F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 30 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DERECK E. CHAPPELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAVID R. McKUNE, Warden,
Lansing Correctional Facility; JOHN
C. CALLISON, Former Deputy No. 99-3171
Warden of programs and operations of (District of Kansas)
L.C.F.; R. A. STUPAR, Deputy (D.C. No. 95-3467-GTV)
Warden of programs and operations of
L.C.F.; ROGER BONNER, CSI of
intelligence and investigation unit of
L.C.F.; MICHAEL A. NELSON,
Warden, El Dorado Correctional
Facility,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Dereck E. Chappell, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
his Motion to Appoint Counsel and grant of the defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirms.
Chappell filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit against various Kansas
state prison officials, alleging that his right to due process was violated when he
was placed in administrative segregation for an extended term without a hearing
and when his visitation rights were suspended for one year. The district court
dismissed the complaint sua sponte on grounds that it failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal of
Chappell’s claims relating to the denial of visitation rights but reversed as to the
claims relating to administrative segregation. See Chappell v. McKune, No. 96-
3359, 1997 WL 787184, *1, *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 1997) (unpublished
disposition). As to the claims relating to administrative segregation, this court
concluded that the record before the district court was not sufficiently developed
to determine whether Chappell’s lengthy stay in administrative segregation
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constituted an “atypical and significant hardship” sufficient to confer on him a
liberty interest. Id. at *2. Accordingly, this court remanded to the district court
for further proceedings.
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants.
The district court concluded that Chappell’s due process claim failed because
Chappell had “failed to offer any evidence that the conditions of confinement in
administrative segregation were significantly different from ordinary prison
conditions.” The district court also rejected Chappell’s claim that the defendants
violated the Equal Protection Clause when they prosecuted him for trafficking
money in prison, while refusing to prosecute a similarly situated white prisoner.
According to the district court, “The uncontroverted evidence indicates that
defendants referred both cases to the [prosecutor] and that subsequently the
[prosecutor] only chose to prosecute [Chappell]. [Chappell] has failed to offer
any evidence that defendants were involved in the decision to prosecute, or that
defendants treated the two inmates differently.”
This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same
standard as the district court. See Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848
F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). With that standard in mind, this court has
undertaken a close review of the parties’ briefs and contentions, the district
court’s order, and the entire record on appeal. That close review reveals no
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reversible error. Accordingly, this court affirms the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants for substantially those reasons set
out in the district court’s order dated May 26, 1999. Furthermore, because the
procedural history of this case demonstrates that Chappell was able to present his
case sufficiently to both the district court and this court, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Chappell’s request for appointment of counsel.
See Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1572 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
decision whether to appoint counsel is within district court’s sound discretion).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is hereby AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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