UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 4/22/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
BENJAMIN BREWER,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 96-5100
v. (N.D. Oklahoma)
RON WARD, Warden of the Oklahoma (D.C. No. 92-C-487-BU)
State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Benjamin Brewer appeals from an order of the district court denying his Motion to
Reconsider Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and denying his
application for a stay of execution. The district court’s order was entered on April 9,
1996. We received Mr. Brewer’s notice of appeal, request for a stay, and brief on Friday
afternoon, April 19. We ordered the state to file its response brief by noon today,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Monday, April 22. Mr. Brewer is scheduled to be executed in the early morning hours of
Friday, April 26, 1996.1
Mr. Brewer raises a single issue in this appeal: whether the district court properly
held that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment entered by
district court Judge Thomas Brett on February 10, 1994, dismissing Mr. Brewer’s habeas
petition, need not be vacated for violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). He also seeks a stay of
execution and transfer of his case to a different judge for the purpose of instituting new
proceedings on the issues raised in his amended habeas corpus petition.
Several courts have determined that a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion raising new
claims may be treated as the functional equivalent of a successive habeas petition,
implicating abuse of the writ, procedural bar and exhaustion principles. Hunt v. Nuth, 57
F.3d 1327, 1339 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 724 (1996); Guinan v. Delo, 5
F.3d 313, 316 (8th Cir. 1993); Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 1993) (but
deciding the Rule 60(b) claim also on the merits in the alternative); Williams v. Whitley,
994 F.2d 226, 230 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 608 (1993); Bolder v.
1
This panel has closely monitored this petition since it was initially filed in the
United States District Court, and considerable effort has been expended on the issues
raised. This panel has had the benefit of all the briefs filed with the district court.
Accordingly, the panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be
useful, that no further briefing is necessary in this court, and that further delay in this
appeal is not warranted. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Appellant’s
request for oral argument is therefore denied and the case is ordered submitted without
oral argument.
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Armentrout, 983 F.2d 98, 99 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1088 (1993); Blair v.
Armentrout, 976 F.2d 1130, 1134 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 916 (1993);
Landano v. Rafferty, 897 F.2d 661, 668 (3d Cir.) (applying exhaustion requirement to
Rule 60(b)(6) motion but otherwise not deciding the issue), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811
(1990); Lindsey v. Thigpen, 875 F.2d 1509, 1511-12 (11th Cir. 1989). Other courts
including our own, without addressing the issue, have evaluated the denial of Rule 60(b)
relief in the habeas context for an abuse of discretion. See Resnover v. Pearson, 9 F.3d
113, 1993 WL 430159 (7th Cir. 1993) (unpublished order); Robison v. Maynard, 958
F.2d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 929 (1992); May v. Collins, 961 F.2d
74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 504 U.S. 901 (1992). We need not decide the issue because
even under the abuse of discretion standard for the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief, we
conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion.2
Mr. Brewer’s argument is that the district court misapplied the harmless error
standard of Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), in
determining that the February 10 order need not be vacated. In particular, he claims that
the court erroneously focused on harm or error in the context of the merits of Mr.
Brewer’s own case, and he suggests, without citation of supporting authority, that the
court should have looked at systemic harm. While we agree that systemic harm is a
Furthermore, the request for relief is clearly untimely under Rule 60(b), coming
2
more than two years after our decision in Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir.
1994). See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868 (1988).
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consideration, we disagree that it is the only consideration. Any error resulting from the
violation of § 455(a) must also be analyzed and determined as it relates to Mr. Brewer and
his own case.
Mr. Brewer does not argue that he is actually innocent of the crime,3 nor does he
claim any constitutional error occurred at his trial, nor does he claim any actual bias
resulting from the involvement of Judge Thomas Brett, the judge who erroneously failed
to recuse himself from Mr. Brewer’s habeas proceeding, in which an evidentiary hearing
was held. In recently determining that a conviction occurring in a case in which § 455(a)
was violated because the trial judge erred in failing to recuse herself, the Fifth Circuit
made just such a case-specific inquiry:
After a thorough review of the trial record, we are convinced that the
conviction should stand. First, Appellant does not contend that Judge
Melinda Harmon was actually biased during the trial phase, nor does she
allege an explicit nexus between the alleged errors and the appearance of
bias. Second, Appellant never contends that she suffered any harm during
trial because of any alleged bias or prejudice. Third, we find neither an
indication of bias in the trial record nor any error requiring reversal.
3
In our affirmance of the denial of Mr. Brewer’s first habeas petition, we described
the crime as follows:
On August 17, 1978, the semi-nude body of Karen Joyce Stapleton
was discovered in her Tulsa apartment. She had been stabbed twenty-one
times. Mr. Brewer confessed to the crime and physical evidence introduced
at trial corroborated that confession.
Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 936
(1996).
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United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1412-13 (5th Cir. 1994).
In holding that Judge Brett’s order need not be vacated, the district court relied in
part on Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1066 (1989), which Mr. Brewer claims is wrong. In Parker, in considering the third
prong of the Liljeberg harmless error standard, “the risk of undermining the public’s
confidence in the judicial process,” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864, the court observed that a
determination that § 455(a) had been violated would itself “instill greater confidence in
our judiciary,” Parker, 855 F.2d at 1527, without the necessity of also vacating the
judgment. Indeed, on this latter point the Parker court said, “[i]n fact, if we reverse and
vacate a decision that we have already determined to be proper, the public will lose faith
in our system of justice because the case will be overturned without regard to the merits
of the [underlying] claims.” Id. We have cited this analysis with approval in applying the
harmless error standard. See Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d at 1572.
We have carefully reviewed all filings in this case and the record before us in this
appeal. In our previous opinion affirming the district court order Mr. Brewer would have
us now vacate, we explained that we had “exhaustively reviewed” the record in the case.
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We AFFIRM the denial of Mr. Brewer’s Motion, for substantially the reasons set forth in
the district court’s order. We DENY his request for a stay of execution. The mandate
shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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