacity to form the
specific intent to kill.

Judge Dolbin found that Saranchak had premeditated and
deliberated the killings of Edmund and Stella, and entered
verdicts of guilty on both counts of first degree murder. He also
found Saranchak guilty of burglary, aggravated assault, robbery,
theft, and conspiracy. A jury was empaneled for the sentencing
phase of Saranchak’s criminal trial and returned a sentence of
death.3

3
At the sentencing phase of the proceedings, the jury found
two aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. The sentence of
death was thus mandatory. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)

11
 The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Saranchak,
675 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1996). Saranchak petitioned the Supreme
Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, which was
denied. Saranchak v. Pennsylvania, 519 U.S. 1061 (1997)
(Mem.). He then filed a pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s
Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541–9546
(“the PCRA”). Judge Dolbin, the same judge who held the
degree of guilt hearing and non-jury trial, appointed new
counsel to represent Saranchak, but later denied the petition.
Saranchak appealed. His present counsel assumed
representation in the PCRA matter after docketing but prior to
briefing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the denial
of the PCRA petition and remanded with instructions to permit
Saranchak to file an amended PCRA petition. Commonwealth
v. Saranchak, 739 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1999).

After a protracted procedural history not relevant to this
appeal,4 Judge Dolbin (“the PCRA court”) held an evidentiary
hearing on the amended PCRA petition and denied relief. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the merits and affirmed.

(“[T]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously
finds at least one aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating
circumstance . . . .”). As noted above, the District Court did not reach
any issues related to sentencing, so they are not before us.
4
See Saranchak v. Beard, 538 F. Supp. 2d 847, 854–56 (M.D.
Pa. 2008).

12
Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 866 A.2d 292 (Pa. 2005).
Saranchak then filed this habeas petition in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting eleven grounds that he claimed
warranted relief. The District Court, without holding a hearing,
granted the petition on three issues arising out of the degree of
guilt proceedings. It did not address the remaining eight
grounds, which included issues related to the penalty phase.
Saranchak v. Beard, 538 F. Supp. 2d 847 (M.D. Pa. 2008). The
Commonwealth appeals.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
2241 and 2254, and our jurisdiction rests upon 28 U.S.C. §§
1291 and 2253. Because the District Court ruled on Saranchak’s
habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing, our review of its
decision is plenary. Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). We review the decision of the state
court under the same standard that the District Court was
required to apply. Id.

The federal courts have the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus to prisoners in state custody on the sole ground
that the individual “is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Saranchak argues that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution, specifically his “right . . . to have the Assistance of

13
Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The
assistance of counsel has been interpreted to mean the “effective
assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970)) (emphasis added). To make out a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus be entitled to
collateral relief from a conviction or sentence, a habeas
petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient and that this deficient performance caused him
prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To be deficient,
counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Id. at 687–88. To demonstrate prejudice, the
petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner
in state custody, whose claims were adjudicated on the merits in
the state system, will be granted only if the adjudication of the
claims by the state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d). The “determination of a factual issue made by a State
court [is] presumed to be correct. The applicant [has] the
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

14
convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

III.

The three claims before us arise out of Saranchak’s
degree of guilt hearing: (1) whether Watkins was ineffective for
failing to investigate thoroughly and present adequately a
diminished capacity defense; (2) whether Watkins was
ineffective for failing to ask the trial court to suppress
statements made to the state police officers; and (3) whether
Watkins was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of the
statements made to Laurie Garber. We will address those claims
in reverse order.

A.

Saranchak contends that Watkins was ineffective because
he did not seek suppression of the statements Saranchak made
to Garber while in jail.5 These statements, he argues, were
introduced into evidence in violation of his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.

5
Watkins filed and later withdrew an Omnibus Pretrial
Motion that, among other things, sought suppression of the statements
challenged here. The circumstances surrounding the motion’s
withdrawal are immaterial to our disposition of this appeal.

15
 The Fifth Amendment requires that a person subjected to
interrogation while in custody be advised that he has the right to
remain silent and the right to have a lawyer present. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).6 If questioning takes place
and incriminating statements are made absent this procedural
safeguard, the statements must be suppressed. Id.; United States
v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2001). The
interrogation necessary to trigger the need for Miranda warnings
is not limited to the quintessential station-house police
interrogation. After all, the Miranda Court was concerned with
“the ‘interrogation environment’ created by the interplay of
interrogation and custody [that] would ‘subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner’ and thereby undermine the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination.” Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457).

In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the
defendant was in prison serving a state sentence. An agent of
the Internal Revenue Service met with him and questioned him
about discrepancies in two of his federal tax returns in the
course of a “routine tax investigation” that was, at the time,
purely civil in nature. Id. at 4. The defendant made
incriminating statements that were later introduced at his
criminal trial for tax fraud. The Supreme Court held that the

6
The parties dispute whether Saranchak, when he met with
Garber, was “in custody,” for purposes of Miranda. We assume for
purposes of this opinion that he was.

