F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
NOV 6 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
REBECCA MAYCHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-7021
(D.C. No. CV-96-403-S)
MUSKOGEE MEDICAL CENTER (E.D. Okla.)
AUXILIARY, a nonprofit corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to amend her
complaint to substitute the proper party defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3).
Reviewing the district court’s application of Rule 15(c) de novo, see Slade v.
United States Postal Serv., 875 F.2d 814, 815 (10th Cir. 1989), we reverse.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her employer, the Muskogee Regional
Medical Center. Upon receiving the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter, plaintiff timely
filed her Title VII complaint on August 16, 1996, naming the Muskogee Regional
Medical Center Auxiliary (the Auxiliary) as the defendant. Plaintiff’s attorney
named the Auxiliary after inquiring of the Oklahoma Secretary of State’s office as
to the official designation of the medical center. In fact, plaintiff’s employer was
actually the Muskogee Regional Medical Center Authority (the Authority); the
Auxiliary was, instead, a volunteer organization associated with the medical
center.
On October 7, 1996, after the expiration of the ninety-day limitations
period for commencing her Title VII suit, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), plaintiff
filed a motion to substitute the Authority as the defendant. Following the district
court’s initial order granting this motion, plaintiff served the Authority on
November 14, 1996. Subsequently, the district court vacated its order granting
the amendment and denied the substitution. In doing so, the district court
-2-
determined that allowing the amendment would permit plaintiff to add a
defendant past the expiration of the limitations period, to the substantial prejudice
of the substituted party as it would deny the Authority its statute-of-limitations
defense. The district court then granted the Auxiliary’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the Title VII action. Plaintiff appeals the denial of her
motion to substitute the Authority as the proper defendant.
Rule 15(c)(3) provides that an amendment changing “the party or the
naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted” relates back to the filing of
the original pleading if the claim “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading,” Rule 15(c)(2), and, within the
time for service of the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m),
the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice
of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in
maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought against the party.
The district court’s determination that to allow plaintiff to assert her Title
VII claims against the Authority after the expiration of the limitations period
would preclude the Authority from asserting the limitations defense merely begs
the question. Rule 15(c)’s “relation back doctrine is typically applied with
reference to statutes of limitations.” Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d
1525, 1543 (8th Cir. 1996); see Kansa Reinsurance Co. v. Congressional
-3-
Mortgage Corp., 20 F.3d 1362, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1994) (Rule 15(c) allows
amendment despite applicable statute of limitations, if prerequisites are met); see
also, e.g., Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1245 (10th Cir. 1988)
(applying prior Rule 15(c)). 1 If, under the terms of Rule 15(c), the amendment
should relate back to the filing of the original complaint, then plaintiff’s Title VII
claims will not be barred by the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Donald v. Cook
County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 557 (7th Cir. 1996); FDIC v. Conner, 20
F.3d 1376, 1385 (5th Cir. 1994).
Further, Rule 15(c)(3) speaks only of prejudice to a party’s defense on the
merits. See Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (3d Cir. 1995)
(“The prejudice to which . . . Rule [15(c)] refers is that suffered by one who, for
lack of timely notice that a suit has been instituted, must set about assembling
evidence and constructing a defense when the case is already stale.”) (quotation
omitted); see also Patton v. Guyer, 443 F.2d 79, 86 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying
prior Rule 15(c); noting that “invariably some practical prejudice result[s] from
an amendment,” but proper question under Rule 15(c) is whether party’s ability to
prepare defense is prejudiced). Defendant’s conclusory allegations that the
1
Rule 15(c)(3), as amended in 1991, applies to this case. Like its
predecessor, the current rule requires that the party to be added receive notice
sufficient that his ability to defend will not be prejudiced. See Aslanidis v.
United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1076 (2d Cir. 1993).
-4-
timing of the amended complaint substantially prejudiced the preparation of its
defense are unpersuasive.
Applying the remainder of Rule 15(c)(3)’s requirements, there is no dispute
that plaintiff’s amended claims arose from the same conduct alleged in the
original complaint--her amendment sought only to substitute the Authority for the
Auxiliary as the defendant. See Archuleta v. Duffy’s Inc., 471 F.2d 33, 34-35 &
34 n.3 (10th Cir. 1973) (applying similar language of prior Rule 15(c)).
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend, in part, because to
allow her to do so would permit plaintiff to add a defendant past the expiration of
the limitations period. While the prior version of Rule 15(c) did require that the
party to be added receive notice of the action within the limitations period, see
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1986), Rule 15(c)(3), as amended in
1991, 2 only requires that plaintiff give the additional party notice within the 120
days provided for service of the original complaint. See, e.g., Delgado-Brunet v.
Clark, 93 F.3d 339, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1996); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police
Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 458 (3d Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff served the Authority
with the amended complaint within this 120-day time frame, plaintiff satisfied
this requirement.
2
See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993)
(amendment to Rule 15(c) overruling Schiavone was effective December 1, 1991).
-5-
The district court also held that plaintiff had been aware of the proper
defendant and that her failure to name the Authority in the original complaint was
not due to matters outside her control. The record, however, does not support this
finding. While plaintiff obviously was aware that she was employed by the
Muskogee Regional Medical Center, she was mistaken as to its official
designation.
Further, this is not a case where the plaintiff is aware of the identity of a
party, but makes a deliberate choice not to name that party as a defendant until
after the expiration of the limitations period, see, e.g., Rendall-Speranza v.
Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 917-19 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d
694, 705 (2d Cir. 1994), nor is it a case where the plaintiff initiates litigation
against an unknown party and does not identify that party until after the
limitations period has expired, see Henry v. FDIC, 168 F.R.D. 55, 59-60 (D. Kan.
1996), and cases cited therein. Rather, plaintiff intended from the outset to sue
her employer; she just mistakenly misnamed that entity in her complaint.
Defendant’s cited authority, see Appellee’s Br. at 7-10, therefore, is inapposite.
Plaintiff, who had been an employee of the Authority since 1992, and the
Authority had been involved in the EEOC proceedings preceding plaintiff’s Title
VII action. By statute, plaintiff ordinarily could not sue anyone other than the
employer named in the EEOC complaint, in this case designated only as the
-6-
“Muskogee Regional Med Cntr,” Appellant’s App. at 1. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Aller
Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 860 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). The Auxiliary itself had no employees. See Appellee’s
Supp. App. at 11.
Plaintiff served the Auxiliary’s representative, who was located at the same
address as the Authority. See Appellant’s App. at 2, 28, 29, 48-49; see also id. at
46, 48 (Auxiliary’s only physical base of operations is within Authority’s medical
center). Further, in his deposition, the Authority’s chief executive officer
testified that he believed he was made aware of the original complaint at the time
plaintiff initiated this action. See id. at 52.
Because the district court misapplied Rule 15(c)(3), denial of plaintiff’s
motion to amend was error. The judgment of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Oklahoma is, therefore, REVERSED, and the cause is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
-7-