UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 6/25/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
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ROBERT D. HOLDSWORTH,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 96-1008
(D.C. No. 93-Z-2287)
v. (D. Colorado)
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
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Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Robert D. Holdsworth appeals the district court's order affirming the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services' decision to deny his
application for social security benefits. We affirm.
On December 2, 1980, Mr. Holdsworth was injured at work when he fell
from scaffolding. On April 22, 1991, he filed a Disability Report with the
Department of Health and Human Services alleging he suffered from a T-12
compression fracture, pain in his midback, frontal headaches, blurry vision,
chronic cervical sprain and degenerative arthritis as a result of the fall. On April
1, 1993, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision finding "[t]he evidence
as a whole clearly shows that the claimant, at all times pertinent to this decision,
was capable of performing sedentary work." The appeals council denied Mr.
Holdsworth's request for review. On October 26, 1993, Mr. Holdsworth filed an
action in the district court alleging the "conclusions and findings of fact of the
administrators were not supported by substantial evidence and are contrary to
law." The district court affirmed the Secretary's decision and noted:
This is a case where very clearly in looking at the entire
record, the plaintiff has the ability to do sedentary work. The ALJ's
finding that he is able to do sedentary work is a proper finding. In
fact, there is nothing in the record that's in conflict with that, and I
don't think the words "frequent[] changes of position" can be
magnified to be in conflict with that, because in that same sentence,
the doctor indicates that he can do lighter type of work.
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I have no problem -- I don't know whether the grids should
have been applied in this case, but I have no problem with the fact
that they were. I don't think it's error, because it appears that
plaintiff's other problems, his pain, headaches, were controlled with
medication and did not limit his ability to do the sedentary work.
Again, there is nothing from any doctor in the record that says that
there was a limitation.
Mr. Holdsworth raises five issues on appeal: 1) "[d]id the district court err
by finding the Commissioner of Social Security ... Decision was supported by
substantial evidence"; 2) "[d]id the Commissioner satisfy her burden at step five
of the evaluation procedure"; 3) "[d]id the Commissioner fail to consider all of
the evidence in the record"; 4) "[d]id the Administrative Law Judge ... fail to
develop the record"; and 5) "[d]id the Appeals Council fulfill its duty of review or
violate Mr. Holdsworth's right to procedural due process?"
Although Mr. Holdsworth raises numerous issues, our task is limited to
examining the record as a whole to determine whether the Secretary's decision is
supported by substantial evidence and adheres to applicable legal standards.
Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994).
I
We will first address whether the Administrative Law Judge failed to meet
his burden at step five of the evaluation process. See generally Williams v.
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Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (detailing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520
& 416.920's five-step analysis). Having determined that Mr. Holdsworth was
severely injured and was unable to return to his previous line of work, the judge
then had to consider Mr. Holdsworth's "residual functional capacity and [his] age,
education, and past work experience to see if [he] can do other work." 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(f). The judge noted Mr. Holdsworth's inability to perform his prior
line of work, his age which classified him as a younger individual at the relevant
time, his ninth grade education and his ability to perform the full range of
sedentary work. Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a):
Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and
small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which
involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often
necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking
and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria
are met.
The judge then applied his findings to § "404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and
Rules 201.24, 201.25, or 201.26, Table No. 1 of Appendix 2, Subpart P,
Regulations No. 4," ("the grids") to conclude that Mr. Holdsworth was not
disabled.
Mr. Holdsworth claims application of the grids was inappropriate because
the judge failed to consider his non-exertional limitations which include
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restrictions on reaching, stooping, exposure to cold weather, "need to frequently
change positions," inability to drive for longer than an hour, "headaches,
depression, sleep disorder, blurred vision, dizziness and pain." Mr. Holdsworth is
correct that when non-exertional limitations are present, use of the grids is only
appropriate as a framework to determine whether a sufficient number of jobs exist
that the claimant can perform. Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1131 (10th Cir.
1988). If the claimant's non-exertional limitations, however, do not affect his
ability to perform sedentary work then use of the grids is appropriate.
In his decision the judge found:
Regarding the claimant's own statements, the undersigned was
persuaded by the claimant's estimates of what he could have
performed during the time frame in question and it was his own
estimate that he could lift from 10 to 15 pounds. This, in fact,
exceeds the requirements for sedentary work. Regarding his ... use
of pain medication, he said that this is somewhat limited including
aspirin and Inderal for pain. He stated that what exacerbates his pain
is cold weather but sedentary work is performed primarily interiorly,
unlike what the claimant was used to as a carpenter. Regarding daily
activities, he said he spends his days walking his dog, watching
television, and going to the union hall. His hobby is working on
lawn mowers.
The Administrative Law Judge also considered the medical evidence
and statements of treating and examining physicians. Exhibit 15
provides a good summary of the claimant's history of injury but this
record, while establishing a medically determinable impairment, does
not show that the claimant would be incapable of performing
sedentary work at the time ... in question.
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We have carefully reviewed the record and considered each of Mr.
Holdsworth's complaints. His restrictions regarding reaching, stooping, exposure
to cold weather, need to frequently change positions and inability to drive for
longer than an hour do not affect his ability to perform a sedentary job. The
definition of a sedentary job refers to one where he would need to sit or stand for
regular periods of time and do occasional light lifting. These requirements do not
anticipate that he will be doing any reaching, stooping, driving or be exposed to
cold weather. Furthermore, his need to frequently change positions should be
easy to accommodate. Regarding his other complaints, the headaches, pain and
sleep disorder he testified were controlled by medication when he chose to take it.