16
statements, taken without Miranda warnings, should have been
suppressed. Id. at 5. This was true even though the “interview
was indistinguishable from the thousands of inquiries into tax
liability made annually as a necessary adjunct to operation of our
tax system.” Id. at 6 (White, J., dissenting). It did not matter
that the defendant was “in familiar surroundings.” Id. at 7
(White, J., dissenting) (distinguishing this interview from a
“police station interrogation of someone charged with or
suspected of a crime”). Because the defendant was in custody
at the time of questioning, and because of the ever-present
possibility that tax investigations could wind up as criminal
prosecutions, the Fifth Amendment was implicated. Id. at 4
(majority op.). Indeed, “the availability of the privilege [against
self-incrimination] does not turn upon the type of proceeding in
which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the
statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.” In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).

In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme
Court again analyzed the Fifth Amendment’s protections vis-à-
vis questioning by someone other than a law enforcement
officer. There, the trial judge, without a motion by either party,
ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the criminal defendant to
determine his competency to stand trial. Without administering
Miranda warnings, a doctor examined him for 90 minutes,
concluded that he was competent to stand trial, and filed a short
report to that effect. Id. at 456–57. At the capital sentencing
phase, the doctor was the state’s sole witness and testified on the

17
question of the defendant’s future dangerousness, a key factor
in determining a sentence of death and one on which the state
bore the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
457–58. Though his initial report only termed the defendant “a
severe sociopath,” with no more specific reference to the issue
of future dangerousness, the doctor offered seven very specific
and damning opinions on the defendant’s future dangerousness.
Id. at 459–60. The jury returned answers to special
interrogatories that rendered the death penalty mandatory. Id. at
460. The defendant sought federal habeas review, and the
district court vacated the death sentence based on the admission
of the doctor’s statements. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. In
affirming the lower courts, the Supreme Court rejected the
contention that the defendant’s statements to the doctor, because
they were made in a pretrial competency evaluation, were akin
to handwriting or voice exemplars and thus not protected by the
Fifth Amendment. To the contrary, the Court noted that it was
the substance of the defendant’s discussion with the
doctor—describing the details of the crime—that provided the
basis for the doctor’s opinion of future dangerousness. Id. at
463–64. The defendant was given no warning that this
“compulsory examination would be used to gather evidence
necessary to decide whether, if convicted, he should be
sentenced to death.” Id. at 467. Because he “did not voluntarily
consent to the pretrial psychiatric examination after being
informed of his right to remain silent and the possible use of his
statements,” his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was violated. Id. at 468. The Court went out of

18
its way to reiterate that what had taken place was “a court-
ordered psychiatric inquiry” while the defendant was in custody.
Id. at 469.

It is clear, then, that assuming the defendant is in custody,
interrogation vel non is the focal point of Miranda’s protection
against the evidentiary use of self-inculpatory statements. Innis,
446 U.S. at 300. A criminal defendant always runs the risk of
having his statements used against him if he makes them
voluntarily. “The fundamental import of the privilege while an
individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to
the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but
whether he can be interrogated. . . . . Volunteered statements of
any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment . . . .”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. Without government agents actually
eliciting statements, there is no risk of compelling a defendant
to incriminate himself. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (“‘Interrogation,’
as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself.”) (footnote omitted).

Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that
Garber did not interrogate Saranchak. It noted that she was
visiting Saranchak to discuss matters related to proceedings
involving his children: “The caseworker interviewed Appellant
shortly after his arrest, concerning his children, who were in
foster care as the result of his incarceration.” Saranchak, 866
A.2d at 302 (emphasis added). And again: “Here, the CYS

19
caseworker was concerned with the plight of Appellant’s
children. She was a stranger to any aspect of the criminal case.
Her question regarding the murders was purely conversational
and was not made with the purpose of soliciting information
from Appellant about the crimes.” Id. at 302. This
characterization is accurate. Garber testified at the degree of
guilt hearing that she and Saranchak were discussing visitation
with his children when she expressed her inability to understand
how the murders happened. It is unremarkable that a CYS
worker involved in structuring visitation rights of minor children
with a suspected murderer and forwarding letters from him to
those children would wonder how, if at all, the suspect became
involved in the crime. When Saranchak “freely admitted to
killing [Edmund]” and “also admitted to killing [Stella],” id. at
302, Garber’s follow-up question was not an interrogation
eliciting incriminating information: “During our court hearing
the judge had asked him about what he was in prison for and
what he was pleading and he said he was pleading not guilty and
I asked him why he had said that at our court hearing.” It struck
Garber as odd that Saranchak would so readily admit to the
murders both to her and to his children in the letters he planned
on sending them when he had told the judge presiding over the
CYS matter that he was pleading not guilty. Thus, Saranchak
was able to qualify his answer, stating that he would serve time
for the murders but not for the other charges because he had not
stolen anything. Saranchak went on to tell Garber that, after he
killed Edmund and Stella, he bent down to check on his dog
because he did not know how it would react to the dead bodies.

20
Whatever effect this statement may have had on Judge Dolbin’s
conclusion concerning Saranchak’s intent on the night of the
murders, it was not elicited by any “express questioning or its
functional equivalent” by Garber. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300–01.

