UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 6/25/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 95-6310
(D.C. No. CR-92-141-T)
PETER I. PHILIPS, also known as (W.D. Okla.)
Emaraobebi Idaba,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before EBEL, BARRETT, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted
without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation
of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms
and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant Peter Philips pled guilty to one count of making false statements on a loan
application in August 1992. The district court sentenced him to 149 days’ imprisonment,
which was the amount of time already served at the time of sentencing, followed by three
years of supervised release. In July 1995, defendant pled guilty to mail fraud. Based on this
subsequent conviction, the district court revoked defendant’s supervised release. Although
application of the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the sentencing guidelines would
yield a sentence in the range of four to ten months for the original conviction, see U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.4(a), the district court sentenced defendant to twenty-four months’ imprisonment, the
maximum permitted by statute. Defendant appeals this sentence, arguing that the policy
statements should be treated as binding on the district court, absent “extraordinarily
compelling reasons” for departure, which he contends are not present in this case.
Appellant’s Br. at 5.
We recently considered and rejected a similar argument in United States v. Hurst, 78
F.3d 482, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1996). After considering the effect of the Supreme Court’s
opinions in Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), and Williams v. United States, 503
U.S. 193 (1992), on our earlier decisions, we reaffirmed our holding in United States v. Lee,
957 F.2d 770, 773-74 (10th Cir. 1992), that the policy statements in Chapter Seven
concerning the revocation of supervised release are only advisory, and that a trial court’s
decision to impose a sentence in excess of that recommended by the policy statements will
not be reversed “‘if it can be determined from the record to have been reasoned and
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reasonable.’” Hurst, 78 F.3d at 483-84 (quoting Lee, 957 F.2d at 774). The record here
reflects that the district court articulated a number of reasons for its decision to impose a
sentence in excess of that recommended in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). As the district court’s
decision appears to be both “reasoned and reasonable,” Lee, 957 F.2d at 774, it must be
upheld.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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