See Dixon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding a condition that
can be controlled with medication cannot serve as the basis for a finding of a
disability). His complaints of blurred vision were refuted by an ophthalmologist
who found "[n]o disability from an ophthalmological viewpoint" and that his
vision was 20/20. Although on appeal he alleges depression as a factor, during
his hearing before the Administrative Law Judge his attorney asked him if he had
suffered from any emotional or psychological problems to which he responded:
"No, sir. I don't believe so." After testifying that he had not suffered from any
emotional or psychological problems, it is disingenuous for him now to argue he
was disabled because of depression.
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Like the district court, we also find persuasive the fact that every doctor
who examined Mr. Holdsworth found him to be capable of performing light work.
In an attempt to discredit the above testimony before the district court, Mr.
Holdsworth's counsel argued:
[Counsel]: I'm not -- when I hear that someone is capable of
light work, I'm always somewhat puzzled as to what they mean.
Whether it means part-time work, work less restrictive than the
patient was doing in the past, or what --
THE COURT: Well, for Social Security appeals purposes, it
means not lifting heavy weights, not doing the type of things that
would bother someone with a bad back as the plaintiff apparently
has.
[Counsel]: Of course, light work under the department of
labor -- that's right, your honor -- means something very specific; but
I'm not sure that that's the context. And that that is a true
interpretation of what the physician was saying in this case.
But in any event, the doctor -- and Dr. Messner has since
retired. That's one of the problems with this case. If we want some -
- want some specifics as to what he meant by certain -- by some --
sometimes contradictory restrictions or ambiguous restrictions, he's
not going to be around to clarify the record for us.
We do not find the doctor's restrictions to be ambiguous or contradictory or
preclusive of sedentary work. In the absence of any non-exertional limitations
that would have affected Mr. Holdsworth's ability to perform sedentary work, we
find the Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence and in
accordance with applicable legal standards.
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II
Mr. Holdsworth also claims the Commissioner failed to consider all of the
evidence. In particular Mr. Holdsworth claims the Administrative Law Judge
"refused to consider the opinion of treating physician Milo L. Messner, M.D."
This contention is contradicted by the record. In his decision the judge states:
The report from the claimant's treating physician also shows that the
claimant could return to work in the time frame in question. Milo
Mes[s]ner, M.D., stated in April 1982 that the claimant "will not
return to his usual occupation and that rehabilitation should be into
another type of work with the limitations of not working above the
level of his shoulders, not working below the level of his waist, and
not to lift greater than 25 pounds 1 foot from his chest." He went on
to say "[t]he patient remains on a no-work status from his usual job
but has been released to a lighter type of work." Dr. Mes[s]ner
confirmed similar limitations in an updated letter of December 20,
1982.
The above passages show that the judge did in fact consider and give great
weight to Dr. Messner's findings and recommendations.
Next, Mr. Holdsworth claims the Commissioner failed to fully develop the
record. Mr. Holdsworth alleges: "The appeals council refused to include the
exhibits in the prior file .... The Commissioner failed to explain why she did not
give credit for Mr. Holdsworth's 1980 earnings .... The ALJ was unable to apply
SSR95-1p to the prior claim." He then claims "[t]here was an apparent conflict in
the record between Dr. Messner's and others' orthopedic assessments." His
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contentions lack merit. He does not provide us with any information regarding
what information should have been included in the prior file or why Mr.
Holdsworth was prejudiced by this denial or why it was inappropriate. Regarding
Mr. Holdsworth's 1980 earnings, we assume this addresses the argument Mr.
Holdsworth made before the district court that his insurance period rendering him
able for disability benefits should have lasted until 1984 instead of 1983. As we
affirm the finding that Mr. Holdsworth was not disabled, whether the period he
would have been eligible for disability ended in 1983 or 1984 is irrelevant.
Regarding the apparent conflict in the record Mr. Holdsworth seems to be arguing
that the judge should have had him examined by a neurologist and a psychologist.
Neither this issue nor the appropriateness of the SSR-95-1p were raised in the
proceedings below and we will therefore not address them for the first time on
appeal. See Walker v. Mather (In re Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992).
III
Finally, Mr. Holdsworth contends the appeals council failed to fulfill its
duty of review and violated claimant's right to procedural due process. His entire
argument on this point is:
Plaintiff requested the post-complaint second Appeals Council's
decision be stricken from the record .... The District Court
wrongfully denied this motion [citation omitted]. Whether the
Appeals Council received claimant's documents and refused to
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consider them or whether they simply misplaced them, the reviewing
tribunal failed to review the complete record before making its
decision [citations omitted]. This Court also has mandamus
jurisdiction to require the Commissioner to rule on claimant's
Request to Reopen.
This brief argument does little to inform us of the alleged errors or of any
prejudice Mr. Holdsworth may have suffered as a result. Because our standard of
review is so narrowly focused in this type of appeal and we have already found
the Administrative Law Judge's decision to be supported by substantial evidence
and in accordance with the correct legal standards we affirm without addressing
the propriety of the Appeals Council's actions.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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