Garber the CYS worker is hardly the Internal Revenue
agent-turned-informant in Mathis. Her interview with
Sarnachak was not of the kind, like a tax investigation, that has
a high probability of leading to informant testimony at a
criminal trial. It is no quantum leap to conclude that a civil tax
investigation may lead to a criminal inquiry. Mathis, 391 U.S.
at 4–5. The same could be said for a CYS interview of a person
charged with offenses involving children. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 532 A.2d 465 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(statements made to CYS caseworker without Miranda warnings
held inadmissible where caseworker was investigating charges
relating to sexual abuse of a child for which the defendant was
incarcerated pending trial). It is quite another matter to say that
a CYS worker like Garber, answering questions about visitation
and letters to children and explaining the CYS court process,
should know that the person she is interviewing would freely
admit to committing two murders. The testimony at the PCRA
hearing establishes that Saranchak helped Garber to understand
how the murders happened. It fails to reveal interrogation
compelling him to do so. This is not akin to the tax man
knocking on your door (or, as in Mathis, your prison cell) and
asking you questions about your returns.

21
 Though decided on Sixth Amendment grounds, our
decision in Bey v. Morton, 124 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 1997), is
instructive. In that case, an inmate was housed on death row in
a New Jersey state prison. Corrections Officer Alexander
Pearson’s duties of keeping inmates safe and secure were
carried out, in part, by regularly engaging them in conversation.
Such encounters enabled him to detect possible suicidal
tendencies in the inmates. Id. at 526. Pearson was aware that
the inmate Bey had an appeal pending and was represented by
counsel. Notwithstanding such knowledge, Pearson spoke with
Bey about “‘why he was [t]here’ and ‘why he did it.’” Id. The
guard also “‘asked him why he would do that. What kind of
mind you was in.’” Id. When the appeal resulted in a retrial, the
inmate’s incriminating statements to the guard were admitted
into evidence. We held that there was no error “because there
was no deliberate elicitation of incriminating information for use
in connection with a prosecution.” Id. at 525. The guard,
“while a state actor, was not a state actor deliberately engaged
in trying to secure information from the defendant.” Id. at 531.
While there may have been “elicitation” in a general sense,
“there certainly was no ‘deliberate elicitation’ within the
teachings of the cases” the inmate relied upon. Id. We
explicitly distinguished the guard’s actions under those factual
circumstances in asking “why” an act was committed from the
usual scenario of “questions designed to elicit” incriminating
statements because, “most importantly, Pearson did not behave
like someone who intended to secure incriminating statements
from Bey.” Id.

22
 Garber’s actions cannot be meaningfully distinguished
from those of the guard in Bey. There was no interrogation of
Saranchak because there was no compulsion of incriminating
statements for use in a prosecution. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.
Garber went to the jail to discuss Saranchak’s children and the
particulars of visitation. Saranchak, 866 A.2d at 302. Indeed,
“taken to its logical conclusion, [Saranchak]’s argument, in
essence, is that any governmental employee would be required
to provide Miranda rights before engaging in conversation.
Assuming one was in jail, this would include maintenance staff
cleaning the facility, cooks preparing food and volunteers
offering solace.” Id. We agree with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court that this is not the law.

We detect no error in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
conclusion that there was no interrogation by Garber. While the
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment is “as broad as the mischief against which it seeks
to guard,” Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892),
it is not implicated with respect to Garber’s actions because her
meeting with Saranchak did not “contain[] inherently
compelling pressures which work[ed] to undermine
[Saranchak’s] will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467;
United States v. Benton, 996 F.2d 642, 644 (3d Cir. 1993) (no
Miranda violation because officer’s remarks “gave [the

23
defendant] no incentive” to make his incriminating statement).7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding Watkins’s failure to
seek suppression of the statements to Garber was not an
unreasonable application of, or contrary to, clearly established
federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Watkins’s failure to seek
their suppression did not amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.

B.

Saranchak next contends that Watkins was ineffective for
failing to seek suppression of statements made to the state police
officers. He argues that these statements were introduced into
evidence at the degree of guilt hearing in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. The PCRA court

7
Saranchak also imbedded within his claim of ineffectiveness
for not protecting his Fifth Amendment rights a claim of
ineffectiveness for not protecting his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel during Garber’s interview. “The definitions of
‘interrogation’ under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the
term ‘interrogation’ is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are
not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two
constitutional protections are quite distinct.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300
n.4. Nevertheless, we conclude that Garber did not engage in the type
of deliberate elicitation of incriminating statements from Saranchak
necessary to cause a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Bey,
124 F.3d at 531–32.

24
denied relief on this ground in part because the other evidence
against him “was sufficient to establish his guilt of first degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court essentially adopted this conclusion when it determined
that Saranchak suffered no prejudice by the admission of these
statements “due to the overwhelming evidence of [his] guilt.”
Saranchak, 866 A.2d at 301. Although the State Police
probably did violate Saranchak’s Miranda rights, we need not
resolve that issue because we agree with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that no prejudice resulted.

