F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 25 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LINCOLN A. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Case No. 96-4182
JIMMIE LEE STEWART, Director, at (D.C. 94 CV 773 G)
the Iron County/Utah State (District of Utah)
Correctional Facility, individually; Lee
Hulet, Lt. Inmate Discipline Hearing
Officer, (I.D.H.O.),
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has unanimously
determined that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Lincoln A. Smith, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, proceeding in forma
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
pauperis, brought this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officers and
employees at the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility. Mr. Smith,
alleged violations of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments arising from
the defendants’ administration of disciplinary proceedings against him. The
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations that (1)
defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted; (2) Mr. Smith’s motion for
summary judgment be denied; and (3) his claims be dismissed. Mr. Smith appeals
and we affirm.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).” Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir.
1995). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the uncontroverted material facts
establish that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 1991). We construe the
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Wolf, 50 F.3d at
796. In addition, because Mr. Smith is proceeding pro se, we must construe his
pleadings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Smith received notice of a disciplinary hearing against him arising
from an incident involving his alleged disorderly conduct and his use of
derogatory language toward an officer at the Utah State Prison. Based upon that
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hearing, he claims that his due process rights were violated when he was unable
to present witnesses or gather evidence at the disciplinary hearing held at the Iron
County State Correctional Facility, to which he was being transferred. Mr. Smith
was found guilty of the alleged infractions and placed in punitive isolation
confinement for twenty days. He also claims that the nature of the resulting
punitive confinement violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.
The district court correctly concluded that under Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, ___, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995), we must look to the nature of the
alleged deprivation to determine whether a liberty interest is implicated. As to
Mr. Smith’s placement in punitive isolation for twenty days, there is no evidence
that this confinement is the sort of “atypical, significant deprivation” that would
give rise to a liberty interest deserving of due process protection. Id. Nor is there
any indication that the disciplinary action “will inevitably affect the duration of
[Mr. Smith’s] sentence.” Id. at 2302. We agree that Mr. Smith’s punitive
isolation does not implicate a liberty interest that would entitle him to procedural
due process.
Mr. Smith also claims that Sandin should not be applied retroactively, but
we have held otherwise. See Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1413 (10th Cir.
1996). Here, as in Talley, there is no evidence in this case that the “disciplinary
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action would . . . inevitably affect the duration of plaintiff’s sentence under state
parole regulations.” Id. Thus, Mr. Smith was entitled to no procedural due
process in this matter, and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are
foreclosed.
Similarly, Mr. Smith’s claim that his placement in punitive isolation
constituted cruel and unusual punishment is unsubstantiated. There is nothing in
the record suggesting that Mr. Smith’s segregation amounted to an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981)
(holding that prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment if they
involve “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain [or if they are] grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment”).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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