UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 7/24/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE MENDOZA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY,
BOARD OF REGENTS OF NEW No. 95-2105
MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY, (D.C. No. CIV 94-1426 JC/WWD)
WILLIAM B. CONROY, MARY (District of New Mexico)
THUMANN, DEBORAH DENNIS,
PATRICIA WOLF, and ROBERT E.
HOWELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before PORFILIO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
ALARCON, Senior Circuit Judge.**
This case concerns the doctrine of res judicata.
George Mendoza, an Hispanic male who is visually impaired and qualifies as
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3
**
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”),
was employed for some eight years as Assistant Coordinator of the Student Disabled
Program at New Mexico State University (“University”), located in Las Cruces, New
Mexico. Mendoza was terminated from his employment effective July 30, 1993. Prior to
his termination, Mendoza had filed two complaints with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The first alleged discrimination based upon
national origin, physical disability and retaliation for filing internal complaints of
discrimination. The second charge, filed after Mendoza received a Notice of Proposed
Termination, alleged retaliation based upon that notice.
On July 16, 1993, after receiving the Notice of Proposed Termination but before
the actual termination, Mendoza filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico against the University and individual defendants Mary
Thumann (“Thumann”), Deborah Dennis (“Dennis”) and Patricia Wolf (“Wolf”), all
employees at the University. The complaint alleged “Deprivation of Constitutional
Rights,” and was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 12117.
In paragraph twelve of Count I of his complaint, Mendoza alleged, without any
particular detail, that the defendants had subjected him “to arbitrary and capricious
disciplinary actions . . . which has [sic] resulted in [his] discharge from employment.” In
paragraph thirteen, Mendoza alleged that the defendants “have acted in concert to create,
conduct and orchestrate a hostile work environment, directed against [him], which has
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resulted in his discharge from employment.” And in paragraph sixteen, Mendoza alleged
that the defendants, acting in concert, “have instituted and undertaken personnel actions,
seeking to terminate and/or suspend or otherwise discipline [him], in violation of [his]
due process rights in such employment.” Mendoza sued for judgment against the
defendants “in an amount to be proved at trial.”
In Count II, Mendoza alleged that the defendants’ actions towards him were
“based, in whole or in part, upon his gender and sexual orientation.” In Count III,
Mendoza alleged that the “defendants have refused to make reasonable accommodation to
enable [him] to continue to be employed, in light of his physical disability.” The
complaint was drawn by his attorney of record.1
On April 15, 1994, Mendoza, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss his July
16, 1993, complaint. In that motion, Mendoza stated “that he no longer wishe[d] to
pursue the matters in litigation,” and that “counsel for the defendants ha[d] been
contacted and agree[d] to this dismissal.” The district court granted Mendoza’s motion
to dismiss that same day, and dismissed the complaint, “with prejudice.”
On December 15, 1994, Mendoza filed a second, pro se, complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico against the University, Thumann,
Dennis, Wolf, and additional individual defendants, Elva G. Tilles (“Tilles”), William B.
1
The entire complaint was couched in general and conclusory terms and did not
set forth particular events or dates.
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Conroy (“Conroy”) and Robert E. Howell (“Howell”), also employees of the University.
The complaint was almost identical to the complaint filed on his behalf by his attorney on
July 16, 1993, merely adding four additional claims, one for “breach of contract,” one for
“wrongful discharge,” one based on the “Americans with Disabilities Act,” and a final
one for “Retaliation.” As concerns the additional four counts, they were all “one-liners,”
and all we know about these four counts has been set forth immediately above.
On December 28, 1994, the defendants filed a Motion for Immediate Dismissal.
As grounds therefor, the defendants asserted that “all claims are barred by res judicata or
claim preclusion.” In response, on January 30, 1995, Mendoza filed a pro se “First
Amended Complaint,” naming as defendants the University, Conroy, Thumann, Dennis,
Wolf, and Howell. The federal claims asserted in that complaint were based on 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 12203, and 29 U.S.C. § 794.
In his First Amended Complaint, under the heading “General Allegations,”
Mendoza alleged the following: (1) on February 13, 1993, Mendoza filed a complaint
with the EEOC, charging the University and the defendants Thumann and Dennis with
employment discrimination based on his national origin, his disability and for filing
internal complaints of discrimination with the local office of the EEOC at the University2;
(2) on July 2, 1993, Mendoza received a “Notice of Proposed Termination” from the
2
In his complaint filed with the EEOC Mendoza alleged that these acts occurred
between January 1, 1990, and January 25, 1993, and all pertained to on-the-job
discrimination.
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University; (3) on July 12, 1993, Mendoza filed a second complaint with the EEOC
charging the University with “retaliation, to wit: the intent to terminate him for his prior
filing with the EEOC”; (4) on July 16, 1993, Mendoza filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico charging the defendants with
“disparate treatment based upon gender and disability and alleging procedural and
substantive due process violations”; (5) a hearing was held on the Notice to Terminate,
and Mendoza’s employment with the University was terminated, effective July 30, 1993;
(6) on August 26, 1997, a post-termination hearing was held before the school’s
Professional Personnel Board, which recommended that the termination be upheld; and
(7) on September 2, 1993, the defendant Conroy, after reviewing the hearing transcripts,
upheld the termination.
Count I of the First Amended Complaint set forth a charge against all defendants
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II was based on “Retaliation in Violation of the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act [29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.].” Count III and Count IV were both
state claims, based upon breach of contract and retaliatory discharge, respectively.