When Saranchak was questioned by the state police, he
was read Miranda warnings several times. Initially, Saranchak’s
responses concerned only the illegal trash dumping, in which he
readily admitted his involvement. When officers continued to
question him about his activities on the night of the murders,
Saranchak assumed a military posture and demeanor. He stated
that the information the officers sought was classified. Before
long, however, Saranchak admitted to killing his uncle. As to
his grandmother, he refused to budge from his position that his
presence in the house that night was part of a classified military
mission and that the police officers should not question him
about it.8

8
Before us, Saranchak argues that he asserted his right to
silence even before admitting to killing Edmund. As support, he
relies on testimony at the sentencing hearing by Corporal Reynold
Wagner, whose paraphrasing of Saranchak’s assertions that the

25
 Saranchak’s assertions that the information was
classified, however bizarre, were probably sufficient to invoke
his right to silence. Cf. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155,
164 (1955) (“As everyone agrees, no ritualistic formula is
necessary in order to invoke the privilege.”). Thus, we will
assume that Saranchak asserted his Fifth Amendment right to
silence and that the continued interrogation violated that right.
Even so, the admission into evidence of Saranchak’s elicited
statements caused him no prejudice.

The inculpatory content of Saranchak’s statements to the
police is probative of two things: his involvement in the killing
of Edmund, and his intent in doing so. Whatever was probative
of his involvement in the killing is of no moment for our
purposes because Saranchak had already entered a plea of guilty
to murder generally. The fact that he shot and killed Edmund
was established through the guilty plea colloquy, so that the
exclusion of his statements probative of the same would not
have helped his case. The degree of guilt hearing was
concerned only with Saranchak’s intention in killing Edmund
and Stella. Thus, the admissibility of the statements insofar as

mission was classified could be read to suggest that he invoked his
right to silence before he confessed to Edmund’s murder. We note
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court understood Saranchak to be
claiming to have “invoked his right to silence after confessing to
killing [Edmund].” Saranchak, 866 A.2d at 301. Because we
ultimately see no prejudice in Watkins’s failure to move to suppress
these statements, we need not weigh in on this discrepancy in timing.

26
they are probative of his intent presents a closer call.

Pennsylvania State Trooper Kirk A. Kirkland testified at
the degree of guilt hearing as to his interrogation of Saranchak.
After Saranchak invoked his right to silence by claiming that his
“mission” was “classified,” Trooper Kirkland was alone with
Saranchak in an interview room. He told Saranchak that he did
not understand how Edmund’s killing had taken place.
Saranchak then explained. Saranchak directed Kirkland where
to walk, stand, aim, fire, and eject the shell casing in a recreated
version of the shooting. Kirkland testified to this re-creation at
the degree of guilt hearing.

The version of events as recounted by Trooper Kirkland
supports a premeditated and deliberate killing of Edmund. The
account presents Saranchak entering the basement with the
purpose of executing his uncle and then carrying out the
execution. Yet Saranchak has not shown that Watkins’s failure
to seek to exclude this evidence creates “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. The manner in which the shootings were
carried out was summed up in the eye-witness testimony of
Miles, a co-conspirator to the shootings. Moreover, the physical
evidence, including the nature of the wounds and the fact that
the shell casing was found under Edmund’s body, amply
demonstrates that these killings were intentional. Finally, the
testimony of Garber, which we have concluded was properly

27
admitted, also supports the intentional nature of the killings.
Trooper Kirkland’s testimony may have “had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding,” id. at 693, but that is
not the test. “An error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”
Id. at 691. We conclude that Saranchak, by the evidence he
introduced at the PCRA hearing, has failed to establish “a
reasonable probability that, but for” the admission of his
statements to the State Police, “the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694 (“A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.”). That same conclusion reached by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 866 A.2d at 301–02, was not an
unreasonable application of, or contrary to, clearly established
federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

C.

Saranchak’s final contention is that Watkins was
ineffective in his investigation and presentation of a diminished
capacity defense at the degree of guilt hearing. The diminished
capacity defense seeks to negative the intent element of a charge
of first degree murder, thereby reducing it to murder of the third
degree. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 876 A.2d 916, 926 (Pa.
2005). A diminished capacity can result from a variety of
factors, including voluntary intoxication. See Commonwealth

28
v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2009).9 The defense
will be successful only “if the evidence shows that the defendant
was ‘overwhelmed to the point of losing his faculties and
sensibilities.’” Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 653
(Pa. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 571 A.2d
1035, 1041 (Pa. 1990)). Even “ample evidence” that a
defendant “used mind-altering drugs at the time of the offense,”
standing alone, is insufficient because such drugs must be
shown to have intoxicated a defendant “to such an extent that he
was unable to form the requisite intent.” Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (Pa. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Diminished capacity is “an extremely limited defense” that
requires a defendant to establish through “extensive psychiatric
testimony [that he] suffered from one or more mental disorders
which prevented him from formulating the specific intent to
kill.” Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 832 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa. 2003)
(citing Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937, 943 (Pa.
1982)). That is, psychiatric testimony addressing “‘mental
disorders affecting the cognitive functions of deliberation and
premeditation necessary to form a specific intent’ is admissible.
However, psychiatric evidence that a defendant lacked the
ability to control his actions or that he acted impulsively,” for

9
Voluntary intoxication itself is not a defense to a criminal
charge in Pennsylvania, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 308, but evidence of
intoxication may be offered to reduce a conviction for murder, as
noted above, from the higher degree to the lower degree. Id.;
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 653 (Pa. 2008).

