F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 18 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-8098
(D.C. No. 95-CR-104)
TRACY LEWIS O’DONNELL, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Appellant’s request
for oral argument is therefore denied, and the case is ordered submitted without
oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
In this direct appeal, defendant Tracy Lewis O’Donnell challenges the
propriety of his sentence following conviction of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Specifically, Mr. O’Donnell asserts that the district court erred in enhancing his
sentence two levels for possession of a firearm pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)
and failing to afford him relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.
I. Background
In mid-July 1995, Mr. O’Donnell’s co-defendant, David Witt, entered into
an agreement with a confidential informant for the Wyoming Division of Criminal
Investigation, whereby Mr. Witt agreed to procure four ounces of
methamphetamine from Mr. O’Donnell in Arizona. The informant paid Mr. Witt
$1,500 for the purchase of the methamphetamine. Mr. Witt traveled to Arizona to
make the purchase and subsequently called the informant to advise him that he
would need an additional $4,500 in order to complete the transaction. The
informant wired this amount to Mr. O’Donnell’s bank account in Arizona.
After attempting, without success, to acquire the methamphetamine, the two
co-defendants and Mr. O’Donnell’s wife traveled to Worland, Wyoming, where
they returned the $6,000 to the informant before continuing on to Sturgis, South
-2-
Dakota, to attend an annual motorcycle rally. During this trip, Mr. O’Donnell
carried with him a nine millimeter Beretta pistol. Mr. O’Donnell confessed to
these facts during a non-custodial interview with agents of the Wyoming Division
of Criminal Investigation.
In late August 1995, the co-defendants advised the informant that the
methamphetamine was available, and again he wired $6,000 to Mr. O’Donnell’s
bank account in Arizona. In mid-September 1995, Mr. Witt personally delivered
three ounces of methamphetamine to the informant in Worland, Wyoming. The
final ounce was delivered to Mr. Witt by controlled mail delivery in early October
1995. Both Mr. O’Donnell and Mr. Witt were subsequently arrested.
On June 20, 1996, Mr. O’Donnell entered a non-conditional plea of guilty
to conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846. 1 He was sentenced to sixty months’ imprisonment, four years’
supervised release, a $10,000 fine, and a $50 special assessment. Because Mr.
O’Donnell possessed a firearm during the course of the drug offense, the district
court enhanced his sentence pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), and rejected his
request for sentencing under the “safety valve” provision of the Sentencing
1
In exchange for Mr. O’Donnell’s plea of guilty to the charge of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, the government agreed to
dismiss charges of aiding and abetting the possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
-3-
Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Mr. O’Donnell asserts error as to both
decisions.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing
guidelines. See United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 377 (10th Cir.
1995). We have noted, however, that “a district court’s application of the correct
legal standard to a particular defendant, and the specific conclusion that the
defendant is or is not eligible for relief under § 3553(f), would ordinarily be
reviewed for clear error.” Id. at 378 n.3.
B. USSG § 5C1.2 2
“Section 3553(f) was enacted as a ‘safety valve’ to permit courts to
sentence less culpable defendants to sentences under the guidelines, instead of
imposing mandatory minimum sentences.” Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 378. The
“safety value” provision allows the district court to depart from the statutory
minimum sentence if it finds that:
2
The U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, § 5C1.2, adopts
verbatim the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
-4-
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history
point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of
violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapons (or induce
another participant to do so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury
to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the
sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal
enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information
and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses
that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme
or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other
information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the
information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the
defendant has complied with this requirement.
USSG § 5C1.2(1)-(5).
Here, the district court concluded that because Mr. O’Donnell possessed a
firearm during his trip from Arizona to Worland, Wyoming, he did not qualify for
relief under the second factor of § 5C1.2. The court opined that the trip to return
the purchase money to the informant was part of the on-going drug trafficking
transaction and, moreover, the co-defendants were carrying drugs at the time,
albeit for the their own use.
-5-
We have held that “the defendant has the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of [§ 5C1.2].” United States v.
Verners, 103 F.3d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1996). At his sentencing hearing, Mr.