The defendants filed an answer to Mendoza’s First Amended Complaint on
February 14, 1995. As their first affirmative defense, they alleged that the complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, because all claims were barred
by res judicata. The defendants also filed a motion for immediate dismissal based on res
judicata.
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On February 22, 1995, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
holding that the voluntary dismissal of Mendoza’s July 16, 1993, complaint was a final
judgment which barred bringing a second suit. Specifically, the district court held that
“the same events underlying the earlier Complaint also form the nucleus of conduct on
which Plaintiff bases his claim in the present action.” Accordingly, the district court
dismissed the First Amended Complaint, “with prejudice in its entirety.”
At this point, the attorney who now represents Mendoza in this Court filed with the
district court an entry of appearance for the “sole and specific purpose of assisting him in
drafting, filing and perfecting a motion to seek a rehearing of the motion by Defendants to
dismiss the First Amended Complaint on res judicata grounds or, in the alternative, to set
aside under Rule 60 the order filed on February 22, 1995, dismissing the Complaint on
said grounds.”
On March 7, 1995, Mendoza, through counsel, filed a motion for rehearing or to
set aside the district court’s order, alleging, inter alia, that the order had been entered
before Mendoza had an opportunity to respond. A memorandum was filed in support of
said motion. The defendants, in response, stated that they had no objection to a rehearing
and filed a reply to Mendoza’s memorandum.
On April 24, 1995, the district court denied Mendoza’s motion, stating that
Mendoza did have an opportunity to respond to the defendant’s answer and request for
dismissal based on res judicata. However, the court went on to consider the “written
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arguments and materials” presented by Mendoza’s counsel in his memorandum and
concluded that “its February 22, 1995 order dismissing this action was proper.” Mendoza
appeals. We affirm.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been
raised in that action”. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); See also Satsky v.
Paramount Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir. 1993) (same). “Inasmuch as the doctrine of
res judicata precludes parties from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised,
parties cannot defeat its application by simply alleging new legal theories.” Clark v. Haas
Group, Inc., 953 F.2d. 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 832 (1992).
Further, “[a] district court’s conclusions as to res judicata are conclusions of law and
reviewable de novo.” Id. at 1237.
Mendoza agrees that his initial action proceeded to a final judgment when the
district court granted his motion and dismissed the action with prejudice. Mendoza also
agrees that the same parties, or their privies, are involved in the two actions. However,
Mendoza maintains that the issues in the two actions are not identical, and that his pro se
First Amended Complaint “is not based on the same cause of action as the first suit that
was dismissed, on his motion, with prejudice.”
In determining what constitutes a single cause of action, we have adopted the
transactional approach” recommended by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24
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(1982). Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas Joint Venture, 835 F.2d 1329 (10th
Cir. 1988). Under the transactional approach, a final judgment on the merits extinguishes
the plaintiff’s claim, including “all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant
with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of
which the action arose.” Petromanagement, 835 F.2d at 1335. Whether certain facts
constitute a “transaction” or a “series of corrected transactions” is to be determined
pragmatically, “giving weight to such considerations as to whether the facts are related in
time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether
their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding
or usage.” Id.
Mendoza’s contention that the issues raised in his First Amended Complaint are
not identical to the issues raised in his initial complaint appears to be based exclusively on
the fact that he had not been terminated from his employment when he filed his first
action on July 16, 1993, and that he was not terminated until sometime subsequent to that
time. Thus, Mendoza essentially argues that his termination constitutes a separate
transaction from the prior on-the-job discrimination that formed the basis of his initial
complaint. We are not persuaded by this argument.
Under the “transactional approach”, any claim for unlawful discharge in this case
arguably would be barred under res judicata, even though Mendoza was not actually
terminated until after July 16, 1993, and even if Mendoza had not asserted a claim in his
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first complaint based on unlawful discharge. Certainly it would seem that we are here
involved with a “series of connected transactions.” On February 13, 1993, Mendoza filed
his first complaint against the University with the EEOC. On July 2, 1993, Mendoza
received a Notice of Proposed Termination from the University. On July 12, 1993,
Mendoza filed a second complaint with the EEOC against the University based on
“retaliation.” Further, in that EEOC charge, Mendoza indicated that he intended to
challenge the termination in court on a retaliation theory. Mendoza’s first complaint in
federal district court, filed on July 16, 1993, charged the University, inter alia, with
unlawful discharge. On July 19, 1993, Mendoza was in fact discharged by the University,
the discharge to become effective on July 30, 1993.3 Certainly the foregoing would seem
to constitute a “series of connected transactions,” and Mendoza’s termination cannot be
considered separately from the other allegedly discriminatory acts, which led to his
termination.
However, even though Mendoza may have still been an employee of the
University on July 16, 1993, when he filed his first action, the important fact is that in his
first action Mendoza did allege, in so many words, a claim for unlawful discharge.
Indeed, that was the gravaman of his complaint. Counsel’s suggestion in a footnote of his
brief that such allegations were “premature, mistakenly included and a non-sequitur” is
not very convincing. Not only were there claims made in the first complaint based on
3
That discharge was administratively upheld on September 2, 1993. The defendants do
not dispute the chronology of events now relied on by Mendoza.
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unlawful termination, but, so far as we can tell, they were still in the complaint when, on
Mendoza’s own motion, the first complaint was dismissed on April 15, 1994, because
Mendoza “no longer wished to pursue the matters in litigation.”
In sum, under the described circumstances, we agree with the district court that
Mendoza’s First Amended Complaint is barred by the final judgment entered in the first
action against the University.
Judgment affirmed.
Entered for the court:
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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