29
example, “is irrelevant and inadmissible on the issue of the
defendant’s specific intent to kill. Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1183
(quoting Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d at 943) (alteration omitted).
Where expert testimony does not speak to mental disorders
affecting the cognitive functions of deliberation and
premeditation, it is inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Ventura,
975 A.2d 1128, 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Thus, evidence of “personality disorders or schizoid or paranoid
diagnoses,” which includes “substance abuse, adjustment
disorder, antisocial personality features and depressive
features,” is “not relevant to a diminished capacity defense.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Finally, expert testimony that the defendant
suffered from depression, auditory hallucinations,
schizoaffective disorder, delusio, pathological paranoia, and
even a tenuous ability to apprehend reality is irrelevant to, and
inadmissible in support of, a diminished capacity defense.
Commonwealth v. Kuzmanko, 709 A.2d 392, 397–99 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1998).

Saranchak easily meets the deficient performance prong
on this claim. At the time of his trial, Pennsylvania law was
clear that a diminished capacity defense requires expert
testimony. Cuevas, 832 A.2d at 393 (citing Zettlemoyer, 454
A.2d at 943); see also Commonwealth v. Fierst, 620 A.2d 1196,
1204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (referring to “those cases which have
discussed the need for expert psychiatric testimony in cases
where a defense of diminished capacity is proffered”). Watkins
originally sought a court order for a mental evaluation of, inter

30
alia, Saranchak’s capacity to form a specific intent. But the trial
court’s order for an evaluation of Saranchak did not extend to
his capacity to form specific intent, and Watkins did not return
to the court with a further request. Watkins nevertheless
presented what purported to be a diminished capacity defense at
the degree of guilt hearing, albeit without offering expert
testimony. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
declared that this defense requires expert testimony, Cuevas, 832
A.2d at 393, counsel’s performance was per se unreasonable.
Cf. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453
(2009) (per curiam) (“Here, counsel did not even take the first
step of interviewing witnesses or requesting records.”) (citation
omitted).

Deficient performance alone, however, does not entitle
a petitioner to habeas relief. For deficient performance to
violate the Sixth Amendment, counsel’s dereliction of duty must
also be prejudicial to his client. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691–92.
“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. at 694.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reviewing the
evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing held by the PCRA
court, concluded that Saranchak suffered no prejudice by
Watkins’s failure to offer expert testimony at the degree of guilt

31
hearing on the issue of diminished capacity. Saranchak, 866
A.2d at 301. A federal habeas court is deferential to the merits
determinations made by a state collateral relief court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), (e); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)
(citations omitted). However, the Strickland standard differs
from that applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the
issue of prejudice in this case. That Court employed a
subjective review of the evidence introduced at the PCRA
hearing and analyzed the effect it would have had on the judge
presiding, and acting as factfinder, at the degree of guilt hearing.
See Saranchak, 866 A.2d at 300–01 (noting that “the court,
nevertheless, would have returned” the same verdict, and
highlighting the fact that the PCRA judge was also the judge at
the degree of guilt hearing). It upheld the PCRA court’s
decision by considering the effect the new evidence would have
had on that particular judge—Judge Dolbin—rather than
considering, more abstractly, the effect the same evidence would
have had on an unspecified, objective factfinder, as required by
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“The assessment of prejudice . . . .
should not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular
decisionmaker . . . .”).10

10
The District Court may also have incorrectly employed the
subjective standard. Saranchak, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 877 (“The court
is persuaded that if the trial court had heard testimony from Dr.
Kruszewski on his evaluation of Saranchak’s mental capacity . . . that
the trial court, following the law, would have found Saranchak guilty
of third degree murder, not first degree murder.”) (emphasis added).
Because our review of the decision of the district court is plenary, we

32
 This fact does not mandate that Saranchak’s petition be
granted. That the state court evaluated the evidence in a manner
other than as the Supreme Court requires does not ipso facto
entitle Saranchak to a new trial. He “is not entitled to relief in
the federal courts unless he can show that he was in fact denied
effective assistance of counsel, not merely that the state courts”
applied a different standard. Gibbs v. VanNatta, 329 F.3d 582,
584 (7th Cir. 2003). Saranchak must still establish that his
lawyer’s deficient performance prejudiced him and thereby
violated the Sixth Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). We
conclude that even under a non-deferential, de novo review of
the state court’s determination, Saranchak has not carried that
burden.

The Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence
of Saranchak’s specific intent to murder Edmund and Stella at
the degree of guilt hearing. First, the injuries resulting in the
deaths of both victims were caused by a rifle aimed at a vital
part of the body. Under Pennsylvania law, “the use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient evidence to
prove the specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Santiago,
980 A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (citation omitted); see
also Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 297 (3d Cir. 1991)
(citing Commonwealth v. Davis, 479 A.2d 1077, 1080 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984)).

need not consider this possible error further.

33
 Further, before Saranchak and Miles first left Courtney’s
Bar some hours before the shootings, Saranchak told Miles that
he knew where they could get some money but that they might
have to kill someone to get it. Saranchak, 866 A.2d at 296.
Then, while enroute from Courtney’s Bar to Saranchak’s
grandmother’s house, Saranchak stopped to obtain his brother’s
.22 caliber rifle. When his wife pleaded with him not to leave
with the rifle, Saranchak “feigned” that he was going hunting.
Id. When Saranchak and Miles arrived at Stella’s house,
Saranchak exited the vehicle, rifle in hand, and declared he was
going to get some money. Id. at 301. All of this is evidence of
specific intent.

