F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 24 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DERECK E. CHAPPELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAVID R. McKUNE, Warden of
Lansing Correctional Facility; JOHN
C. CALLISON, Former Deputy
No. 96-3359
Warden of Programs and Operations of
(D.C. No. 95-CV-3467)
L.C.F.; R. A. STUPAR, Deputy
(District of Kansas)
Warden of Programs and Operations of
L.C.F.; ROGER BONNER, CSI of
Intelligence and Investigation Unit of
L.C.F.; MICHAEL A. NELSON,
Warden of El Dorado Correctional
Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Dereck Chappell filed suit against Kansas state prison officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that his right to due process was violated when he was
placed in administrative segregation for an extended term without a hearing and
when his visitation privileges were suspended for a year. (R. 2.) The district
court sua sponte dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.
See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1996); see also McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing standards of
review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). Dismissal of a pro se complaint is proper only
where it is obvious that plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it
would be futile to allow him an opportunity to amend. See Whitney v. New
Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 1997). Further, we liberally construe a
pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Because we believe that the district court erred in dismissing this complaint for
failure to state a claim, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
A. Administrative Segregation
Chappell alleges that officials at Lansing Correctional Facility placed him
in administrative segregation without a hearing and that he has remained there on
“Other Security Risk” status for well over two years. (R. 2 at 4-5; Aplnt’s Br. at
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2, 5.) Chappell argues that imposing this extended term of administrative
segregation without a hearing violates his right to due process.
The district court correctly determined that Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
(1995), controls Chappell’s due process claim. In Sandin, the Supreme Court
held that a state’s creation of a liberty interest “will generally be limited to
freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its
own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (internal citations
omitted). Courts have held or assumed that extended terms of segregation may
constitute an “atypical and significant hardship” depending on the conditions of
confinement. See Bryan v. Duckworth, 88 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 1996);
Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n.3 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
367 (1996).
In Clemmons v. Thomas, Nos. 94-3172 & 94-3173, 1996 WL 282304 (10th
Cir. May 29, 1996) (unpublished order and judgment), we recognized that Sandin
suggests that administrative segregation generally does not implicate a liberty
interest. Id. at *4. We remanded for factfinding, however, because the record in
Clemmons did not include the conditions of Clemmons’s confinement and thus
did not reveal whether Clemmons suffered an “atypical and significant hardship.”
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Id.. Other courts have also noted the fact-specific nature of the Sandin analysis.
See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1997); Frazier v. Coughlin, 81
F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1996); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir.
1995) (per curiam).
The state argues on appeal that Chappell has not suffered an “atypical and
significant hardship” because Kansas regulations provide that prisoners in
administrative segregation are to be treated as nearly as possible like those in the
general population. However, the record does not indicate whether the conditions
under which Chappell is incarcerated reflect those regulations. See Brooks v.
DeFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1997). Although Clemmons was an unpublished
order and judgment without binding precedential force, we are persuaded by its
reasoning that we must remand for factfinding. None of our published decisions
interpreting Sandin suggest that we should hold to the contrary. In Penrod v.
Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406-07 (10th Cir. 1996), for example, the record was
sufficiently developed to allow this court to evaluate the plaintiff’s conditions of
confinement. In Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412 (10th Cir. 1996), the
plaintiff was given a hearing before being placed in administrative segregation.
Consequently, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Chappell’s claim
and remand to allow the district court to determine the conditions of Chappell’s
confinement. The court should determine whether those conditions constitute an
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“atypical and significant hardship” sufficient to confer upon Chappell a liberty
interest, especially given the extended period Chappell has been placed in
administrative segregation.
Further, we note that Chappell’s complaint raises additional allegations that
the district court did not previously resolve, including claims that his placement
in segregation was retaliatory in nature and that he suffered equal protection
violations. (R. 2 at 4-5, 10.) On remand the district court should address these
issues as well.
B. Visitation Privileges
Chappell also alleges that he was unconstitutionally deprived of all
visitation privileges for a period of a year after he was caught with contraband
(fourteen bags of “leafy green vegetation” (R. 23 at 1)) following a visit. The
district court held that the restriction of plaintiff’s visitation rights was consistent
with the prison’s regulations and was a reasonable response to Chappell’s abuse
of visitation. (R. 23 at 3.) It dismissed the claim sua sponte. (R. 23 at 3.)
“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Assuming that Chappell has a
constitutional right to visitation of some degree, we are convinced that the
suspension at issue here was reasonably related to the prison’s legitimate interests
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in preventing prisoners and their visitors from introducing contraband into the
prison. Consequently, the district court’s decision to dismiss this claim is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for further
proceedings.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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