O’Donnell argued that the presence of the firearm was not for any purpose in
furtherance or protection of a drug trafficking activity. His wife testified that he
always took the firearm with him in the saddlebags on his motorcycle “for
whatever reason we need them for, you know, shooting snakes, bears, I don’t
know whatever else.” R. Vol. II at 16.
On appeal, Mr. O’Donnell argues that the return of the money to the
informant in Wyoming was not in connection with the drug offense. He asserts
that because the money was being returned, “the drug transaction had stopped and
ended.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Relying on Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501
(1995), Mr. O’Donnell contends that the government was required to prove “a
nexus between the offense and the firearm,” and failed to do so. Appellant’s Br.
at 8.
In United States v. Hallum, 103 F.3d 87 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1710 (1997), we considered a similar argument. The defendant in Hallum
argued that the burden was on the government to support the “in connection with”
element of § 5C1.2(2) by a preponderance of the evidence. 103 F.3d at 89. He
-6-
further asserted “that we should analogize the ‘possess’ element of § 5C1.2 to the
Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of the ‘use’ language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) in Bailey . . . , to require the government to prove active employment
of the firearm in relation to the underlying offense.” 103 F.3d at 89.
In rejecting this contention, we opined that “Bailey dealt with ‘use’ in
§ 924(c), not ‘possess,’ in § 5C1.2(2),” id., and that the Supreme Court’s analysis
that “‘§ 2D1.1(b)(1) provides an enhancement for a person convicted of certain
drug-trafficking offenses if a firearm was possessed during the offense[,] . . .
constitutes a recognition, . . . that ‘possess’ is to be given a broader meaning than
‘use.’” Id. We then joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that “a firearm’s
proximity and potential to facilitate the offense is enough to prevent application
of USSG § 5C1.2(2).” Id.; see also United States v. Burke, 91 F.3d 1052, 1053
(8th Cir. 1996). Here, we are satisfied that Mr. O’Donnell failed to prove a clear
probability that the presence of the firearm during the trip to Wyoming to return
the money was not for the purpose of facilitating that part of the drug trafficking
conspiracy.
Mr. O’Donnell also tenuously argues that although he carried the gun, the
money was always in Mr. Witt’s possession. This argument also is unavailing.
Section 5C1.2 is applicable not only to a defendant’s own conduct, but also to
“‘conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
-7-
willfully caused.’” Hallum, 103 F.3d at 90 (quoting USSG § 5C1.2, comment
(n.4)). Accordingly, for purposes of the applicability of § 5C1.2, Mr. O’Donnell
was responsible for Mr. Witt’s actions as well as his own. The district court’s
finding that the presence of the firearm could have been for the purpose of the
protection and furtherance of this joint activity was not clearly erroneous, and the
court was correct in denying Mr. O’Donnell relief under § 5C1.2.
C. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)
The sentencing guidelines provide that a base offense level should be
increased by two levels “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was
possessed.” USSG § 2D.1(b)(1). Asking this court to consider the same
arguments he made for application of § 5C1.2, Mr. O’Donnell asserts that the
district court improperly enhanced his sentence for possession of a firearm in
connection with a drug trafficking offense.
The government bears the initial burden “of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the gun was proximate to the drug offense.” United States v.
Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 964 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Roederer, 11
F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding “[w]eapon possession is established if the
government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a temporal and
spacial relation existed between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the
-8-
defendant”) (quotation omitted). This can be done by establishing that the
firearm was in the same general location “where drugs or drug paraphernalia are
stored or where part of the transaction occurred.” Roederer, 11 F.3d at 983
(quotation omitted). Once proximity is established, the burden shifts to the
defendant to “show it is clearly improbable that the weapon was related to the
offense.” United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1449 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quotation omitted).
Here, it is clear that the return of money, originally intended for the
purchase of drugs to the buyer/informant in Wyoming, was drug-trafficking
activity, and that Mr. O’Donnell’s firearm was proximately linked to that activity.
Moreover, Mr. O’Donnell has not established a clear probability that the firearm
was not present for the purpose of protecting and furthering the conspiracy.
Therefore, the district court’s two-level enhancement of sentence for possession
of a firearm pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1) was proper.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-9-