When Saranchak entered the basement door of his
grandmother’s house, he walked directly to his uncle and shot
him. Id. at 296. Saranchak and Miles then rolled Edmund’s
lifeless body back and forth while they searched through his
pockets. Id. They then went upstairs, and Saranchak asked
Miles to shoot Stella. When Miles refused, Saranchak shot her
himself. Id. After killing Stella, Saranchak and Miles lowered
the bedroom blinds and went through her personal belongings,
looking for money to steal. Id. Before leaving, Saranchak
returned to the basement to look for the shell casing spent in
Edmund’s killing.

While incarcerated pending trial, Saranchak told Laurie
Garber that he was not intoxicated on the night in question, but

34
that he “snapped.” 11 He also told her that Edmund had “married
a whore” and that Edmund’s children had received an
inheritance that was rightfully his. Saranchak described the
killing of Edmund to Garber in a very matter of fact manner, and
also conveyed to her the impression that he did Stella a favor by
killing her because she was very ill. All of the foregoing
supports a finding of specific intent.

In addition to the evidence recounted above, and despite
the alcohol consumed, we are mindful that at oral argument
counsel acknowledged that Saranchak was doing all of the

11
As stated above, a diminished capacity defense will be
successful “if the evidence shows that the defendant was
‘overwhelmed to the point of losing his faculties and sensibilities.’”
Blakeney, 946 A.2d at 653 (quoting Breakiron, 571 A.2d at 1041).
We do not believe that Saranchak’s simple assertion that he
“snapped” satisfies this requirement. Cf. Commonwealth v. Pruitt,
951 A.2d 307, 315 (Pa. 2008) (“Appellant’s statement constitutes
evidence of his capacity—at the time of the murder—to formulate a
plan, to act deliberately in pursuit of that plan, and then to take steps
to attempt to conceal his actions. This is not the behavior of someone
whose sensibilities have been overwhelmed.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 876 A.2d 916, 926 (Pa. 2005) (“[W]e have
repeatedly rejected the contention that evidence of a defendant’s
supposed inability to control his actions—by virtue of an ‘irresistible
impulse,’ a ‘compulsion,’ or otherwise—is relevant to negate specific
intent, and we have consistently held that such evidence may not be
admitted in support of a diminished capacity defense.”) (citation
omitted).

35
driving on the night of the murders. He drove himself and Miles
from Courtney’s Bar to a store to purchase beer, to his
stepfather’s house to get the gun, to a bar to purchase more beer,
to his uncle and grandmother’s house to shoot them, back to
Courtney’s Bar, and finally to a diner. Saranchak purposefully
drove from place to place completing his intended objectives,
demonstrating significant cognitive function.

The foregoing, all of which was presented to Judge
Dolbin, shows someone who was anything but “overwhelmed to
the point of losing his faculties and sensibilities.” Blakeney, 946
A.2d at 653 (quoting Breakiron, 571 A.2d at 1041).

“It is firmly established that a court must consider the
strength of the evidence in deciding whether the Strickland
prejudice prong has been satisfied.” Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d
163, 172 (3d Cir. 1999). The record adduced at the degree of
guilt hearing was “amply sufficient to prove that [Saranchak]
acted with a specific intent to kill.” Vandivner, 962 A.2d at
1176. The record included, briefly, (1) eyewitness testimony
from Roy Miles about Saranchak’s behavior prior to and after
the murders, as well as about the murders themselves; (2)
Saranchak’s admissions to Laurie Garber about killing the
victims and why he did it; (3) medical testimony about the cause
of death being gunshot wounds and Saranchak’s open guilty
plea establishing that the manner of death was homicide; (4)
Saranchak’s statement to Miles that they would have to shoot
someone to get money, his retrieving a rifle and going with it,

36
loaded, to the victims’ house, shooting both victims, and telling
Miles to shoot his grandmother before he himself did it; and (5)
the use of a gun on the victims’ heads. This is strikingly similar
to the record in Vandivner, which included the following facts:
(1) eyewitness testimony to the murder that the defendant shot
the victim in the head with a handgun; (2) defendant “freely
admitted to police that he had killed” the victim; (3) medical
testimony as to the cause of death and the manner of death; (4)
defendant went to the victim’s home with a loaded handgun,
made a statement to the victim that he would kill her, and
promptly followed through with it; and (5) the use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body. Vandivner, 962
A.2d at 1176. Moreover, this case contains evidence that
Saranchak told Miles to look for the shell casing after shooting
Edmund, and that the pair did look for it; that after shooting
Stella, Saranchak and Miles lowered the blinds and went
through her belongings, stealing money; that Saranchak had a
motive to murder Edmund because he thought Edmund had
“married a whore” and that their children had received
Saranchak’s rightful inheritance; and that Saranchak did all of
the driving on the night of the murders and acted according to a
plan. All of this evidence, moreso than that in Vandivner, is
“amply sufficient,” id., to support the verdict rendered. More to
the point, the verdict from the degree of guilt hearing had
“overwhelming record support.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
Thus, it would take a considerable amount of new, strong
evidence to undermine it. See id. at 695–96. The record,
however, even as supplemented by the evidence adduced at the

37
PCRA hearing, admits of no reasonable probability of a
different outcome.

The PCRA hearing was conducted more than eight years
after the degree of guilt hearing.12 The evidence presented at
that proceeding included the testimony of Saranchak’s two half-
brothers, his stepfather, Miles, Watkins, and two mental health
experts. Saranchak’s family members testified generally about
his family life and his behavior when he was drinking compared
to his conduct when he was not drinking. They also testified to
his demeanor on the night of the murders. This evidence was
irrelevant. Commonwealth v. Brown, 578 A.2d 461, 466 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (holding psychiatrist’s and mother’s testimony
to defendant’s “past bizarre behavior” not relevant to diminished
capacity defense). Watkins recounted nothing more than his
understanding of the applicable law and his choices in
representing Saranchak. Miles generally reiterated his testimony
from the degree of guilt hearing regarding Saranchak’s
purposeful conduct, but recanted that portion in which he had
claimed to hear Saranchak say they might have to shoot
someone to get money.13

12
The degree of guilt hearing was held on September 6, 1994,
with the verdict announced two days later. The evidentiary hearing
in the PCRA matter was conducted on February 11 and 19, 2003.
13
The PCRA court did not disturb its earlier factual
finding—at the degree of guilt hearing—that Saranchak made this
statement to Miles on the night of the murders. The Pennsylvania

38
 Dr. Harry Krop, a psychologist who first interviewed
Saranchak during the collateral relief process, testified that
Saranchak had “adult attention deficit disorder” and “problems
focusing,” that he had mood disorders and depression, and “a
personality disorder . . . with paranoid and anti-social features.”
He referred to the paranoid disorder as a delusional disorder. He
recounted that Saranchak’s parents divorced when he was two
years old, that Saranchak’s father was an abusive alcoholic who
was in and out of jail, and that his mother was treated for
depression. According to Krop, all of this “deformed Mr.
Saranchak’s overall personality and coping skills and problem
solving skills.” Saranchak, he said, developed a “poor self-
concept, as a result of poor coping skills,” was rejected by the
military, and “almost started living in a fantasy world about
being in the military.” When Saranchak was intoxicated, Krop
observed, “sometimes there was a blurring of fantasy and reality
in terms of this militaristic lifestyle that he almost perceived
himself truly to be in the military and on a mission”; at those
times he was “truly delusional.” Krop’s opinion was that, based
on his alcohol consumption on the night of the murders,
Saranchak’s thought processes would have been impaired, his
judgment would have been compromised, and his impulsivity

Supreme Court likewise did not disturb it on appeal. Saranchak, 866
A.2d at 296. It is thus a finding of fact we “presume[] to be correct,”
and Saranchak has not carried his burden of rebutting “the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

39
would have been compromised. Krop diagnosed that, at the
time of the murders, Saranchak was suffering from “an extreme
mental or emotional disturbance,” the nature of which was “the
combination of the depressive disorder, paranoid personality
disorder, possibly delusional again”; that “primarily the
combination of psychiatric issues with the level of intoxication
put him in an extreme state of emotional disturbance”; that
Saranchak’s “capacity to appreciate the criminality of what he
was doing and to conform his conduct to the law was
substantially impaired” “for the same reasons”; and that his
belief and statements regarding a military mission and its
“classified” status demonstrate he was “somewhat in a paranoid
kind of state.” Dr. Krop also pointed out Saranchak’s
resentment toward his uncle due to Edmund’s children having
received Saranchak’s rightful inheritance and the “cumulative
resentment” Saranchak harbored toward his grandmother for
constantly deriding him.

Dr. Kruszewski, a psychiatrist, testified that alcohol can
produce “psychiatric and psychotic effects on an individual’s
behavior,” and cause “[d]epression and psychosis.” He said that
Saranchak suffered from a Jekyll-and-Hyde–type personality
disorder, explaining that when Saranchak drinks, “he has
specific delusions that are presumably a result of the alcohol and
behaves in a very different manner.” Kruszewski diagnosed
Saranchak as suffering from “a psychoactive substance induced,
in this case, alcohol induced delusional disorder and alcohol
induced depressive disorder.” He further opined that Saranchak

40
lacked the capacity to form a criminal intent at the time of the
murders because he “was acting within the scope of his
delusional beliefs.” Saranchak was in a state of extreme mental
or emotional distress, which is to say “that his behavior and his
thought patterns and his mood and affect were severely
compromised by something, in this case alcohol and the
psychotic features as a result.” He also had a history of
“[a]cting out in an antisocial manner.”

The addition of the PCRA evidence into the record does
not reveal prejudice. The testimony of Saranchak’s family
members, Miles, and Watkins offered no new insight into
whether Saranchak experienced a diminished capacity on the
night of the murders. It was not expert psychiatric testimony,
and was thus irrelevant on that issue. Brown, 578 A.2d at 466.
The expert testimony offered by Dr. Krop and Dr. Kruszewski
consisted almost totally of the type of evidence the Pennsylvania
courts hold irrelevant and inadmissible. It demonstrates that
Saranchak suffered from auditory hallucinations, schizoaffective
disorder, delusion, pathological paranoia, and a tenuous ability
to apprehend reality. Such testimony is irrelevant. Kuzmanko,
709 A.2d 392. To the extent it shows Saranchak was unable to
control himself or acted impulsively, it is likewise irrelevant.
Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170; Taylor, 876 A.2d at 926. Both
experts testified that Saranchak was anti-social, which is
irrelevant. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128. Dr. Krop merely summed
up what all knew about Saranchak: he was a very troubled man
who carried with him the baggage of a troubled past. He also

41
reaffirmed that Saranchak had a motive to commit these crimes,
but Dr. Krop did not offer any opinion on whether Saranchak
was able to form the specific intent to kill. His testimony is thus
unhelpful. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 510, 527
(Pa. 2009) (“Thus, a defendant asserting a diminished capacity
defense . . . contests the degree of culpability based upon his
inability to formulate the requisite mental state.”) (emphasis
added).

Dr. Kruszewski did opine that Saranchak lacked the
capacity to form a criminal intent, but this opinion was based on
irrelevant information: “He was acting within the scope of his
delusional beliefs the best I can put it together.” See Kuzmanko,
709 A.2d 392 (evidence of delusion is irrelevant to a diminished
capacity defense). Accordingly, if offered at the degree of guilt
hearing, the opinion would have been inadmissible. Id. at
398–99 (approving of exclusion of expert’s opinion that
defendant’s ability to form specific intent to kill was adversely
affected because it was based on irrelevant grounds). The only
evidence introduced at the PCRA hearing
that—possibly—would have been admissible at trial on the
diminished capacity issue is Dr. Kruszewski’s fleeting testimony
that Saranchak was depressed as a result of his alcohol
consumption. See Commonwealth v. Legg, 711 A.2d 430, 444,
448 (Pa. 1998) (evidence of “major depression with anxiety at
the time of the shooting,” which in expert’s opinion was
sufficient to “distort[] her perception of the situation with her
ex-husband and impair her judgment” because it was

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“associated with her feelings of anger and betrayal,” admissible
on the question of diminished capacity). Dr. Kruszewski
testified only that Saranchak had an “alcohol induced depressive
disorder when drinking” and noted “the psychosis that he
experienced as a result.”

What little might be gleaned from Dr. Kruszewski’s
testimony does not give rise to a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the degree of guilt hearing would have been
different. As recounted above, there was ample evidence of
Saranchak’s specific intent to murder Stella and Edmund, and it
would have taken much to disturb it. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
695–96. This case stands in contrast to Jacobs v. Horn, 395
F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2005), where we concluded that evidence of the
defendant’s impaired cognitive function unearthed at the PCRA
stage was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable probability that,
had it been introduced at trial, it would have altered the
outcome. However, in Jacobs there was no evidence of the
defendant’s behavior and plan prior to the victims’ deaths. The
facts of that case only include a call to the police alerting them
to the crime scene, a witness’s testimony recounting the
defendant’s inculpatory statements, and then evidence from the
crime scene itself. Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 98. There is no
indication that evidence of the defendant’s statements, thoughts,
or movements prior to the killings were ever presented to the
finder of fact. The defendant’s diminished capacity and other
defenses at trial failed, but upon delving further into possible
support for the failed diminished capacity defense, the

43
defendant’s experts uncovered evidence of brain damage and
other cognitive maladies. We concluded that his counsel’s
failure to introduce this at trial was prejudicial under Strickland.
Id. at 105. That is, the defendant was deprived of “a trial whose
result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

In this case, both experts who testified at the PCRA stage
presented a thorough evaluation of Saranchak’s mental health.
Yet Dr. Krop’s testimony did not satisfy the legal requirements
of a diminished capacity defense under Pennsylvania law, and
Dr. Kruszewski’s abbreviated reference that Saranchak is
depressed when he drinks is the only portion of his testimony
that was relevant to the defense. Neither could explain away
Saranchak’s stated intent to obtain money, his retrieval of the
gun, his deliberate method of committing the murders, or his
admitted motive for doing so. “The assessment of prejudice
should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is
reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the
standards that govern the decision.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
After a thorough review of not only the testimony of Dr. Krop
and Dr. Kruszewski, but the entire PCRA record and degree of
guilt hearing record, we conclude that there is not “a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors” made at the degree of guilt
hearing, a rational, objective factfinder following the directive
just quoted “would have had a reasonable doubt respecting
[Saranchak’s] guilt” of first degree murder. Id. Thus,
Saranchak has failed to establish a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors in failing to investigate

44
and present a proper diminished capacity defense, he would not
have been convicted of first-degree murder. Id. at 694. Even a
diminished capacity defense that was supported by the expert
testimony introduced at the PCRA hearing would have failed to
negate the showing, made by the evidence of his behavior prior
to the murders and how they were committed, that Saranchak
acted with the specific intent to kill.

IV.

Saranchak has failed to show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). For the foregoing reasons, we
will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with
instructions for the District Court to deny in part Saranchak’s
Petition For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus By A Prisoner In State
Custody with respect to Counts I, II, and III. The District Court
shall consider the remaining issues in the petition, including
issues related to the penalty phase of the state proceedings.

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